AFGHANISTAN

NATIONAL HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2004

Security with a Human Face
Challenges and Responsabilities



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NATIONAL HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2004

Security with a Human Face: Challenges and Responsibilities

UNDP
Afghanistan

Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

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The Preparatory Team

National Coordinator of the Project
Abdullah Mojaddedi

Editor-in-Chief
Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh

Principal Authors
Daud S. Saba and Omar Zakhilwal

Contributing Authors
Abi Masefield and Michael Schoiswohl

National Advisory Panel
Minister Haneef Atmar (Chair), Abdul Baqi Banwal, Abdul Rashid Fakhri, Hafizullah Haddad, Abdullah Haqaiqi, Helena Malikyar, Nilab Mobarez, Daud Rawish, Safia Siddiqi and Asadullah Walwalji

International Expert Committee
Katarina Ammitzboell, Nancy Hatch Dupree, Carol le-Duc, Ishaq Nadiri, Omar Noman, Barnett Rubin and Andrew Wilder

Background Paper Authors
Mohammad Najeeb Azizi, Homira Nassery, Daud S. Saba, Lutfullah Safi, Naqibullah Safi, Said Mubin Shah and Nasrullah Stanikzai

Thematic Paper Authors
Abdul Baqi Banwal, Ramazan Bashar Dost, Nancy Dupree, Abdul Rashid Fakhri, Abdullah Haqaiqi, Mir Ahmad Joyenda, Partaw Nadiri, Ahmad Zia Neikbin, Daud Rawish, Asadullah Walwalji and Seddiq Weera

Statistician
R. N. Pandey

Data Analyst
Haqiq Rahmani

Administrative and Research Assistant
Sadeq Wardak

Research Assistants
Abdul Latif Bari and Khial M. Sahebi

UNDP Focal Points
Fakhruddin Azizi and Michael Schoiswohl

Foreword

Afghanistan has come a long way since December 2001 when the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan came into existence. The Government has moved towards consolidating its power, bringing security and national unity. Today, we have a new Constitution, have made progress in our state-building activities and have improved our ability to provide good governance. For the first time in history, Afghanistan has an elected President. The economy has picked up and so has the reconstruction of the infrastructure. Since 2002, we have seen a record high school enrolment of about 4 million students, and several accomplishments in the health sector, particularly in the vaccination campaigns. As the high levels of voting in the Presidential elections attested, the Afghan people now have high expectations for the new Government to deliver on security and reconstruction, and to do it on the basis of the rule of law and a commitment to transparency and accountability. Afghanistan has once again restored its status in the international community, which in turn has reaffirmed its support for the reconstruction efforts through generous pledges committed at the donor Conference in Berlin. We now look forward to the preparation for the Parliamentary elections in April 2005.

The Government recognizes the challenges ahead, including those of providing security and at the same time livelihoods for all Afghans. Curbing corruption, bringing reconstruction gains to all regions of Afghanistan, drawing in foreign investment in a secure involvement, and opening up the political process to participation remain the top priorities of the new Government. As the country now turns a new leaf, our ambition is to give hope to each and every Afghan.

At this crucial juncture in our history, I am very pleased that the first *National Human Development Report* (NHDR) of Afghanistan has been prepared for the year 2004 with the relevant theme of human security. The concept of human development, as an alternative development paradigm that emphasizes people as both the agents of change and objects of development, is highly appropriate for post-conflict Afghanistan. With the country now engaged in a transition from relief to development, from emergency projects to sustainable policies, from short-term contingency planning to long-term perspectives, human development can be an ideal framework for the development vision of Afghanistan. I am optimistic that the preparation of NHDRs in Afghanistan will help us vet different policy options and design better people-oriented policies and programs.

The preparation of the first NHDR in Afghanistan enjoyed strong Government support, since we believe in its contribution to current efforts to develop a coherent development strategy for the upcoming years based on reliable data and objective analysis.

As was expected, the report has painted a gloomy picture of the status of human development in the country after two decades of war and destruction. The Human Development Index (HDI) value calculated nationally puts Afghanistan at the dismal ranking of 173 out of 178 countries worldwide. Yet the HDI also presents us with a benchmark against which progress can be measured in the future.

The Government of Afghanistan may not agree with all the contents of this NHDR, which has been prepared by a team of independent authors, but we are confident that the recommendations and conclusions of the report will contribute to the multiplicity of debates for shaping the future of Afghanistan.

Hamid Karzai

President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

Preface

It is my pleasure to introduce the first NHDR for Afghanistan. Since 1990, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has produced annual global Human Development Reports as analytical and policy tools designed to promote the concept of human development. Each year, these reports calculate the Human Development Index and rank about 175 participating countries; unfortunately, Afghanistan has not been included since 1996 due to the unavailability of data. We are especially proud this year to be able to put Afghanistan back in the global ranking, which assesses progress made towards the well-being of all people.

Since 1992, UNDP has also sponsored NHDRs prepared as well as owned by independent national teams. So far, more than 479 national and sub-national reports have been produced by 135 countries, in addition to 24 regional reports. Afghanistan's first NHDR, commissioned by UNDP but compiled by an independent team of authors, joins this family in 2004.

After 23 years of war, Afghanistan has now entered a period of stabilization conducive to the design and implementation of a new development vision. As the new Government sets out to devise long-term, sustainable policies, the first NHDR for Afghanistan proposes an ambitious vision: putting all Afghan people equally at the forefront of all new policies, both as the ends and the means of democracy and development.

The report uses a human security lens to look at the linkages between safety, dignity and livelihoods. For too long, the problems of Afghanistan were seen as being the result of a political conflict that required military solutions. The NHDR expands the notion of "security" in Afghanistan to cover not only freedom from violence and human rights abuses, but also the ability of the Afghan people to access basic needs (education, health, food, shelter, incomes, livelihoods, etc.) and strategic needs (participation, dignity, empowerment, etc.). The report argues that while many gains have been made in the past two years, the country could still fall into a cycle of conflict and instability unless the genuine grievances of people – the lack of jobs, health, education, income, dignity, opportunities for participation, etc. – are dealt with adequately. The report analyses the local roots of insecurity today, and makes recommendations for policies and actions required from the new Afghan Government, civil society and the international community.

This first NHDR for Afghanistan provides three out of four human development indices: the Human Development Index (HDI), the Gender Development Index (GDI) and the Human Poverty Index (HPI). At this stage, the HDI, GDI and HPI could only be calculated at the national level, given that statistics on income disaggregated by district or even province were not available. I am confident that an expanding and increasingly reliable pool of data will allow subsequent NHDR teams to prepare more thorough analyses in the next few years.

With this report, UNDP is also launching a long-term commitment to support the production of biannual NHDRs in Afghanistan. These will contribute to the calculation of progress in human development indicators. While the current report presents a broad overview of numerous interlinked challenges for Afghanistan today, future editions will be devoted to particular topics. The recommendations in this NHDR are broad; subsequent in-depth studies will evaluate concrete policy options.

The preparation of this report laid the foundations for extensive sharing of information and advocacy on human development through trainings, the commissioning of studies, lectures and nationwide consultations. It also led to capacity building for the systematic collection, verification and analysis of data to produce the HDI. The NHDR team made every effort to carry out a national process under the guidance of a National Advisory Panel. Workshops, consultations and dialogues were held with Afghans in Kabul and four other provinces regarding the theme, the process and the findings of the report.

A large team of national and international experts contributed to the preparation of this NHDR, and I am grateful for all their efforts, as well as for the support provided by the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan during all stages. I am especially grateful for the support of Minister of Finance Ashraf Ghani, and Minister of Rural Rehabilitation and Development Haneef Atmar, a *human development champion*.

I hope that this and future NHDRs for Afghanistan will become important tools for the promotion of people-centred approaches to policy making. I also hope that the information offered here will prove useful for the planning and programming purposes of the new Government, as well as for those national and international organizations working on behalf of the Afghan people.

Ercan Murat
Country Director
UNDP Afghanistan

Preface from the NHDR Team

The Human Development Reports of Afghanistan should be an instrument for accountability. They should be used by the people of Afghanistan to monitor how we have performed with regard to their needs and aspirations.

Haneef Atmar, Minister of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, a *human development champion*

Based on the recommendations of the NHDR Corporate Policy, the preparation of the first NHDR for Afghanistan was initiated by the Government of Afghanistan and UNDP in line with the principles of national ownership, objectivity and independence in April 2003. The NHDR production team made every effort to involve Afghans in the identification of problems and solutions for the country. Preparation included five stages during a year and a half of activities:

- **Stage 1** included capacity building through two trainings, three seminars and four thematic lectures in Kabul, and four workshops in Jalalabad, Bamyan, Balkh and Herat. This stage also involved the creation of a National Advisory Panel and an International Expert Committee, consultations through workshops with the media, and parallel statistical capacity building with the Central Statistical Office (CSO) of Afghanistan.
- **Stage 2** consisted of commissioning seven sectoral background papers and 18 thematic papers from national researchers. Consultations were also held in Kabul and in some regions to prepare boxes for the report on people's views about their development and security needs.
- **Stage 3** saw the compilation of the findings into the various chapters by the national and contributing authors under the guidance of the editor-in-chief.
- **Stage 4** involved consultation on the final draft with national and international advisors. Two rounds of peer review on the summary and draft chapters solicited written and oral comments from key ministers of the Government, the National Advisory Panel, the International Expert Committee, UNDP staff and "Friends of the NHDR".
- **Stage 5** covered the preparation for the dissemination of the report, including the creation of press kits and a communication strategy involving a number of workshops with the media. Sensitizing representatives of the media through inviting them to workshops and press conferences took place throughout the NHDR process.

The Human Development Resource Office

The nerve centre of the production of the NHDR for Afghanistan was the Human Development Resource Office, headed by National Coordinator Abdullah Mojaddedi, and staffed by an administrative and research officer, an international statistician, a data analyst and a translator. The office was supported by UNDP in Afghanistan, especially by Country Director Ercan Murat, and NHDR focal points Fakhruddin Azizi and Michael Schoiswohl.

Under the management of Mr. Mojaddedi, the resource centre was equipped with computers connected to the Internet, a photocopier, a library of books and resources on human development, and a meeting room. It was located first in the offices of the UNDP Programme Implementation Unit, and then moved within the compound of the Afghanistan Information Management Service (AIMS) Office in Kabul.

The Human Development Resource Office worked in close cooperation with governmental agencies, research and academic institutions, and international agencies involved in gathering data and research. It also organized NHDR seminars

and human development lectures on a regular basis.

The Authors

The NHDR involved a large number of authors, contributors and background paper writers. These included:

Editor-in-chief:

- Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh: Adjunct Lecturer, Columbia University; Guest Professor, Institut d'Etudes Politiques (Sciences-Po), Paris; and former NHDR Policy Advisor, Human Development Report Office, UNDP New York.

Authors:

- Daud S. Saba: independent researcher, writer and former lecturer at the Kabul Polytechnic University.
- Omar Zakhilwal: Senior Advisor to the Minister, Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development; and Professor of Development Economics, Kabul University.

Contributing authors:

- Abi Masefield: poverty specialist, consultant and former advisor to the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development in Kabul.
- Michael Schoiswohl: lawyer, UNDP Programme Officer, Kabul.

The NHDR office commissioned seven sectoral background papers and 18 brief thematic papers or theoretical think-pieces.

Background papers authors:

- Poverty: Mohammad Najeeb Azizi, former macroeconomist, Ministry of Finance.
- Gender: Homira Nassery, Advisor to Senior Women in Management, UNDP and the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development.
- Environment: Daud S. Saba, independent researcher, writer and former lecturer at the Kabul Polytechnic University.
- Education: Lutfullah Safi, Education Coordinator, UNESCO.
- Health: Naqibullah Safi, Senior Advisor, Primary Health Care/Preventive Affairs to the Ministry of Health.
- Economy: Said Mubin Shah, economist, Da Afghanistan Bank.
- Governance: Nasrullah Stanikzai, Director, Foreign Relations, President's Secretariat; and Lecturer at the Faculty of Law and Political Science, Kabul University.

Thematic papers authors:

- Abdul Baqi Banwal: Lecturer of Economics, Kabul University; and Project Coordinator, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung.
- Ramazan Bashar Dost: Minister of Planning.
- Nancy Dupree: Senior consultant, ACBAR Research and Information Center (ARIC) and the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR).
- Abdul Rashid Fakhri: Director of Demography, Central Statistics Office.
- Abdullah Haqaiqi: Professor of Economics, Kabul University.
- Mir Ahmad Joyenda: Deputy Director for Communication and Advocacy, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU).
- Partaw Nadiri: Media Manager, Afghan Civil Society Forum.
- Ahmad Zia Neikbin: Head of the Department of Philosophy and Sociology, Kabul University.

- Daud Rawish: Dean of the Pedagogical University and former Chair of the Department of Social Sciences, Kabul University.
- Asadullah Walwalji: writer.
- Seddiq Weera: advisor, Ministry of Education.

Data Collection

Collecting data and statistics in a post-conflict country like Afghanistan was not an easy task. In the absence of a national census for 25 years, a nationwide demographic survey and a household income survey, and with a low capacity to gather and analyse administrative data from different ministries, the NHDR faced a daunting challenge in correctly estimating many of the main human development indicators. The project worked closely with the CSO and the national and international agencies that have conducted surveys up to now. The NHDR also used the services of Mr. R. N. Pandey, Director of the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion at the Ministry of Commerce and Industry of the Government of India. During three months in Kabul, he helped compile the human development indicators used in this report.

In addition to the CSO data and *Statistical Year Book* 2003, the NHDR heavily relied on the UNICEF/CSO Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS) of 2003, which covered the entire country, and the 2003 National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA) survey, which provided data on poverty in rural Afghanistan. For provincial data, collection was hampered by lack of sufficient centre-periphery communication, infrastructure and networking problems, and the overall lack of access to provinces, especially remote ones. Disaggregating the human development indices for provinces proved an impossible task due to the lack of data.

The NHDR National Advisory Panel

The ten-member NHDR National Advisory Panel constituted itself on 2 September 2003, and served as the steering committee overseeing the drafting of the report and providing substantive guidance. The composition of the panel reflected various professional fields relevant to human development. The panel was chaired by Minister of Rural Rehabilitation and Development Haneef Atmar. Other members included many of the drafters of the thematic papers:

- Abdul Baqi Banwal: Lecturer of Economics, Kabul University; and Project Coordinator, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung.
- Abdul Rashid Fakhri: Director of Demography, CSO
- Hafizullah Haddad: Head of Planning, Academy of Sciences.
- Abdullah Haqaiqi: Professor of Economics, Kabul University.
- Helena Malikyar: researcher, New York University.
- Nilab Mobarez: medical doctor and representative of the NGO Enfants Afghans.
- Daud Rawish: Dean of the Pedagogical University and former Chair of Department of Social Sciences, Kabul University.
- Safia Siddiqi: Advisor, Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development; Spokesperson of the Constitutional Loya Jirgah, December–January 2004; and Deputy Chair of the Constitutional Loya Jirgah.
- Asadullah Walwalji: writer.

The International Expert Committee

An International Expert Committee, consisting of international researchers working on Afghanistan, provided the NHDR Team with relevant expertise on thematic areas. The members included:

- Katarina Ammitzboell: former Assistant Country Director, Governance, UNDP Afghanistan.
- Nancy Hatch Dupree: senior consultant, ARIC Resource and Information Center and ACBAR.
- Carol le-Duc: Senior Social Scientist (Gender), World Bank (WB), Kabul.
- Ishaq Nadiri: J. Gold Professor of Economics, New York University, and senior member of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Omar Noman: Senior Advisor to the Director, Regional Bureau for Asia Pacific, UNDP New York.
- Barnett Rubin: Director of Studies, Center of International Cooperation, New York University.
- Andrew Wilder: Director of AREU, Kabul.

Workshops, Lectures and Consultations

As part of the strategy to build the necessary capacity for the drafting of Afghanistan's first NHDR, workshops were held in Kabul and four other provinces. These also raised public awareness of human development and the NHDR process.

- **The first workshop** was held in Kabul on 8–9 December 2003 for 43 national and international participants. It was meant as a first opportunity to train the National Advisory Panel members on the concept of human development and calculation of the human development indices. Participants brainstormed on possible themes for the report and laid out a plan for tasks related to preparation.
- **A second workshop** on statistics was held on 5–11 April 2004 for 20 representatives of the CSO and various ministries. Participants were given exercises on the calculation of the human development indices and received a final certificate.
- As part of a regional outreach strategy, a series of workshops and lectures on human development, human security and the NHDRs were held at the following academic institutions in Kabul. Each lecture was followed by discussions and consultations, and questionnaires were circulated to collect the views of participants:

  Kabul University: Around 300 students attended and actively participated in a discussion led by National Advisory Panel members Abdul Baqi Banwal and Asadullah Walwalji on 9 May 2004.

  Academy of Sciences: Around 30 scholars of various disciplines attended a discussion led by National Advisory Panel member Hafizullah Haddad on 10 May 2004.

  Pedagogical University: One hundred and fifty students and teachers from the Pedagogical University and the Polytechnic Institute attended a workshop led by National Advisory Panel members Abdullah Haqaiqi and Daud Rawish on 16 May 2004.
- Similar workshops and lectures were held at universities in four major provincial capitals. National Advisory Panel members presented lectures, answered questions from 1,000 students and instructors, and collected Voices of People. These events included:

  Jalalabad: discussions led by Safia Siddiqi

Bamyan: discussions led by Abdul Rashid Fakhri and Helena Malikyar

Balkh: discussions led by Asadullah Walwalji

Herat: panel member Abdullah Haqaiqi and NHDR author Daud Saba held a gathering in the District of Adraskan's Grand Mosque that brought together religious scholars and representatives of various tribes. They also spoke with the Board of Directors of the Association of Professionals in Herat, and held a town hall meeting in the municipality and a workshop at the University of Herat.

The NHDR team had also planned to visit Khost, Takhar and Kandahar, but those trips did not materialize due to a shortage of time, and logistics and security problems.

A Lecture Series

Starting in April 2004, the NHDR office organized monthly lectures on topics related to human development. These included:

- "The Gender Issue in Afghanistan" by Homira Nassery
- "The Health Situation" by Naqibullah Safi
- "The Status of Education in Afghanistan" by Lutfullah Safi
- "Environment in Afghanistan" by Daud S. Saba

Advocacy

- Articles were published on human development, human security and the NHDR in local newspapers and journals by panel members Abdullah Haqaiqi and Daud Rawish, and by NHDR Research and Administrative Assistant Sadeq Wardak.
- On 10 February 2004, the NHDR Office and panel members Nilab Mobarez and Asadullah Walwalji announced the preparation of the first NHDR in Afghanistan to the media, and discussed the human development concept.

A few words about the report

Afghanistan's first NHDR was the product of a multidisciplinary team. This allowed the report to incorporate multiple perspectives, which was particularly appropriate given the kaleidoscopic nature of Afghanistan today. The authors tried to go beyond a simple presentation and analysis of human development indicators. Instead, the intention was to contextualize them in a broader framework, and to analyse possible causes, consequences and impacts. Given that the report is an introductory NHDR, the authors also tried to present theories and baselines upon which the upcoming cycle of biannual analyses could be based. Future reports will provide more detailed analyses of particular topics as well as concrete recommendations.

To this end, the structure of the report moves the reader gradually through various steps culminating in the conclusions and recommendations presented in the last chapter. These building blocks, each of which could stand on their own, were intended to have a cumulative impact. They include:

- A conceptual framework that explains why the authors are taking a particular view on the current problems in Afghanistan.
- A presentation of indicators as they stand today, using sources from the CSO, the most comprehensive surveys available (NRVA and MICS), and published statistics from international and national agencies. Most data are footnoted to show their source.
- An analysis of the causes and consequences of these indicators from the point of view of greed and grievances, fears and wants. The analysis presented in the report builds on the latest global discussions on the relationships between democracy, development and conflict.
- Where applicable, historical facts that offer lessons from the past.
- An examination of governance and development processes from the viewpoint of human security and human development.
- Lessons learned from the role of aid in post-conflict situations.
- A set of both broad and more specific recommendations.

The report has a number of intended audiences in mind. The authors sought to provide some knowledge of Afghanistan as well as conceptual thinking on development, an important element for strategic consideration of long-term needs. Both aspects will prove useful for:

- Policy makers, who may draw ideas from the report's conclusions.
- International aid workers, whose contribution to the stabilization of Afghanistan could benefit from lessons learned in other conflict and post-conflict situations. The historical overviews may also help development practitioners and members of the international community to better understand the complicated context in which they work.
- Members of civil society in Afghanistan and outside, who could use parts of the report for advocacy.
- Students, who may learn and discuss the report's various theories.

The different forms of expertise that shaped the report are reflected in the various chapters. Social scientists contributed to the theoretical framework of Chapter 1, and the greed and grievance analysis of Chapter 4; statisticians calculated the indicators presented in Chapters 2 and 3; lawyers and constitutional experts helped form the analysis of governance in Chapter 5; development specialists and economists contributed to the analysis of strategies in Chapter 6; development practitioners with international experience reviewed the role of aid presented in Chapter 7; and social historians provided input on Afghan history. The conclusions were vetted with the authors as well as with members of the National Advisory Panel.

Acknowledgements

The preparation of this report was made possible due to the contributions and support of many organizations and individuals, who generously gave the NHDR team their valuable time and ideas.

The NHDR benefited greatly from the advice and guidance of the prominent experts on the National Advisory Panel, including Minister of Rural Rehabilitation and Development Haneef Atmar, Abdul Baqi Banwal, Abdul Rashid Fakhri, Hafizullah Haddad, Abdullah Haqaiqi, Helena Malikyar, Nilab Mobarez, Daud Rawish, Safia Siddiqi and Asadullah Walwalji.

The valuable feedback provided by Minister of Finance Ashraf Ghani and Minister of Rural Rehabilitation and Development Haneef Atmar is deeply appreciated.

The team is grateful for the constant support of UNDP Afghanistan Country Director Ercan Murat, Senior Deputy Country Director Karen Jorgenson, and former Assistant Country Director Katarina Ammitzboell. UNDP focal points Fakhruddin Azizi and Michael Schoiswohl constantly provided assistance. A readers group made up of UNDP Afghanistan officials provided very useful comments, inputs and suggestions on the draft of the report. Zahira Virani's comments and edits are especially appreciated, as are Emilia Mugnai's contributions to Chapter 5, and Gretchen Luchsinger Sidhu copyediting. Omar Noman, Senior Advisor to the UNDP Regional Bureau for Asia Pacific, provided constant support. Eliana Escobedo Gonzàles, UNDP Media Consultant, designed the communication strategy for the launch and outreach of the report.

The International Expert Committee (Katarina Ammitzboell, Nancy Hatch Dupree, Carol le-Duc, Ishaq Nadiri, Omar Noman, Barnett Rubin, Andrew Wilder) provided guidance throughout the process and gave invaluable comments on the draft.

Acknowledgements go to all the authors of the background and thematic papers named above. Authors Daud Saba and Omar Zakhilwal did an outstanding job compiling the findings from the papers, and conducting additional research to produce the first draft. Along with Abi Masefield and Michael Schoiswohl, they contributed countless hours to writing the different chapters and commenting on the overall report. Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh's dedicated support to the Afghanistan NHDR included designing the project, conducting trainings in Dari, contributing to the writing of chapters and editing the final report during various missions to Kabul and electronically at other times. Students from her spring 2004 Human Security Class at Sciences-Po, Paris, especially Hanna Schmitt, Jeanette Kroes and Chowra Makaremi, contributed papers as well.

The international statistician R. N. Pandey worked for three months with the NHDR team to calculate the human development indices and compile the statistical annexes for the report.

Abdul Qayum Qawim and Mohammad Hussain Yamin edited the Dari version of the report, which was translated by Sadeq Wardak and his team. The design, layout and printing were done by Army Press, Islamabad. We are grateful to *Zanbel-e-Gham* magazine's staff and cartoonists for allowing us to use their cartoons.

Acknowledgements also go to Research and Administrative Officer Sadeq Wardak, Data Analyst Haqiq Rahmani, Research Assistants Abdul Latif Bari and Khial M. Sahebi, and Translator Talib Rahman

Rahmani. The entire project came together under the able management of National Coordinator Abdullah Mojaddedi.

Several national and international institutions shared their knowledge, research materials, surveys and data with the NHDR team. We benefited in many ways from the following institutions in Afghanistan and their officials: UNICEF (Jonathan Cauldwell and Nadia Behboodi), the CSO (Director Mohammad Ali Watanyar, and Asmatullah Ramzi and Abdul Rashid Fakhri), the AIMS (David Saunders, Golam Monowar Kamal, Joe Crowley and Ahmad Sear Rifahy), the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Higher Education, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), AREU (Andrew Wilder, Thomas Muller and Royce Wiles), UNHCR (Pablo Mateu and Anna Bendall), UNODC (Ziauddin Zaki and Nazir Ahmad Shah), UNMACA (Abdul Ghafar Mohibzada), the WFP, UNEP and Da Afghanistan Bank (Asadullah Mojaddidi and Said Mubin Shah). The continued valuable support of Andrew Pinney (NRVA) is also highly appreciated. The list of officials mentioned in the above organizations is not comprehensive, but gratitude goes to all those who provided assistance.

Provincial authorities and universities in Herat, Jalalabad, Balkh and Bamyan were very helpful in organizing the regional workshops and public consultations. Authorities of the University of Kabul, the Pedagogical University of Kabul and the Academy of Sciences in Kabul also helped in facilitating workshops and consultations on their premises.

Financial support for the NHDR was provided by UNDP, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the WB. Without their support, it would not have been possible to sustain this comprehensive project.

Last but not least, we are grateful to all the “Friends of the NHDR” for their support of the process, as well as their contributions to and participation in our workshops and lectures.

Abbreviations

AACA	Afghan Assistance Coordination Authority
ACBAR	Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief
AIHRC	Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission
AIMS	Afghanistan Information Management Service
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANBP	Afghan New Beginnings Program
ANP	Afghan National Police
AREU	Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit
ARTF	Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund
CSO	Central Statistical Office
DAB	Da Afghanistan Bank
DAD	Donor Assistance Database
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNP	Gross National Product
HRW	Human Rights Watch
IARCSC	Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission
ICG	International Crisis Group
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IRC	International Rescue Committee
ISAF	International Security Assistance Forces
ITAP	Immediate and Transitional Assistance Programme for the Afghan People
JEMB	Joint Electoral Management Body
LCG	Local Consultative Group
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MICS	Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey
MRRD	Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development
NDB	National Development Budget
NDF	National Development Framework
NEEP	National Emergency Employment Programme
NRVA	National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment
NSP	National Solidarity Programme
PDPA	People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan
PPP	Purchasing Power Parity
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
SF	Strategic Framework
TISA	Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan
UXO	Unexploded Ordnance
WB	World Bank
UNAMA	The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

Glossary of Afghan expressions

Bank-i Milli	National Bank
Chaddari	Veil
Hejrat	Migration
Kareez	Underground canals connecting wells
Kuchi	Nomad
Loya Jirgah	Grand Council, “Grand Assembly of Elders”
Maharam	Man from the women’s family
Maulawi	Religious Scholar
Meshrano Jirgah	Senate
Mujahideen	Freedom Fighters
Shariat or sharia	Islamic Law
Sharwali	Municipality
Shura	Council
Ulama	Religious Scholars
Walayat	Province
Wolesi Jirgah	National Assembly
Woleswali	District

Map 0.1: Afghanistan with Provincial Borders



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Photo: Anthony Fitzherbert

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Overview

Security with a Human Face: Challenges and Responsibilities

Security is not just the end of war, but the ability to go about one's business safely, to go to work or home, to travel outside knowing that one's family will not suffer harm. It is the assurance that development gains made today will not be taken away tomorrow. For Afghans, human security is not only the ability to survive, but also the chance to live a life of dignity and have adequate livelihoods. Bringing an end to insecurity should not therefore be sought solely through short-term military solutions, but with a long-term, comprehensive strategy that abides by the promises of development and the promotion of human rights.

For too long, the security problem in Afghanistan has been interpreted narrowly as the security of the "state" from internal and external aggression, or as the protection of the interests of fragmented groups claiming political legitimacy, or from the perspective of global and regional interests. Often neglected have been the human security needs of the population at large. Forgotten were the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought safety and dignity in their daily lives.

This NHDR ventures beyond the traditional narrative of the "security problem" in Afghanistan. It proposes that the real security challenge is for the reconstruction process to generate the means to provide services and jobs, and protect human rights, especially in rural areas. Insecurity in Afghanistan is not only a problem of physical safety, but also of deprivation and restricted access to health and education facilities, legal and political rights, and social opportunities.

The NHDR team that prepared this report gathered a variety of voices from their meetings at universities and town halls. The overwhelming majority of people expressed their sense of pessimism and fear that reconstruction has bypassed the ordinary Afghan.

Centring a discussion about security on all the people of Afghanistan entails the idea that human security is a public good to which everyone is equally entitled. It is not the privilege of those defending their interests through war. This approach leads to **two messages for state-building in Afghanistan:**

1) *First, a positive message of new responsibilities for the new Afghan democracy:* Human security as a public good entails state responsibility, as well as a corresponding duty of engagement by the people. The state draws its meaning and moral legitimacy from its response to the people. With the ultimate aims of ensuring survival, livelihoods and dignity, the obligations of those in positions of power – the state and the international community – consist of protecting, providing and empowering. Those in a position to receive – people and communities – must assume, demand and defend their rights.

2) *Second, a warning to prevent a new cycle of further instability and renewed conflict:* The existence of "horizontal inequalities", defined in this report as differentiated access to socio-economic opportunities, resources and power-sharing among various groups, could create a reality of multiple experiences

within Afghanistan. Horizontal inequalities could renew deep-rooted conflicts when they combine identity with inequality in a historically or emotionally charged situation. Power inequalities and asymmetries in Afghanistan today include sources of long-term as well as short-term grievances, ranging from economic inequality to imbalances stemming from gender, geography, religion, ethnicity, etc. Because these grievances have been manipulated to fuel conflict in the past, their continued existence is not only unfair, but also potentially dangerous.

In the future, preventing conflicts will require targeting and responding to root causes, both internal and external. With the renewed sovereignty of Afghanistan, a window of opportunities has opened to build a sustainable peace based on popular aspirations and participation. The human security challenge in Afghanistan today is for a devolution of power to take place at the same time that power is consolidated at the centre. Striking the right balance will call for the state to provide human security as a public good, while at the same time incorporating public participation in the peace-building process.

These messages are elaborated within Afghanistan's first NHDR in eight chapters.

- **Chapter 1** presents the conceptual framework of human development and human security, and introduces their application to the situation in Afghanistan today.
- **Chapter 2** assesses the status of human development indicators for Afghanistan: the Human Development Index (HDI), Gender Development Index (GDI) and Human Poverty Index (HPI) are calculated for the first time. These highlight the challenges of reconstruction and development in Afghanistan, and provide a baseline for measuring future progress.
- **Chapter 3** provides a threat-based analysis of the human development and human security indicators for Afghanistan, categorizing them in terms of "fears" (safety as well as strategic needs such as human rights) and "wants" (the basic needs of development).
- **Chapter 4** employs a framework of "greed" and "grievances" to analyse the causes of 23 years of conflict. Political, social and economic processes that have led to or resulted from the Afghan wars are discussed from their relationship to people's "wants" and "fears". The chapter then considers the impact of conflict on Afghans and the institutions that affect their lives.
- **Chapter 5** evaluates Afghanistan's state-building process from a human security perspective, and examines the challenges of political transition, participation and centre-periphery relations.
- **Chapter 6** builds on the national development strategies as they have been designed in the past two years to make recommendations on what type of economic growth and development vision are needed for a "humanly secure" Afghanistan.
- **Chapter 7** examines the role of the international community in providing incentives and disincentives through aid for peace-building in Afghanistan.
- **Chapter 8** presents the report's conclusions and main recommendations. It outlines the seven ingredients necessary for development and democracy in Afghanistan, and for providing human security as a public good for all Afghans.

Chapter 1

Concepts and Implications

Photo: Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh

Chapter 1

Concepts and Implications

1.1. Human Development and Human Security as an Analytical Framework: Concepts do Matter

Chapter 1 presents the analytical and normative framework on which the following analysis of the situation in Afghanistan is based. As this is a first NHDR for Afghanistan, this introductory chapter presents the definitions and implications of the concepts of human development and human security in order to lay a foundation for analysis in this and subsequent cycles of biannual NHDRs.

Human Development: A People-centered Approach

As argued first in the UNDP global Human Development Report of 1990, the concept of "human development" has been conceived first and foremost as an alternative vision to the prevailing development paradigms of the time.

Since the 1950s, the subject of "development" has seen an evolution that has responded to the theoretical and practical needs of various decades. Throughout the developing world, the colonial legacy had led to low incomes, low savings and investments, appalling health, low literacy, and primary production with little manufacturing and total dependency. The 1950s and 1960s brought an emphasis on economic growth based on industrialization and investments. The ensuing rapid growth, however, did not produce sustained development. Dependency remained and distribution problems resulted in unemployment, underemployment and poverty, as the human dimension was neglected, and the trickle-down theory proved not to be automatic.

By the 1970s the growth-only agenda was being challenged, with development theories criticizing money income, questioning the Gross National Product (GNP) as the measure of development, and putting as objectives employment and redistribution with growth. The end of that decade witnessed the emergence of the basic needs approach, which emphasized a group of basic goods and services required for the poor to live decently. However, the approach was criticized for its paternalistic view, its utilitarianism and its commodity fetishism. The 1980s then saw the debt crisis, as well as a rising emphasis on poverty. Adjustment and stabilization programs, which had called for shrinking the role and size of states and increasing the role of markets, led to increased inequalities and poverty, prompting thinking around "adjustment with a human face".

The human development paradigm, established in 1990 by Mahbub ul Haq, Amartya Sen, Frances Stewart, Paul Streeten and others, set itself apart from previous development theories by arguing that economic growth does not automatically trickle down to improve people's well-being, while approaches such as basic needs do not hand over decision-making to beneficiaries themselves. The human development concept thus advocates putting people back at centre stage, both as the means and ends of development. It distinguishes between two sides: One is the formation of human capabilities, the other is the use that people make of their acquired capabilities for work or leisure.

This approach includes both an "evaluative aspect" and an "agency aspect". The evaluative aspect means improving human lives as an explicit development objective and understanding how these

The obvious is the most difficult to see: The true wealth of a country is its people.

Mahbub ul Haq, founder of the Human Development Reports

improvements can be made; it emphasizes equity as a policy objective. The agency aspect is what people can do to improve their lives through individual, social and political processes. This second aspect, which has gained increased attention in the past decade, has introduced individual as well as collective agency, added social movements and political reforms to economic development policies, and, ultimately, considers human rights an intrinsic as well as instrumental value of development.

By emphasizing the diversity of human needs, human development was thus conceived as an alternative to pure economic development and straightjacket policy prescriptions – such as the neo-liberal Washington Consensus, which dictated a set of standard reforms and their sequencing, often regardless of national realities. Human development argues that economic growth centres exclusively on the expansion of only one choice – income – while a holistic development approach must embrace other choices that people value: greater access to knowledge, better nutrition and health services, more secure livelihoods, security against crime and physical violence, satisfying leisure hours, political and cultural freedoms, a sense of participation in community activities, and self-respect and dignity. Economic growth therefore is only a *means* to better human welfare, not an *end* in itself. The causal link between economic growth and improved well-being does not arise automatically, but rather has to be created consciously through public policies.

The essential elements of the human development concept are:

- **Efficiency/productivity:** the optimal use of existing resources through investment in the education, health, aspirations and skills of people.
- **Equity:** distributive justice, and the fair distribution of incomes and assets through equal access to opportunities.
- **Sustainability:** concern for not only present generations but future ones as well.
- **Empowerment/participation:** enabling people to attain a level of individual development that allows them to make choices close to their hearts.

The human development concept avoids prescriptions and concentrates more on destinations, which should be the ultimate vision of development. Focusing on the destination, however, does not mean that the path to get there is open-ended and erratic. And while the paths taken can lead to different destinations, human development suggests a simultaneous, not sequential achievement of the four principles above.

The equal weight of these values has led critics to highlight the various conflicts and trade-offs that exist among them, as well as the difficulties of adapting these utopian ideals to public policies at the national level. These conflicts and trade-off should be subject to a much more extensive discussion and analysis than is possible within this report. Laying the foundations is intended to at least offer a point of departure for debates on Afghanistan's human development future.

Human Development in Conflict Situations

While the objective of economic growth and development should be human development, for countries emerging from conflict, such as Afghanistan, sustainable peace requires a guarantee that gains made today will not be taken away tomorrow. This idea is embodied in the concept of "human security". On the one hand, it entails the notion of "safety", which goes beyond security in the traditional sense, and on the other hand, it includes the guarantees and assurances that underpin the concept of "social security". Human security, therefore, becomes both the



Source: Zanbel-e-Gham, Edition 5, May 2002.

People need security so as to enjoy the greatest possible degree of freedom and dignity in their lives.

Amartya Sen, 2000

prerequisite for human development as well as a guarantee of its sustainability. While human development is a process of widening the range of people's choices, human security means that people can exercise these safely and freely while being relatively confident that the opportunities they have today are not lost tomorrow. As such, it is a particularly relevant lens through which the challenges of Afghanistan can be examined.

Expanding the Notion of Security – the Human Security Concept

In the same way that traditional economic development paradigms had failed to address the broader concerns of people, traditional "security" discourses are no longer adaptable enough to address the new threats to the safety and well-being of people within states. With a combination of new global trends, the rise of non-state actors, and new types of non-military threats to the internal stability of states and people within them, the traditional concept of "security" as a realist pact between nations became obsolete at the beginning of the 21st Century. If, in the past, existential threats were assumed to emanate from external sources, and security mainly focused on protecting the state and its sovereign territory from external attacks, new non-military threats such as poverty, infectious diseases, environmental disasters, massive population movements and drugs – all of which travel without a passport – have now become part of the "security" agenda.

The demise of the Cold War between the two super-powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, with their proxy

We must also broaden our view of what is meant by peace and security. Peace means much more than the absence of war. Human security can no longer be understood in purely military terms. Rather, it must encompass economic development, social justice, environmental protection, democratization, disarmament, and respect for human rights and the rule of law.

UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan.[1]

confrontations in countries such as Afghanistan, meant that threats to national borders became a diminishing security concern. Intra-state unrests and conflicts, often fueled by the socio-economic and political marginalization of certain segments of society, became new threats to be dealt with instead. People were increasingly identified as the victims of violence on the one hand, and the cause of new threats to the stability of states on the other. Weak states became identified as those unable or unwilling to respond to the welfare of their people, and failed states became a threat to the stability of the international system in addition to that of their own people.

According to the global *Human Development Report* of 1994, human security is broadly defined as "safety from chronic threats such as hunger, disease, and repression as well as protection from sudden and harmful disruptions in the patterns of daily life – whether in homes, in jobs or in communities."[2] Human security is referred to as freedom from fear and freedom from want. Seven threats are identified: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security and political security. As elaborated by the Commission on Human Security, "the objective of human security is to safeguard the vital core of all human lives from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats, in a way that is consistent with long-term human fulfillment."[3] As a normative concept, it "means using processes that build on people's strengths and aspirations. It means creating political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity."[4]

Human security is concerned with reducing, and if possible, removing the insecurities that threaten human lives. It is a dramatic shift from the traditional view of "state security", according to which the state would monopolize the rights and means to safeguard the integrity and robustness of the state vis-à-vis other states as its first priority. Too many examples have demonstrated how states can become perpetuators of insecurities themselves, not only failing to fulfill their obligations towards their citizens, but also becoming a source of threats. The human security approach calls instead for a multi-pronged strategy: identifying threats, seeking to prevent them from materializing, mitigating harmful effects for those that occur, and helping victims cope with the consequences of widespread "insecurities" such as conflict, human rights violations and massive underdevelopment.

1.2. Relevance of a Human Security Framework for Afghanistan

The Traditional "Security" Narrative

For too long, Afghanistan's security problem has been interpreted narrowly as the security of the "state" from internal and external aggression, or as the protection of the interests of fragmented groups claiming political legitimacy in the absence of a state, or from the position of global and regional interests. Often neglected have been the human security needs of the people in Afghanistan. Forgotten were the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought security and dignity in their daily lives. Yet, security should be first and foremost a public good, not the

1 Kofi Annan 2001.

2 UNDP 1994

3 The independent global Commission on Human Security was established in 2001 by the Japanese Government and was co-chaired by Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen and former UNHCR High Commissioner Sadako Ogata. It included Lakhtar Brahimi, the former UN Secretary General's Envoy for Afghanistan.

4 Commission on Human Security 2003.

Box 1.1.

A Human Security Framework for Post-conflict Peace-building

Ensuring public safety

In the aftermath of a conflict, national authorities usually face the challenge of ensuring personal security, one of the most vital and immediate aspects of human security. Public safety may disintegrate in the wake of increased crime rates, looting, revenge killings and reverse ethnic cleansing. Furthermore, interpersonal violence will likely increase, especially gender-based violence, as a consequence of the disruption of social structures such as families and communities. Other critical questions that may need to be solved are the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) into society of former combatants and their dependents, along with the creation of economic opportunities to prevent them from rejoining rebel armies. Moreover, it is important to remove small arms and light weapons and landmines from conflict areas.

Meeting immediate humanitarian needs

After the fighting has stopped, it is crucial to provide the earliest possible life-saving humanitarian assistance, in the form of food, basic health services, shelter, water and sanitation. Moreover, special attention should be given to address traumatic experiences through psychological care and counselling as well as the reunification of families. It is crucial to address the entire population, including internally displaced persons (IDPs), refugees, children and youth.

Launching rehabilitation and reconstruction

Economic insecurities are a common feature of societies emerging from conflict. They find expression in unemployment, low wages, low job security, low social provisions for the unemployed, and so on – factors that intensify inequalities and poverty. In order to build a sustainable peace, it is important to relaunch economic activity and growth, and transform the war economy into a normal economy. Rehabilitation and physical reconstruction, which can be a major incentive for peace, should begin at the earliest possible time. Relief and development activities should ideally work in parallel, and people should become increasingly independent of humanitarian relief. Post-conflict reconstruction programmes should include providing key services, rebuilding basic infrastructure, reintegrating displaced people, demobilizing combatants and reintegrating them into the economy, and establishing a social safety net and macroeconomic framework.

Emphasizing reconciliation and coexistence

One important consequence of violent conflict is that it erodes trust, namely in people, communities and existing government institutions, and thus undermines social cohesion. In other words, it endangers community security, which is focused on the protection of groups that are threatened by other entities. If these questions are ignored, they can lead to a radicalization of identity politics, and new violence may erupt. Thus, there is an urgent need for the provision of justice by establishing the truth and punishing perpetrators, but also for reconciliation programs that focus on establishing the rule of law as well as strengthening the judicial system and the respect for human rights. In terms of human security, it is important to complement this strategy with a community-centered approach involving as many people as possible. A minimal level of trust and confidence must be promoted between the people in a war-torn society in order to make reintegration and coexistence possible. This might be achieved through fostering dialogue between communities and encouraging joint activities.

Promoting governance and empowerment

Another crucial aspect of human security is political security, which means the enjoyment of civil and political rights, and freedom from political oppression. According to the UN Secretary-General, "Good governance at the local, national and international levels is perhaps the single most important factor in promoting development and advancing the cause of peace."[5] The Commission for Human Security identifies the following key governance issues that need to be addressed following conflict: democratization; participation in decision-making; accountability of decision makers; respect for the rule of law and human rights; and inclusive, equitable and fair rules and institutions. These institutions will allow for the effective empowerment of people and communities, which in turn is essential for effective governance. One central aspect is the rule of law, which is key to the functioning of institutions and the protection of the population. Establishing this, however, goes beyond the drafting of a constitution and laws, the creation of courts, etc. It requires the inclusion of norms, principles and practices that establish relations among people, and between people and the state. Moreover, it is important to strengthen civil society in post-conflict environments, as it provides a mechanism for people to participate, express their views and hold decision makers accountable.

Adapted by Hanna Schmitt, from "Recovering from Violent Conflict", Chapter 4 in *Human Security Now* (the Report of the Commission on Human Security), 2003.

[5] Kofi Annan, United Nations General Assembly, 2002.

privilege of those defending their interests through war.

There is much talk of insecurity in Afghanistan today. Its impact on political processes, on the work of the international community, and on Afghanistan's potential for drawing in foreign direct investment is hammered home daily in the international press. The international narrative on Afghanistan sees bombings, terrorism, kidnapping and physical insecurity as undermining the peace process, hindering democratic processes, and forcing the withdrawal of international aid organizations from the southern and eastern regions of the county. Populations vulnerable to "terrorist" attacks are aid workers, Government officials, troops, and, in the summer of 2004, election officials. Traditional insecurity is further exacerbated by a system of incentives for armed regional militia to remain loyal to individuals instead of institutions, as well as criminal opportunists, especially narco-criminals.

Security, security, security – the mantra has been repeated almost daily in Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban two years ago.

BBC Report, 8 January 2004

The answers to this security dilemma have been sought in the expansion of the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) troops led by NATO outside of Kabul, the demobilization of former militias, the bolstering of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP), and an enhanced fight against Al-Qaida by Coalition Forces. The main problems are seen as the lack of police training, and a limited commitment to security forces by the international community.

Fanning the insecurity is the lack of law and order, as well as negotiating spaces between competing power-holders in different regions. The story of Afghanistan is that of a crisis of legitimacy: disappointment in government in the periphery, competition with rival power structures, warlords and their private armies, intimidation by extremists, slow progress on the disarmament of former militia, and poor delivery on promises of progress and stability. All of these factors diminish support for state-building.

Only when instability in Afghanistan began to bleed into insecurities for the Western world did the global community, led by the United States, respond through military force by removing the Taliban regime. While the initial focus was on eliminating the remnants of the Taliban, it soon became apparent that Afghanistan needs a stable state, that is at peace with itself and no danger to the world community. The state-building process started with the December 2001 Bonn Agreement, which provided for the creation of first an interim and subsequently a transitional government. Consultative processes led to a new Constitution in January 2004, national presidential elections in October 2004 and the return of over 3.5 million refugees so far. Billions of dollars for the economic reconstruction of the destroyed country were pledged first at the Afghanistan Reconstruction Conference in January 2002 in Tokyo and then in March 2004 in Berlin.

However, despite all of this, the real challenge of another type of "insecurity", remains that stemming from the lack of livelihoods, access to water, health, education and other public goods for all Afghan citizens. For too long, the people of Afghanistan have been subjected to the consequences arising from an approach to security based on the interests of a state, of groups, of clans and tribes or of the international community.

- For 23 years, they experienced some of the worst violations of their human rights, ranging from political killings to systematic impoverishment. Foreign interventions fueled a series of brutal wars that entrenched the power of unaccountable power-holders, divided the country along ethnic lines, and destroyed its already limited infrastructure and economic base.

- Some of the excesses were committed during this time by successive irresponsible governments in the name of "state security". Gross violations of human rights by the Soviet-backed Communist regime, the Mujahideen self-styled government and the repressive Taliban were all done in the name of national security.
- During years of a state vacuum, political power shifted from traditional community-based systems that allowed for popular participation to ethnically and religiously based military factions who ruled through force.
- The Western world was more interested in curbing the expansion of the Soviet Union than in the consequences of heavily arming resistance groups. It then abandoned Afghanistan, and its people, after the pull-out of the Soviet Army.
- Regional players continued to meddle in the affairs of Afghanistan by backing various ethnic or language groups against each other. Power struggles in Afghanistan became a matter of regional security.
- Up until 11 September 2001, the plight of Afghans passed largely unnoticed by the outside world. While humanitarian agencies struggled to cope with the catastrophe with limited resources, the international community imposed economic sanctions on Afghanistan that harmed ordinary civilians perhaps more than the Taliban regime.
- September 11th directed the overwhelming attention of the international community towards Afghanistan because it was believed that those who carried out this act of terror on US soil were hiding and training in Afghanistan. Instability there was no longer an internal concern of the Afghans alone, but of the world community as well.

The investment programmes presented by the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan (TISA) for accessing bilateral and multilateral funds were consequently built on the logic of presenting an ultimatum for a "failed" or "narco-state" that represents a danger to the international community. Although the pledges have been part of a noble and empathetic engagement by the international community, and their generous amounts will help development in Afghanistan, they have been first and foremost an indication of concerns for global and regional insecurity.

The Broader "Security" Vision

Today, security continues to be seen in its traditional sense: regional stability, territorial security for the nation-state, small arms, and even security of political and economic systems as identified by threats to democracy, market stability, investments, etc. The unit of consideration continues to be the state, the market, the region and the international system.

In contrast to this definition, this report proposes that the real security challenge in Afghanistan is for the reconstruction process to generate the means to provide services and jobs, and protect human rights, especially in rural areas. Security is not just the end of war, but also the ability to go about one's business safely, in a safe environment; to have a job; to participate in political processes; to have choices for the education of one's children; to lead a healthy life; and to do all this with the knowledge that these gains will not be taken away tomorrow. Insecurity in Afghanistan is not only a problem of physical safety, but also of deprivation and restricted access to health and education facilities, legal and political rights, and social opportunities. Dealing with

insecurity should not be sought (solely) through short-term military solutions, but through a long-term comprehensive strategy that abides by promises of development and the promotion of human rights.

This report seeks to dispel the belief that the only way to provide security and build lasting peace is through military action, in the form of the expansion of international peacekeeping forces throughout the country or victory over Al-Qaida by the Coalition Forces. Rather, there is a moral and ethical imperative to promote public policy reforms and state-building efforts that allow for participation, and to reduce the local incentives that trigger conflict in the first place. To minimize chances for renewed conflict while improving livelihoods and the prospects for dignified lives for all Afghans, state-building strategies need to expand the notion of "security" to cover not only territorial security, or freedom from violence and human rights abuses, but also basic human needs (education, health, food, shelter, incomes and livelihoods, etc.) as well as strategic "needs" (such as participation, dignity, empowerment, etc.).

Because human security threats continue to exist in Afghanistan even after the imposition of peace in 2001, the situation today can be considered as a potentially dangerous one, where threats could lead to instability and to the further impoverishment of people and their quality of life.

In a country where security and development are interdependent, it makes little sense to insist on one as a condition for another. Recognizing the co-conditionality requires commitments to improving people's lives and addressing inequalities while involving ordinary citizens as stakeholders of their future. Preventing future conflicts calls for targeting and responding to root causes, both internal and external. As the country moves beyond presidential and parliamentary elections, and as the optimistic pledges of the international community after the Berlin Conference trickle in, this is a window of opportunity that should not be missed.

1.3. The Responsibility for Human Security

Because human security is a public good that belongs to all and cannot be exclusive, it entails a responsibility for the state to provide guarantees that people will not fall below an acceptable threshold, but also a corresponding duty among people to remain engaged. It is in its response to its citizens that the state finds its meaning and moral legitimacy. As the *Human Security Now* report puts it, "achieving Human Security includes not just protecting people but also empowering people to fend for themselves."[6] Human security is thus not a mere challenge of "protection" and "provision", but one of empowerment and participation. If the state is to be entrusted with the responsibility to provide public goods, people have to be able to engage it in order to hold it accountable. People are not only passive recipients of "security", or even mere victims of its absence, but active subjects who can contribute directly to identifying and implementing solutions to the dilemma of insecurity. Security is not an objective good that can be delivered from the outside, but ultimately a public good and a subjective feeling that requires a conscious willingness to be "provided" by the state and the capacity to be requested by the people.

This shift in focus, however, is neither simple nor politically easy, as it would require a re-examination of priorities and the responsibilities of the state and the

[6] Commission on Human Security 2003.

international system. The shift is also particularly difficult in Afghanistan, where individual identity is deeply embedded in collective units (tribe, clan, family, etc.). These reinforce accepted norms of behaviour and function as economic, political and cultural units that act on behalf of those who comprise them.

With an expanded notion of security come new types of responsibilities:

- **First** and foremost, those of the state: If sovereignty once meant monopoly over the use of violence and protection of territory from external threats, it now has to incorporate the idea of responsibility to protect people from extreme underdevelopment and human rights abuses, and to empower them. This is not a responsibility to be taken lightly. Agents of the state are responsible for their actions; that is to say, they are accountable for their acts of commission and omission.[7]

The raison d'être of any actor or institution rests with their contribution to the well-being of the very people who brought them into being in the first place. State-building hence becomes a means, not an end by itself. The end is the safety, welfare and dignity of the people of Afghanistan.

The notion of human security does not replace but ultimately supplements that of

Source: Zanbel-e-Gham, Edition 5, May 2002.

[7] International Commission on Interventions and State Sovereignty 2001.

state security. Human security requires strong and stable institutions, while state security provides an environment conducive to the birth, growth and strength of such institutions. The focus on human security, therefore, does not mean an end to the role of the state in the management of development or security issues. The absence of a state or its lack of effectiveness can be detrimental to human security. Indeed, "order requires rules, rules require authority, and authority is exercised on behalf of people by states."[8] For this order to be socially, economically and environmentally sustainable, people need a state to mediate distribution.[9]

The responsibility of a viable state should therefore be stability, enabling equitable economic growth, ensuring essential social services, regulating markets to prevent negative externalities such as inequalities, and allowing the participation of all stakeholders in decision-making processes.

- **Second**, an expanded notion of security calls for growing recognition of the role of people, of individuals and communities, in ensuring their own security. Measures for empowerment and education become key goods that the state and international community can provide. Individuals and communities must in turn assume responsibility for demanding what is owed to them.

People can contribute directly to identifying and implementing solutions to the quagmire of insecurity. In Afghanistan, bringing diverse constituents together to rebuild their communities can solve security problems while involving them in the reconstruction process, and ultimately foster the ability to be engaged.

Empowered people can stand up for their dignity when it is violated. They can create new opportunities for wealth through their aspirations and address many problems locally. And they can mobilize for the security of others, for example, by publicizing food shortages early, preventing famines or protesting human rights violations. Mistrusted and mistrusting people, by contrast, cannot contribute to the overall well-being of their society.

Supporting people's ability to act on their own behalf means providing education and information so that they can take collective action. It means building a public space that tolerates opposition, encourages local leadership and cultivates public discussion. It also means creating a larger environment of support, one that provides freedom of speech, the press, information, conscience and belief, along with the freedom to organize.

- **Third**, the paradigm shift on security also involves the residual responsibility of the international community in cases when the state is unable – or unwilling – to fulfill its responsibility to protect, provide and empower its citizens.

As the Commission on State Sovereignty and International Intervention noted in its 2001 report, the responsibility of the international community has expanded from a "right to intervene", as written in the UN Charter, to a "responsibility to protect". This requires that in some circumstances, action must be taken by the broader community of states to support populations in jeopardy or under serious threat."[10] It comprises not only the "responsibility to react", but also the "responsibility to prevent" and the "responsibility to rebuild".

This argument should not be interpreted as an excuse for ad-hoc military interventions for "humanitarian" reasons.

8 R. O. Koehane and J. S. Nye 1998.
9 Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh 2004.
10 International Commission on Interventions and State Sovereignty 2001.

Rather, it encourages the global community to assume responsibility for fair rules of engagement in preventing not only conflict, but also mass underdevelopment, hunger, disease, environmental degradation, etc. Preventing and mitigating the impact of violent conflicts through military means is not enough. Pledging and delivering sufficient funds, providing humanitarian aid, pursuing inclusive and equitable development, establishing a level playing field with respect to trade regimes, and upholding norms of human rights through respecting dignity and diversity are some of the essentials.

Upholding all three forms of responsibility listed above in the Afghan context, with its precarious security situation, is a formidable challenge for all actors – the state, the people and the international community. However, making this commitment, and building on existing and new models of the participation of people and communities is a first imperative that would unleash trust, aspirations and potentials.

While this initial chapter provided a normative conceptual framework for looking at human development challenges through a human security lens, the following chapters will examine each of these responsibilities in detail in the context of Afghanistan.

Chapter 2

The Status of Human Underdevelopment and People's Insecurities in Afghanistan

Photo: Raphy Favre

Chapter 2

The Status of Human Underdevelopment and People's Insecurities in Afghanistan

2.1. Introduction

Afghanistan is a landlocked country with an area of 647,500 sq. kms., bordering Pakistan to the east and south, Iran to the west, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan to the north, and China to the north east.[1] Exact population figures for Afghanistan are not available because a census has not taken place since 1979. However, a nationwide 2003 UNICEF/CSO MICS estimate puts the total population figure at 23.85 million, with 28.8 per cent living in urban areas and 71.2 per cent in rural regions, and a population growth rate of 2.5 per cent per year.[2] Overall, the population is scattered at a rate of 40 people per sq. km., while the distribution is very uneven – ranging from 489 persons per sq. km. in Kabul province to 0.7 persons per sq. km. in Nimruz. Administratively, Afghanistan is divided into 34 provinces (*Welayat*), each further divided into smaller administrative units (districts) called *Woleswali*.[3] The boundaries of two new provinces have not yet been defined.

The county has hardly seen any significant span of stability during the past two decades. Areas have changed hands frequently between warring parties, resulting in frequent destabilization of regions and the migration of people to safer places. Years of conflict and neglect have taken a devastating toll, as measured by dramatic drops in human, social and economic indicators.[4] By early 1992, the global *Human Development Report* recorded a per capita income of US$819 (in purchasing power parity, or PPP terms), a life expectancy at birth of 44.5 years, and an average adult literacy rate of 28.7 per cent. Women's literacy rate was only 12.7 per cent. Only 29 per cent of the population had access to health services, which were clearly more available in urban areas (80 per cent) than in rural ones (17 per cent). Only 23 per cent had access to safe water – again predominantly in urban areas, where 40 per cent of households had access versus 19 per cent in rural areas).[5]

By the beginning of the new century, human development estimates as recorded in this NHDR had become even more alarming: Life expectancy today is approximately 44.5 years, with healthy life expectancy at birth estimated at 33.4 years. One out of five children dies before the age of five, and one woman dies approximately every 30 minutes from pregnancy-related causes.

1 CIA *Factbook*.
2 The CSO demographic figures put the current population at 22.2 million; the urban and rural shares and the annual population growth rate at 22.2 per cent, 77.8 per cent and 1.92 per cent respectively. However, this NHDR utilizes the figures derived by the UNICEF/CSO MICS.
3 Abdul Rashid Fakhri 2004.
4 Abdul Baqi Banwal 2004.
5 UNDP global *Human Development Report* 1995 (indicators for 1992-1993).

The lack of basic things such as drinking water, schools, health facilities and so on has been the biggest impediment to human development. These basic needs need to be pursued aggressively in order to make any progress on human development in Afghanistan.

Nazar Mohmmad Joya, from Logar

2.2. The Status of Composite Human Development Indicators in Afghanistan

The Human Development Index

The evaluative aspect of human development as discussed in Chapter 1 is measured by three of the most important basic and universal capabilities: The ability to lead a long and healthy life, to have access to and make use of knowledge, and to earn a decent standard of living. Other capabilities such as the ability to participate in the community, and to achieve security and even happiness are as important as the other capabilities. However, because they are not objective factors – i.e., have different meanings for different people – and because data is not always available on them, they have not been included in the basic Human Development Index (HDI), the standard for measuring progress in human development.

The HDI combines longevity as measured by life expectancy at birth, knowledge as measured by a weighted average of adult literacy (two-thirds), and combined gross enrolment in school (one-third) and standard of living as measured by real per capita income adjusted for a county's PPP. The HDI sets a minimum and a maximum for each dimension and then shows where each country stands in relation to them (See Annexure 2, technical appendix on statistics for calculations and methodology).

Afghanistan's HDI value of 0.346 falls at the bottom of the list of low human development countries, just above Burundi, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Sierra Leone (See Table 2.1). Afghanistan also has the lowest HDI indicator among its neighbours (See Chart 2.1). With the exception of Pakistan, all of its neighbours fall in the category of medium human development.

Because information on income is not available, the HDI could not be disaggregated by province or by urban and rural areas for this NHDR.

Table 2.1: Human Development Indices (2002)

	Literacy Rate	Gross Enrolment	Life Expectancy at Birth	Per Capital GDP (PPP adjusted)	HDI	HDI Ranking	GDI	GDI Ranking	HPI	HPI Ranking
Niger	17.1	19	46	800	0.292	176	0.278	144	61.4	94
Burkina Faso	12.8	22	45.8	1100	0.302	175	0.291	143	65.5	95
Sierra Leone	36	45	34.3	520	0.273	177	-	-	-	-
Guinea-Bissau	39.6	37	45.2	710	0.350	172	0.329	141	48	86
Afghanistan*	28.7	44.93	44.5	822	0.346	173	0.300	143	59.3	94
Tajikistan	99.5	73	68.6	980	0.671	116	0.668	93	-	-
Uzbekistan	99.3	76	69.5	1670	0.709	107	0.705	85	-	-
Turkmenistan	98.8	81	66.9	4300	0.752	86	0.748	67	-	-
Iran	77.1	69	70.1	6690	0.732	101	0.713	82	16.4	31
Pakistan	41.5	37	60.8	1940	0.497	142	0.471	120	41.9	71

* Due to the unavailability of data, Afghanistan was not included in the HDR 2004. The rank of 173 is where Afghanistan would have placed had it been included in the global report..

Sources: UNDP global *Human Development Report* 2004, UNICEF/CSO MICS 2003, CSO *Statistical Yearbook* 2003; authors' calculations.

Chart 2.1: HDI Comparison with Neighbouring Countries, 2002



Source: UNDP global *Human Development Report* 2004; authors' calculation

The values of HDI follow closely the differences in per capita Gross Domestic Products (GDPs) (See Chart 2.2). Countries such as Niger, Burkina Faso, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau that have HDI values close to that of Afghanistan also have similar per capita GDP values. Moreover, the per capita GDP values are significantly higher in neighbouring countries with higher HDI values. The only exception is Tajikistan. Its Purchasing Power Parity (PPP)-adjusted per capita GDP of US$980 is not significantly different than the US$822 of Afghanistan, but its HDI value is almost twice as high. This is due primarily to its education indicators, given that the reported literacy rate is close to 100 per cent (See Chart 2.3).

Chart 2.2: Comparison of PPP-Adjusted GDP per Capita, 2002



Sources: UNDP global *Human Development Report* 2004, CSO *Statistical Yearbook* 2003; authors' calculations.

Chart 2.3: Comparison of Literacy Rates

Data for all countries 2002, except Afghanistan 2003.



Sources: UNDP global *Human Development Report* 2004, UNICEF/CSO MICS 2003.

The Gender Development Index

The Gender Development Index (GDI) reflects the level of discrepancies between men and women in terms of the HDI indicators – life expectancy at birth, educational achievements, and standard of living as measured by GDP. The GDI value for Afghanistan places the country further down on the scale of low human

Chart 2.4: GDI Comparison with Neighbouring Countries, 2002



Sources: UNDP global *Human Development Report* 2004, CSO *Statistical Yearbook* 2003; authors'calculations.

development (See Chart 2.4). With a GDI value of only 0.300, Afghanistan is just above only Niger and Burkina Faso. Afghanistan's GDI is much below all its neighbours, with Pakistan at the top of the low human development countries and the rest all making it to the medium human development range. Components that make up the GDI are presented in Charts 2.5 to 2.8 for further comparison.

Chart 2.5: Comparison of Male/Female Life Expectancy at Birth, 2002



Sources: UNDP global *Human Development Report* 2004, CSO *Statistical Yearbook* 2003; authors' calculations.

Chart 2.6: Comparison of Male/Female Adult Literacy Rate (Age 15 and Above)

Data for all countries 2002, except Afghanistan 2003.



Sources: UNDP global *Human Development Report* 2004, UNICEF/CSO MICS 2003.

Chart 2.7: Comparison of Male/Female (Primary, Secondary and Tertiary) Gross Enrolment Ratios, 2002



Sources: UNDP global *Human Development Report* 2004, CSO *Statistical Yearbook* 2003; authors' calculations.

Chart 2.8: Comparison of Male/Female PPP-Adjusted Per Capita GDP, 2002



Sources: UNDP global *Human Development Report* 2004, CSO *Statistical Yearbook* 2003; authors' calculations.

The Gender Empowerment Measure

The Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) shows the participation of women in political and economic life. It includes the share of women in Parliament, and in official positions in law and management, professional and technical fields, as well as women's opportunities for income generation. A low GEM shows that women's participation in political and social life is limited, and they lack opportunities to make use of their capabilities. The GEM was not calculated for Afghanistan because of the absence of data on these indicators.

The Human Poverty Index

At present, when poverty has become a human development priority, calculation of the Human Poverty Index (HPI) is of high importance. The index is designed to portray poverty as more than just a lack of income. It also involves limited access to opportunities, which in turn hinders capabilities. While the HDI measures average achievements, the HPI concentrates on deprivations. Deprivation of a long and healthy life is defined as vulnerability to death at a relatively early age and calculated through the probability at birth of not surviving to age 40. Lack of knowledge is measured as exclusion from the world of reading and calculated through illiteracy rates. A decent standard of living is considered in terms of access to overall economic provisioning, as measured by the average of the percentage of the population without sustainable access to an improved water source and the percentage of moderately and severely underweight children under five. In the global Human Development Reports, developing countries are compared together using an HPI-1 index, while Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries are ranked by the HPI-2 index, which adds to the HPI-1 a dimension of social exclusion.

The HPI-1 for Afghanistan is calculated to be 59.3 (See Chart 2.9). This value is lower than those for Niger and Burkina Faso, meaning that Afghanistan fares better in terms of poverty. However, its HPI value is much higher than the calculations for Iran and Pakistan (16.4 and 41.9 respectively).

Source: Zanbel-e-Gham, Edition 9, October 2002

Chart 2.9: Comparison of HPI Values, 2002



Source: UNDP global *Human Development Report* 2004, authors' calculations.

Components that make up the HPI are presented in Charts 2.10 to 2.12.

Chart 2.10: Probability at Birth of Not Surviving to Age 40, 2002



Source: UNDP global *Human Development Report* 2004. authors' calculations.

Chart 2.11: Households with No Safe Drinking Water from Pumps or Protected Springs

Data for all countries 2002, except Afghanistan 2003.



Source: UNDP global *Human Development Report* 2004, UNICEF/CSO MICS 2003.

Chart 2.12: Children Underweight for Age (% under age 5), 2001



Sources: UNDP global *Human Development Report* 2004, CSO *Statistical Yearbook* 2003.

2.3. Components of the Human Development Indices

Table 2.2: Selected Indicators for Poverty, Vulnerability and Risk in Afghanistan

	GDP per capita (US$) (2002)	Life expectancy at birth (years) (2002)	Infant mortality rate per 1,000 live births (2002)	Population without sustainable access to an improved water source % (2000)
Afghanistan	190	44.5	115*	60*
Iran	1,652	70.1	35	8
Pakistan	408	60.8	83	10
Tajikistan	193	68.6	53	40
Turkmenistan	1,601	66.9	76	-
Uzbekistán	314	69.5	52	15
Least developed countries	298	50.6	99	38
South Asia	516	63.2	69	15
Low human development countries	322	49.1	104	38
Low-income countries	451	59.1	80	24
World	5,174	66.9	56	18

* Figures for 2003.
Sources: UNDP global *Human Development Report* 2004, UNICEF/CSO MICS 2003 and CSO *Statistical Yearbook* 2003.

Life Expectancy

In 1990, the World Bank (WB) recorded a life expectancy of 42.5 years for Afghanistan. By 2000, the UN Population Division put it at 43.5 years for women and 43 years for men. In 2002, the CSO and WB put the estimate at 44.5 years: 45 for men and 44 for women. These last figures are used for the calculation of the HDI in this report.

Chart 2.13: Comparison of Life Expectancy at Birth, 2002



Sources: UNDP global *Human Development Report* 2004, CSO *Statistical Yearbook* 2003 .

Compared to all of its neighbours, life expectancy in Afghanistan is at least 20 years short. It is about 6.1 years lower than the averages of the Least Developed Countries, and 18.7 years lower than in the region of South Asia (See Chart 2.13).

Infant and maternal mortality rates in Afghanistan are currently among the highest in the world. The two figures stand at 115 per 1,000 and 1,600 per 100,000 live births respectively.[6] One out of five children die before the age of five and one woman dies from pregnancy related causes approximately every 30 minutes. Less than 15 per cent of deliveries are attended by trained health workers. About half of children under five years of age are stunted due to chronic malnutrition, and up to 10 per cent suffer from acute malnutrition. Mental health is also a major concern as will be further elaborated in Chapter 3.

Box 2.1

Health-related Statistics

Mother and Child Health

Infant mortality rate per 1,000 live births: 165*
Under-five mortality per 1,000 live births: 257*
Maternal mortality ratio per 100,000 live births: 1,600
Provinces with obstetric care: 11 out of 31
Low birth weight: 20%
Children under five with malnutrition: 10% acute, 50 % chronic
Under fives dying from diarrhoea: 85,000 per year
A women dies of pregnancy-related complications every 30 minutes
Acute malnutrition stands at 10 %
Chronic malnutrition stands at 50 %

Immunization Coverage

Less than 40% of Afghan children receive life-saving vaccinations

Disease Burden

There are an estimated 72,000 new cases of tuberculosis each year
Death from tuberculosis: 15,000 per year (12-13,000 are women)
Cases of measles: Estimated 35,000 a year
Polio: 11 in 2001 (120 cases in 2000)
Malaria: 2 to 3 million per year, with 6% p. falciparum

Mental Health

Over 2 million Afghans are estimated to suffer from mental health problems. Due to the ongoing war for the last 22 years, it is estimated that most Afghans are suffering some level of stress disorder. Mental disease that one would see in any population has not been attended to for years in Afghanistan.

Water and Sanitation:

Access to safe water: 23% (18% rural, 43% urban)
Access to adequate sanitation: 12% (28% rural, 6% urban)

* The *Securing Afghanistan's Future* was released before the UNICEF/CSO MICS. The estimates differ between the two publications.

Source: TISA, *Securing Afghanistan's Future*, 2004

[6] UNICEF/CSO MICS.

Table 2.3: Literacy and Gross Enrolment Ratios

Data for all countries 2002, except Afghanistan 2003.

	Literacy Rate Total	Male	Female	Combined Gross Enrolment Ratios
Niger	17.1	25.1	9.3	19
Burkina Faso	12.8	18.5	8.1	22
Sierra Leone	36	--	--	45
Guinea-Bissau	39.6	55.2	24.7	37
Afghanistan	28.7	43.2	14.1	44.93
Tajikistan	99.5	99.7	99.3	73
Uzbekistan	99.3	99.6	98.9	76
Turkmenistan	98.8	99.3	98.3	81
Iran	77.1	83.5	70.4	69
Pakistan	41.5	53.4	28.5	37

Sources: UNDP global *Human Development Report* 2004, CSO *Statisitcal Yearbook* 2003, UNICEF/CSO MICS 2003

Education

Ignorance is what has destroyed this country and education would rebuild it. Education is where most of our focus should go.

Salarzai, from Kunar

The literacy rate in Afghanistan today is one of the lowest among developing countries, above only Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali (See Table 2.3). Compared to neighbouring countries, Afghanistan has the lowest literacy rate. However, in terms of gross enrolment, its rate is higher than that of Pakistan by almost 8 per cent (44.93 per cent as apposed to 37 per cent for Pakistan).

According to the UNICEF/CSO MICS, only 28.7 per cent of Afghans over age 15 can read and write. The current primary enrolment ratio is estimated to be about 54.4 per cent, girls' primary school enrolment is still only 40.5 per cent of the total.[7] So not only are the rates of literacy and primary enrolment extremely low, they are also skewed towards male literacy (See Chart 2.6 p.21 and Chart 2.7 p.22).

Three years ago, the enrolment figures for Afghanistan stood below 30 per cent. Enrolment declined throughout the 1990s, largely as a result of war, the destruction of schools, exile and the restrictive policies of the Taliban. However, this trend has been reversed recently. In 2002, more than 3 million students were enroled in grades 1–12, which was beyond the Government's expectations of 1.5 million. Last year's "Back to School" campaign entailed urgent provision of student and teacher kits, including 10 million textbooks. The total school enrolment is now 3.7 million children, 30 per cent of whom are girls.[8] Still, a third of the children are not in school, while the other two-thirds study under mainly primitive conditions.[9] (See Table 2.4 for some other important education-related statistics).

Despite the major achievement in increasing enrolment, over 61 per cent of children are not enroled in school in provinces such as Farah, Nimruz, Helmand, Kandahar, Zabul, Paktika, Uruzgan, Badghis and Nuristan, while in Kabul, Balkh, Herat and Badakhshan less than 30 per cent of children are not enroled. On girls' enrolment, the situation is even more alarming. In provinces such as Farah, Helmand, Kandahar, Zabul, Paktika, Khost, Paktia, Uruzgan, Ghor and Badghis, over 80 per cent of girls are not in school (See Map 2.1 and Map 2.2).

7 The primary, secondary and tertiary combined enrolment ratio is estimated to be about 45 per cent, with males making about 67 per cent of the total.

8 CSO *Statistical Year Book*, 2003.

9 UNDP 2004b. *Opening Doors to Opportunity: Afghanistan's Millennium Development Goals*.

Table 2.4: Education Related Statistics

	Latest available
Average annual teacher salary (as multiple of per capita GDP)	2.7
Spending on inputs other than teacher salaries (as US$ of primary education recurrent spending)	40
Unit (classroom) construction cost (US$)	8,000
% of primary students with textbooks	N/A
School hours per year – primary grades	632
School hours per year – secondary grades	728
% of public financing in higher education	99
Number of students in higher education	26,000
Number of faculty with a Ph.D.	89
Number of accredited universities (public)	17
Number of accredited universities (private)	1

Source: TISA, *Securing Afghanistan's Future*, 2004.

Many of our social grievances are embedded in people's economic deprivations. I propose that the government would focus on helping people with their economic security – the rest will arrange by itself.
Safir Ahmad, from Bamyan

Economic Indicators

The GDP per capita for Afghanistan was US$190 in 2002, based on calculations of an estimated non-drug GDP of around US$4.05 billion (while the drug-related income was US$2.54 billion) for an estimated population of around 22 million.[10]

A year before the war began in 1977, Afghanistan's GDP was estimated to be about US$3.7 billion but it had dropped by about 20 per cent to US$3.1 billion by 1987.[11] The early 1990s were a time of stagnation, and by 2000, GDP had fallen to US$2.7 billion. With the post-Taliban interim government, the economy recovered significantly, with GDP rising to about US$4 billion, giving it a yearly growth rate of between 25–30 per cent in 2002, and an estimated rate of some 15–20 per cent in 2003.[12] The 2004 recovery or growth rate may achieve the same pace. These figures, however, have also been estimated to be as low as seven percent, and are generally calculated to fall somewhere around 16 per cent. Overall, it is expected that Afghanistan will achieve 10 –12 per cent GDP growth (non-drug) for the next decade or so.

The economic recovery reflects a return to relative peace and stability, and renewed market confidence. In addition, the GDP growth rate of the past two years has been boosted by injections of international assistance, which are most visible in the services and construction sectors. These are rapidly expanding in cities, especially in Kabul.[13] The Afghan economy continues to be predominantly based on agriculture, which amounted to 52 per cent of GDP in 2002, according to the CSO. This makes Afghanistan the country with the greatest share of agriculture in its GDP among the countries of the surrounding region (See Table 2.5).[14]

Agricultural products, which comprise a lion's share of Afghanistan's exports, have also significantly contributed to GDP growth.[15] In 2002, agriculture consisted of 52 per cent of the aggregate national output, with a value of about US$2.1 billion. The values for the aggregate produce in the years 1977 and 2000 were

10 CSO 2003 data quoted from *Securing Afghanistan's Future*.
11 Tawfiq Ghanim, *The Afghan Economy and 12 Years of War*, as quoted by Mubin Shah 2004.
12 The economic analysis relies on the background paper by Mubin Shah 2004.
13 IMF 2003.
14 WB. World Development Indicators 2003.
15 According to the CSO (2003), the share of agriculture in total exports in the prewar period was 71 per cent in 1978. In 2003, the same figure was 84 per cent.

Map 2.1: Percentage of Children 7–13 Years Not Enroled in School by Province (2003)



Map 2.2: Percentage of Girls 7–13 Years Not Enroled in School by Province (2003)



Table 2.5: Gross Domestic Product by Sector

Country	Gross Domestic Product									
	Billions of US$		Agriculture Value-added % of GDP		Industry Value-added % of GDP		Manufacturing Value-added % of GDP		Services Value-added % of GDP	
	1990	2001	1990	2001	1990	2001	1990	2001	1990	2001
Iran	120.0	114	24	19	29	33	12	16	48	48
India	316.9	477.3	31	25	28	28	17	16	41	48
Tajikistan	4.33	1.05	33	29	38	29	25	25	29	41
Uzbekistan	23.67	11.27	33	34	33	23	0	9	34	43
Afghanistan		4.0		52		24				24

Sources: CSO *Statistical Yearbook* 2003, World Development Indicators 2003.

US$1.8 billion and US$1.5 billion respectively.[16] The recovery in the agriculture sector was made possible by the return of farmers to their land, donors' assistance with irrigation, improved cereals, mine clearance and rainfall, among other factors.[17] Currently, over 60 per cent of Afghanistan's labour force is absorbed by the agriculture sector.

The industrial sector never was a big part of the aggregate national output in Afghanistan. Its share of GDP was about 20 per cent before 1978, and it absorbed only about 6 per cent of the Afghan labour force.[18] The industrial sector was severely damaged during the war, which also changed its structure. For example, before the war, the share of food production in aggregate industrial output was only 17 per cent, while that of textiles was 53 per cent. In 1985, the former increased to 53 per cent and the latter fell to 21 per cent.[19] In 2002, the industrial sector grew by a remarkable 50 per cent, with improvements also made in its labour absorption capacity. Much of this recovery has been due to robust private sector investment, which is most visible in the cities, and which contributed about 13 per cent to GDP in 2002.[20]

The total private investment during 2001 was only about US$10 million, a figure that dramatically increased to over US$250 million in the following year.[21] The figure for the first two quarters of 2003 stood at close to US$150 million, and increased exponentially for the remainder of the year. The share of foreign direct investment (FDI) in total investment has been significant (See Table 2.6). Nevertheless, FDI has been largely focused on small-scale service provision, mostly operating

Table 2.6: Investment Record (Million US$)

	2001	2002	First two quarters of 2003
Domestic	10.66	66.48	12.3
FDI	0	198.56	134.7
Total	10.66	265.05	146.9

Source: CSO *Statistical Yearbook* 2003.

16 CSO 2003.
17 FAO/WFP 2003.
18 Tawfiq Ghanim, *The Afghan Economy and 12 Years of War*, as quoted by Mubin Shah 2004.
19 Rosanne Klass 1987.
20 Abdul Rashid Fakhri 2004a.
21 CSO 2003.

Table 2.7: Trade Records During 1381[22] (2002) in Millions of US$

Items	1381 (2002)
Export of goods	2,406.9
Recorded own exports	100
Re-exports (including unofficial)	2,306.9
Imports of goods	3,734.8
Recorded imports	2,452.1
Unrecorded imports	1,188.8

Source: CSO *Statistical Yearbook* 2003.

in Kabul, and has stemmed mainly from minor investments from Iran and Pakistan. Investment in larger sectors, which is often long term, is severely constrained by general insecurity, as well as the lack of institutional structures to protect investors and investments. Corruption, bureaucratic red tape, and the absence of banking and legal systems also raise the costs of doing business in Afghanistan.

International trade is another area in which the Afghan economy has experienced a significant turnaround over the past couple of years. Improvements in international trade have been due both to the rise of aggregate national income and the global opening to Afghanistan for trade and business. Although the current national income is not significantly different than what it was before the war began, Afghanistan's exports and imports have grown to seven times what they were at that time.

In 2002, imports and exports (including re-exports) accounted for almost half of the aggregate national income. In 1977, each was about 10 per cent. The other difference between now and then has been the increasing share of imports in the total share of trade, and therefore a relatively huge trade imbalance or deficit. The share of imports was 52 per cent of the total trade volume in 1977, but this increased to 72 per cent in 1985 now stands at over 94 per cent (See Table 2.7).

Exports consist of agricultural commodities like cotton, wool, leather and fruits. Imports consist of consumption commodities, fuel and lubricant, and other durable goods such as televisions, refrigerators and items related to transportation. By the end of the third quarter of 2003, transportation-related goods had reached 33 per cent, food items 15 per cent, industrial products 22 per cent, and consumption goods 19 per cent, with consumption commodities making up 56 per cent of total imports. These figures represent only officially recorded imports and exports, and do not include substantial informal trade.

2.4. Some Human Insecurity Indicators for Afghanistan

There are no established "human security indicators" that have been recognized globally for defining and measuring human security. The Afghanistan NHDR, because of its emphasis on survival, dignity and livelihoods, considers as part of its analysis those indicators showing discrepancies in equal opportunities and access for various vulnerable groups.

Income Inequality

What does Afghanistan's expected economic growth and recovery mean in

[22] Afghanistan uses the Islamic Calendar, which is based on lunar cycles. The Calendar uses as a reference point the Hijrah or migration of the Prophet Muhammed from the city of Mecca to Medina in 622 c.e. 2003 of the Gregorian Calendar is 1424 of the Islamic Calendar.

Table 2.8: Distribution of Income and Consumption

Percentage share of income or consumption								
	Gini index	Lowest 10%	Lowest 20%	2end 20%	3rd 20%	4th 20%	High 20 %	Highest 10%
Afghanistan 2002	35.50	2.00	7.00	13.00	19.00	26.00	35.00	20.00
Bangladesh 2000	31.80	3.90	9.00	12.50	15.90	21.20	41.30	26.70
India 1997	37.80	3.50	8.10	11.60	15.00	19.30	46.10	33.50
Iran 1998	43.00	2.00	5.10	9.40	14.10	21.50	49.90	33.70
Pakistan 1998-99	33.00	3.70	8.80	12.50	15.90	20.60	42.30	28.30
Tajikistan 1998	34.70	3.20	8.00	12.90	17.00	22.10	40.00	25.20
Uzbekistan 2000	26.80	3.60	9.20	14.10	17.90	22.60	36.30	22.00
Turkmenistan 1998	40.80	2.60	6.10	10.20	14.70	21.50	47.50	31.70
Russia 2000	45.60	1.80	4.90	9.50	14.10	20.30	51.30	36.00
Botswana 1993	63.00	0.70	2.20	4.90	8.20	14.40	70.30	56.60
Namibia 1993	70.70	0.50	1.40	3.00	5.40	11.50	78.70	64.50
Sierra Leone 1989	62.90	0.50	1.10	2.00	9.80	23.70	63.40	43.60

Sources: WB, World Development Indicators 2003 and Da Afghanistan Bank estimates 2004.

terms of the well-being and welfare of the Afghan population? The answer to this question depends in part on the distribution of income across the population and the level of persistent inequalities.

Since 1987, the CSO has collected no data on the extent of inequalities – whether they are related to income, gender or spatial. Da Afghanistan Bank (DAB) used its own estimates to calculate a Gini index that measures inequality.[23] Comparing the bank's 35.5 value for Gini with those reported for other countries in the global Human Development Report, however, Afghanistan is no worse than other Central Asian countries and better (lower) than most Latin American and African countries (See Table 2.8).[24] The lowest 30 per cent of the population receives only nine per cent of the aggregate national income, while the upper third absorbs 55 per cent. Given the unreliability of data the Gini was based on, however, one has to read DAB's calculation with a note of caution.

Using food consumption as a proxy for the variable in income, the 2003 National Rural Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA) data show relatively unequal distribution of wealth across five wealth groups, from the poorest to the richest. The poorest 20 per cent of the population is spending four times more on food than the richest 20 per cent. Although these are preliminary indicators of inequalities in assets, incomes and consumption, the NHDR recognizes the need for more data to draw out existing inequalities in quantitative as well as qualitative ways.

The Most Vulnerable: the Poor

According to the NRVA, poverty is "a condition that reflects physical, economic, social and political deprivation, as well as a lack of assets and income…. [Whereas] poverty reflects an unacceptable level of well-being, vulnerability captures the exposure to uninsured risk leading to a socially unacceptable level of well-being

[23] The Gini coefficients are aggregate inequality measures and can vary anywhere from 0 (perfect equality) to 1 (perfect inequality).
[24] Said Mubin Shah 2004.

Chart 2.14: Distribution of Food Expenditure by Income Groups



Source: NRVA (2003).

in the future."[25] The majority of the Afghan population can be classified as poor. The NRVA, a survey of some 11,000 rural households from across Afghanistan, indicated that 20.4 per cent of the rural population consumes less than 2,070 kilocalories per person per day.

Human poverty in Afghanistan is a multidimensional problem that includes inequalities in access to productive assets and social services; poor health, education and nutritional status; weak social protection systems; vulnerability to macro and micro-level risks (both natural and human-triggered); human displacement; gender inequities and political marginalization.[26] Low incomes and low levels of living standards for the poor are manifested in their poor health, nutrition and education, which in turn can lower their economic productivity, and thereby lead directly and indirectly to a slower growing economy.



[25] WB 2004b.
[26] Werblow 2002.

Box 2.2

Findings of the NRVA

Who are the rural poor?

Measuring poverty and vulnerability through consumption data, the NRVA collected data on food intakes over seven days, concluding that half of the rural sample (48 per cent) were poor, because for these households, food expenditures were less than the cost of purchasing 2,100 calories a day per person based on local prices. Food insecurity was reported by half of the rural sample. Overall, around 20 per cent appeared to be extremely poor and chronically food insecure, with a further 60 per cent living either in poverty or close to poverty (and often suffering from a lack of dietary diversity and ill health). Only 20 per cent of households were better off, although they too face serious problems accessing basic services. As expected, poorer households were more likely to be headed by a single parent, often a woman, and have a higher proportion of people with disabilities. By contrast, better-off households were more likely to be literate and to own land.

Alarming spatial and gender disparities: The NRVA confirmed the wide inequalities in access and opportunities that exist in Afghanistan. Poverty, as measured by consumption and access to services, displayed wide disparities: between provinces, within provinces and within households. Power, medical services and transport were available to those who could pay for them, but access to public services such as drinking water, transportation, schools, clinics and hospitals was extremely low among almost all households. Other disparities included the fact that while children from poorer households have lower school enrolment rates, the gender gap was similar for households regardless of wealth, with gender gaps even worse in some provinces (e.g., Kandahar, Ghor, Zabul and Helmand). The survey also suggested that some parts of Afghanistan may have overall poverty levels that are higher than others, particularly the west, north and central west, with the northeast relatively better off. However, caution is expressed as to the accuracy of these figures in the absence of accurate population figures by province, and given the existence of pockets of poverty in every province.

How do they live?

The survey demonstrated that rural livelihoods were highly complex and varied, with agriculture (including poppy) playing a major role as a coping mechanism. Contrary to expectations, the majority of the rural poor in the sample did not produce food or engage in farm activities: 24 per cent reported they were completely landless, and almost half of all rural employment involved non-farm activities (such as construction, trade, manufacturing, transport, mining and other services). Remittances from relatives migrating to neighbouring districts and provinces for seasonal and cross-border work (by land to Iran and Pakistan) were crucial to the survival of many poor rural families.

What are some of the causes of poverty?

Eighty per cent of households said they had been affected by some form of shock during 2002–2003, and the majority identified drought as the most serious example. As the majority of drought-affected households (70 per cent) had not recovered income or asset losses, 40 per cent of rural households had to reduce food consumption to cope.

Poor health among poorer households was also confirmed by the NRVA, which found that the poorest rural households sampled had double the chance of having experienced a death in the family, and especially a child under the age of five, than the richer households. The assessment also confirmed that shocks such as the death of a family member also have a negative impact on the welfare of households, resulting in a loss of human capital, incurred costs and even early marriages. These miseries fuel a vicious cycle of poverty. Contrary to expectations, only two per cent of households reported violence as a household-level shock, although these findings may have serious flaws given sensitivity on the issue.

Source: MRRD/WFP, Preliminary Findings of the NRVA (first release), 2004

The NRVA identifies drought as the main cause of rural poverty (See Chart 2.15), affecting more than half of the rural population. Other causes included farm-related shocks such as the loss of animals, natural disasters such as landslides or flooding, epidemic diseases such as malaria, and economic shifts such as market price increases. Surprisingly, violence as a cause of poverty was reported by only five per cent of the rural population.[27]

Other issues confront Afghans living in urban areas. The Government estimates that around 6.4 million people live in cities

[27] WB 2004b.

Chart 2.15: Reported Poverty Shocks



Source: NRVA 2003 (from Poverty, *Vulnerability and Social Protection in Afghanistan*, 2004).

Children were some of the primary victims of the two and a half decades of conflict in Afghanistan. The 1.5 million people killed may have included more than 300,000 children.

– 30 per cent of the population. This figure will have doubled by 2015 at the current rate of urbanization. Thousands of returnees have chosen major cities such as Jalalabad, Kandahar, Herat, Mazar and Kabul as their residence in order to benefit from their facilities and social services. Owing to the influx of returning refugees, the population of Kabul alone has increased from 1.7 million in 2000 to around 3 million in 2003.[28] A crisis of rapid and uncontrollable urbanization has led to an acute shortage of housing, particularly in Kabul. The majority of new urban residents are landless returnees and IDPs who have settled in unplanned and hence un-serviced portions of the cities. Most have little or no access to conventional services.

While most Afghans in both rural and urban areas can be classified as poor, some groups and/or households are most vulnerable to poverty, or to falling deeper into poverty. These include children, women, the disabled, IDPs, returnees, and the Kuchis, pastoralists who move from place to place.

Children as Victims

Children were some of the primary victims of the two and a half decades of conflict in Afghanistan. The 1.5 million people killed may have included more than 300,000 children.[29] In addition to the loss of lives, there have been grave physical and emotional scars that will affect generations of Afghans who have known nothing but war.

A 1998 UNICEF study found that among the more than 300 children ages eight to 18 interviewed in Kabul by mental health workers, 72 per cent experienced the death of a family member between 1992 and

[28] TISA 2004e. "Technical Annex: Urban Development." *Securing Afghanistan's Future*.
[29] The figure of 1.5 million is quoted in Ahman Rashid 2000. The figure of 300,000 was taken from Save the Children (US) 2002.

1996. In 40 per cent of these cases, the child had lost a parent. Almost all of the children had witnessed acts of violence during the fighting, while two-thirds of them saw dead bodies or parts of bodies, and nearly half saw many people killed at one time in rocket and artillery attacks. Ninety per cent of the children interviewed said they believed they would die during the conflict. Almost all the children, sometimes or often, felt that life was not worth living.[30]

Risks and shocks identified by children and their families include political repression, war, displacement, poverty, family loss and separation, family tensions, physical illness, danger from the physical environment, heavy and exploitative work. These threats harm children's overall social and emotional well-being, affecting their social development, morality, behaviour, mental health and the opportunities they are able to access. Moreover, many years of war, drought, hunger, disease, lack of proper medicine, and the migration of families in search of survival, food and new livelihoods have resulted in poor health and poverty that stretches the coping mechanisms of many people to the limit.[31]

The burden of poverty falls heaviest on children, who are frequently kept out of school – even at a young age – to help support the family.[32] They work on their families' farms, collect water and firewood, and scavenge for scrap metal to sell for spare change. In Kabul alone, 50,000 children – mostly aged eight to ten – work on the streets polishing shoes, selling fruit for shopkeepers, burning incense for prayers, acting as porters in the markets, washing cars or simply begging for money. They also search wasteland and ruins for firewood, scraps of food, plastic, metal or paper – anything that can be used in the home or sold.[33]

A 2003 survey of vulnerable children and their families carried out by Save the Children (US) and UNICEF verified poverty as the incubator of other human insecurities for children. For example, poverty was reported to increase tensions in the home, force children to work on the street, pressure parents to pull their children out of school and encourage early marriage for daughters – all of which had emotional and sometimes physical impacts.[34]

For children, threats posed by poor health are even more deadly than armed conflict. According to UNICEF, Afghanistan's under-five mortality rate is at a staggering 17 per cent. That means that almost one in five children dies before reaching the age of five. Afghanistan has the second highest maternal death rate in the world, and the highest rates of infant and child mortality in Asia.[35] Afghan children also face health risks from infectious diseases, many of which are preventable by vaccine. Measles alone is estimated to kill 35,000 children every year. It is followed as among the leading causes of death for children by pneumonia and other acute respiratory infections in winter, and diarrhoea diseases, particularly during the summer months, that derive from severe water shortages, notably in rural areas, and inadequate sanitation.[36]

According to the UNICEF/CSO MICS, approximately 39 per cent of the population

30 UNICEF, as quoted by Amnesty International 1998.
31 Save the Children (US)/UNICEF 2003.
32 In 2002, Save the Children (US), with support from UNICEF, conducted a significant consultation with children and their families living in Kabul. The aim of the research, using primarily qualitative methods, was to listen to children's views and to access their experiences of daily life in order to guide the development of support programmes. More than 600 people participated in the group discussions.
33 Save the Children (US) 2002.
34 Save the Children (US)/UNICEF 2003.
35 *Ibid*.
36 Twenty-five per cent of child mortality is due to diarrhoea, 19 per cent to respiratory tract infections, 16 per cent to measles, six per cent to scurvy and the remaining 34 per cent due to other factors.

Chart 2.16: Correlation between Population without Sanitation (%) and Child Mortality Rate



Source: MRRD, 2004

in urban areas and 69 per cent in rural areas do not have access to safe water, with considerable regional disparities. Waterborne diseases take the lives of half the children who die under the age of five. This means that about 125 out of every 1,000 children die because of contaminated water and the unhygienic situations where they live. This is among the worst figures in the world (See Chart 2.16).

Against this background, some successes have been achieved with respect to children's health. In 2002, over 11 million children were immunized against measles (measles immunization coverage now stands at about 80 per cent) and some 6.4 million children were immunized against polio in five rounds of vaccinations (polio coverage now exceeds 80 per cent). There is a concern that cross-border transmission may occur if maximum polio immunization coverage is not achieved soon.

Even before the war, Afghanistan's resources for education were very limited. The war made the situation worse as school buildings were destroyed or neglected, and teachers received little or no training. Thousands of qualified teachers were also forced out of the country. As a result, an entire generation of Afghan children was deprived of education and the opportunity for a better life. Taliban control from the mid-1990s until 2001 led to strictly enforced bans both on girls attending school and on female teachers. By the end of the 1990s, only five per cent of girls compared to 60 per cent of boys were going to school. In March 2002, the Afghanistan Interim Authority launched the "Back to School" campaign, which resulted in some three million children and 70,000 teachers returning to school. Today, an estimated 3.7 million children attend some form of learning, the vast majority at the primary level. Nationally, girls make up on average 30 per cent of the student population, a massive increase even compared to the years prior to the Taliban restrictions.

There is still a chronic need for rebuilding schools, with over 60 per cent of formal institutions having suffered some degree of damage. Water and sanitation facilities are available in only a fraction of schools, presenting a potential barrier to girls'

Table 2.9: School Non-attendance Reasons by Wealth Group and Gender

	BOYS %				GIRLS %			
	Very poor	Poor	Medium	Total	Very poor	Poor	Medium	Total
School not available	27	25	31	28	58	54	61	58
Family commitment/ marriage/tradition	10	12	13	12	18	25	21	22
Expensive	27	18	8	15	14	7	3	6
Employment	16	19	16	17	3	3	5	4
Too far away	17	22	28	24	7	9	9	8
Other	4	4	4	4	1	2	1	1

Source: NRVA 2003.

attendance.[37] According to the 2003 NRVA, the lack of school availability was the main causes of non-attendance (See Table 2.9). In 13 of 32 provinces surveyed (there are now 34 provinces), over 70 per cent of households identified the unavailability of schools as the main reason for girls not attending them.

A relatively new but rapidly growing threat to the well-being of Afghan children is abduction and trafficking. In 2003, police rescued nearly 200 abducted children – both boys and girls – in different parts of the country, while some 750 children were trafficked to Saudi Arabia alone. Trafficking can be attributed to many factors, including conflict, lack of internal security, poverty and poor socio-economic opportunities. A recent report by the International Organization for Migration (IOM), stated that there were many forms of human trafficking practiced in Afghanistan, including child prostitution, exploitation of prostitutes, forced labour, slavery and practices similar to slavery, servitude and the removal of body organs.[38]

With increasing concerns about child trafficking, local human rights bodies and the United Nations have started a countrywide awareness-raising campaign in a bid to sensitize government officials, local police, religious leaders and parents about the existence and consequences of the problem. Besides the drug mafia, child trafficking is proving now to be another difficult issue for fledging state institutions to address.

The Plight of Afghan Women

Years of discrimination against women, coupled with poverty and insecurity, have left Afghan women with a legacy of some of the worst social indicators in the world today. Only 14 % are literate. Every half an hour a woman dies of pregnancy-related problems: 1,600 out of 100,000 die during childbirth, a rate 60 times higher than that for women in industrial countries. Seventy per cent of people affected by tuberculosis are women.

In Kabul, 50,000 Afghan women are widows and heads of households. Sixty-five per cent surveyed by the organization Physicians for Human Rights were found to have suicidal tendencies and 16 per cent have actually attempted suicide.[39] The feminization of poverty, serious

It seems like the government has not paid as much attention to human security as it should. Everyday we hear about children and women abducted for inhuman purposes. Women are used for sexual pleasures and children for sex abuse, drug trafficking and body parts. It is the responsibility of the government to put a stop to these sorts of crimes, and if it cannot do it by itself it should seek assistance from the international community.

Jawid Hussain from Jaghori, Ghazni

[37] USAID 2002.
[38] IOM 2004.

malnutrition, exclusion from public life, gender-based violence, rape, lack of basic health facilities, illiteracy, forced marriage and routine denial of justice are some of the many human security concerns faced by Afghan women. The situation of women as a manifestation of inequality and a threat to human security will be discussed thoroughly in Chapter 3.

The Disabled

Afghanistan is one of the world's most heavily mined countries. But very few reliable data exist on disability issues, including the number of people with impairments. An estimate from a number of uncoordinated sample surveys puts the figure at around four per cent of the population, which means approximately one million people.[40] The number may be higher since negative stereotypes together with poor infrastructure and a lack of resources to conduct proper surveys make it difficult to identify all those with disabilities. Moreover, considering that disability does not only affect individuals but also families, it can be argued that the percentage of the population coping with disabilities is much higher than four per cent.

An ongoing national survey by the Ministry of Martyrs and Disabled in 2003 showed that among the 13,000 disabled people surveyed across the country, the majority (86 per cent) were physically impaired or had multiple disabilities.[41] Only five per cent noted a mental disability. Men represented 78 per cent of those with disabilities, and, as expected, 38 per cent of them had been disabled by the war and 16 per cent by mines. Among women, ten per cent were affected by the war followed by disease or congenital disabilities. Half of the men and almost all of the women with disabilities were illiterate.

The survey also found that while hundred of thousands of Afghans were disabled through war or landmines, many more have been victims of harsh nature and poor nurture. Years of drought and poverty, the resulting malnutrition and natural disasters have left many people with impairments. Preventable diseases such as polio, birth defects and accidents are other factors. Moreover, the lack of awareness on disability prevention leads to many new cases that could be avoided. Poor medical infrastructure means that many treatable cases end up as permanent impairments.[42]

Years of conflict in Afghanistan have touched every stratum of the society, but disabled people have suffered much more because of their vulnerable social position. Political and economic inequality compounded by negative social attitudes and stereotype that see disabled people as dependent, inactive and non-productive has marginalized them to the level of seclusion, leaving an overwhelming majority of disabled Afghans and their families with social and economic deprivation. Poverty and unemployment are key factors for perpetuating this exclusion. A survey conducted by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs and the International Rescue Committee (IRC) has found very high unemployment among disabled people, estimated at 84 per cent.[43] The lack of legislation to protect the rights of the disabled has also led to institutional discrimination.

IDPs and Returnees

Afghans comprise the second largest number of refugees and IDPs in the world,

39 UNIFEM, statement by Noeleen Heyzer at "Learning from Experience from Afghanistan: Second Lesson Learning Workshop", UNDP 2002.
40 TISA 2003c, Comprehensive National Disability Policy.
41 Wardak and Turmusani 2003.
42 TISA 2003c.
43 Wardak and Turmusani 2003.

after Palestinians. Not too long ago, it was estimated that one in every three Afghan was either a refugee or an IDP, prompting the United Nations to declare Afghanistan as *the major site of human displacement in the world*. At the beginning of 2002, there were approximately 6 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan (3.5 million) and Iran (2.5 million). Since the fall of the Taliban, over 2.5 million Afghans have returned from Pakistan (1.8 million) and Iran (600,000),[44] yet an estimated 3.4 million Afghans remain outside their country.[45]

The IDPs were estimated at 1 million at the beginning of 2002. During the course of 2003, some 70,000 IDPs returned to their places of origin, predominantly in the northern and western provinces. However, the southern and western parts of the country – Kandahar, Helmand, Nimruz, Uruzgan and Zabul provinces – still host approximately 200,000 IDPs. They are comprised primarily of nomadic Kuchi who lost their livelihoods during the four-year drought, and Pashtuns uprooted by ethnic violence in the north and west of the country.

Most of these IDPs are willing to return to their places of origin in the north, and since the Constitutional Loya Jirgah, return has became an issue of political priority for the Government. Some progress has been made towards that end, including securing pledges of support or at least no interference from the military strong men in the north. However, the preconditions for their return also include the removal or control of local commanders, disarmament and the establishment of the rule of law through police training, improved district administration and the creation of a mechanism for the resolution of land disputes. These steps have not yet been achieved.[46]

The Kuchi IDPs from Registan comprise pastoralists who use the area as a key resource. They can be divided between those who permanently stay there and those who are seasonal users. Making up about 25–30 per cent of the total number of IDPs, they are willing to return to their place of origin. Facilitating their return, however, requires a substantial improvement in local conditions and support to restart sustainable livelihoods. Necessary components would include rehabilitation of existing water sources, rebuilding livestock herds, community-led and capacity building projects, income-generating activities, and access to social services such as education and health.[47]

Other Kuchis have been affected by drought, and make up about 30–40 per cent of IDPs. They include pastoralists who used to migrate from the southern provinces towards the central highland – from Kandahar and Helmand to Zabul and Ghazni. Drought has caused severe losses among their livestock, and has been exacerbated by the lack of access to major grazing areas due to conflicts over pasture rights. A majority of this category are also willing to return to their places of origin if provided with livestock.

The non-Kuchi IDPs affected by drought are estimated to comprise some five per cent of IDPs, and are scattered in all IDP settlements. They are composed mostly of landless and economically vulnerable rural inhabitants who have lost their source of livelihood due to the drought. Many consequently opted to settle in IDP camps in order to benefit from their humanitarian assistance. The lack of land and assets are stated as obstacles for their return to their places of origin.

Much of the media analysis on the IDPs and returnees highlights the problem with

[44] IDPs include those who have been internally displaced as result of a combination of environmental, political, tribal and economic factors.
[45] TISA 2004f. "Technical Annex on Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons." *Securing Afghanistan's Future.*
[46] TISA 2003. Consultative Group on IDPs, IDP Strategy for Afghanistan.
[47] Global IDP 2003.

Chart 2.17: Reasons for Not Returning to Place of Origin



Source: UNHCR, *IDP Profiling Survey*, April 2004.

Chart 2.18: Reasons for Displacement



Source: UNHCR, *IDP Profiling Survey*, April 2004.

respect to security, war-lordism, ethnic tensions and factional conflicts. Yet from the perspective of the IDPs themselves, it is the gloomy prospect of limited livelihoods in their areas of their origin that is preventing them from returning.

In a recent UNHCR survey of some 20,000 IDP households, a majority (61 per cent) of the respondents expressed their willingness to return to their places of origin. However, in answer to the question "What prevents you from returning?" a vast majority identified human security concerns.[48] Forty-six per cent mentioned the lack of drinking water, only about 14 per cent identified security-related issues, and the remaining 40 per cent pointed to livelihood concerns (See Chart 2.17).

[48] UNHCR 2004b.

Similarly, in response to a question about "reasons for displacement" a vast majority of the respondents identified human security issues as primary factors. A staggering 49 per cent were forced to move because they lost their livestock due to drought, followed by 19 per cent and ten per cent respectively who reported a lack of drinking water and loss of daily labour (See Chart 2.18). Armed conflict came as a distant fourth, with only nine per cent of the respondents identifying it as a reason for displacement.

Clearly, livelihood security is a pressing concern for the majority of the IDPs, who struggle to scrap together the most basic elements of survival and dignity. For promoting a return to the communities of origin, there is a need for balancing the focus of assistance between the areas of displacement and the areas of return. Any area of return needs to be a place that is secure and that offers opportunities for vulnerable community members to regain and enhance their livelihoods.

The Kuchis

The Kuchis constitute a significant part of Afghanistan's cultural tradition. For centuries, they have migrated across parts of the country semi-annually with their caravans of goats, sheep, donkeys and camels. Their motivation for constant migration is twofold: to search for seasonal pastures for their livestock and to benefit from milder climates, since the tents in which they live do not provide adequate protection from either heat or cold. The pattern of migration is, therefore, predictable, determined by the availability of pasture and the climate.[49]

Given incomplete demographic data, accurate population figures for the Kuchis are non-existent. The last official figures on their number stem from the 1979 census. The nomads then were registered as 1,074,000 individuals, or nine per cent of the total population. Currently, the CSO estimates there are 1.5 million Kuchis, or about 6.3 per cent of the total population.

The livestock owned by Kuchis used to make important contributions to the national economy in terms of meat, skins and wool. In the 1970s, livestock was said to make up 18 per cent of Afghanistan's domestic product and was an important component of national exports. The Kuchis owned about 30 per cent of all sheep and goats and most camels. At a village level, they provided tea, sugar, matches, kerosene, guns, etc., in exchange for wheat, vegetables, fruits and other foodstuffs. They also acted as moneylenders and offered services in transportation along with additional labour at harvest time. Their flocks fertilized the fields after the harvest, when the farmers allowed the animals to graze the fields. Relations between the settled people and the Kuchis were, therefore, largely based on exchanges of goods and services.

The Kuchis' lifestyle initially came under threat due to changes associated with "modernization". For example, the development of road systems in the 1950s and 1960s led to severe competition between truckers and the Kuchi's traditional camel caravans. Driven out of business, some Kuchis began operating trucking businesses combined with land ownership. Others purchased or hired trucks to assist in moving between pastures. However, the slow decline of the Kuchis accelerated after the war began and during the droughts of 1971–1972 and 1998–2002. Bombing campaigns by the US-led coalition starting in 2002 as well as the spread of land mines during 23 years of conflict decimated the Kuchis' animal herds – their major economic asset. Fighting also often blocked migratory routes.[50]

Shamir, who lost all 200 of his sheep and goats in the drought, says "...we used to sing about everything. Women would dance, especially at weddings...but all that has gradually disappeared. Poor people cannot afford drums and music. This war and now this drought have swept everything away."

Mark Herold, 2003.

[49] AFSU/Vulnerability and Analysis Mapping (VAM), WFP 2002.
[50] Marc Herold 2003.

Haji Khan used to have 300 sheeps, two horses and nine camels. He now has only one camel and lives in a four metre by two metre UNHCR tent in the sprawling refugee camp of Spin Boldak. He recalls other times before the rains stopped. Life was good, we never used to let our daughters marry people from the city because if they settled they would be like a bird in a cage. Now we are like a bird in a cage.

Marc Herold, 21 September 2003

The drought of 1998–2002 is said to be responsible for the death of 75 per cent of the Kuchi animals. Consequently, many of the once independent, self-sufficient Kuchis have been reduced to destitute farmers, IDPs, casual labourers and beggars.

Constraints on grazing areas have exacerbated their vulnerability. Access is impaired for most due to historical and socio-territorial factors. In the past, disputes over land use, and competition over resources between permanently settled Afghans and the Kuchis have reached violent levels, today, there is no overall policy regarding land tenure and pasture rights, and access is determined by the local authorities and the specific attitudes of the people involved. The traditional system of pasture rights seems to have eroded been replaced by the power of the gun. Many Kuchis still hold documents – some as old as a 100 years – giving them rights to pastures in different areas, but their current value is undetermined.

The Kuchis' current relations with settled populations vary across the different regions, depending on past relations, the extent of ethnic polarization of, ethnic composition and other factors. The type of relationship the Kuchis hold with the settled people in the areas in which they live is crucial for understanding their vulnerability. For example, the Kuchis of the south and of central Hazarajat have a relatively low community coping capacity due to their weak links with the settled population.

Although the National Development Framework (NDF) states quite strongly that the living conditions of Kuchis shall be improved, with an emphasis on the need to revive the livestock production sector, current governmental policies and programmes are largely focused on settled populations. The Kuchis are often excluded from government services and development opportunities because most service delivery and intervention programmes provided by the government and the aid community do not accommodate their mobility.

Kuchis currently make up over 70 per cent of Afghan IDPs. Conditions in the IDP settlements are arguably better than those in the areas of origin, with potable drinking water and access to education and health care. Pull factors to the areas of origin have to be created, complemented by projects aiming for longer-term reintegration. These include improved access to water, support for livestock, access to pastures, skills training in animal husbandry, livestock products processing and veterinary services, and access to markets and social services. The Kuchis return to their inherited livelihood will only be sustained through area integration projects that benefit not only those who are returning but also the neighbouring communities. Project activities should therefore be directed towards including both populations; promoting coexistence, particularly in areas of potential ethnic tension; and establishing the view that Kuchis are assets rather than a form of competition to the settled population.

2.5. Conclusions

Even before its long conflict, Afghanistan was already one of the poorest countries in the world, with low levels of access to health care, education, potable drinking water and opportunities for income generation. The years of war and instability, along with the ravages of nature, have only made the situation worse by any measure of human development and human security.

Today, whereas education indicators have improved and are expected to continue to do so, the health situation has not changed much. Moreover, the remarkable GDP recovery of the past couple of years and the projected robust growth over the next few years may certainly improve

Afghanistan's HDI ranking, but may not help the overall human security situation. One reason is the unequal distribution of wealth and poverty. While reliable data is not available, anecdotal evidence points to the facts that the growth has done little to alleviate poverty and has worsened inequality.

These figures and evidence highlight the severity of the challenges of reconstruction and development in Afghanistan, but they also provide direction and meaning for movement forward, as well as benchmarks for progress.

Chapter 3

A Threat-based Analysis of Wants and Fears

Photo: Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh

Chapter 3

A Threat-based Analysis of Wants and Fears

3.1. Why a Threat-based Analysis?

Chapter 3 reexamines the indicators presented in Chapter 2 according to threats to "wants" (basic needs related to development) and "fears" (deficiencies related to human rights and strategic needs). The rationale behind an approach is based on a number of assumptions:

- Fears and wants, as symptoms of violence, abuse and under-development, are inter-related. This interdependence means one cannot be prioritized over the over;
- Threats include both objective, tangible elements, such as insufficient income, chronic unemployment, dismal access to adequate health care and quality education, etc., as well as subjective perceptions of threat, such the inability to control one's destiny, indignity, fear of crime and violent conflict, etc;
- Threats can be both direct (those that are deliberately orchestrated, such as systematic persecutions, or drug-related crimes) and indirect (those that arise inadvertently or structurally, e.g., underinvestment in key social and economic sectors such as education and health care);
- Fears and wants include human rights and dignity as underlying factors. Human rights for this NHDR are not confined to the first generation of civil and political rights (i.e., freedom from violence, rights abuses, freedom of expression and participation, etc.) but also second-generation social, economic and cultural rights (including the right to development and freedom from wants).

Ultimately, a threat-based analysis allows the recognition of the causes and consequences of vulnerability to a wide array of threats. The persistence of these has to be addressed by appropriate preventive and corrective state policies, since they endanger the human security of the Afghan people, as well as the stability of the state.

First, a word of caution. References to "the people" can be problematic. Cultural, gender, generational, ethnic and other differences change the way individuals perceive themselves from place to place, but also in time. While one can assume a certain minimum of universal needs, wants, rights and feelings, human security challenges differ from region to region, province to province, household to household, and individual to individual. Settled people do not suffer from the same vulnerabilities as IDPs. Women face different challenges than men. Rural and urban populations, ethnic groups, the disabled, and young and elderly people all perceive the complexities of human security in different ways.

A complete threat analysis in Afghanistan would require data disaggregated by gender, profession, province, ethnicity, language group, settlement, income, etc., which at the moment is not available. It would also require an opinion poll and perception study to allow for the subjectivity of the threats. In the absence of perfect data, the NHDR analyses available objective and quantitative data as well as the findings from various surveys and assessments. The report team also held consultations with students, instructors and researchers in Kabul, Jalalabad, Balkh, Herat and Bamyan. Some government officials, aid workers and ordinary people

were also consulted. Disparities are chronicled in the report to the extent possible, although generalities are made and the picture may be incomplete for now.

Beyond survival, this chapter looks as well at the quality of life, defined in a broad way as existence with dignity. Among the various threats to dignity, the chapter discusses the series below, in no particular order, as they all seem to be important priorities. While the indicators have been presented in Chapter 2, here the report analyses the factors that contribute to the appalling numbers.

Box 3.1

Study on "Human Security and Livelihoods of Rural Afghans, 2002–2003"

A report by the Feinstein International Famine Center at Tufts University in the United States, funded by the US Agency for International Development (USAID), documented and analysed recent trends in the relationship between human security and livelihoods throughout rural Afghanistan from 2002–2003. The study was based on the analysis of NRVA survey data, and analyses of six provinces based on primary research by the Tufts University team in Badghis, Balkh, Herat, Kabul, Kandahar and Nangarhar.

The report emphasizes the important links among four key aspects of human security in the livelihoods of rural Afghans, and the prospects for peace and development in the country in the longer term. The four aspects of human security are:

1) Human rights and personal security
2) Societal and community security
3) Economic and resource security
4) Governance and political security

The report also examines the formal, traditional and customary mechanisms that are in place to address injustice and mitigate security and livelihood threats for rural Afghans.

Policy recommendations are made based on these findings, which include the following:

On human security and physical security:

1. Countrywide, rural Afghans have very different views and experiences of security than those of the international community and the Afghan Government. A vast majority of areas that are a "high risk/hostile environment" or "medium risk/uncertain environment" for the United Nations and international NGOs are often experienced as secure, with few reported conflicts by the local rural populations. In contrast, regions that show up as "low risk/permission environment" on UN security maps are areas where local populations often report high levels of conflict and are experiencing insecurity at the hands of armed political groups, warlords, commanders and their associates, including district authorities and police forces.

On political participation and the legal process:

2. The majority of rural Afghans in Badghis, Herat, Kabul, Kandahar, and Nangarhar provinces had no knowledge of the constitutional process. Rural women were four times less likely to be aware of it than rural men. After learning about the new Constitution from the Tufts team, rural women primarily stressed the importance of education for boys and girls, health care, and equal rights for men and women, boys and girls. Rural men primarily stressed the need for a re-enforcement of *Sharia* law and economic opportunities.
3. Countrywide, the almost complete lack of participation of rural women in political and civil affairs is a direct obstacle to their human security and to their political rights, as well as to the nation-building process.
4. Formal and traditional justice systems play a direct role in undermining the human rights of women and girls.

On access to education and health care:

5. There are almost no rural, school-age girls attending school in the south and south central regions of Afghanistan. The primary reasons that both boys and girls in rural areas are not in school countrywide are the lack and distance of facilities.
6. In 38 per cent of rural districts, the majority of rural Afghans have no access to any form of health care, and in 62%, the majority have access to only basic health care, including health posts, basic health care centres and traditional healers. These basic facilities often lack well-trained personnel and adequate medical supplies or medicines.
7. Between 43–78 per cent of rural Afghans in Badghis, Herat, Kabul, Kandahar and Nangarhar provinces have no access to reproductive health care. When they are able to access care, the majority report that the quality is poor.

On rural livelihoods:

8. Countrywide, the majority of rural Afghans use surface water (rivers, lakes and irrigation ditches) as their primary sources of drinking water. Countrywide, 48 per cent report that their primary water source is contaminated or polluted.

9. Many Afghans in rural areas are not engaged strictly in agriculture, but rely on diversified livelihood strategies to generate household income. The type of non-agricultural employment differs by region. Women make contributions to household income in nearly all provinces, but usually perform income-generating work and are paid significantly less than rural men for the same tasks. Children also contribute to household income in most areas of the country.

10. The effects of the drought continue to have a negative impact on livelihoods in much of rural Afghanistan. Environmental degradation caused by conflict, drought, population movement and deforestation exacerbates the problems of limited access to natural resources for many rural Afghans.

On formal and traditional justice systems:

11. The Afghan judiciary suffers from a severe lack of human capacity and material resources. Many judges lack adequate legal training. Public legal advocates and defense attorneys do not exist within the Afghan legal system. Of those judges who are trained, the judicial leadership is divided between graduates of the *Sharia* School and those of the Law School at Kabul University. These groups are often at ideological loggerheads with each other. The three organs of the judiciary – the Ministry of Justice, the Supreme Court and the Office of the Attorney General – lack effective coordination and communication and are often ideologically opposed.

12. The judiciary is highly susceptible to military and political influences at both the urban and rural levels. Formal courts, including family courts, are either non-existent or barely functional in most rural areas. There are few women lawyers and judges in the urban areas and none in the rural areas, and rural women have great difficulty accessing the formal court system.

13. Armed political groups, commanders and warlords have strategically targeted traditional and customary justice systems (Jirgahs and *shuras*) throughout rural Afghanistan in an attempt to control local populations.

14. Very few police officers in rural areas of Badghis, Balkh, Herat, Kabul, Kandahar and Nangarhar provinces have had any official police training. Many are still loyal to their former commanders, who often serve as the chief of police, Army officers, or district or provincial authorities. Police stations are extremely dilapidated, and police officers go without essential resources.

15. The detention centres visited by the Tufts team in Balkh, Badghis, Herat, Kabul, Kandahar and Nangarhar provinces were in very poor condition and lacked basic necessities such as secure structures, sanitation facilities, and blankets for detainees. Signs of mistreatment were common; juvenile offenders were mixed with adults in a number of centres.

16. Prisoners were occasionally held in metal shipping containers or in private detention centres.

3.2. Threats to Human Security in Afghanistan Today

Threats to Survival and a Renewed Look at the "Security Dilemma"

Traditional security threats to the people of Afghanistan are both direct (violence, killings, etc.) and indirect. The latter emerge from a weakened state capacity and challenges to the legitimacy of institutions outside the capital, or from the withdrawal of international aid agencies from dangerous but needy zones. As researchers have pointed out, the many causes of insecurity in Afghanistan can be classified under five categories: warlordism, the narco-trade, groups that threaten the peace process, regional interference and crime.[1] Beyond security sector reform and the DDR process, the "security dilemma" is complicated by the distribution of responsibilities of different components of the security sector to the various lead donor countries involved, resulting in difficulties in coordination and disjointed processes. Other problems include donor fatigue, a lack of reforms

[1] Mark Sedra, ed. 2003.

within power ministries, and limited international commitment to peacekeeping.[2] The police force has been entrusted with the maintenance of order, but as an institution, it is still weak. NATO has assumed command of ISAF, with responsibility for the security of Kabul. In October 2003, the UN Security Council extended the force's mandate for another year and authorized its expansion to other parts of the country, but the deployment has been slow.

We think the human security cannot be ensured if the disarmament and demilitarization is not done and the constitution articles not enforced. The Government should persist and focus on disarmament and demilitarization of the irresponsible people. The current policy of President Hamid Karzai pertaining to the issue of disarmament is not satisfactory. We ask the president to do more.

Saleh Mohammad Haqyar from Herat

From a human security point of view, however, the NHDR postulates that the "security dilemma" for people in Afghanistan consists of the privatization of security and a pervasive military mentality in the country, both of which are detrimental to peace-building.

As the state is unable to hold a monopoly on power in Afghanistan, its authority is challenged by a number of competing factions. Local and regional commanders, some of whom also represent government structures and local officials, engage in regular fighting, often with heavy civilian casualties. Armed regional and local private militia leaders, together with their armed followers, establish their own rules for the provision of welfare and security, the collection and distribution of wealth and booty, and clientelism. A slow DDR process continues to threaten the emergence of a truly "civil" society, where disputes could be settled through words, not arms. Out of the 60,000 armed militiamen, only about 12,000[3] have been disarmed and demobilized, and the programme has stalled rather than accelerated in recent months. The hope now is to disarm 60–70 per cent of the militias before the parliamentary elections in April 2005.

Private militias have in fact become the country's greatest danger. With terrorism and these militias on the rise, the recent election itself had to be "insured" through expensive private security companies contracted by the UN, the US-led Coalition Forces and NATO.[4] The president is guarded by American Special Forces; ministers and other key government officials are also heavily guarded. The only people who have no security are poor civilians. For them, the security dilemma means feeling fearful, powerless and defenceless.

While the international peacekeepers and Coalition Forces are tackling remnants of peace-spoilers, their presence throughout the country could give rise to an insecure feeling among the ordinary population. Such a climate gives rise to vigilantes, Afghan or international, which makes it difficult to know who genuinely is involved in working for security through the Government and who is not. The use of private contractors by the US Government has created a challenge to the "perception" problem. Private security personnel are interrogating detainees, but they may not always be accountable to standards of international human rights, a fact that has been evident from investigations of prisons in Guantanamo Bay, Abu Ghraib and Afghanistan. Agents of security can become perpetuators of insecurity themselves when they are not accountable to international norms.

In a militarized society, where even Coalition Forces engage in reconstruction and rehabilitation through Regional Provincial Teams, and the US provision of food aid is carried out under independent military authority, the distinctions between legitimate and effective human rights and humanitarian action by the UN and NGOs, and a military campaign is blurred. After 24 years of independent aid to the Afghan people, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) withdrew from Afghanistan at the end of

2 *Ibid.*
3 Afghanistan's New Beginning Programme 2004.
4 Nasrullah Stakinzai 2004.

July 2004, following the killing of four of its staff, threats and insecurity. Among one of the reasons it cited for withdrawal was the "co-optation of humanitarian aid by the coalition for political and military motives."

The fighting between Taliban and Al Qaida leaders, and Coalition Forces, or factional leaders and central authorities, inevitably engulfs civilians. The privatization of security and the spread of a military mentality, even if it has been instigated by the pursuit of terrorists and peace-spoilers, has led to a climate of fear, intimidation, terror and lawlessness in many parts of Afghanistan. Most important, such a climate has given rise to a society that is ruled by the power of armed individuals, instead of vetted democratic processes.

Human Poverty

Hunger, disease and vulnerability are the fate of thousands of Afghan families living in absolute poverty, which for them means not having adequate access to food, shelter, clean drinking water and adequate medical services. Over two decades of war and internal crises caused negative rates of economic growth, while the positive growth rate of last year has not substantially trickled down to the poor. Therefore, the magnitude of poverty remains unacceptably high.[5]

Some of the main determinants of human poverty in Afghanistan are poor levels of health and education among the economically active members of households, especially women; high dependency rates in households; a lack of employment opportunities; low productivity of family plots; poor basic infrastructure; and a lack of comprehensive social policies and safety nets in the country. In addition, factors such as the isolation of communities due to inadequate roads, and therefore poor integration of rural markets to allow for the sale of agricultural surpluses are among the features of poverty in Afghanistan. Traditionally in this agrarian society, large families and a strong reliance on kin solidarity were considered viable strategies of risk control and income diversification. Today, the value of this strategy is eroding. An increase in population and the return of millions of refugees aggravate pressure on already limited resources.

As outlined in Chapter 2, the poverty line for Afghanistan has not been established yet, and incidence, extent and location of poverty are hard to estimate. In the absence of absolute numbers, we can deduce causes and consequences of poverty, which in Afghanistan has a very unequal distribution. Gender, geographic location (urban/rural, centre/periphery, etc.) and ethnicity contribute to how different people in Afghanistan experience their poverty.

The NRVA has provided a picture of the extent of rural poverty in Afghanistan, while efforts are underway to assess urban poverty. Using findings from the NRVA and from a human development analysis of the overall situation in Afghanistan, the NHDR recognizes differences in the causes and consequences of both urban and rural poverty.

Rural Poverty

Factors that contribute to and exacerbate rural poverty in Afghanistan consist of:

1. **Lack of income**: Household head unemployment is one the most important determinants of poverty, although family size, household head marital status and number of children are also critical factors.

2. **Lack of access to basic necessities:** This includes limited access and lack of basics such as food, shelter, clothing, safe water and sanitation

Poverty is the mother of many ills. Education, health, and social status are all affected by poverty. I would say, help me get out of poverty and I will help myself with all other things that you call human development.

Mohibullah from Jalalabad

[5] Najeeb Azizi 2004.

Map 3.1: Calorie Gap Rate (Calorie Deficiency) by Province



facilities, formal education, skills training, health care and others.

3. **Social exclusion and isolation:** The rural poor suffer from social, economic and political marginalization. They lack access to basic services, markets, information and opportunities for political participation to influence decision-making at the local and national levels. They have minimal opportunities to participate in decision-making in the crucial areas of social life. Thus, they are generally disenfranchised and powerless, remaining outside mainstream social, economic, cultural and political processes.

4. **Alienation and inability to interact and benefit from factors that contribute to productivity in life:** The rural poor are alienated from crucial livelihood factors such as new technologies and related opportunities for increased productivity. They also lack adequate marketable skills training and educational opportunities, and chances for participation in administration, commerce and trade. More than any other group, they generally lack productive assets such as land, production tools, livestock, equipment and machinery, which are some of the critical elements underpinning productivity and self-sustenance.

5. **Dependence:** Most of the rural poor do not enjoy property ownership rights, especially with regard to land, and they do not have access to credit. Many consequently depend on the precarious support of other people, including those providing humanitarian aid.

6. **Vulnerability:** The rural poor are most vulnerable to acute droughts, earthquakes, crop pests, commodity price fluctuations, illness and morbidity, sudden loss of breadwinners and care providers, loss of employment, and other such shocks. Already living under austere circumstances and conditions, the poor generally tend to be the greatest victims of such shocks as they are the least able and prepared to deal with or to prevent them.

7. **Erosion of indigenous cultures, values and social welfare networks:** The breakdown of social institutions in rural areas of Afghanistan, due to displacement, has affected coping skills and traditional decision-making structures. This has eroded values and social welfare systems, affecting the extended family and mutually supportive community systems.

All these interdependent factors can lead to chronic poverty: the emergence of a very poor population with extremely limited human development capacity and opportunities. For this population, poverty is passed on from generation to generation.

Urban poverty

Urban poverty in Afghanistan is as multidimensional as rural poverty, with common features such as the lack of employment, adequate housing and services, social protection, health care, education and personal security. There are, however, some underlying factors that distinguish one from the other (See Table 3.1).[6]

The 2003 NRVA, which collected data on rural areas, proposes potential similarities and differences between poverty in rural and urban Afghanistan based on the main findings of existing assessments, mainly relating to Kabul. It notes:[7]

- Because of the dense concentration of people, urban households are often

[6] WB forthcoming 2004b (draft on file with the authors).
[7] NRVA 2003.

Table 3.1: Distinctive Characteristics of Urban Poverty and Vulnerability in Afghanistan

Dimension of Poverty and Vulnerability	Distinctive Aspects of Urban Poverty and Vulnerability
Income	Greater dependence on cash and market access for consumption needs. Inherent instability of employment opportunities derived from informal sector. High ratio of dependents to able-bodied adults.
Education	Insufficient service provision in rapidly growing cities. Inability to afford school expenses. Personal safety and security risks deter school attendance.
Health	Pollution of air and water Injuries and deaths from traffic. Unsafe working conditions (informal sector). Overcrowded and unhygienic living conditions. Poor families struggle to meet costs of water and fuel.
Tenure	Land and housing often not affordable in authorized areas – poor occupy land illegally and construct houses without official permission.
Personal	Domestic violence. Family breakdown and reduced support for children – vulnerable urban populations frequently lack extended family ties, which can provide safety nets. Greater social diversity and visible income inequality can increase tensions and crime rate.
Financial	Lack of access to credit and safety nets from social and informal networks.
Disempowerment	Isolation of communities disconnected from jobs and services. Insufficient channels for obtaining employment, knowing legal rights, etc. Social fragmentation weakens ties of trust and collaboration in general.

Source: WB, "Poverty, Vulnerability and Social Protection in Afghanistan", 2004 (draft on file with the authors).

more dependent on complex public delivery systems to meet their needs than their rural counterparts may be. Protracted conflict and instability has resulted in the collapse of basic systems for urban management and investment in Afghanistan, and data on disability and diarrhoea prevalence in children under five years suggests little difference between rural and urban areas.

- Employment opportunities are often highly insecure in Afghan cities and towns, and the frequent movement of households (often living in rented accommodations) can have a negative impact on community support networks, leaving the poor extremely vulnerable.
- Urban areas are a magnet for extremely poor and destitute households and individuals who may be highly dependent on support for their survival. However, at the same time, with a higher proportion of expenditure on, for example, rent and fuel costs in urban areas, many poor households may face food insecurity.
- For many poor households, urban Afghanistan presents a high-risk environment: with accidents (road, fire, etc.), personal violence and crowded unsanitary living conditions widely reported.
- Nevertheless, an initial survey in the most vulnerable areas of Kabul suggested that over half of the sampled

households reported having more to eat now than a year ago, compared to 19 per cent who reported that they were eating less.

The consequences of both urban and rural poverty in Afghanistan can be classified as follows:

- **Vicious circle of poverty:** Owing to a lack of resources, entitlement or information, or because the infrastructure and services are simply not available, the poor do not have access to all sorts of essential infrastructure and services. As a consequence, they usually have little or no education and are not in good health. This limits their ability to find work and earn an adequate income, which in turn limits their access to infrastructure and services. The poor rarely take part in decision-making that affects their lives, and as a consequence they cannot claim a share of development. Afghanistan thus follows patterns more broadly observed in the developing world, where income (or expenditure) is correlated with other factors generally associated with poverty and vulnerability, such as unemployment, low levels of schooling or gender discrimination.
- **Inability to make use of new opportunities:** Lack of income translates into limited access to services or infrastructure that are increasingly fee-based, given a vision of development led by the private sector.
- **Limited opportunities to participate in decision-making** on the issues related to their own lives. Human poverty hence constrains the participation of people in the new democratic processes of Afghanistan.
- **Handing down poverty:** Children born in the poor strata of society have a high probability of poverty, which then trickles down from generation to generation.
- **Limited consumption and lack of use of facilities:** Poor households have difficulty even in providing for their basic food needs, and make less use of medical institutions. Expenditures on medical costs per person among the urban or rural poor is often much less than that of a person from high income group.
- **Risky behaviour:** Poverty and unemployment and attempts to break these cycles are often accompanied by crime and vices as well as violence.
- **Lack of integration** of the poor into the economy and state-building processes can also lead to social fragmentation, lack of trust in government, lack of social capital, etc.

Job insecurity

Dismal livelihood prospects are one of the greatest threats to human security in Afghanistan. Despite new opportunities from donor investments and the return of people to their land, unemployment remains a pressing problem. Although precise statistics are unavailable, it is estimated that unemployment is as high as 2 million out of an estimated labour force of some 8 million. While the recovery and reconstruction programme may result in the creation of 500,000 to 600,000 jobs, an employment gap of over a million jobs may remain. This could have serious consequences for both peace-building and development. Creating adequate employment opportunities is critical to reducing the high levels of poverty among the majority of Afghans. It could help in restoring normalcy and building a stake in maintaining peace, and provide people, particularly young men, real alternatives to fighting.

The share of the employed in manufacturing is almost negligible (two

per cent), while 80 per cent are employed in agriculture and 18 per cent in services,[8] mainly low paying jobs. Outside agriculture, there are few opportunities for secure employment. Afghanistan is a traditional agrarian society, in which the peasants, almost all of them poor, depend on what they can grow, and are particularly vulnerable to degradation of land resources. The agricultural sector is and will remain critical to economic growth and human development. However, in its current structure and capacity, this sector is inefficient, and creates more environmental problems than it pays for.[9]

The importance of agricultural and rural development in Afghanistan is highlighted by the fact that the rural population is the largest share of the total population, i.e., 71.2 per cent in 2003.[10] Thus, the agricultural sector, along with agricultural-based industry such as food processing, will remain a large and important economic arena for providing livelihoods to the majority of Afghans, particularly the poor. In this context, rural development remains crucial for poverty reduction.

Health Deficit

The lack of adequate health care system and the presence of widespread health problems are both threats undercutting human security in Afghanistan. Life expectancy at birth is a meager 45 years for males and 44 years for females, according to the CSO.[11] There is little data or analysis on the causes of these appallingly low levels. However, it is reasonable to assume that certain conditions such as poverty, poor nutrition, lack of adequate shelter and access to safe drinking water and sanitary conditions, limited access to health services, and increased infant mortality contribute to the high death rates.

High infant and child mortality rates characterize the country's poor health care system. The rates are estimated to be 115 per 1,000 and 172 per 1,000 live births, respectively, among the highest in the world.[12] Vaccine preventable diseases are major killers. The main reported causes of death among children under five years old are diarrhoea (25 per cent), respiratory tract infections (19 per cent) and measles (16 percent).[13] Diarrhoeal disease is particularly common in the summer season, causing a characteristic seasonal increase in the prevalence of acute malnutrition.[14] This is mainly due to poor access to safe drinking water and adequate sanitation – the UNICEF/CSO MICS findings indicate that 60 per cent of households in Afghanistan drink unsafe water.[15] Other factors contributing to poor health outcomes are inadequate infant feeding and caring practices, as well as the poor nutritional status of women and their economic constraints.[16]

The **maternal mortality** ratio in Afghanistan is also one of the highest in the world,[17] standing at 1,600 deaths per 100,000 live births. The ratio varies widely across different parts of the country, as indicated by the Center for Disease Control (CDC), UNICEF and Ministry of Health in their 2002 study. They found a range from 200 per 100,000 live births in Kabul to as many as 8,000 per 100,000 live births in Badakhshan, one of the highest recorded

8 CSO 2003.
9 Daud Saba 2004.
10 UNICEF/CSO 2003.
11 CSO 2002.
12 UNICEF/CSO MICS 2003.
13 Ministry of Health/CDC/UNICEF 2003.
14 Naqibullah Safi 2004.
15 According to another survey, 75 per cent of households use unsafe water sources for drinking: Ministry of Health/CDC/UNICEF 2003.
16 Naqibullah Safi 2004.
17 *Ibid*.

Table 3.2: Percentage of Rural Afghans Who Cannot Access Reproductive Health Care, 2002-2003

Province	Cannot access reproductive health care (%)	Cannot access care during pregnancy /birth (%)	Quality of reproductive health care
Badghis	78	90	Poor
Herat	59	34	Poor
Kabul[20]	75	75	Good
Kandahar	46	29	Poor
Nangarhar	43	34	Poor

Source: "Human Security and Livelihoods of Rural Afghans, 2002–2003", Feinstein International Famine Center, Youth and Community Program, Tufts University, June 2004. This survey was conducted among rural populations in five provinces: Badghis, Herat, Kabul, Kandahar, Nangarhar.

ratios in the world.[18] Over 46 women die every day from pregnancy-related causes.[19] A lack of access to adequate health care for women, particularly during their delivery, is an important determinant in this threat to human security. A study by Tufts University in five provinces concluded that a large number of rural women do not have access to any form of reproductive health care, and even where reproductive health facilities are available, the quality of service is generally poor (See Table 3.2).

Afghanistan is one of the 22 highly **tuberculosis-burdened** countries in the world, with an estimated annual risk of infection reaching 2.55 per cent, an incidence of sputum positive cases at 143 patients per 100,000 people per year, and all active cases at 319 per 100,000 people per year.[21] There are 65,000 active TB cases in the country, of whom 70 per cent are women.[22] At the end of 2003, there were 144 health facilities in 126 districts offering Direct Observation Therapy System (DOTS)[23] tuberculosis treatment, although only an estimated 56 per cent of the patients are served.[24]

Malaria is another public health threat that is prevalent and on the rise in more than 60 per cent of the country. The annual incidence is estimated to be 2–3 million, with the highest intensity of transmission in and around rice-growing areas of the east and northeast. Currently, of the 34 provinces in the country, 14 record moderate and high transmission, and 14.7 million people are at risk, according to the World Health Organization (WHO) data on national immunization. All age groups are equally affected, except in the eastern regions, where those under 15 years of age are more vulnerable, suggesting more intense transmission of

18 *Ibid*.
19 UNICEF/CSO MICS 2003.
20 Other studies indicate that women in Kabul have much greater access to reproductive care than in other provinces, as Kabul has more advanced medical care and at least one functioning maternity hospital. The Tufts study was strictly rural, and included villages close to the city in Paghman district as well as extremely remote villages in the insecure Surobi district where health care facilities were reportedly unavailable. Of course, it is also possible that this number is inflated, and that respondents may have meant that women "did not give birth in a hospital", but in fact women were able to access reproductive care.
21 Naqibullah Safi 2004.
22 GFP, "Global Fund Proposal for the third round call for proposals to fight AIDS, TB and Malaria", 2003.
23 The internationally-recommended TB control strategy is DOTS. DOTS combines five elements: political commitment, microscopy services, drug supplies, surveillance and monitoring systems, and use of highly efficacious regimes with direct observation of treatment.
24 WHO 2003b.

this disease in this area. In 2002, several outbreaks were also confirmed in the northeastern parts of the country, indicating the rapid spread of malaria to places where cases had not previously been recorded.[25]

The increased incidence of malaria could be attributed to many factors, e.g., the degraded environment and unbalanced ecosystem, vulnerable and malnourished populations, lack of health infrastructure and poor access to health care services, functional illiteracy causing non-adherence to treatment regimes, and the overuse of poor quality and counterfeit medicines that increase the resistance of biological agents to drugs.

Source: Zanbel-e-Gham, Edition 11, and Feb.2004

Mental disorders are another of Afghanistan's war wounds, yet they have been largely ignored. WHO estimates indicate that 95 per cent of the population in Afghanistan has been affected psychologically, and one in five people suffers from mental health problems.[26] In fact, as many as 30 per cent of Afghans may suffer from anxiety, depression, psychosomatic problems such as insomnia and forms of post-traumatic stress disorder. Although it is difficult to estimate the prevalence of mental illnesses among particular groups of people, a survey among women in Kabul found that 35 per cent of respondents reported that symptoms of mental health problems interfered with daily activities; 98 per cent met the diagnostic criteria for post-traumatic stress syndrome, major depression or severe anxiety; and 40 per cent met the criteria for all three diagnoses.[27] The mental health situation in Afghanistan is complicated by an extremely incapacitated mental health care system. Integration of mental health into basic health care services could substantially increase the effectiveness of the response to mental health problems.[28]

Medical conditions emanating from **drug abuse** also threaten the human security of Afghans, as Afghanistan becomes the major producer of narcotics in the world. In recent years, the UN Office of Drug Control (UNODC), other UN organizations, NGOs and Afghan communities themselves have expressed concern about the escalation of problem drug use in communities in Afghanistan and among refugees in both Pakistan and Iran. In particular, concern has been raised about problem drug use among vulnerable at-risk groups such as the unemployed, poppy cultivators, people disabled by war, ex-combatants, IDPs, refugees, women and children.

Although statistics are not available on the overall number of drugs users nationwide, the Drug Demand Reduction Project of the UN Drug Control Programme (UNDCP) has carried out a number of small-scale but telling community drug

[25] Naqibullah Safi 2004.
[26] Anna Badken 2004.
[27] IMC 2003.
[28] Peter Ventevogel, Sayed Azimi, Sayed Jalal, & Frank Kortmann 2003.

profiles since 1999. These have included an initial assessment, a profile of a group of Afghan women refugees, a comparative study of 300 Afghan street drug addicts in Quetta and Peshawar, and a July 2003 assessment of drug use in Kabul city. Collecting reliable data about illicit drug use in Afghanistan has been problematic. As the UNODC states, the use of all intoxicants in Islam is *haram* (forbidden), and in Afghanistan, the Taliban left a legacy of severe punitive measures for drug users caught by the Department for the Suppression of Vice and Promotion of Virtue. This resulted in drug use becoming an increasingly hidden and secretive activity, compounded by a fear of arrest by the police, and fear of being stigmatized by the community.[29]

Among the 200 drug users interviewed by UNODC in Kabul, women constituted only four per cent of heroin users and nine per cent of hashish users. However, they constituted 29 per cent of opium users and 35 per cent of users of pharmaceutical drug, particularly the benzodiazepine tranquillizer Valium. Key informants estimated that five to ten per cent of heroin users in their area were women. Nearly 50 per cent of heroin users interviewed had first started to use heroin in either Iran or Pakistan, signifying the importance of drug abuse prevention programmes for the refugee population.

While in many remote rural areas of Afghanistan, only a few drugs, particularly opium, may be available, in many urban areas, drug-producing districts and refugee camps there is a plethora of drugs, in particular opium, heroin, hashish and pharmaceuticals. UNODC estimates that "Drug use is not the prerogative of any one group in Afghan society, although some groups may be more at risk of particular types of problem drug use than others, for example, women, youth, the unemployed, the war-disabled, refugees, and those who live in opium cultivation and opium and heroin production areas."[30]

The problems experienced by many drug users are compounded by their general lack of accurate, practical and realistic information about drugs. Misconceptions and misinformation about the nature of drugs and their effects are common, and there is often little understanding of the potentially harmful consequences of drugs such as heroin, opium and Valium, particularly in terms of the risks of overdose, dependency and addiction. Many people who started using these drugs did not know that in the long term, they ran the risk of becoming addicted. This brings particular problems to an impoverished population with very limited access to suitable treatment and rehabilitation services. Reliable reports from drug treatment centres in Kabul suggest that some drug injectors are also sharing needles and syringes, thus increasing the risk of transmission of blood-born diseases such as **HIV/AIDS and hepatitis B and C**.

At a time when the drug economy is in its boom phase, the extremely low socio-political and economic status of women, huge population displacements, poor social and public health infrastructure, drug trafficking, use of injecting drugs and lack of blood safety practices make Afghanistan a high-risk country for the spread of HIV and other transmissible diseases. Indicators suggest that there is an increase in injecting in areas such as Kabul, Gardez, Farah and Herat; in general, drug abuse is widespread in Kabul[31] and other major cities of Afghanistan. A community drug profile study conducted by the UNODC in Kabul revealed that there are over 7,900 heroin

[29] UNODC 2003c.
[30] *Ibid*.
[31] Naqibullah Safi 2004.



Source: Zanbel-e-Gham, Edition 9, and October 2002

addicts there, out of whom more than 470 are drug injectors.[32] Research on Pakistani and Afghan drug users at high HIV risk found that only 16 per cent of those surveyed had heard of HIV/AIDS.[33] The situation is especially alarming because drug abusers are also less likely to know that sharing needles or having unprotected sex could spread sexual transmitted diseases (STDs) and other infectious diseases. Although only 6.3 per cent of the respondents had reported drug injection, 43 per cent had shared injecting equipment, on average with four to six users at one time.

By the summer of 2004, only a 45-year-old father and his two children, two years and six months old, had died of HIV/AIDS in one of Kabul's hospitals, becoming the first recorded victims of HIV/AIDS in Afghanistan. These three were among 24 people registered as infected with HIV. Although it is estimated that 200–300 Afghans are affected by the virus, the real number is probably far higher, because many Afghans with HIV or AIDS avoid talking about it publicly.[34] Lack of information about HIV/AIDS in a traditionally conservative society where most people are illiterate could potentially lead to an epidemic.

The underlying causes of **malnutrition** in Afghanistan are complex and variable, both spatially and temporally, and are determined by a wide range of factors. These include diverse modes of agricultural production, access to markets, limited assets, variation in access to health services, urban and rural disparities in terms of development, seasonal variations and environmental constraints, cultural taboos and practices regarding nutrition and

[32] *Ibid.*
[33] Steffanie Strathdee et al. 2003.
[34] *Ibid.*

health-seeking behaviour, and variable exposure to disease through the seasons.[35]

Saving lives in Afghanistan depends, therefore, on putting health care at the top of the government development agenda – having health workers in the field with sufficient medical supplies, as well as food, shelter and security. The gap in material and human resources is great. Existing health services only cover limited geographical regions, and even in the districts where health services are available, needs are only partially met. According to WHO (2003), in 2001, the total expenditure in Afghanistan on health was 5.2 per cent of GDP. The Government contributed 52.6 per cent, while 47.4 per cent was from private expenditures.[36] However, according to the CSO's 2003 *Statistical Yearbook*, the percentage of expenditure on health between 1997 and 2000 was only 0.5 per cent of total GDP. The number of doctors per 1,000 people (See Map 3.2) is a mere 0.1 against an average of 1.1 for all developing countries.[37] There is a huge disparity in the distribution of health care facilities and staff, with most located in five big cities – Kabul, Herat, Kandahar, Mazar-e Sahrif and Nangarhar.[38]

The poor health care system in Afghanistan is revealed by the fact that throughout the country, there are only 210 health facilities with beds to hospitalize patients and 0.32 beds per 1,000 people (See Map 3.3). Compared to the average of 2.7 beds per 1,000 people for other developing countries,[39] this is a very low and worrisome number. Furthermore, the strong urban bias of the existing infrastructure is disadvantageous to 75 per cent of Afghanistan's population, thus depriving the majority of fair access to health care services. Even in the districts where services are available, needs are only partially met (See Table 3.3).

An Educational Deficit

Education in Afghanistan is considered a key component in influencing awareness of life opportunities. Despite many negative impacts from longstanding

Table 3.3: Percentage of Rural Afghans Who Can Access Health Care, 2002-2003

Province	Can access any form of health care	Average time it takes to access care	Primary reason why you cannot access health care	
Badghis	33%	4 or more hours	No facilities No transport	
Herat	60%	1 or 2 hours	No facilities Bad economies	
Kabul	87%	1 or 2 hours	No facilities No Transport	No
Kandahar	63%	2 to 4 hours	No facilities No transport	No
Nangarhar	43%	2 to 4 hours	No facilities	

Source: "Human Security and Livelihoods of Rural Afghans, 2002–2003", Feinstein International Famine Center, Youth and Community Program, Tufts University, June 2004. This survey was conducted among rural populations in five provinces: Badghis, Herat, Kabul, Kandahar, Nangarhar.

35 *Ibid*.
36 WHO 2003a.
37 WB Group "Developing countries – health, nutrition", 2001, as quoted in Naqibullah Safi 2004.
38 Naqibullah Safi 2004.
39 *Ibid*.

Map 3.2: Distribution of Doctors per 10,000 People by Province



Map 3.3: Distribution of Hospital Beds per 10,000 People by Province



Illiteracy is the source of many problems in Afghanistan. With literacy people get access to information and information is what brings changes in people. Positive changes such as improved human development and human security are things people can do for themselves but they need to be empowered with information and knowledge through literacy.

Shiralam Kamalzai from Jalalabad

conflict, one positive outcome has been a dramatic change in attitudes towards formal school education. Not only do parents now understand the importance of education for the future of their children, but children themselves attach a high value to going to school. These findings are reported consistently among urban as well as rural Afghans.[40] They are also exemplified by the improvement of the six grade retention rate, which for boys has risen from 29 per hundred in 1993 to 44 per hundred in 1999 (152 per cent), and for girls has increased from 18 to 26 per 100 (144 per cent).

Afghanistan introduced free and compulsory primary schooling as far back as 1935. The Constitution of 1964, drawn up by King Zahir Shah, guaranteed free and compulsory education for all. Yet, in 1980, 89 per cent of people 25 years and above had no schooling and only 0.3 per cent had completed first level. By 1999, 69.5 per cent of Afghans (including 85 per cent of women) were illiterate.[41] Afghanistan's long conflict left its education system as one of the worst in the world. An estimated 80 percent of the country's 6,870 schools were damaged, if not completely destroyed.

Due to a dramatic change in societal attitudes towards education and with increased support from the international community, in 2002, Afghanistan enroled 3.7 million students in grades 1–12, the largest figure in its history. Of these, 80 per cent went to primary schools, among which 78 per cent were in grades 1–3, and 30 per cent were girls. Nevertheless, fundamental challenges remain: only half of the school-aged children were enroled in primary schools, and significant gender disparities persisted, especially in rural areas. Female cumulative enrolment drops as girls progress through the grades. A majority of all students cope with substandard facilities – often in the open air or in tents with little or no furniture or learning materials. The content and quality of education is not satisfactory, and infrastructure, equipment and services are insufficient to meet current and future demands.

Unequal access

The unavailability of schools is among the top obstacles preventing boys and girls from going to school, according to the NRVA. This is more so for girls than boys. In addition, for girls, family commitments, marriage and tradition play a larger role, while for boys employment is more of a restricting factor.

There are regional as well as rural and urban disparities in education that are threatening human security and human development in Afghanistan (See Chart 3.1). Thirty years of development practice have focused largely on urban areas, which have skewed the distribution of schools, students and teachers. Out of 3,705,235 students, 74,205 teachers and 6,870 schools in the country, 1,269,665 students, 29,614 teachers and 2,233 schools are located in Kabul, Nangarhar, Balkh, Herat, and Kandahar (See Maps 3.4 and 3.5).[42] There are 130 kindergartens in Kabul with 12,760 students and 2,466 teachers, with a teacher-to-student ratio of 1:5, while in the rest of the country there are 106 kindergartens with 11,460 students and teachers, with a teacher-to-student ratio of 1:13.[43] In the higher education system, there are a total of 22,717 students and 1,449 teachers.[44]

Gender disparities also plague Afghanistan's education system. Out of 3,705,235 school students, 1,171,963 are

40 Sallick and Hashimi, as quoted by Lutfullah Safi 2004.
41 UNICEF 1999.
42 CSO 2003.
43 Lutfullah Safi 2004.
44 CSO 2003.

Map 3.4: Number of Students per Teacher by Province



Map 3.5: Distribution of Schools per 10,000 People by Province



female (See Chart 3.2).[45] According to *Securing Afghanistan's Future*, among over 22,000 students in the higher education system, only 4,363 are women. There is only one female professor with a Ph.D., out of 89. Women who choose to pursue higher education in Kabul and don't come from there face the fact that out of 11,749 dormitory students, only 121 women have access to dormitories. A stark regional and gender disparity is also evident from net enrolment rates, which are as high as 87 per cent in Kabul (boys 92 per cent and girls 81 per cent). In three localities – the city of Herat, Badakhshan province and Herat province – girls' net enrolment is higher than that of boys. The other extreme can be found in Badghis and Zabul provinces, where enrolment for girls is as low as one per cent.[46]

In the provinces, education infrastructure is concentrated in the provincial centers, while some districts do not have high schools.

Achievements and challenges ahead

The enthusiastic demand for education far exceeds expectations, and this has placed pressure on the school system in terms of physical access, the need for classroom supplies and the shortage of qualified teachers.

Chart 3.1: Regional Disparities in the Distribution of School Students, 2002



Chart 3.2: Gender Disparities in Distribution of School Students, 2002



Source: Z

[45] CSO 2003.
[46] TISA, "Technical Annex of Education," in *Securing Afghanistan's Future*, TISA 2004, quoted in Mohammad Najeeb Azizi 2004.

The Government now considers education one of its top priorities, with a specific focus on:

- Improving the education infrastructure;
- Teacher development;
- Improvements in secondary education such as through building science laboratories;
- Curriculum development;
- The establishment of kindergartens;
- Promoting long-distance education programmes; and
- Eliminating prevailing gender disparities.

For this, the Government budget allocated US$250 million, the second largest amount of its 2003 development budget. However,



Source: Zanbel-e-Gham, Edition 2, April 2003

only US$77.47 million has been committed by donors, with a gap of more than 60 per cent not financed.[47] Much of the required amount was not forthcoming because of a perception that the reforms lack credibility. However, this represents a setback for the prospect of making strides in education.

Shortfalls in the education system involve not only the infrastructure aspects, which should be targeted by development programmes, but also curriculum development, gender disparity, equal access in school attendance, and the low salaries paid to teachers. These issues are particularly important in areas where traditional religious schooling is a cheap and accessible contender for the minds of the young. To provide equal access to a basic and balanced education system, realistic policy goals are needed to aim for quality primary, secondary, tertiary and vocational education, as well as literacy and teacher education. This calls for increased allocations for the education sector, along with support for general, non-formal, functional literacy, vocational and teacher education programmes, and distance radio learning to compensate for the lack of capacity in remote areas of the country.

Over the years of conflict, particularly in the last decade, many NGOs filled the void left by the lack of a central Government by providing services in support of Afghan education. There now is an ambiguity about the role of NGOs as implementing agencies. Some argue for phasing them out of the education sector, underscoring the need to ensure longer term sustainability and the lack of qualifications of some NGOs to deliver educational services. The Ministry of Education needs to establish clearer criteria for service delivery and to guide the selection of NGOs for project implementation.

By its own estimates, the Ministry of Education needs at least 28,000 more teachers. Most do not have qualifications beyond grade 12 and are paid low salaries – about US$43 per month. Moreover, while some 74,205 teachers are currently in service, only 27 per cent are women. Kabul is the only city where female teachers (65 per cent) outnumber male teachers (35 per cent).[48]

There is currently no unified national curriculum. At present, due to the lack of capacity and inadequate infrastructure, less than 0.1 per cent of the population reaches higher education, one of the lowest figures in the world. This is in an era where knowledge is considered to be the main driver of growth, be it economic or in terms of human development.[49]

Further attention also needs to be given to the "lost generation" – an entire population of Afghans aged 12 to 30 whose education was terminated by ongoing conflict. Although well beyond the usual school age for Afghanistan, these people must be incorporated into the educational scheme through vocational schools that teach basic skills necessary for any productive member of society, and adult learning centres for those with the will to obtain a high school diploma.

Environmental Degradation and Its Impact on Water, Food Insecurity and Poverty

Environmental degradation and poor access to clean and safe drinking water and sanitation are major environmental security threats to Afghans. Man-made and natural threats to the environment have been caused by erosion, felling of trees,

[47] *Ibid*.
[48] CSO 2003.
[49] All figures presented here on education have been collected by the Planning Department of the Ministry of Education, and quoted in Lutfullah Safi, 2004. However, according to the NHDR team's calculation from CSO's *Statistical Yearbook 2003*, the percentage of population absorbed in higher education is only 0.1 per cent.

destruction of watershed and desertification. The impact on people has been considerable.

Safe water and adequate sanitation

Observations and consultations with people from diverse communities have revealed that water scarcity is one of the key human security threats in Afghanistan, as it is essential to maintaining agricultural productivity, which is the heart of the Afghan economy and livelihoods. There is already a battle in the country between increasing water demands and limited available water resources, as the process of reconstruction and economic development creates more demand.[50]

Surface as well as groundwater resources in many parts of the country have been severely affected by the continuous years of drought, as well as by uncontrolled and mismanaged extraction procedures. As dependence on groundwater resources increases, deep wells have been drilled without considering the long-term impacts on regional groundwater resources, including traditional *Kareez* systems (underground canals connecting wells), many of which have dried up in recent years. At the same time, the country's scarce wetlands are completely dry and no longer support wildlife populations or provide agricultural inputs. Water-use efficiency is very low in all sectors, particularly in irrigation, and causes loss through evaporation of over half of the water supply. There are also significant water losses due to outdated water supply infrastructure, lack of maintenance, and poor water supply management practices in urban areas.[51]

In May 2004, a survey of households in the southwest of the country by the Afghanistan Network on Food Security found that reduced water quality and quantity caused a loss of income, a reduction of assets or both. As a coping strategy, some households reduced the quality or quantity of their diet in some districts, whereas households in other districts drew on investments, took loans from either friends or traders, or sold livestock. When wealthy groups were asked about the priorities for government intervention in these regions, the rehabilitation of irrigation systems was most frequently cited, although this frequency varied significantly between districts.[52]

Poor access to clean and safe drinking water and sanitation are other major threats to human security in Afghanistan. Poor infrastructure limits access, and as a result, parasitic diseases such as giardiasis and amoebas, are very common. Cholera breaks out frequently during the summer season in different parts of the country.[53] Most health insecurities are indeed water-borne diseases, related to poor hygiene and unsafe water.

The UNICEF/CSO MICS found that at the national level, only 8.5 per cent of the population had access to piped water in 2003, which broke down as 23.8 per cent of urban residents and two per cent of rural populations. The rest of the people used protected and unprotected wells, springs, rivers and pools. However, piped water does not necessarily mean safe and clean water. Overall, 32.5 per cent of Afghans drank safe water, 61.7 per cent unsafe water, and 5.8 per cent both safe and unsafe water.[54] The percentage of people using safe sources of water varies widely between provinces, and even in particular provinces between districts and villages (See Map 3.6). For example, 30.3 per cent of people in Nangarhar City were using piped water,

[50] Daud Saba 2004.
[51] UNEP 2003.
[52] *Afghanistan Monthly Food Security Bulletin* 2004.
[53] Naqibullah Safi 2004.
[54] UNICEF/CSO MICS 2003.

Map 3.6: Percentage of Households with No Drinking Water by Province



Map 3.7: Percentage of Households Not Using a Flush or Pit Toilet by Province



while in Nimruz, Uruzgan, Paktia, Paktika, Zabul, Parwan, Sari-Pul and Samangan, piped water was almost non-existent, and the majority of people used unprotected and unsafe sources.

Perhaps worst of all, urban drinking water supplies are contaminated with coliform bacteria, posing a considerable risk to public health. Water resources across the country are threatened by contamination from waste dumps, chemicals and open sewers. In Kabul, water samples clearly indicate that the city's drinking water is cross-contaminated.

Food insecurity

Food insecurity in Afghanistan is manifested by poor caloric consumption and malnutrition among a large percentage of the population. Though the situation has recently improved throughout the country, the vast majority of people still face some degree of food insecurity, both in terms of quality and quantity.[55] The causes are not only several years of severe and continued drought since 1999, but also insufficient income to purchase necessities. The limitations on population movements as a result of poor security in some parts of country, poor transportation infrastructure, seasonal and climatic obstacles, depletion of productive assets at the community and household levels, and a lack of employment opportunities continue to be some of the major ongoing threats to food security.[56]

According to a study by the World Food Programme (WFP), some 1.4 million Afghans are affected by continued drought and crop failure, and US$50 million is needed to tackle the severe situation facing the country today. With a renewed drought, cultivation continues to fall, while price inflation keeps basic foods out of the reach of an increasing number of poor people. Low salary levels do not correspond to the high price of staple food items, especially in the main cities, as monitored by WFP, which has maintained food prices in six regional cities (Kabul, Kandahar, Mazar, Herat, Faizabad and Jalalabad) since 1996.

One of the reasons for the crippling food shortage is a radical change in the pattern of cultivation from wheat to more profitable poppy cultivation, which needs a small piece of land without much water.

Though the population in Afghanistan has characteristically demonstrated a remarkable resilience to the recurrent threats to their food security, the capacities and coping strategies of the most vulnerable communities have been exhausted. Family structures and the labour force have been disrupted by prolonged separations as family members have sought informal labour opportunities outside the country. Girls have been forced into arranged marriages at unusually young ages as a means of securing income for the household.[57]

Access to land and livestock

Access to land is both a human security goal by itself, and a conflict-prevention measure, as competition over land and water has been showed to potentially flare into disputes and conflicts. The aggravation of tensions is conditioned by the lack of availability of arable land (currently standing at 12 per cent of total land of the country)[58], the inefficient access to and use of water and land, and related social factors, i.e., settlement patterns, destructive coping strategies, and to a lesser extent, inter-communal prejudice and practices of exclusion.

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55 S. Lautze, et al. 2002.
56 Naqibullah Safi 2004.
57 Naqibullah Safi 2004.
58 Mir Ahmad Joyenda 2004.

Loss of access to land and the scarcity of water for agricultural use, combined with poor diets, have led to the displacement of distressed populations. A recent Ministry of Health/CDC/UNICEF survey indicated that an estimated 37 per cent of households have been displaced largely to urban centres due to food insecurity related to land.[59] This situation is further exacerbated by a sharp increase of the population in the past 25 years, the return of rural refugees, and the recent urban development boom on agricultural lands. In major cities such as Kabul, Herat, Kandahar and Mazar-e-Sharif, the expansion of urban developments is eating up the most fertile lands, a process that, if it is not stopped, will irreversibly degrade and destroy the fragile and limited agricultural lands of Afghanistan, depriving many of their livelihoods.[60]

Pastoralist groups of Afghans, such as the Kuchis', are seriously threatened by loss of access to pastures, declining numbers of livestock due to disease or distress sales during the latest drought years, as well as limited employment opportunities. The Kuchis are facing a higher degree of nutritional and food security risks than others.[61] Additionally, widespread outbreaks of livestock diseases and the reduction of veterinary services and vaccination programmes has negatively impacted livestock and livestock products, both in numbers and quality.[62] This is at a time that less than one per cent of the land is protected, and no management is taking place to safeguard biodiversity and conserve the ecological integrity and wildlife of Afghanistan, as the basis and means of livelihoods and production for the poor.[63]

Restoration of forests and other vegetation cover combined with grazing management are high priorities to combat erosion, desertification and flood risks. Reorienting production in rural areas from subsistence models to market-oriented approaches will also help overcome some of the environmental problems that degrade land resources.

Air pollution

Of all the environmental concerns, the level of air pollution is the most obvious challenge to the health of urban populations. Prevailing public and media ignorance, however, minimizes concerns. Afghanistan's urban dwellers are exposed to many of the worst toxic and carcinogenic air pollutants known. Smog is a common phenomenon in Kabul and other major cities, while a combination of dust and smoke particles is a common form of air pollution in rural areas.[64] Air pollution is considered one of the leading risk factors for respiratory diseases, such as chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, lung cancer, pulmonary heart disease and bronchitis.

Addressing air pollution requires concerted efforts towards sanitary waste disposal, inspection regimes for air quality, better management of traffic, improvement of efficiency in household energy use, and above all, an adequate policy for sustainable urban development. The design and implementation of a national air quality standard and policy could be a prerequisite to achieving these goals.

Energy

There are multiple links between energy, poverty and the environment that have to be addressed. Afghanistan is an energy-

59 Ministry of Health/CDC/UNICEF 2003, quoted in Naqibullah Safi 2004.
60 Daud Saba 2004.
61 MRRD/WFP 2003.
62 FAO/WFP 2003.
63 UNEP 2003.
64 Daud Saba 2004.

deprived country, and per capita energy use is substantially low by international standards, a problem that has to be tackled with adequate policy design and implementation. The production and use of energy have environmental consequences to which the poor are especially vulnerable. This is because they use inefficient and more polluting energy systems than those who are better off. As well, while low energy consumption is not a cause of poverty, the lack of available energy services correlates closely with many poverty indicators. Increasing the level of energy services is a prerequisite to sustainable and adequate living conditions.[65]

Improving the levels of human development in Afghanistan is directly connected to the ability to adapt new technologies and innovations to satisfy the needs of economic development and of the people. Developing small and medium multi-purpose hydro-electric systems on the country's many rivers will provide new modes of water management and irrigation, and supply direly needed energy.

Multiple impacts on poverty

Most of those who suffer from air and water pollution, inadequate sanitation, and poor solid waste management are the poor. Sewage and wastewater often spew into open gutters and canals, posing an extra risk to poor children. People in poverty are also most affected by floods, erosion, felling of trees, destruction of watershed, desertification, earthquake disasters and harvest failures.

Among vulnerable populations, men and women are exposed to environmental stresses in different ways. Their work environment often varies, a fact that may have considerable health consequences. For example, women are more exposed to high levels of indoor air pollution due to the fact that they spend more time at home, working in the kitchen. They end up doubly affected by environmental deterioration, first because of poverty, and second because of their status in their traditional patriarchal society. In such a setting, they bear a disproportionate burden that exposes them to a greater number of environmental hazards.[66]

Gender Discrimination

Gender insecurities persist in Afghanistan despite the achievements of the past two years in opening schools and putting women back in public spaces.

The context of gender relations in Afghanistan must be viewed through the prism of traditional Afghan culture, which is intensely patriarchal.[67] It must be recognized that the primary social unit in Afghanistan is the family, extending to kin group and tribe. Most Afghan women do not want to be marginalized from their family unit, and the integrity of the family must be respected, particularly when targeting specific groups for assistance, especially women. Afghan culture is based on the code of honor, which is largely manifested in the behaviour of one's "women".

The foundation of gender roles is the division of space into the public/community (men's) space and the private/domestic (women's) space, with corresponding roles and responsibilities for each.[68] Many men and women, particularly in rural areas, are satisfied with this arrangement in relation to one another. What is not acceptable are their current social conditions. Basic needs for food, shelter, health and education are not being met, and the demand for these

65 Ellen Morris and Sudhir Chella Rajan 1999.
66 WRI 1996.
67 Homaira Nassery 2004.
68 *Ibid*.

necessities transcends gender roles. Deprivation of basic human needs affects –everyone – men, women and children.

Two important developments challenge traditional gender roles and will serve as critical catalysts for change:

1. The inevitable advent of globalization, with the influx of large amounts of aid and opening up of markets and media, forces Afghanistan to join the international community, so it is to be expected that traditional gender roles will shift.

2. Decades of conflict have forced women to take on new roles as heads of household, following the death, displacement and participation in combat of their customary male providers. These women have managed lands, properties, agricultural activities and families. To see Afghan women only as victims grossly underestimates their growth and contributions.[69]

A disrupted progress

Strides towards modernization and progress for women began some 120 years ago and continued through the better part of the 20th Century, only to be pushed back by the events of the last two decades. In the 1880s, Amir Abdur Rahman, in line with Islamic teachings, forbade child and forced marriages, and supported inheritance and divorce rights for women. His grandson, King Amanullah Khan, further improved the status of women by establishing girls' schools, granting rights for men and women to choose their own marriage partners, encouraging women to establish their own women's associations, and offering women a choice with regard to wearing the traditional veil.

In the 1950s, opportunities for women significantly increased. They entered the workforce and Government, began to access higher education and attend universities, served in Parliament and the cabinet, worked as diplomats, judges and even army generals, and helped write the Afghan Constitution of 1964, which granted them equal rights with men. These strides toward modernization and progress were slow but solid. In the 1980s, women made up 70 per cent of the country's teachers, 40 per cent of its doctors and half of its government workers.

Some progressive steps were taken for women under the communist regime of the 1980s, when Afghanistan was occupied by the Soviet Union. For example literacy programmes for women were expanded, and women were allowed to travel, go to school and bring knowledge back with them. However, for the first time, women were sent to jails and tortured by the communist government on suspicion of political ties with opposition groups. Rural women were subject to routine bombing together with other civilians.

The ensuing lawlessness that followed during the years of civil war curtailed women's right to full participation in social, economic, cultural and political life. Women and children became victims of artillery attacks and armed conflict, abduction and rape, all resulting in extreme trauma.[70] Millions of Afghans, a majority being women, became refugees in neighboring countries.

Under the Taliban, women' rights were suppressed altogether. By closing all girls' schools, women were deprived of the right to education. They were ordered to remain in their houses, and employers were threatened with dire consequences for taking on female employees. Women lost the right to travel: No woman could venture out of the house alone and unaccompanied by a prescribed male member of the woman's immediate family. They were

[69] *Ibid*.
[70] AI 1995.

deprived of the right to health: A woman could not see a male doctor even in life-threatening instances.

A renewed promise?

Afghanistan's emergence from its long struggle after the defeat of the Taliban in November 2001 led to some notable positive changes and progress for women. They went from complete marginalization to greater freedom to participate in public life, access to education and employment, and participation in decision-making in the peace process and the reconstruction of the country. The re-emergence of media, the reopening of academic institutions and the formation of professional associations are increasingly expanding women's roles. The NDF stressed the enhancement of women's status, for it saw progress towards gender equality as a critical issue for Afghanistan.

As a result, important institutional changes have occurred. Women were guaranteed a quota in the constitutional process in 2003, a quota of reserved seats in Parliament (64 of 250 seats in the lower house), ministerial representation in the Cabinet (with a Ministry of Women's Affairs and a State Minister for Women), and a semiformal caucus in the government–donor aid structure. Afghan women began raising their voices, whether educated or not. Proof came in a projected participation of 11 per cent for women in the first Emergency Loya Jirgah, which was exceeded by almost half. Women also made up 44 per cent of the voters registered for the presidential elections. And women's publications have proliferated in spite of the prevalence of fear and the threat of retribution against women who dare to claim a public presence.[71]

The most remarkable accomplishment with respect to women's position in Afghan society has been Afghanistan's new Constitution, which was ratified on 4 January 2004. "Any kind of discrimination and privilege between the citizens of Afghanistan are prohibited. The citizens of Afghanistan – whether man or women – have equal rights and duties before the law."[72] The Constitution also reserves 25 per cent and 17 per cent of the seats in the National Assembly and the Senate for women respectively. Each province will have one woman representing it in the Lower House of Parliament, the House of the People, and the President will appoint one third of the delegates to the upper house, the House of the Elders, half of whom will be women (one-sixth of the total).[73] In addition, the Constitution pledges to promote educational programmes and health care for women.

Although Afghanistan's new Constitution deserves acclaim for granting women equal rights and a greater share in the country's political structure, its implementation is perhaps one of the most important challenges facing Afghanistan. A key issue relates to women's legal identity and access to legal resources, about which data are mostly unavailable. In 2002, only one to two per cent of women had identity cards and 98 per cent had no formal papers, proof of citizenship or legal identity.[74]

Still fearful

The lack of security across the country not only impedes progress in the rehabilitation of Afghanistan, but also in the advancement of women. Many girls, while having the legal right to education, do not attend school for fear of being kidnapped or attacked and raped on the way. But security is not the only challenge to women's full and equal participation in the rebuilding of their country. The prevalence of conservative attitudes limits their role in civil, cultural, economic,

[71] Homaira Nassery 2004.
[72] TISA Afghanistan Constitution 2004i.
[73] UNIFEM, "Update, Issue #3", November 3, 2003.
[74] WOMANKIND 2002.

political and social life, at all levels of society.

Women continue to suffer from gender-based violence, both as a consequence of the past conflict and in the course of their domestic lives. There are incidents of early and forced marriages, domestic violence, kidnapping of young girls, and harassment and intimidation. In impoverished rural areas, families have been reported to sell their daughters to escape desperate conditions or to settle bad blood between families. An IOM report released in February 2004 claimed that Afghanistan was an important source for human trafficking, including that of women and children. Human rights violations related to trafficking take the form of forced labor, forced prostitution and sexual exploitation.[75] Incidents of self-immolation by women to escape forced marriages and domestic violence are not rare. In the past year, the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) recorded at least 110 cases of self-immolation by women in just five parts of the country.

According to Amnesty International, the criminal justice system is simply unwilling or unable to address issues of violence against women. "At the moment it is more likely to violate the rights of women than to protect and uphold their rights."[76]

Police reform and the integration of women into the police forces therefore holds great promise for Afghan women at present. The prisons for women are abysmal, and the crimes most imprisoned women are convicted of are dubious.[77] Serious attention needs to be paid to the improvement of judicial institutions and their implementing bodies. The DDR programme must include women as decision-makers and evaluators – because the target population of male ex-combatants will be returning to villages, cities and communities that consist of women and girls.

Still not free from wants

With the increase in female-headed households due to the war and displacement, as well as the loss of traditional kin-based coping mechanisms, poverty disempowers Afghan women much more insidiously than official discrimination does. As long as women are focused on meeting their own and their families' basic needs for food, water and shelter, they are effectively blocked from seeking real power via education, activism and legislation. This is where the need for practical gender needs sometimes conflicts with strategic gender needs.[78]

According to the NRVA, female-headed households have the highest incidence of poverty of all the vulnerable categories, and they also have a higher than average presence of disabled members. They are more inclined to be landless, have lower ownership of cows, low access to electricity, and worse than average water and sanitation facilities.[79]

Self-employment for Afghan women has been limited due to the lack of credit and banking facilities in the country. When women do secure external funding sources, as in the carpet weaving populations of the north, they are usually in the form of traders in the markets, who charge fairly high levels of interest, so that the final product, when sold, provides a marginal income. Micro-credit schemes implemented by NGOs have had mixed results, and the overall impact on the lives of women and children has not been measurable.[80]

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75 IOM 2004.
76 Amnesty International 2003a.
77 Homeira Nassery 2004.
78 *Ibid*.
79 NRVA 2003.
80 Homeira Nassery 2004.

The majority of Afghan women are rural. This has serious implications for how gender is mainstreamed into rural and agricultural projects, as well as local governance structures, particularly since most of the needs assessments have not sought the views of rural women (and men), and thus their voices have not been heard. The burden of labour that falls on rural women is substantial, since it can encompass agriculture, child-rearing, livestock and traditional crafts (as a source of income), in addition to care of the family. The fundamental causes of rural women's lack of access to basic needs such as water, land, credit, training and extension services must be taken into consideration in project planning and delivery. It is also important to understand that the interconnections between women's and men's roles are stronger in the rural areas than in the cities due to the symbiosis of their labours.[81]

On the health and education status of women, the indicators continue to be staggering. The data available reflects Afghan women's lack of health care services, and inadequate food, water and shelter. Other factors influencing their health include early marriage, frequent pregnancies, little or no access to birth control, and lack of money for health care. According to UNFPA, the average Afghan woman who survives until the end of her childbearing years will have had an average of eight live births and several more unsuccessful pregnancies. Over 80 per cent of maternal deaths are considered preventable.

The high illiteracy levels for women and girls continue to be not only a primary obstacle to their full participation in society, but also to their health and well-being.

According to this cartoon, many men seem to be threatened by the attention and funding that is being directed towards women in the post-Taliban period.

Source: Zanbel-e-Gham, Edition 2, Feb.2002

Human Rights Violations

As stated in *Securing Afghanistan's Future*, "After more than two decades of war and internecine violence, a culture of impunity has become the norm rather than the exception in Afghanistan."[82] This sparks fears in the hearts of many Afghans. Moreover, the lack of effective mechanisms to ensure basic rights produces its first victim: the trust between citizens and the state that is supposed to protect them.

In addition to the violations of women's rights discussed in the previous section, and the right to development, which for this NHDR are part of the larger context of human securities, a number of human rights violations continue to be reported in Afghanistan.

[81] Nancy Dupree Hatch 1996.
[82] TISA, "Technical Annex: Human Rights," *Securing Afghanistan's Future*, 2004g.

These are exacerbated by the continuation of low-intensity conflict in many areas outside Kabul, the weakness of law-enforcement structures, and ineffective legal and judicial processes, including courts in some regions. A general disregard for the rule of law persists unfortunately among not only paramilitary organizations and independent "warlords", but also agents of the state and even the international community. Ultimately, the continuation of human rights violations is a reflection of a lack of political will on one side, and the low awareness of human rights issues among the population on the other.

Human security is embedded in Islam and so is democracy. When we talk about democracy or human security or social justice or human rights, etc. we shouldn't present it as if these are new ideas that could not be found in our religion.

Zabihullah from Logar

A number of steps have been taken in monitoring human rights abuses in Afghanistan since the Bonn Agreement, not the least of which is the ratification of a Constitution that recognizes the fundamental rights and duties of the people. A human rights oversight office has been established in the Ministry of Interior, and the AIHRC was set up with a "complaints' department within the Ministry of Justice. It has registered 634 cases of violations since June 2003. Human rights violations have also been monitored closely by Human Rights Watch (HRW), Amnesty International and Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) among others.

Yet, a number of important challenges remain, not the least of which have to do with a commitment to human rights within the state-building process.

Marginalization of human rights within the reconstruction process

At the Bonn Conference, the United Nations was asked to support the Afghanistan Interim Authority, supervise the reconstruction, lay the foundations for a political democracy, and introduce a human rights regime at the same time. To coordinate these three tasks simultaneously proved more challenging in implementation than on paper. The NHDR recognizes four of the challenges of mainstreaming a rights-based approach in the reconstruction process:

1. UNAMA has a clear mandate to promote human rights in Afghanistan, and the UN Commission on Human Rights, based in Geneva, contributed to the strengthening of the AIHRC and to mapping human rights violations. Nonetheless, no donor (or group of donors) has taken on a strong human rights advocacy role.[83] UNAMA, as the UN's peacekeeping mission in Afghanistan, initially had a weak institutional commitment, demonstrated through under-sourcing and marginalization of the human rights component, and lack of personnel devoted to this within the organization in Kabul and in the regions during the first year of its activities.[84] The current structure for UNAMA improves on this pattern by integrating human rights into the mission's political and development pillars. However, it will require significant political will and resources to follow through on the major tasks of establishing accountability procedures that apply to all people, including current leaders, and incorporating rights-based programming throughout all UN operations.[85]

2. The reconstruction process may not have adequately integrated a rights-based approach to its programming. This has been demonstrated through the marginalization of human rights concerns within strategies such as *Securing Afghanistan's Future*, perhaps as an indication that financial

[83] Suhrke, 2004.
[84] *Ibid*.
[85] CESR 2002.

institutions involved in the reconstruction process generally view human rights activities outside of their mandates and mark a distinction between political and economic processes.[86] Yet addressing the human insecurities of Afghans requires not only rhetorical human rights commitments, but the provision of sufficient resources and precise tools to incorporate rights-based programming within all reconstruction projects.

3. Another shortcoming has been the lack of genuine consultation with the Afghan people on the determination of priorities and needs. Most of the development strategies designed in the past two years have had to face the constraints of logistics, time, capacity, etc. which has resulted in insufficient participation of not only the Afghan people, but also of many policy-makers within ministries. Lack of consultation on national policies could lead to a lack of trust and a denial of the right to participate.

4. Logistical and capacity constraints aside, there has not been sufficient political will for a comprehensive human rights needs assessment to ensure that reconstruction programmes are based on priorities expressed by Afghans themselves, to establish baselines and benchmarks, and to address root causes of deprivation and insecurities. Coupled with this is the need for enabling genuine public access to information to ensure transparency and public scrutiny of programmes, as well as monitoring to guarantee the progressive improvement of people's living standards as called for in human rights treaties.[87] Such assessments are a tool of empowerment, enabling community participation and providing a check against corruption and waste.

Key human rights problems prevailing throughout the country can be summarized as follows:

Intimidation by armed groups

Human rights organizations have noted extortion, harassment and violence against civilians at military and police checkpoints; the forced conscription of civilians, including under age boys; abductions; arbitrary and politically motivated arrests; and some extrajudicial killings by the police and other security forces. Intimidation and torture have not been limited to the Afghan police, official security forces or warlords and their clients. In March 2004, HRW reported that "today, on Afghan soil, the United States is maintaining a system of arrests and detention as part of its ongoing military and intelligence operations that violates international human rights law and international humanitarian law (the laws of war). In doing so, the United States is endangering the lives of Afghan civilians, undermining efforts to restore the rule of law in Afghanistan, and calling into question its commitment to upholding basic rights."[88]

Access to and ownership of land

Some of the most common violations recognized by the AIHRC are the destruction of houses, the occupation of land and the forced selling of properties. The AIHRC has investigated and registered around 300 violations related to arbitrary house destruction and property occupation since June 2003. The UN Rapporteur on Housing exposed high government officials as culprits in a case of "land grab" in Kabul in September 2003. The AIHRC has called for the resolution of property-related

There is no human security in Afghanistan for so far it is the law of the jungle that is ruling our country. Warlords are the effective rulers almost everywhere in the country. Human rights of ordinary people are at their mercy, they violate them as the wish. No one can dare to defend their rights.

Mohammad Ashraf from Kabul

[86] *Ibid.*
[87] *Ibid.*
[88] HRW 2004b.

disputes and the creation of a sustainable system for property allocation, distribution and registration as among the prerequisites for the development of the country, and dubbed property theft a major human rights concern, especially for disadvantaged groups (minorities, returnees and refugees, women, etc.).

Distribution of, access to and utilization of land, pastures and woodlands is of key importance to the livelihoods of the vast majority of the population in Afghanistan. Not surprisingly, conflicts and disputes over land ownership and tenure are overwhelming traditional and formal judiciary institutions.[89] The problem with land tenure conflicts is not an absence of a legal system. It is, firstly, the parallel existence of at least three types of codified rights (written and unwritten customary law, religious law and state law). Secondly, no matter whether conflicts are dealt with by councils (*shuras*), commanders, administrators or traditional judges, they all have to take into account the real power of the conflicting parties. In that sense, none of the available procedures for conflict resolution are reliably shielded from power politics.[90] Years of "commando administration" have deeply discredited official institutions such as courts. Most people therefore turn to customary law and traditional conflict management institutions, including violent self-help. While customary law appears to have a sound normative foundation with regard to farmland, it is much weaker and more disputed with regard to the complex issues of differentiated, sometimes seasonal rights of access and utilization of pastures and forests.[91]

The exploitation of ethnic or religious differences to justify deprivation of rights or even violent action against opponents in land tenure disputes is a further high risk of such power-influenced and contradictory normative and legal codes. Research in Badakhshan produced evidence that this practice has a legacy of at least 20 years and, though less violent of late, appears to plague some districts with multi-ethnic or multi-faith communities.[92]

The right to movement and ethnic discrimination

During the war, the right to movement was restricted by different Governments and groups. Between 1978 and 1992, movement from resistance-controlled areas to Government-ruled ones (mainly from rural to urban) were very difficult for even common people. After 1992, the country was split into numerous fiefdoms controlled by different parties and ethnic groups, and it was not easy for people to move freely, at times even within one city. Today, approximately 60,000 Pashtun IDPs have yet to return to their former homes in northern provinces after local commanders targeted Pashtuns following the fall of the Taliban for murder, looting, rape and destruction of property. Security concerns, as well as the drought, discourage some refugees from returning to their country.

Human rights of detainees

The AIHRC and other human rights monitoring bodies, including the US State Department's Annual Human Rights Report, have point out the ill-treatment and torture of detainees, arbitrary detentions, prolonged pre-trial detentions due to a severe lack of resources in the judicial system, and inhumane conditions in prisons. The main concerns of the AIHRC are cases of torture, arbitrary detentions, extrajudicial killing cases in prisons by local authorities, and illegal detentions stemming from property

89 For land and pasture disputes, see Mir Ahmad Joyenda 2004.
90 Jan Koehler 2004.
91 *Ibid*.
92 *Ibid*.

disputes. Overcrowding and limited food and medical supplies contribute to deteriorating health and even death among prisoners. Human rights organizations have also noted the existence of private prisons where torture is committed that belong to the commanders and warlords in provinces. Some, as the international press came to find out in the summer of 2004, are run by American bounty hunters, who, for instance, kept a private jail in Kabul.

The right to participation

The right of citizens to participate in the decision-making processes of a nation is a key indicator of the health of its civil society. Afghanistan's newly ratified Constitution has paved the road towards national elections. The Presidential election marked the first time Afghanistan experimented with direct and countrywide suffrage for the choice of a national leader. However, elections are only the first steps towards ensuring meaningful participation. It must be kept in mind that the purpose of participatory political systems is to ensure that the rights of citizens are protected. It will be naive to assume that the elections by themselves will lead to this result. The subsequent Parliamentary elections needed to overcome not only logistical problems but also cultural, political and social challenges, including the lack of security, lack of a reliable census, lack of experienced political parties, and lack of general awareness in the population about the process and value of elections.[93]

Political intimidation

Intimidation was widespread during the voter registration process, leading to the deaths of both male and female officials. The US State Department's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for Afghanistan noted that intimidation, attacks, and killings took place during the 2002 Loya Jirgah process.[94] HRW reported allegations of violence and intimidation against regional representatives and delegates in the preparation of the Constitutional Loya Jirgah, including during the process, where several powerful military and party leaders threatened less powerful delegates, and agents of the National Directorate of Security spied on and delivered threats to delegates. HRW warned that vote-buying and intimidation had undermined the assembly during December 2003. As the State Department report noted: "Human rights sources indicated that political intimidation and violence in the Constitutional Loya Jirgah registration process was a problem. However, other reports, including those prepared by the U.N., suggest that intimidation was localized and did not significantly impact the outcome of elections."[95]

Perceptions of Poor Governance and Justice

Many Afghans have high expectations that policy-makers will take the unique opportunity that Afghanistan has for reforms following the elections. However, the slow record of change up to now and lack of delivery on promises of security and development may have gradually eroded trust in weak state institutions and spread a fear that the existing peace may only be partial or temporary. This fear results in the withdrawal of many from actively participating in political life. Once withdraw their support from the peace process, the state may become isolated from society, and the window of opportunity may close.

Political exclusion is visible in the form of labeling and stereotyping entire ethnic,

There are lots of words but little action. One sees few deeds on the part of the Government that would suggest the Government's seriousness with respect to human security; whereas, it should be the top priority.

Nezam Gul from Laghman

93 Nasrullah Stanikzai 2004.
94 United States Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, "Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – ", released 25 February 2004.
95 *Ibid.*

Afghanistan has no policies for any of the things that help with human security and human development. It has no education policy, it has no health policy, it has no economic policy, it has no environmental policy, it has no security policy. It just takes everything by the day and many of the days are bad. I wish I could have been more optimistic.

Hamdullah from Jalalabad

linguistic or religious groups; the monopoly of power; inadequate ethnic representation in higher ranking government positions; denial of the right to employment to certain groups such as the disabled; access to higher education that is restricted to certain groups; unequal distribution of resources; and the monopoly of the public media by one group.

Threats also include the perception that people have about the relationship between the state and warlords and narco-mafia bosses. In the summer of 2004, regional strongmen still wielded significant influence over scarce resources, and often set and enforced their own rules and their own personal or group interests. To change the negative domination and menace of power-holders over the state-building process in the country, it is necessary to implement a radical reform to address conflicts of interest in the structure of the state, and in doing so, to secure the national interests of Afghans, rather than the interests of particular groups.

Without an institution that transcends communalism, steps to address the threats that arise from fragmentation cannot take hold. A functioning state must replace the status quo, the wielding of power by local warlords. Otherwise, the lack of state power and influence at the local level will continue to be a critical deficit. To overcome this problem, connecting local community management capacities to local state institutions must become a strategic goal. So far, the central Government's soft approach has failed to provide institutional cornerstones for conflict transformation, state-building, and social and economic reforms, even though people's demand for more state involvement in local governance is high all over the country.

With political and militia groups still focused on personal, group, or ethnic interests, allegations and labels such as "war criminal" are assigned only to the loser groups. No one is being tried the human rights violations or crimes against humanity that have persisted for 23 years, and accusers have failed to assume any responsibility for their own crimes. This political dishonesty was identified during the NHDR consultations as a serious obstacle to national reconciliation. Assuming responsibility and trying to learn from mistakes would be an essential step towards mending broken relationship and regaining lost trust, among Afghans, and also between the state and the citizens. In the eyes of Afghans, an incompetent government is one that is unable to adequately address major grievances, fails to enforce law and order, and cannot meet the basic needs and aspirations of the people.

Threats to Survival: Mines

A serious threat to survival in Afghanistan is the continued presence of mines. Afghanistan is one of the three most mine-afflicted countries in the world, with an estimated 10 million scattered throughout the country. The landscape is littered with other unexploded ordnance (UXO) – rockets, mortars, grenades and fuses that have the potential to maim or kill. Children are especially vulnerable to injury. Many are at risk just by performing everyday chores such as gathering wood, tending livestock and collecting water for their families.[96] The latest estimates indicate that between 150 and 300 people are killed or injured by landmines every month, many of them children. Estimates from the United Nations Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan (UNMACA) indicate that 860 people were killed or injured by landmines in 2003 (See Chart 3.3). The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) calculated that 7,097 Afghans had been killed or wounded by landmines between 1998 and 2003.[97]

[96] Save the Children (US) 2002.
[97] United States Department of State 2004.

Table 3.4: Percentage of Rural Afghans Living Among Landmines and UXOs by Province, 2003

Province	Badghis	Herat	Kabul	Kandahar	Nangarhar
Landmines	13%	17%	62%	7%	24%

Source: "Human Security and Livelihoods of Rural Afghans, 2002–2003", Feinstein International Famine Center, Youth and Community Program, Tufts University, June 2004. This survey was conducted among rural populations in five provinces: Badghis, Herat, Kabul, Kandahar, Nangarhar.

Map 3.8: Percentage of Villages per District in Which Landmines Affect Access to Schools, Clinics, Markets, Agricultural Land, Water or Homes (2004)



Source: UNMACA 2004.

Map 3.9: Mined Area Situation in Afghanistan as of May 2004



Source: UNMACA, 4 August 2004, Kabul.

Map 3.10: Total Area Cleared of Landmines as of March 2004



Source: UMACA, 4 May 2004, Kabul.

Chart 3.3: Landmine Victims in 2003



Source: UNMACA database, 2004.

Chart 3.4: Landmine Victims by Gender 2003



Source: UNMACA database, 2004

3.3. Conclusions

An analysis of the "fears" and "wants" that characterize everyday existence in Afghanistan today leads us to make the following conclusions about how they relate to threats to human security:

1. **It is not constructive to prioritize wants and fears:** It is often noted that security is a pre-requisite for development. The threat analysis presented here, however, shows that development concerns can create insecurities themselves, and are just as urgent. Human security embodies the notion that problems must always be addressed from a broader perspective that encompasses both poverty and inequality. Both lead to insecurity and conflict, in addition to being "inhumane" by themselves. The imperative is therefore to simultaneously work on "freedom from fear", which entails provision of security and a violence-free day-to-day life for everyone in the country, and "freedom from want", which calls for providing not only the basic needs of food, shelter and services, but also the more strategic needs that support long-term, sustainable development.

2. **Threats are interconnected:** Threats to human security in Afghanistan are inter-connected in two ways. First, they are mutually linked in a kind of domino effect: health insecurity could lead to poverty, which could lead to education deficits, etc. Or responses to insecurities stemming from environmental degradation could contribute to population movement into other fragile ecological settings, a deteriorating health situation, hunger, loss of livelihoods, and so on. Second, the various threats can spread within the country (with impoverished areas, for example, threatening the stability of more progressive ones); bleed into other regions (through massive employment migration, export of arms, environmental degradation, etc.); and negatively impact global security (through breeding discontented armed groups, drug exports, etc.). Dysfunctionality in one part of the system structurally and sequentially affects other sub-systems, and leads to a vicious cycle of causes and effects.

   These linkages increase the urgency of dealing with threats.

3. **The answers are not just military:** The real guarantor of national security is not solely military power, or the expansion of ISAF or ANA troops, but a strategic and sustainable human development agenda that favours social, political and economic conditions from a rights-based and

inclusive perspective. Such an agenda should imply a secure livelihood, which includes sustainable employment with a decent income; access to universal and quality health care and education; a clean and sustainable environment; freedom from fear of crime and infringement of civil rights; and freedom from fear of violent conflict.

4. **The responsibility does not belong to the state alone:** The state seems to have a special responsibility in the minds of the people of Afghanistan, although historical experience shows that the state itself at times became a perpetuator of insecurities. The notion of state responsibility was expressed by people consulted by the NHDR team, and in a CARE survey that showed that 81 per cent of Afghans expect the Government to provide services in the next three years, while group discussions revealed serious concerns about accountability and capacity. That people in Afghanistan continue to rely on a state that they do not trust poses serious questions about the level of awareness and empowerment that individuals and communities have. While public policies by the Government and international community are the main tools to achieve human development and security goals, one cannot neglect other critical components, including advocacy by civil society, good practices by market forces, and proactive action by individuals and households.

Chapter 4

Causes and Consequences of Insecurities

Photo: Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh

Chapter 4

Causes and Consequences of Insecurities

4.1. Introduction

This chapter analyses the impact of two decades of conflict on the people of Afghanistan and on the institutions that affect their lives. It examines the "how and why" of the threats discussed in Chapter 3, and then goes on to discuss the potential causes of the conflict using a framework of "greed and grievances". Political, social and economic processes that have led to or resulted from the Afghan wars are viewed in terms of their relationship to people's wants and fears.

A Warning

The following chapter argues that preventing future conflicts in Afghanistan requires targeting and responding to root causes, both internal and external.

Although external factors such as foreign invasion and interference were the predominant factors fomenting conflict in Afghanistan, persistent and pervasive human insecurity deepened and sustained the war and devastation. In the future, stronger human security could be viewed as a requisite mechanism for preventing new eruptions.

Conflict in Afghanistan can be ascribed to both grievances (motives) and greed (opportunities). This NHDR postulates that both grievances and greed still flourish, and may not have been dealt with sufficiently enough to prevent future conflicts. Greed spurred by the drug economy and on the rise among those hungry for more power and wealth has kept the Government fragile. It is unable to fulfil many of its responsibilities to meet people's needs in terms of welfare, employment and security. This in turn could eventually lead to disenfranchisement and disillusionment. Ineffective and short-term policies focused on political compromise will not prove an adequate strategy. Instead, there is a need to identify the root causes that may continue to endanger the new democracy.

A Historic Overview of the Afghan Conflict

The causes and consequences of crisis, and their implications for state-building, cannot be understood in isolation from Afghanistan's historical and international context.[1] A historical perspective is especially important in assessing the roots of the country's current situation. Afghans have a historical memory of tensions over land, failed states, challenges to power structures and external intervention. This memory lingers long after the guns have been set down.

Afghans have a historical memory of tensions over land, failed states, challenges to power structures and external intervention. This memory lingers long after the guns have been set down.

A detailed examination of Afghanistan's history of unremitting conflict and external domination exceeds the scope of this report. However, to be accurate, any analysis of the current situation and reconstruction efforts needs to be underpinned by an understanding of the causes and the impact of the conflict. Internally, Afghan history is characterized by tribal and ethnic rivalries, and a struggle for progress. Externally, powerful neighbours and regional powers have sought influence and imposed regimes. Overall, ordinary Afghans have had little opportunity to participate in the decision-making processes that have affected their lives.

[1] This section draws among other sources from the background paper by Hanna Schmitt 2004.

Box 4.1

Different Phases of the Afghan Conflict Since 1979

1979–1988 – Jihad in a Cold War context: The Afghan rural resistance fights the Soviet-backed Kabul regime. The Sunni resistance parties receive military and financial support from Pakistan, the United States and Saudi Arabia, and the Shia parties from Iran. More than 5 million Afghans become refugees in Iran and Pakistan. The Geneva agreements of 1988 pave the way for the Soviet withdrawal. An interim Government, composed mainly of Sunni parties but also including some Shia parties such as the Hizb-e Wahdat and the Harakat-e Islami Mohsini, is set up under the aegis of the United States, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.

1989–1992 – Jihad among Afghans: After the Soviet withdrawal, an internal war between the Soviet-supported Government of President Najibullah and the various Afghan factions ensues with continued support from the Soviet Union and the United States. However, the collapse of the USSR and the ending of US aid alter the balance of power. The Najibullah regime collapses when Dostum and his Uzbek militia switch allegiance from the Kabul regime to the Mujahideen, who enter the capital in April 1992.

1992–1996 – Factional war: The Mujahideen Government is fractured by internal power battles and shifting alliances among the major party leaders. As superpower influence declines, regional power interests reassert themselves and the conflict assumes the characteristics of both a regional proxy war and a civil war. In late 1994, the Taliban emerge, with a stated objective of restoring stability. In September 1996, they take Kabul.

1996–2001 – Talibanization: Fighting continues between the primarily Pashtun Taliban, backed by Pakistan and the United States, and the non-Pashtun United Front (UF), backed by Iran, Russia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and India. The Taliban control roughly 90 per cent of the territory, and the UF occupy the remaining pockets of land. Both sides have access to external aid and international markets, and continue to pursue their objectives through military means.

2001–Present: US-led international "war against terrorism".

Adapted from Mohammed Haneef Atmar and Jonathan Goodhand, "The Challenge of Winning the Peace", published in: Searching for Peace in Central and South Asia, 2002.

Afghanistan, a largely mountainous country capped by the majestic Hindu Kush, has always been of strategic importance to the colonial "great powers" (Russia and Great Britain, and later the United States). The country's present borders were established at the end of the 19th Century, when the great powers sought to establish a buffer state between the British and Russian empires. After the Second World War, the "Great Game" began once again, this time between an expansionist USSR looking south, and a new superpower, the United States, keen to influence events in Iran, Central Asia and China. While Afghanistan preserved its political neutrality, it received considerable quantities of development and military assistance from both the United States and the USSR.[2]

In 1964, under King Zahir Shah, Afghanistan adopted its first liberal Constitution. It allowed for greater political freedom and provided for a two-chamber legislature. These changes ushered in a period of democratic experimentation, accompanied by some freedom of the press and rudimentary forms of political activity by many newly formed political parties. The 1970s, however, were a tumultuous decade. Shah was overthrown by his cousin Mohammad Daud in 1973, and a second, military coup in 1978 by the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) installed a pro-Soviet communist regime. In 1979, in response to increasing fears of Islamic resistance both within Afghanistan and in the newly declared Islamic Republic of Iran, the PDPA "invited" the Soviets to invade Afghanistan, marking the beginning of Afghanistan's 23-year-long war.

[2] From 1955 to 1978, the Soviet Union provided Afghanistan with US$1.27 billion in economic aid and roughly US$1.25 billion in military aid, while the United States furnished US$533 million in economic aid. See Barnett Rubin 2002b.

The Afghan conflict mutated over time, passing through several distinct phases. From late 1979 until February 1989, Soviet military forces occupied the country, encountering fierce resistance from the Western-backed Afghan guerilla fighters, known as the Mujahideen.

The resistance movement received substantial international assistance. Aid shot up from US$30 million from the United States in 1980 to US$630 million in 1987, with Saudi Arabia approximately matching the US contribution.[3] During this period, about 3 million refugees settled in camps along the Afghan border in Pakistan, and about 2 million fled to Iran.

Various international NGOs established operations in refugee camps, providing humanitarian assistance to refugees and also helping to channel international aid to the Afghan areas that were under the control of the Mujahideen. The Soviet occupation was also characterized by large-scale changes in rural Afghan society and its institutions, as villages emptied and existing hierarchies eroded in the wake of massive displacement. Authority increasingly came from local Mujahideen militia commanders, whose newly acquired wealth and power was bolstered by an aid–arms industry.

Soviet troops withdrew in 1989, following the international Geneva Accords of 1988. The Accords, however, failed to address the post-occupation government setup needed for peace-building, and war continued between the Mujahideen and the Soviet-installed regime of President Najibullah. In 1992, the United Nations negotiated a deal with President Najibullah under which he would step down to establish a broad-based transitional authority. However, this attempt was hijacked by the divided Mujahideen factions, who could not agree on a power-sharing formula and instead stormed Kabul from different directions. While fighting ensued, Afghanistan was renamed the Islamic State of Afghanistan, although there was no united strategy for running the Government.

In the course of this phase of the conflict, different commanders took over different parts of the country. Front lines and coalitions changed frequently, with the infighting fuelled by neighbouring countries backing various Mujahideen factions and commanders willing to serve their interests in Afghanistan.[4] Once again, atrocities were committed against the Afghan population at large; many people ended up internally or externally displaced. Another important aspect of this time was the transformation of Afghanistan's economy. As financial assistance from the superpowers declined with the end of the Cold War, fighters were obliged to procure alternative local sources of funding their activities. Consequently, Afghanistan became a "transport and marketing corridor" for drugs and contraband.[5]

The third phase of the Afghan conflict began with the arrival of the Taliban on the Afghan military scene in 1994. The Taliban, who consisted mainly of Pashtun youth, rose out of the refugee camps in Pakistan, from where they brought the conservative values taught in the *madrassas* (Quranic schools). The Taliban enjoyed the financial and military support of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Agency, and were also welcomed by the majority of the Afghan population, which was traumatized by the behaviour of local Mujahideen fighters. Initially, the role of the Taliban was to secure the main transport routes, and to remove or disarm

3 Barnett Rubin 2002b.

4 In the course of the conflict, the different factions became proxies for the interests of their own regional sponsors, namely Pakistan and Saudi Arabia on the one hand, and Iran, Russia, India, and the central Asian republics of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan on the other.

5 Christopher Cramer and Jonathan Goodhand 2002.

the different Mujahideen checkpoints.[6] Sultan Barakat 2002. In 1996, groups opposed to them formed The United National Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (The Northern Alliance), and open conflict broke out between the two camps. The Taliban, however, enjoyed military superiority and advanced with relative ease, taking control of Kabul in September 1996. In October 1997, the country became the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.

The Taliban regime was based on a very strict interpretation of *Sharia* law. Television, music and photography were banned, as were games and numerous popular leisure activities. Taliban rule particularly affected the lives of urban women and girls who had to wear the all enveloping *chaddari*, and who were forbidden to attend schools or university, to work, or to leave their homes without a male relative. Men had to grow their beards, wear traditional Afghan clothes and attend prayers regularly in the mosque. During the Taliban regime, the war economy was further consolidated and Afghanistan became the world's major source of opium, with a production of 4,600 tons in 1999. Simultaneously, the Taliban abandoned many of the core functions of the state, such as welfare and representation.[7] By mid-2001, the Taliban controlled more than 90 per cent of the territory of Afghanistan, and had established some level of security by ending factional fighting. Nevertheless, the Taliban were never accorded official international recognition, and their strict policies (especially those regarding women) earned them the condemnation of most of the international community.[8]

The last phase of the Afghan conflict started in October 2001, when, as a response to the September 11th terrorist attacks, an international coalition led by the United States invaded Afghanistan and ousted the Taliban regime with the help of the Northern Alliance. The Taliban were then replaced by a Government composed of the three Mujahideen coalition groups and the Rome group led by the former King, Zahir Shah. The international community negotiated this arrangement in Bonn in December 2001.

4.2. A Framework of Motives and Opportunities

As the opening page of the Nobel Prize-winning economist Amartya Sen's On Economic Inequality asserts, "The relation between inequality and rebellion is indeed a close one". The poor may rebel to induce redistribution, and the rich may mount secessionist rebellions to preempt redistribution.[9] From this perspective, income and asset inequality, which in traditional agrarian Afghanistan mainly implies land ownership and access to water, could be considered as a trigger of the conflict in 1979. It started in the aftermath of land reform policies carried out by the Government at that time.

Although the complexity of the Afghan conflicts cannot be oversimplified, for the purposes of a human security analysis one could propose that the first phase of the conflict (1978-1992) may have had a very different motive than the second phase (1992-2001). In the first phase, conflict could be accounted for in terms of motives. Rebellion occurred as a result of grievances that included threats to independence, cultural values, poverty, illiteracy, political repression, threats to livelihoods, and human rights violations, all fueled by foreign occupation. These grievances prompted people to engage in violent

6 Sultan Barakat 2002.
7 Christopher Cramer and Jonathan Goodhand 2002.
8 Ahmed Rashid 2000.
9 This is analogous to the theory of tax exit proposed by Buchanan and Faith 1987.

protest in defense of their motherland, national dignity and cultural identity. Theirs was also a civil aspiration for freedom, justice and fairness, as well as freedom from poverty.

In contrast to this phase, the post-1992 conflict could be explained in terms of opportunities.[10] According to this model, conflict as an industry generates profits from looting in such a way that "The insurgents are indistinguishable from bandits or pirates".[11] Rebellion during 1992-2001 in Afghanistan was mainly motivated by greed, which was sufficiently common that profitable opportunities for rebellion were not passed up.[12] A particularly powerful factor in this context was the dependence of many of the Mujahideen groups upon primary commodity exports, such as lapis lazuli, emeralds, rubies, timber, and, in the later stages, opium gum along with archaeological and antique artefacts. All of these provided income to finance the war.

Recent studies of the causes of conflict cast economic agendas (greed) against political ones (grievances) in causing and sustaining conflicts.[13] The Afghan case, however, shows that economic agendas have been intertwined with social and political crises. Grievances have included worsening poverty and inequality that can centre on ethnic or cultural identities. They have been fuelled by and in turn added fuel to "greed", associated with the rise of conflict entrepreneurs and war profiteers, private militia commanders and narco-mafia-style profit seekers. It is this dimension that has led to the collapse of legitimate state authority and social control, which has bred crime and disorder, disturbed livelihoods, diminished resources, degraded the environment, spread poverty-related diseases and hunger, exhausted the national budget, spiked inflation, depleted the national historical heritage, and, in the end, led to further dependence on international humanitarian operations.

A human security analysis gives as much weight to the objective reality of opportunities (greed) as to the more subjective perception of the motives (grievances). Perceptions of threat may be as significant as any objective differences in economic wealth or political or military power. Fear is easily reinforced and manipulated by those in power, and can prove as effective a means of control as overt violence.[14]

A human security analysis gives as much weight to the objective reality of opportunities (greed) as to the more subjective perception of the motives (grievances).

Conflict as Transformation

It is misleading to talk about "the Afghan conflict" with a unified term. First, the conflict in Afghanistan has had vertical ties with a conflict system that comprises interconnected zones of instability and spans the entire Central Asia region as well as southwest Asia.[15] Second, the conflict itself underwent several transformations, which may not have always been about breakdowns, but also about opportunities for beneficiaries. It is therefore misleading to hope for a smooth transition from "war" to "peace", especially since the distinction is blurry in the history of Afghanistan. "Wars are sites of innovation, leading to the creation of new forms of legitimacy and protection. Conflict and struggle have historically been essential for the advancement of peoples on the margins and one could argue that minorities have advanced their position as a result of the conflict. Violent resistance may ultimately have positive

10 See H.I. Grossman 1991 and H. I. Grossman 1999.
11 Grossman 1999.
12 According to the "Machiavelli Theorem" (Hirshleifer 2001) no one will pass up a profitable opportunity to exploit someone else.
13 See, for instance, Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler 2001.
14 Sarah Collinson 2003.
15 Barnett Rubin and Andrea Armstrong 2003.

social outcomes – the growing assertiveness of historically excluded groups such as the Hazaras may be one example. Conversely 'peace' may be associated with particular political agendas, and in the interests of dominant groups – 'national reconciliation', promoted by the Najibullah regime for instance, or the 'security' brought by the Taliban could not bring lasting and equitable peace."[16]

The transition from war to peace is therefore not a simple agenda. Recognition of conflict as a form of breakdown but also of opportunities requires a subtle approach. Old conflicts will continue (for example, center–regional tensions) and new ones will emerge (for instance, land conflicts related to returnees). War has altered institutions and social structures, such as by leading to new relationships between the bazaar and the countryside, between ethnic groups and their access to power, etc. A nuanced approach to conflict resolution, peace-building and reconstruction therefore requires recognizing the underlying process of transformation. Policy objectives cannot simply be "peace" or "ending wars", but must be directed towards transforming institutions, networks and incentive systems, regionally, nationally and locally.[17]

One can postulate that poverty and lack of progress on development indicators exacerbated and sustained the conflict in Afghanistan. Poverty forced people to join militias as an alternative to employment, for example.

4.3. Causes of the Conflict: Grievances and Greed

Grievances

Horizontal Inequalities and Poverty

The causes of conflict are often manifold, and attempt to agree on one determining factor are generally not successful. From the onset, it is hard to pinpoint whether grievances such as unusually high inequality and weak political and civil rights are the main motives that explain rebellion in Afghanistan. They have always been, however, serious and widespread. Absolute poverty, social and political exclusion, acute inequality, and inequity in the distribution of resources and opportunities among different identity groups based on ethnicity, geography, etc. have made Afghanistan vulnerable to conflict in the past, as they may in the future. One can postulate that poverty and lack of progress on development indicators exacerbated and sustained the conflict in Afghanistan. Poverty forced people to join militias as an alternative to employment, for example. The lack of viable and alternative livelihoods or opportunities perpetuates the sense of frustration, creating new tensions (such as over land and natural resources) or feeding into existing tensions (e.g., inter-ethnic rivalries). While underdevelopment may not directly cause violent conflict, poor social, economic and environmental conditions as well as weak or ineffective political institutions certainly diminish the capacity to manage social tensions in a non-violent manner.

The existence of "horizontal inequalities", defined as a differentiated access to socio-economic opportunities, resources and power-sharing, has fostered a reality of multiple experiences within Afghanistan. These inequalities can lead to deep-rooted conflicts when they combine the issue of identity with that of inequality in a historically or emotionally charged situation. Power inequalities and asymmetries can include sources of long-term as well as short-term grievances, ranging from economic inequality to asymmetries stemming from gender, race, religion, ethnicity, etc. It is not the mere existence of these inequalities, but a collective feeling of "unfairness" stemming from a skewed distribution of development gains among different groups, as well as political opportunities for power and

[16] Johnathan Goodhand 2002.
[17] See B. Rubin, A. Ghani, W. Maley, A. Rashid and O. Roy 2001.

expression, that can feed animosities. Ignoring these factors points to the failure of political structures to address these inequalities on the one hand, and to curb the dominance of particular groups on the other.

In Afghanistan, the relative human poverty of different ethnic, gender or geographic groups is hard to identify given the lack of disaggregated statistics. If available, these data could show the scope of poverty or illiteracy by different groups, and the extent of their marginalization from international markets or state benefits. It may be safe to assume that aggregate statistics can hide realities. But pockets of poverty and inequality can prove detrimental to the overall situation when they result in instability.

Conflict and peace in Afghanistan point to a dialectical relationship, i.e., peace makes development possible, but development must also start now in order to reinforce and consolidate peace, and provide a platform for human security and human development. Obviously, if people were busy and cared for, they would not seek out conflict. Poverty, on the other hand, which is the reality across much of south and southwest Afghanistan, in places such as Paktia, Paktika, Zabul, Helmand, Nimruz,and Uruzgan, could lead to situations where people don't have anything to lose. They can therefore be easily manipulated by extremists, international terrorist organizations and narco-mafia lords. For these groups, conflict creates an opportunity to grab power, means of production, assets, and so on.

Land and Water Resources

Land degradation has long contributed to tension and grievances in Afghanistan. While lack of access to land has been a concern for the majority of Afghans (grievance), it has also been an asset and a means of control for power-seekers (greed). Land disputes are preoccupying in that, if not dealt with within a reasonable period of time, they can foster conflict, particularly if they have been exploited for political and military ends.

More than 100 years of power struggles in Afghanistan have set the scene for present day land disputes. Each region has its own history of land changing hands multiple times as one of the most precious spoils of war.[18] The multiple claims that stem from this history are unfortunately accompanied by few title deeds. Where they exist, they are often contested because customary, religious and state laws have generated various forms of documentation to prove land ownership. As the International Crisis Group (ICG) noted, "Every commander that comes starts giving out land to his people with legal documents. There are multiple claims to land and many of these disputes involve big commanders. If they just involve ordinary people they can be solved at a local level, usually in the form of compromise, but these are only the small disputes. Often land is controlled by commanders who have no wish to let go, then they threaten, they kill."[19] Two decades of migration have further complicated the situation. As large numbers of refugees return to resettle regions where they once made their homes, they are finding themselves confronted with new conflicts and insecurities over land rights.

About 80 per cent of Afghans depend on what they can grow, but the country increasingly lacks water and fertile land.

About 80 per cent of Afghans depend on what they can grow, but the country increasingly lacks water and fertile land. Even in the relatively peaceful 1970s, less than six per cent of the land was irrigated. The war almost halved that. Drought, which has withered the land for as many as seven years in some regions, has lowered

[18] Jeanette Kroes 2004.
[19] International Crisis Group 2003c.

water levels across the country. Pumps brought in to lift water to higher lands often deprive those downstream, while water taken for agriculture frequently draws down the shallow wells that are the only source of drinking water for villagers. Generally, the drought has increased inequalities, as the wealthy have met their water and land needs at the expense of the poor. It was also an ally of the Taliban. They could not have pushed north without picking up farmers along the way who, having lost their crops and herds, hoped to earn something by shouldering a gun.

As Afghanistan's IDPs and refugees continue returning home, the country's land and water resources will be stretched to the limit if they are expected to satisfy the needs of all. The parched southern regions in particular were suffering from the effects of continued drought in 2004. People in this area are increasingly desperate and isolated, which naturally renders them all the more receptive to the fruits of the one crop that is supremely suited to both Afghanistan's geography and its political instability – opium.

Ethnic Fragmentation and Domination

Internal strife in Afghanistan has often been characterized by outside experts as an ethnic struggle. Those who throw the ethnic factor into the mix of major root causes for the Afghan crisis base their analysis on the observation that warring factions were formed around ethnic and regional lines. In the chaos of the 1990s, following the withdrawal of Soviet troops, ethnicity seemed to become the dominant factor in the civil war. The Jamiat-e-Islami of President Rabbani and General Masoud, the Jumbesh-e-Milli of General Dostum, and the Hizb-e-Wahdat of Abdul Karim Khalili presented themselves as representative of the Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras, respectively. This enabled them to mobilize troops and justify their existence. The Taliban too fit seamlessly into this ethnic pattern on the basis of their predominantly Pashtun membership and support from the south and east.[20] Factions within the anti-Taliban alliance derived their military manpower from their respective ethnic groups: Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras of northern and central Afghanistan. All factions were extremely ethnocentric, with each having committed excesses against the people of rival ethnic groups on numerous occasions. This, in turn, has been touted as evidence of grievances among ethnic groups turning into bitter internal conflicts.

Some sources suggest that substantial inequality and discrimination over a long time may account for current ethnic tensions. Before the war, Pashtuns dominated the Afghan state. However, the conflict brought a new assertiveness from non-Pashtun minorities such as the Tajiks and Hazaras, who also mounted an effective resistance to the Soviet invasion. There was consequently a shift in the ethnic balance of power during the course of the war. The political motives of interest groups behind the opposition brought ethnic differences to the forefront. Although few resistance parties were absolutely mono-ethnic, they were nonetheless geographically based and thus dominated by a particular group. With the fall of the Najibullah Government in 1992, Afghanistan fractured mostly along regional and ethnic lines. All parties committed human rights abuses, and once atrocities began, ethnic polarization increased. Clearly, it is impossible to separate the rise of ethnic tensions from subsequent political developments, and the use of ethnic identity and past grievances to serve the political and hegemonic ends of greedy interest groups. The state of overall insecurity in Afghanistan has created an environment of human vulnerability ideal for this kind of manipulation.

[20] Frank A. Clements 2003.

While the observation that Afghan warring factions were factionalized along ethnic lines may be accurate, the analysis and conclusions drawn from it have often been misleading. Such analyses fail to take into account the fact that the Afghan conflict was kicked off by a foreign invasion and then kept alive by the meddling of neighbouring countries. They continuously pursued their various self-interests in Afghanistan though their Afghan clienteles – who often belonged to the same ethnic, linguistic and religious groups. The Afghan population, by and large, and regardless of their ethnic, linguistic, regional and religious background, detested their own ethnic warring factions as much as those of other ethnicities.

Although some experts equate ethnic groups with dominant military–political movements and see them as uniform bodies, many insist that there has been no real "ethnicization" of the Afghan conflict. In fact, it would appear "...even the relevance of ethnicity as a factor of military and political cohesion remained limited in Afghanistan's civil war, with countless commanders and combat units changing their allegiance several times out of political opportunism and economic incentive – independent of their ethnic affiliation."[21]

In a report about human rights and reconstruction in Afghanistan by the Center for Economic and Social Rights – based on a countrywide survey in December 2001, when the war against the Taliban and Al-Qaida was at its very height – respondents largely disputed the importance of ethnic-based societal outbursts as the cause of the Afghan war. Blame for ethnic tensions was attributed to political interest groups and military factions, along with their foreign sponsors, who were accused of building regional power bases along ethnic lines and continuing to manipulate ethnicity as a pretext for political revenge and profiteering. Many expressed fear that ongoing ethnically targeted human rights abuses by these factions could undermine the social cohesion of the country for years to come. The United Nations was also criticized for taking up false ethnic divisions at the behest of Afghan leaders, rather than working to bring ordinary people together around issues of common concern. The director of an international NGO was quoted as saying, "I conducted a survey of 700 people on the importance of ethnicity in Afghan society. The only people who raised the issue as important were aid workers with the UN and NGOs."[22]

Contrary to many common assumptions, the various ethnic groups such as Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras, Turkmens, Baluchs, Nuristanis and others have evolved into a mix of Afghans with a fairly common culture, psychology and ethos. For example, Pashtuns from the eastern and western parts of Afghanistan have more in common with Tajiks and Uzbeks from the north than with the Pashtuns of Pakistan. A more accurate conclusion may be that although they are ethnically diverse, the Afghans have mingled into one distinct identity, historically, politically and socially. It is this distinction that prevented Afghanistan from disintegrating, as has been the case in ethnically divided countries such as the former Yugoslavia.

Contrary to many common assumptions, the various ethnic groups such as Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras, Turkmens, Baluchs, Nuristanis and others have evolved into a mix of Afghans with a fairly common culture, psychology and ethos.

As Afghanistan moves towards a new political system, it may need to wrestle with the fact that even in democracies, a small group may fear permanent exclusion if political allegiance is based on ethnicity, and one ethnic group claims to be a majority. The incentive to exploit the minority increases with the size of the

[21] Conrad Schetter 2001.
[22] Center for Economic and Social Rights 2002.

minority, since there is more to extract.[23] Hence, a minority may be most vulnerable if the largest ethnic group constitutes a small majority, a situation referred to by Collier and Hoeffler (2001) as ethnic dominance. It is defined as occurring if the largest ethnic group constitutes 45-90 per cent of the population. Although this phenomenon is as common in peace as in conflict, the use of ethnicity by armed groups in Afghanistan has surfaced mainly in terms of physical force against others.

The source of inter-group tension has therefore not been ethnic diversity itself, but the phenomena of polarization and dominance. It is also worth noting that historically, societies characterized by ethnic and religious diversity have been safer than homogenous societies, as long as they avoid dominance. Diversity makes rebellion harder because of the greater cost of rebel cohesion, although it would be difficult to argue that diversity reduces grievance.

The source of inter-group tension has therefore not been ethnic diversity itself, but the phenomena of polarization and dominance.

While the recent history of the Afghan society is marked by political and even violent attempts for ethnic dominance, diversity in the country has positively prohibited disintegration, keeping the national integrity of the country intact.

The danger today in Afghanistan is the continued manipulation of differences by dominant factions, who have wrought catastrophic consequences by targeting minorities in areas under their control. Many ethnically and politically targeted victims from the past decade feel bitterness over the neglect of justice and accountability with respect to those responsible for these heinous crimes. In the end, the problem in Afghanistan is not ethnicity, but the skewed distribution of resources and justice across the entire population.

Source: Zanbel-e-Gham, Edition 6, July 2002

Greed: Conflict as an Opportunity

Using the notion of opportunity to explain conflict in Afghanistan is consistent with the economic interpretation of conflict as greed-motivated, as well as the grievance motivations perceived by Afghans themselves.

During the conflict, many rebellions had their roots, either directly or in general, in the grievances of the past. However, opportunity also accounted for the existence of both for-profit and also not-for-profit rebel organizations. Conflict can be both economically and politically functional for those who are able to retain power through violence. Although resources in Afghanistan became both an objective and an important means of sustaining violent conflict, it is difficult to determine whether activities related to war economies, such as smuggling, resource extraction and drugs, are responses to the stresses of war, or would have been carried out in normal situations.

[23] P. Collier and A. Hoeffler 2001.

Weak states, strong networks and terrain

Afghan social networks have been extremely resilient and have adapted to many changing conditions. Historically, the state has both utilized and been colonized through such networks.[24] Countries with interests in Afghanistan also have turned to these networks when channeling arms to the resistance. The Mujahideen drew upon them to mobilize fighters, and more recently, they have been tapped for drug smuggling and other criminal activities.

Conflict has also been a force for social change that has reworked many social identities and challenged power hierarchies. The war brought intense ideological struggles into the most remote valleys. It precipitated new leadership, the reworking of traditional patron–client relationships, and an adherence to larger-scale identities based on religion, ethnicity and political groupings.[25] The Taliban victory, for example, represented a "social revolution" in which the sons of poor tribes and clans were able to overthrow a tribal aristocracy.[26] In a dramatic reversal of previous patterns, it was the countryside that ruled the capital. Violence was thus viewed as a means to restore status and power.[27]

The collapse of the Government and the total chaos in the country in the aftermath of the withdrawal of the Soviet forces left a weak state with weak military capability, which opened another avenue for opportunity and greed. Added to the institutional vacuum was the harsh mountainous terrain, which favoured rebel groups, such as the ones based in the forests in eastern and southeastern Afghanistan, or in the mountains in the central, and northeastern regions. Cohesive social networks served rebel military needs in areas where they existed, but were less effective in regions with ethnic and religious diversity. Other social factors, mainly low population density and limited urbanization, inhibited the central Government's ability to control rebellion, which in the end helped prolong the conflict.

War economy

War transforms an economy by affecting both its workforce and its capital. Wartime entrepreneurs – often referred to as profiteers, economic criminals and greedy warlords inspired by the prospects of greater profits – are those who possess the determination and often the ruthlessness to engage in economic activity despite increased risks. Due to their "underground" nature, wartime economic activities are usually characterized by the accumulation of very specialized skills and market connections, particularly where illicit commodities are concerned. Wartime capital accumulations are typically obtained through brutal, primitive measures, such as slavery, oppressive working conditions, fear and force. "Under conditions of primitive accumulation, the distinction between 'interests' and 'passions' breaks down. Normally, successful wartime accumulation of this kind requires social organization and command over means of violence as a tool of accumulation and to protect interests."[28] In post–conflict situations, such social structures and interdependencies frequently remain entrenched and are difficult to deconstruct.

Conflict can be both economically and politically functional for those who are able to retain power through violence.

Conflict in Afghanistan clearly has had its beneficiaries. Afghanistan became a transport and marketing corridor for a flourishing illicit economy based upon

[24] Mohammad Haneef Atmar and Jonathan Goodhand 2002.
[25] Kristian Harpviken 1999.
[26] Barnett Rubin 2002b. Matthew Fielden and Jonathan Goodhand 2001a.
[27] Fielden and Goodhand 2001a.
[28] Christopher Cramer and Jonathan Goodhand 2002.

opium and smuggled consumer goods, for example. Economic agendas became increasingly important and incentive systems developed for vested interests to continue violent conflict. "Conflict entrepreneurs deployed 'top down' violence to control markets and incentive systems and created a monopoly of predation. The poor and vulnerable, because of a lack of alternatives, were forced to engage in bottom up (or subaltern) violence, to secure a livelihood."[29]

Greed in this context refers to seeking opportunities by grabbing power and resources. A corrupt and opportunist leadership recruits people into a low-cost infrastructure of power in an attempt to equip their institutions for grabbing ever more opportunities as they become available.

In Afghanistan, quantitative indicators of the levels of greed practiced by those who took advantage of opportunities related to conflict are many. They include three major funding sources for rebellion: illegal trade, extortion of natural resources and contributions from hostile governments. In the first instance, the Afghan economy's dependence on primary commodity production and export actually helped finance the war. As the years of conflict wore on, commodity exports shifted from items such as dry fruits and handicrafts to illegal trade in gemstones, archaeological artefacts and poppy gum. These exports remained at high levels, even as the economic system as a whole collapsed to the point of negative growth. Collier and Hoeffler[30] demonstrate the link between commodities and war: At peak danger, where primary commodity exports make up 32 per cent of GDP, the risk of civil war is about 22 per cent, while a country with no such exports has a risk of only one per cent. In today's Afghanistan, among the illegal commodity exports, poppy products equal 38.2 per cent of the country's official GDP, notwithstanding that gem smuggling, lumber extraction and excavation of archaeological artefacts still continue, keeping the risk of conflict resumption at or over the peak.

The exploitation of forests served as another source of revenue for war.



Source: Zanbel-e-Gham, Edition 11, February 2004

29 Jonathan Goodhand 2002.
30 *Ibid.*

Map 4.1: Deforestation in Nuristan, Kunar, and Nangarhar Provinces, 1977 and 2002



Conifer forests in the provinces of Nangarhar, Kunar and Nuristan have been reduced by over a half since 1977. Pistachio woodlands in the north have also been disappearing at a critical rate.

According to the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP), satellite imagery reveals that conifer forests in the provinces of Nangarhar, Kunar and Nuristan have been reduced by over a half since 1977 (See Map 4.1). Up to 200 timber trucks a day, representing the loss of up to 200 hectares of forest, ply the main road in Kunar, according to local officials. Probably two-thirds of their cargo is destined for export markets in Pakistan.[31] This process has resulted in local communities losing control of their resources to warlords, timber barons and foreign traders controlling illegal and highly lucrative logging operations.

Pistachio woodlands in the north, which could produce 35–50 kg of nuts per year, providing significant revenue for thousands of families, have also been disappearing at a critical rate. Almost no trees could be detected by satellite instruments in Badghis and Takhar provinces in 2002, compared to 55 and 37 per cent land coverage in 1977, respectively.[32] The main cause of the deforestation is pervasive poverty and lack of access to other sources of fuel. Conifer forests in the east and southeast were extracted for profit only, sometimes against the will of local communities.

Trafficking of archeological artefacts has been another source of booty that has propelled the war in Afghanistan. Though the share of GDP that comes from the illegal selling of archaeological artefacts is not known, the flow of money from the sale of these items is quite significant. It is estimated that 75 per cent of the ancient artefacts belonging to the National Museum in Kabul have been smuggled out of the country since 1992.[33] These were part of the Museum's vast collection, which

31 UNEP 2003.
32 *Ibid.*
33 Amrollah Mas'oudi, head of the National Museum of Afghanistan, interview with IRNA (12 April 2003), as quoted by the Afghanistan Press Agency (APA).

Source: Zanbel-e-Gham, Edition 11, February 2004

ranged from prehistoric treasures to early Buddhist art to modern artefacts with a monetary value in the range of hundreds of millions of dollars. As a noted cultural historian of Afghanistan said, "The breakdown of law and order which has plagued Kabul ever since the arrival of fractious Mujahideen groups in April 1992 has spelled disaster for the museum." In that case, "...all indications suggest that the looting was carried out with careful consideration".[34] As of today, almost 31,000 pieces of historical and cultural value have been stolen and sold outside the country,[35] and illegal digging and smuggling is continuing.

Narco-Warlordism and The Opium Trade

It will take serious international engagement to transform Afghanistan's deeply embedded war economy, which leaves the majority of Afghans living in heightened states of both fear and want. The legacy of the opium industry and the drug lords that thrive from it undeniably represents one of the most daunting obstacles to state-building.

This legacy comes from the years following the end of the Cold War, when a decline in superpower support led to local warlords becoming more dependent on local resources to maintain their military activities. During this time, Afghanistan became a transport and marketing corridor for drugs and contraband. Under the Taliban, Afghanistan emerged as the world's major source of opium, with production peaking at 4,565 tons in 1999.[36] The drought was also an ally of opium traders, as herders, who used to move livestock around the country, now moved opium by being paid advances on the next year's harvest.

A June 2000 ban by the Taliban hiked up the prices of opium gum while reducing opium output to relatively insignificant amounts in 2001 (185 tons). But the post-Taliban years have again seen a profitable expansion. Afghanistan produced 3,400

[34] Nancy Hatch Dupree 1995.
[35] Enemies of the Afghan Heritage, www.rawa.org/museum.html.
[36] UNODC 2003a.

Table 4.1: Afghanistan Opium production from 1999 to 2003

	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Tons of opium	4,565	3,276	185	3,400	3,600

Source: UNODC, *Afghanistan Opium Survey*, 2003.

tons in 2002, 3,600 tons in 2003 (See Table 4.1 and Map 4.2), and even higher amounts are predicted for 2004, allowing it to reclaim the title of the world's largest producer.[37] According to a UNODC report, high prices have spurred the recruitment of more farmers, spreading poppy cultivation to all provinces of the country The report claimed that Afghan opium farmers and traffickers took home about US$2.5 billion in 2003, about half of the country's legitimate GDP and almost ten times the Government's tax revenues.[38] The cultivation of marijuana is another issue, having become widespread in the north of the country.

It was a combination of exhausted assets, accumulated debts and the sharp rise in opium prices that presented opium poppy production as a major opportunity for livelihood through wage-labour and trade. Consequently, the rural elite and the poorer stratum of indebted households embraced the poppy economy, the former as a strategy to further accumulate wealth, the latter as a coping mechanism to compensate for the losses they have suffered from drought. Drought, drugs and insecurity appear now to be feeding off each other. Three of the country's five big drug-producing provinces – Helmand, Uruzgan, and Kandahar – are both unsafe and parched. Poppy cultivation is also spreading to new areas, and with it insecurity. Whether they produce out of fear or financial insecurity, however, Afghans living in these regions hardly have any appealing alternatives, given that most individuals live in dire conditions.

The growing professionalization of the poppy economy may have been caused by the attempts of an emerging narco-state or international terrorist and mafia organizations to criminalize the poppy economy of Afghanistan in order to control political and economic processes. Indicators of this direction include the appearance of an estimate of 21 heroin courtyard factories, employing "foreign" experts, and allegedly being protected by regional or central political patronage. Another sign is the professionalization of the trade, which now involves strong ties with Russian and Tajik business partners across the border.[39]

Presently, drug-related activities are the core component of the informal and criminal economic sector. They cover production, refining, trafficking and consumption of opium poppies and heroin, all under the control of the warlords and mafia-style organized criminal gangs, local as well as regional and international. The risk that the drug economy and violent conflict could spin into a vicious circle, where one reinforces the other, is still present. The enormous profits that the drug industry generates have been shown to corrupt state officials and undermine already weak state capacities.

Revenues from trade in opium products in 2003 are estimated to have reached US$2.5 billion, more than half the country's annual GDP. Cultivation of poppy in 2003 had increased to 80,000 hectares from 74,000 hectares in 2002 (See Map 4.3), an 8 per cent increase in one year.[40] Experts predict

[37] *Ibid*
[38] *Ibid*.
[39] Jan Koehler 2004.
[40] UNODC 2003b.

Map 4.2: Afghanistan Poppy Production by Province (2002-2003)



Source: UNODC and Counter Narcotics Directorate (CND), Afghanistan Opium Survey 2003.

Map 4.3: Afghanistan Poppy Cultivation by Province (2002-2003)



Source: UNODC and Counter Narcotics Directorate (CND), Afghanistan Opium Survey 2003.

an even sharper increase with record high cultivation rates in 2004.[41] UNODC estimates that the amount of land devoted to poppy cultivation has more than doubled in a little over a decade, with a mere one year low-level deviation in 2001.

Poppy, guns and terrorism reinforce each other. For Afghanistan to have peace, we have to address all three at the same time.

President Hamid Karzai

It is estimated that in 2003 Afghanistan produced three-quarters of the world's illicit opium[42], supplying some 80-90 per cent of the heroin consumed in Europe[43] According to the UNODC, as much as half the quantity of the illicit drugs produced in Afghanistan are consumed in neighbouring Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and other states in Central Asia and the Persian Gulf.[44] U.S Seizure data suggest that at least five percent of the heroin imported into the United States originates in Afghanistan.[45] In other words, the high levels of production threaten the human security of millions of people all over the world.

Officials warn that Afghanistan could become a narco-terror state in the future. Drug production is no longer an obscure issue. Enough Afghan officials and warlords are now so heavily involved in the illicit trade that they threaten the state's fledgling economy. Interior Minister Ali Ahmad Jalali told reporters, "In some parts criminals are supported by those who have power," referring to regional warlords who hold sway over large parts of the country.[46]

International Functions: The Aid, Trade and Arms Pipeline

One of the major causes of conflict in Afghanistan can be attributed to the external interventions of states, neighbouring and distant, all of whom have attempted to manipulate internal Afghan affairs to benefit their own interests. The support provided to warring factions in Afghanistan is a clear case of greed.

The flow of aid to Afghanistan played a significant role in the formation and the conservation of a "prosperous" war economy. During the Soviet occupation at the end of 1979, Western development programmes were effectively terminated, and the Soviet Union became the country's major source of foreign aid, particularly for residents of urban areas. During the 1980s, Western-backed humanitarian aid programmes became entangled with Cold War and, later, post-Cold War political agendas. In the early part of the decade, Western aid was part of a conscious strategy to undermine the pro-Soviet communist Government. Avoiding official structures and instead working through local commanders, mostly in eastern regions where the central Government was weak, patterns of aid distribution tended towards preferences for political ties over real humanitarian need.

This inevitably accentuated national–regional and centre–periphery tensions, and legitimized Mujahideen groups in rural areas. Essentially, humanitarian aid was being distributed to resistance groups much in the same way arms had been only a few years earlier. In addition to creating a "culture of dependency", particularly on food aid, the "aid and arms pipeline" led directly to the build-up and legitimization of factional

41 Associated Press, "Afghan President Ready for Elections," 2004
42 US State Department's 2004 *International Narcotics Strategy Report*, quoted in "Poppy crop in Afghanistan at record high," AFP, Washington, Mar 01 2004.
43 CIA, "The World Fact Book, Illicit Drugs". Updated 18, December 2003.
44 UNODC 2003b.
45 US Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report -, Southwest Asia, Released by the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, March 2003.
46 "Afghan Officials Involved in Drug Trade," Paktribune, 14 May 2004. [http://paktribune.com/news/index.php?id=64987&PHPSESSID=706ee2ee0abecea7ea9adf44316f3f17].

forces, and eventually to the expansion of smuggling and other businesses.[47]

During the phase of the Cold War that stretched between 1979 and 1989, the Mujahideen groups received about US$7 billion in military and economic aid from the US and some other western countries.[48] This kind of support was very open during the Cold War, when each great power supported its proxies. The opportunity for rebellion may have been exacerbated by the fact that conflict-specific forms of capital, such as military equipment, were provided either for free or at an unusually cheap rate.

The military sponsorship of warring factions by regional powers prompted a HRW study in 2001 to investigate the delivery of arms and other forms of military aid to both sides by Pakistan, Russia and Iran (by passing the United States), and the impact of this aid on human rights.[49] The report detailed the nature of military support provided to the warring parties, the major transit routes used to move arms and other equipment, the suppliers, the role of state and non-state actors, and the response of the international community. HRW then called for international sanctions, including a comprehensive embargo on arms and other forms of military assistance, against all warring factions in Afghanistan by the international community. Likewise, the group noted that governments that provide military assistance to abusive states and rebel groups should be held accountable for the resulting abuses.

Various forms of international trade also supported Afghanistan's instability. A WB study estimated that trade in 1997 was about US$ 2.5 billion, largely through unofficial exports to Pakistan.[50] During the Taliban years, Afghanistan may have been the second largest trading partner of the United Arab Emirates (which, along with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, was one of only three states that recognized the Taliban regime). Afghan traders would purchase duty-free goods in Dubai and ship them onward for smuggling.[51] As noted by an expert on Afghanistan, "Several networks have linked Afghanistan to a wider arc of conflict, or a regional conflict formation, stretching from Moscow to Dubai.[52] Regional conflict formations are transnational conflicts that form mutually reinforcing linkages with each other throughout a region, making for more protracted and obdurate discord. In South Central Asia, the regional conflict comprises state and non-state actors in Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kashmir. Networks of armed groups, often covertly aided by neighboring states ...link the conflict within Afghanistan to violence in Kashmir, Chechnya, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. Networks of narcotics traffickers, collaborating with armed groups, link Afghan poppy fields to global markets via Pakistan, Iran, and Central Asia. Networks of traders, more benignly, seek access to buy and sell their goods, even when profit requires avoidance of customs regulations. Cross-border social ties among the region's various ethnic and religious groups underpin all of these networks. That conflict that gripped Afghanistan over the past 25 years was [therefore] much more than a local or national power struggle and must be seen in its regional context."[53]

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47 Jonathan Goodhand 2002.
48 Ahmad Rashid 2001.
49 HRW 2001.
50 Zareen F. Naqvi , "Afghanistan-Pakistan Trade Relations", Islamabad: WB, 1999.
51 Barnett Rubin 2000.
52 Regional conflict formations are transnational conflicts that form mutually reinforcing linkages with each other throughout a region, making for more protracted and obdurate discord. In South Central Asia, the regional conflict comprises state and non-state actors in Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kashmir.
53 Barnett Rubin and Andrea Armstrong 2003.

Source: Zanbel-e-Gham, Edition 11, December 2003.

In general, Afghanistan's economic situation has had and continues to have significant regional spillover effects – through unofficial trade, narcotics, terrorism and extremism, financial flows and the movement of people. These impacts tend to undermine revenue collection and the effectiveness of economic policies in neighbouring countries. At the same time, and despite failed policies of the past, regional actors continue to seek influence within Afghanistan's borders, potentially fueling renewed struggles and factionalism along ethnic lines.

Hopes for an end to interference lie in a stronger, more unified central Government. The renewed sovereignty of Afghanistan opens the formidable possibility that the reconstruction process could transform negative spillovers into possibilities for trade and economic development, not only in Afghanistan, but in the region as a whole. The common languages and cultures that Afghans share with their neighbors could be used to further positive interactions. The changed political circumstances after the Taliban provide an opportunity to improve regional relations by expanding legitimate trade

and initiating other forms of positive cooperation. A regional approach is particularly critical for the border areas between Afghanistan and Pakistan, which have become incubators of violence, migration, smuggling and drug trafficking because of their deep and stubborn poverty.

4.4. Impacts and Coping Strategies

It is very difficult if not impossible to quantitatively assess the impacts of all the damages produced by violent conflict on human security and human development indices in Afghanistan. It is as difficult from the livelihoods point of view to estimate how much productivity loss can be attributed to the continuously traumatized people, or how much has been lost in terms of foreign investment, tourism and incomes by the falling international "image" of Afghanistan. Yet what is clear is that at the individual level, conflict inflicted enormous misery, destroying confidence and mutual trust, leadership and entrepreneurship.

The Diversification of Livelihoods and Coping Strategies

One of the most notable outcomes of the conflict has been the extraordinary resilience of the Afghan people. People cope with and survive conflict and humanitarian crisis first and foremost by adapting and diversifying their livelihoods. The transformations in the wider political economy are therefore mirrored in varied and often irreversible changes in people's lives. In Afghanistan, years of conflict saw growing vulnerability across most of the population, with a gradual erosion of assets, compounded by the weakening or collapse of governance institutions and a range of external shocks to poor communities' coping strategies. But Afghanistan also demonstrated that people use a variety of coping strategies, which depend upon their location, the strength of local governance structures and social networks, and access to roads, land, markets and water. Their responses ranged from reducing food consumption and disposing of assets, to moving to Iran, Pakistan, Europe and North America. Afghan families with members working in Europe, the Gulf, or North America were often able to profit and increase their asset base through remittances, while those dependent on workers in Pakistan and Iran were more likely to be using the remittances simply to survive.

Survival strategies, however, also had a number of negative consequences. Fuel-gathering under drought conditions resulted in severe deforestation and denudation that resulted in increased susceptibility to flood and avalanches. At the same time, conflict and migration limited the labour available to maintain the functionality of water systems, such as *kareez* and canals.[54] Debt and migration resulted in shifting patterns of land tenure and the expansion of a class of landless labourers with limited or insecure access to natural assets. In such an atmosphere, in order to secure their livelihoods, most Afghans pursued such strategies as holding multiple jobs, and diversifying sources of income through their own production or disposition of assets and wage labour.[55]

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Afghan survival strategies also point to the role of mutual support mechanisms. In some communities, where social capital was destroyed, kinship systems broke down, particularly where there had been periods of settlement by different ethnic group. In some others, these systems were maintained and strengthened by extended ties of economic interdependence and a strong sense of mutual support.[56] Afghan households as well as individuals pursued

[54] Peter Marsden 1996.
[55] Adam Pain and Sue Lautze, AREU, 2002.
[56] Sarah Collinson 2003.

livelihood strategies based on the combination of assets they owned and the opportunities and restrictions created by their institutional environment, mainly informal factional and regional militia institutions. As a study on livelihoods carried out by the AREU showed, people's primary objectives were and continue to be pursuing food security to ensure their survival, and an income to satisfy their other basic needs, i.e., clothes, shelter, energy and medicine. But beyond basic needs, households also showed inclinations towards wider indicators of well-being, such as a dignified absence of poverty and social values such as freedom, choice and self-esteem.[57] The resilience of the people in Afghanistan during the years of natural and social miseries was the result of their own efforts, using their own resources. These included subsistence farming, wage-labour migration, strategic family alliances and negotiation with armed forces.[58] Innovative coping strategies and the resilience that shapes them will likely continue to remain critical for stability, economic growth, human security and sustainable human development across the country.

The informal sector often operates as an "incubator economy", where new entrepreneurs learn to operate in the urban market economy and develop their micro-enterprises through trial and error.

Livelihood security requires that policies focus on identifying opportunities and building strengths rather than emphasizing constraints to development. The heart of a policy framework oriented around livelihoods is essentially the household and its access to natural resources such as land and water; physical resources such as agricultural equipment, *kareez* systems and irrigation canals; financial resources such as cash availability, credit and debt; human capital such as health and education; and social resources such as trust, social and moral norms, and community networks.

The Informal Sector as Survival Strategy

In rural Afghanistan, the cultivation and trafficking of opium as a survival strategy for indebted farmers that yields income, employment and cash for food security has been widely studied. The other less studied informal economic activity, more legal than the poppy trade, is the informal sector, which existed and continues to boom in urban centres, primarily Kabul.

A discussion of survival strategies in Afghanistan would be incomplete without a look at this burgeoning area of economic activity. The informal sector is based on the existence of a dual economy, mostly in urban areas: a registered and wage-earning sector, and an un-enumerated, small-scale, labour-intensive, self-employed sector.[59] The irregular (also known as black or underground) economy produces legal outputs, but uses illegal practices in either production or distribution (for example, no taxes are paid). This is distinct from the criminal sector, which relies on similar illegal practices but often produces illegal products such as drugs. The difference between quasi-legal and illegal enterprises resides in the fact that the former are not actively sanctioned (and are thus only *de jure* illegal), while the latter are consciously hidden from and actively punished by law enforcers.[60] The informal sector often operates as an "incubator economy", where new entrepreneurs learn to operate in the urban market economy and develop their micro-enterprises through trial and error. The sector is also a phenomenon of cities where there is a higher demand for services.

A 2001 study by the WB and UNDP of the impact of unofficial trade on Afghanistan's economy concluded that it continued to provide employment and

57 Adam Pain and Sue Lautze, AREU, 2002.
58 Adam Pain and Sue Lautze, AREU, 2002.
59 Timor El-Dardiry 2004.
60 *Ibid.*

revenues during the Taliban regime. The findings indicated that the cities of Herat, Jalalabad and the town of Weish were thriving as hubs of trade. "Jobs are being created in the transport, fuel, road-building and repair, wholesale and retail trade sectors. Export markets for the indigenous products provide revenues for agriculture, horticulture, sheep farming, carpets, semi-precious jewelry, and handicrafts."[61]

The informal sector continues to grow in Afghanistan's cities today. Large imports of construction materials indicate that some segments of the Afghan economy are investing in housing, warehouses, markets and shops. This activity is fuelled by massive foreign aid inflows and gross income from drug production. The income of the expatriate community, the returning diaspora, the nouveaux riches and state employees creates new demands for imports and local services. For the moment, the extent and nature of the informal sector has not been measured. In order to estimate its size, surveys based on questionnaires would be one option, although people may not want to disclose such information through an interview. Other methodologies could involve measuring the demand for currency as proxy. Assuming that most, if not all, transactions in the informal economy are paid with cash, there will be more demand for currency than official national income figures would predict. However, the shortcomings of this approach are that a large proportion of informal economic activity may be based on barter.[62] Despite these methodological difficulties, however, leaving out the informal sector when formulating public policy based on official statistics will overlook the activities of many people.

The growing importance of the informal sector in providing a form of security to millions of Afghans cannot be underestimated. Recognizing its role will allow policy-makers to design development strategies that provide new opportunities for alternative livelihoods, based on people's proven resilience. For those without access to regular employment, the informal sector acts as a safety net, offering the chance to earn a modest income as well as social protection normally provided by the state. Yet the informal sector can also be a problematic safety net. It may prevent people from falling through altogether, but it can be very hard for them to significantly improve their incomes and escape poverty. Moreover, informal alternatives are almost always imperfect substitutes for state protection.[63]

Migration as a Way of Reducing Insecurities, Including Income Disparities

Even prior to the Soviet occupation, there were migratory movements to neighbouring countries (especially Iran) for seasonal labour. Cross-border movements from Afghanistan have been substantial and regular, and driven by economic and social opportunities (and motives), but have not been accurately quantified either by number or duration. The existence of transnational households with networks in both Iran and Pakistan is thought to have grown appreciably in the last 25 years. The economic contribution of these networks (including the wider Afghan diaspora) to family budgets is believed to run into hundreds of millions of dollars annually.

Facilitated by better transport and communication, internal and international migration has become more circular. Remittances have contributed to a substantial reduction in the income disparity between urban and rural areas, where many households may in fact

[61] WB and UNDP, "Impact of Unofficial Trade on Afghanistan's Economy", 2001, .
[62] Timor El-Dardiry 2004.
[63] *Ibid.*

depend on them for much of their income. Migration should thus be viewed in terms of the free flow of labour to areas where it can earn at a higher rate. Within the country, rural–urban migration, which has been renewed since 2001, may be contributing to economic growth and reducing income disparities.

Migration is not a single, decisive move by the entire family that ruptures all ties with the place of origin. Many families act according to a deliberate strategy, sending different members to different places. Those in the city save money to support their families in rural areas. The families may use the savings to create an economic base for the migrant for his or her return. Migrants provide information to the family back home about new employment opportunities, and help relatives and friends settle in the urban area or abroad. For many, migration has the long-term objective of providing children with a good education so that they will have a better life than their parents. The return of migrants to their homes can also mean the introduction of new skills, ideas and knowledge.

Migration may also have some negative impacts, such as the loss of labour to cultivate the land. It can lead to the break-up of the family, or to men having two families, one in an urban area and one in a rural area.

Migration may also have some negative impacts, such as the loss of labour to cultivate the land. It can lead to the break-up of the family, or to men having two families, one in an urban area and one in a rural area. When men migrate, women's position in the rural society changes, as they are forced to undertake tasks traditionally limited to men. A drastic increase in the population in Kabul and the growing number of unregistered residents expands the scope of informal employment, and with its human insecurities.

Perhaps one of the most lasting impacts of migration from a human security point of view has been changes in traditional social values and attitudes, and the character of social interaction. New influences, both destructive and innovative, have filtered in from the experience of exiles in refugee camps and towns, but also from Western societies as the diaspora returns. The adoption of conservative values, which were the experience of rural men brought up in refugee camps, changed the culture of cities in Afghanistan during the Taliban years. External influences on attitudes and values manifested in young men who enlisted in militia forces, as well as in men and women going to neighbouring countries as migrant workers. The large number of Afghans based in Western countries could indirectly (through contacts with relatives) or directly (if they return) influence attitudes related to production, consumption and other aspects of economic and social life in Afghanistan.

The result of such a fluid movement of people has been an unprecedented contrast in terms of social behaviour and living standards, between those who remained in the country and those who made it outside. These new influences could significantly change the social balance in Afghan society, including the way material resources are generated and distributed at all levels.[64]

Forced Migration: The Experience of Displacement

Though the massive displacement of people is often perceived first and foremost as a threat to state and even regional security, refugees are rarely, in and of themselves, the cause of conflict, but rather, one of its tragic results.[65] States may encounter serious difficulties when forced to cope with the influx of refugees in large numbers. However, in such cases, it is clearly the security of the individuals that is most threatened. They may have been forced from their homes, perhaps attacked during their flight, and have arrived at a destination where their basic needs may

[64] Umer Daudzai 2003.
[65] Discussions in this part are adapted from Chowra Makaremi 2004.

not be met. In the event that displacement endures over a longer period of time, there are greater chances that conflict might arise depending on the degree of prosperity and integration that refugees experience in their host countries.

The case of Afghanistan's human displacement is complex and "unique in the twentieth century (as Afghan refugees) make up the greatest population of the same region ever transplanted outside their own borders – an exodus from the south to the south, and the poor towards other poor."[66] Many Afghans have been displaced up to four times due to ongoing conflict, beginning with the Soviet invasion, then the warring Mujahideen factions, then the terror of the Taliban regime combined with their ongoing clashes with the United Front, and finally the US-led coalition air strikes.[67]

Afghanistan's exodus first exploded as the war between Soviet invaders and the resistance intensified. There were 3.9 million refugees fleeing the war in 1983. In 1988, at the height of displacement, Afghan refugees constituted as much as 60 per cent of the entire world refugee population. The second act played out in 1989, when the Soviet forces withdrew and a first repatriation occurred. When the Mujahideen conquered Kabul in 1992, one observer noticed "a huge surge of collective optimism which resulted in no fewer than 1.2 million Afghans returning from Pakistan in six months – none of them assisted by an extremely stretched UNHCR".[68] This phase of chaos witnessed a dual movement of people: Despite the insecure situation following the entry of the Taliban, 1.7 millions refugees were repatriated by 2000, while a new wave fled the obliteration of Kabul and other areas to join over 4 million of their fellow citizens in exile.

Displacements intensified as the Taliban regime weighed down a population already weakened by dramatic droughts. This led to a huge increase in refugee movement in October 2000, combined with large-scale internal displacement. The human security of Afghan refugees deteriorated considerably after 2000, when countries such as Pakistan and Tajikistan, who had previously received their neighbors in distress, closed their borders. Food security drastically decreased beginning in October 2001 when aid workers, upon whom the Afghan population had grown dependent for their basic needs, withdrew from the country in the weeks before the coalition air strikes.

The fourth phase of displacement began almost immediately following the September 11th attack. Once again, Afghans attempted to flee, this time in anticipation of US retaliation against the country that harboured Osama Bin Laden. However, large numbers of refugees were stopped at the closed borders of Iran and Pakistan as they attempted to escape the certain warfare. With neither the option of seeking security in neighboring countries nor in their homeland, many Afghans remained internally displaced, worsening the already precarious humanitarian situation.

For 2002, the Transitional Afghan Government figures showed approximately 5.6 million Afghan refugees, with 2.3 million in Iran and 3.3 million in Pakistan, 1 million people were internally displaced. Since then, the Government, with the help of UNHCR, has established repatriation programmes, which brought back 1.2 million refugees by 2003. Despite the considerable success in repatriation, however, many returning refugees face further displacement and thus become new IDPs[69]: the cycle of human displacement has not yet been broken.

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66 Micheline Centlivres-Demont 1994.
67 Susanne Schmeidl 2002.
68 Colville 1997.
69 AI 2003b.

Despite common features, displacement is not one single phenomenon, but changes according to the country of asylum, the causes of displacement, and the time when it occurs. During the massive exodus from the mid-1980s to the year 2000, different movements took place – from *hejrats* to individual displacements – with different effects on Afghan's societal structures. The *hejrat* is an organized religious exodus in Islamic societies, is based on the belief that it is the duty of every believer to leave a land that is no longer Muslim and seek asylum on Muslim ground. As a response to the Soviet invasion in the1980s, tribal chiefs organized collective *hejrats* which allowed groups to maintain their social structures in exile.[70] In many cases, tribal populations moved en masse to Pakistan's frontier areas, because the host population is Pashtun and has similar social structures.

Contrary to the *hejrat*, survival displacements were individual strategies for facing economic or political insecurity, as well as responses to social and political exclusion. These individual exoduses were characterized by disorder and lack of group cohesion, each family deciding separately to leave. First people found refuge in neighbouring valleys, and then in Kabul or in a neighbouring country. A researcher noticed the destructive effect of such forced migrations: If families often managed to remain together in exile, the group at a community level didn't form again.[71] This occurs mainly because forced migration is a "totalizing phenomena", involving "acute degrees of disintegration as community structure, social networks and even kin groups may be dispersed to different resettlement sites".[72]

"The experience of war, displacement and refugee life have led to changes in women's roles, offering greater levels of responsibility on the one hand and exposing them to greater levels of vulnerability on the other" noted a study on Afghan women and international aid.[73] The position of women in the public and private spheres evolved with the specific conditions of protracted exile in refugee camps in Pakistan. The absence of refugee men, many of whom were engaged in military operations inside Afghanistan and continued to have links with their home villages, often involved refugee women in decision-making processes that would normally have been undertaken either jointly with men, or by men alone.[74] Many women were also involved in construction work as the camps evolved towards permanent establishments. It was the first time most had ever undertaken such tasks.

Rural Pashtun women immigrating to Pakistan (who comprised more than 85 per cent of female refugees) were accustomed to relatively free movement within their villages. For them, migration led to a dramatic change in their lives as "they found themselves confined in vast, overcrowded refugee camps, sometimes in temperatures of 45+ degrees centigrade, with no available running water, little shade, and no space".[75] In these conditions, women had to face strict reactions from their communities, who accentuated traditional ways to preserve their identity from external influences and put extreme pressure on women to maintain their honour, considered the guarantee of the group's integrity. "Many women experienced harassment from young Mujahideen, while attacks on families who allowed women to work with foreigners, go to school, or go shopping without a *maharam* relative, could be extremely vicious."[76]

70 Olivier Roy 1985.
71 *Ibid*.
72 Anthony Oliver-Smith 1991.
73 Sultan Barakat and Gareth Wardell 2002a.
74 *Ibid*.
75 *Ibid*.
76 *Ibid*.

The harsh segregation of men and women and the loss of community boundaries and meaning in every day life became key factors behind the emergence of second-generation refugee warriors.[77] While the first generation had grown up in Afghanistan, and thus "could recount their tribal and clan lineage, remembered their abandoned farms and valleys with nostalgia and recounted legends and stories from Afghan history", the Taliban belonged to a generation that never knew their homeland or peace, and who had grown up in the manly world of the *madrassas* and in a culture of war, with hardly any contact with women, including mothers or sisters. According to their most noted historian, because of the loss of community identity produced by displacement, the Taliban had "no memories of their tribes, their elders, their neighbors nor the complex ethnic mix of peoples that often made up their villages and their homeland. These boys were what the war had thrown up like the sea's surrender at the beach of history."[78]

4.5. Conclusions

History matters, and the history of the Afghan conflict is one of greed and grievances feeding into each other and perpetuating social fragmentation. As the Afghan case demonstrates, the link between conflict and development is a complex one. Conflict can be exacerbated if not caused by a breakdown in development, while development can also be the solution for conflict resolution and prevention. Central to any intervention strategy should be the understanding that prevention cannot be orchestrated from outside, but needs to build on local aspirations and circumstances, priorities and capacities.

Such a notion was explicitly expressed during consultation sessions the NHDR team held with local communities. For example, in Adraskan, a district or *woleswali* of Herat province, people said the major reason for the failure to cope with drought was the lack of consultation and understanding of real local grievances and aspirations.

Some of the most pertinent lessons that can be learned from the history of the interdependence between development and conflict include:

1. **The root causes of fragmentation have to be addressed. At the same time, there is a need to understand the motivation behind violence and recognize its transformatory role.** Understanding the Afghan conflict means understanding what motivates warring groups and the broader role of violence in society in general. In any conflict, there is usually a continuum of different forms of violence, from organized warfare and systematic economic violence by the state or other organized military actors, to more individualized forms linked to crime and opportunism. In Afghanistan, economic agendas have become intertwined with social and political crises, making it difficult to disentangle the causes and effects of the conflict from wider processes at work. Patterns of vulnerability may alter rapidly with the shifting fortunes of different communities or social groups. Understanding what motivates violence could help policy-makers recognize and anticipate these changes, and respond appropriately. Effective policies are those that deal with the causes and the consequences of conflict simultaneously, and make an attempt to integrate conflict transformation and social cohesion objectives into governance, poverty reduction and environmental

[77] Ahmad Rashid 2000.
[78] *Ibid.*

programmes. By keeping injustice on the agenda, governance processes in the new democratic Afghanistan must address and not exacerbate existing power inequalities. Finally, a long-term strategy for cutting the roots of Afghanistan's instability needs to build on the positive aspects of inter-group and inter-ethnic relations, such as respect, tolerance and the benefits of diversity, in order to promote joint problem-solving and consensus-building.

2. **With high levels of poverty and unemployment, holding on to Kalashnikovs or engaging in poppy cultivation and the narco-industry are still considered ways to survive.** In many rural communities, the young are increasingly dependent on income from cultivation and trade of opium poppies. Any untargeted interdiction programme would most certainly have a very negative effect on the food security of a resource poor group that only recently managed to upgrade their survival strategy to coping due to the poppy economy. In other cases, enlisting in a militia group or joining a criminal band may for many individuals still represent a livelihood strategy. Reducing the vulnerability of rural communities to predation may thus depend on finding suitable livelihood options for those involved in illegal industries, banditry and militia violence.

3. **The response to societal security problems must be genuine reconciliation – something that so far Afghanistan's state-building process has shied away from.** Reconciliation is a process through which a society moves from a divided past to a shared future. It is a complex process that includes the search for truth, justice, forgiveness and healing, in order to find ways for former adversaries to coexist. It is clear that a mere provision of financial support for reconstruction-oriented state building is not sufficient. Success lies in embedding the concept of reconciliation into the process of state-building.

4. **Ethnic, linguistic, cultural and religious diversities are Afghanistan's rich legacies and cannot be discounted only as political factors.** It cannot be emphasized enough that a Government able to bring a lasting peace and stability to Afghanistan has to represent all ethnic, cultural and regional groups. The state-building process must give every citizen a sense of belonging to the Government and to the country, by giving recognition to their respective cultural, religious and linguistic values – as has been done by Afghanistan's new Constitution.

5. **There is a regional dimension to many of the security problems that have beset Afghanistan for many years.** These include black market regional trade, narcotics, cross-border arms smuggling, human trafficking, ethno-regional identities that compete with national ones, etc. The changed political circumstances after the Taliban provide an opportunity to improve regional relations by expanding legitimate trade and initiating other forms of positive cooperation. Regional problems require regional solutions, an approach particularly suitable for the border areas between Afghanistan and Pakistan, where violence thrives on poverty, and in terms of the Central Asian republics, which offer renewed opportunities for collaboration.

Chapter 5

Evaluation of Afghanistan's State-building Process from a Human Security Perspective

Photo: Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh

Chapter 5

Evaluation of Afghanistan's State-building Process from a Human Security Perspective

5.1. Introduction: The Current Reconstruction Process from a Human Security Perspective

A central objective of the national as well as international reconstruction and state-building processes in the transitional period has been to re-unite the country around a clearly defined and sequenced unitary reform agenda. Hampered by the absence of fully functional state institutions and continuing security risks, reforms have been slower than anticipated. Few would argue with the fact that political insecurity is the main obstacle to Afghanistan's development. However, it is becoming increasingly apparent that a short-term focus on security objectives, in the traditional sense, is insufficient to address the root causes of chronic national instability: the grip of strongmen and their militia, the absence of the rule of law, chronic poverty and widespread human suffering, the violation of basic human rights and pervasive political marginalisation. The legitimacy of the new Afghan state will depend upon its capacity to address the needs both immediate and strategic of its citizens, and to promote the enlargement of opportunities through ensuring both freedom from want and freedom from fear.

Naturally, post-conflict processes have to deal with the challenge of attracting public confidence in the face of prejudices that may have been caused by previous abuses of power by the state. Yet because development and conflict prevention are closely linked to democratic governance, state-building processes need to be participatory and address inequalities, instead of exacerbating these, in order to gain confidence and essential public support.

To cultivate a "culture of democracy" in a post-conflict situation is an enormous task, both with regard to generating the responsibility of the decision-makers to provide "good governance", and the responsibility of the constituency to participate.[1] Newly emerging governmental structures will often operate without a well-developed system of checks and balances, including indirect accountability through public opinion and media. Moreover, political transition may give rise to governmental structures overly dependent on key power-holders. This can easily exacerbate the risk of corruption as well as the manipulation of systems for the benefit of a few, instead of the community. Simultaneously, the people often feel more concerned about their immediate needs and see themselves as detached from a state structure that is not able to meet these. This will particularly apply if the state structures are too remote because of geographic and political conditions. Perceptions of inequalities on ethnic or other grounds may further enlarge a growing rift between the state and its constituency.

Against this background, the peace-building and state-building processes are critically dependent on:

- Rebuilding governance institutions.
- Promoting respect for human rights and the rule of law.
- Ensuring basic security.
- Fostering participatory dialogue.[2]

Our primary focus is to revive and build the State apparatus, a system of democratic governance with active participation of the citizenry.

President Hamid Karzai, Tokyo, 2002

1 Ramazan Bashar Dost 2004a.
2 UNDP,"Governance in Post-Conflict Situations", 2004d.

We have so far not played our important role in the state-building process to the extent we could for three reasons: one, by and large, we have not yet enjoyed the benefits of the multi-billion state-building or reconstruction project, second, we have not been made part of the very project that is intended for us; third, instead of seeing those who have committed excesses against us in the past two decades in some accountability process, we see them as part of the state.

Fazel Rahman from the eastern city of Jalalabad

This chapter analyses the current state-building processes with regard to these four broad components, against the key elements of the human security paradigm: participation, and addressing horizontal inequalities and responsibilities. These elements are closely interlinked, as participation enhances responsibility (of the constituency as well as the state through mechanisms of accountability) and thereby diminishes the dangers of horizontal inequalities.

It is argued that while central reforms have already provided a strong *de jure* basis for the unitary institutions of a state, much remains to be done in order to promote the conducive *de facto* environment required to ensure lasting and complete human security. While the state retains a large measure of responsibility to become the provider of human security as a public good, the undertaking of building a stable state capable of satisfying the needs of the people also requires the people to assume their responsibility and participate in state-building processes.

5.2. The Path to State-building

The following sections outline and discuss the major building blocks of the state-building endeavour upon which Afghanistan has embarked. This has essentially followed the path "agreed upon" at the Bonn talks, held shortly after the regime change initiated by the US-led coalition in late 2001.

The section commences with a brief review of the past two years, including an overview of the Bonn Agreement as well as its shortcomings, the political transition, and the constitution-making process. Turning to the present, an analysis of the newly adopted Constitution from a human security perspective is followed by a brief description of the current administrative structure and administrative reforms. In looking into the future, two "building blocks" namely, centre-periphery relations and elections are discussed through their direct relevance to the three key elements identified above (participation, horizontal inequalities and responsibilities).

Political Transition: A Long Way from Bonn

On 5 December 2001, one month after the fall of the Taliban regime, talks brokered by the United Nations resulted in the Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions (the Bonn Agreement). The agreement laid out a roadmap for the establishment of the interim administration, and paved the way for constitutional and electoral targets, presenting a time-line for both electoral reform and for conducting presidential and parliamentary elections.

In essence, the Bonn Agreement envisaged three "building blocks" for the reconstruction of the state of Afghanistan: the establishment of an Interim Authority to be succeeded within six months by the Transitional Authority; the adoption of a new Constitution for Afghanistan within 18 months of the establishment of the Interim Authority; and finally, the creation of a fully representative Government elected through free and fair elections. Since elections could not be held immediately in view of the prevailing security vacuum, the Bonn Agreement facilitated an instrument of national consultation that has figured prominently in Afghanistan's history: the Loya Jirgah ("Grand Assembly of Elders").[3]

Incorporating the traditional consultative mechanism deeply rooted in Afghan community affairs, the Bonn Agreement called for the convening of an Emergency Loya Jirgah, which was to form a

[3] Barnett Rubin 2004.

transitional Government that would remain in power until presidential and parliamentary elections. Another Loya Jirgah was to be convened for the adoption of a new Constitution, modelled after the Constitutional Loya Jirgah for Afghanistan's five previous Constitutions (1923, 1931, 1964, 1977 and 1987).[4] Specific commissions were established either to directly facilitate these political processes, such as in the case of the Special Independent Commission for the Convening of the Emergency Loya Jirgah and the Constitutional Commission, or to lay the "substantive" foundations for legal reform (the Judicial Reform Commission), the observance and protection of human rights (AIHRC) and the future public administration (the Civil Service Commission). Last but not least, the annexes to the Bonn Agreement addressed the need to fill the security vacuum by requesting the deployment of ISAF and specify the role of the United Nations in supporting the state-building processes.

The Bonn Agreement and its roadmap have proven a success: A 30-member Interim Authority, chaired by President Karzai, was immediately established, and the Security Council authorised the deployment in Kabul and the surrounding areas of the ISAF by its resolution 1386. In March 2002, through Resolution 1401, the Security Council established the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). Headed by the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative (currently Mr. Jean Arnault), UNAMA was mandated to assist the Afghanistan Transitional Administration (ATA) with the implementation of the Bonn Agreement. In June 2002, the Emergency Loya Jirgah met to establish the ATA under the leadership of President Karzai. The Constitutional Loya Jirgah convened in December 2003 and adopted a new Constitution on 4 January 2004. The presidential elections were held on 9 October 2004, and parliamentary elections are scheduled for April 2005.

The process envisaged in Bonn was built on the international community's assumption that a democratic and representative state would allow Afghans

Source: Zanbel-e-Gham, Edition 7, August 2002

[4] Din Mohammad Jawaid and Asadullah Walwalji 2003. Barnett Rubin 2004.

to exit the vicious cycle fuelled by a history of internal armed conflict, natural disasters and underdevelopment, as well as foster stability in the region, which would cut the roots of terrorism. The international community, encapsulated by the United Nations, was ready to provide all support necessary to make the state-building exercise outlined in the Bonn Agreement a success, despite the challenges of a tight schedule and past state-building failures.

However, the Bonn Agreement remained isolated from the daily realities of the people within Afghanistan; It was a top-down exercise, which hoped to generate the necessary "buy-in". The Loya Jirgah, as a means to enhance the legitimacy of the central Government as well as the adoption of the constitution, could only serve as a limited substitute for representative public participation. While trust may gradually be forged through reforms and a visible democratisation process, the transition to a democratic environment remains a complex process. To many Afghans, democracy certainly remains appealing in principle, but still a dream that has been born in Bonn and has yet to come alive at home.

The pace of the roadmap further exacerbates the remoteness of the Bonn process from the realities of most Afghans. At first, indirect elections were held in early 2002 to determine the 1,500 or so delegates to the Emergency Loya Jirgah. Roughly a year later, preparations commenced for the – again indirect – elections of the delegates to the Constitutional Loya Jirgah, which many participants confused with the voter registration programme that had been launched simultaneously.

Moreover, Bonn was more about process and less about the substance with which a democratic state of Afghanistan is to be built. In particular, the Agreement did not address the need for peace and reconciliation between the warring factions as the foundation for a democratic state. Instead of reducing inequalities in political participation, Bonn sanctioned them. Given the hastily organised nature of the talks held in Bonn briefly after the Taliban-regime had been ousted, as well as the imbalanced composition of the participants in the talks, the focus remained on setting the path and the necessary benchmarks to gradually build a representative and legitimate Government.[5] the The Bonn Agreement itself recognized the lack of representation, stressing in its preamble that the interim arrangements were intended "as a first step toward the establishment of a broad-based, gender-sensitive, multi-ethnic and fully representative government."[6]

While the Bonn Agreement did indicate the path towards democratization, neither in terms of participation nor content did it resemble a peace agreement that would lay the foundation for reconciliation between warring factions. The Bonn talks were exclusively held among those who had fought against the Taliban, remnants of which were continuing to fight the US-led coalition in December 2001. Lack of representation at that time naturally prevented the Bonn talks from establishing a basis for reconciliation and transitional justice. Rather, the process of democratization aimed at creating an enabling environment within which the political landscape would gradually be pacified.

To many observers, the Constitutional Loya Jirgah showed that such an enabling environment was in the making, given that political and military groupings were participating in the political arena, rather than opposing it by force. However, the

5 Barnett Rubin, Adib Farhadi, Humayun Hamidzada, and Abby Stoddard. 2004.

6 *Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions*, signed on 5th of December 2001, available at www.af.

Bonn Agreement's emphasis on process neglected the core issue of the redistribution of power, while the main challenge remained: How to diminish the political influence of those whose legitimacy rested mainly on military and economic power largely fuelled by illegal sources, rather than on democratic support? In other words, the apparent flaw and irony was to create a mechanism by which the power of various factions would be consolidated in the form of an interim administration, while subjecting it to a democratization process, which effectively aimed at diminishing their political role in the long run.

In essence, at a time when the Bonn roadmap is approaching its end, the process has affirmed the position of key power-holders on both the national and local levels. Although the international community has successfully been able to pressure those with money and guns to abide by the rules through the leverages of international aid, support and recognition, democracy has fortified their position to such an extent that the democratic processes have become prone to manipulation.

Laying The Formal Foundation for a State – The Constitution-making Process

A major step forward in Afghanistan's state-building process was the adoption of a new Constitution on 4 January 2004. In the context of a post-conflict situation, a participatory process for the drafting of a constitution is as crucial as its content, for the legitimacy and sustainability of the document will largely depend on its acceptance by the people. Given the challenge of mobilizing public participation and support, the process involved some attempts to facilitate broad consultations and public participation, despite the tight time-line provided in the Bonn Agreement. However, these attempts were perceived as inadequate and too limited.

For purposes of developing preliminary recommendations on the contents of the Constitution and in line with the process stipulated in the Bonn Agreement, the President of the TISA appointed a nine-member Constitutional Drafting Commission in October 2002. The commission presented its recommendations on the content as well as format in March 2003. These recommendations formed the basis of the work of the Constitutional Review Commission a 33-member body, including seven women, representing the country's diverse regional and ethnic composition. President Karzai had appointed the commission in April 2003; its mandate was to conduct a public consultation process.[7]

At that time, a political debate on the various constitutional models had fully unfolded, exposing the work of the commission as well as the Government to severe criticism, particularly with regard to the alleged secrecy of the process. The refusal to make any draft public combined with the lack of a formal public approval process through a nation-wide referendum was perceived by many as yet another attempt to impose a constitution fitting the needs of the Transitional Administration and its allies. However, the commission and its secretariat tirelessly emphasized that it could only speak of a draft once public consultations had been conducted, the views analysed and incorporated.

In order to obtain guidance from the Afghan people, while simultaneously educating them about the process as well as its importance, the commission distributed a total of 484,450 questionnaires and gathered over 100,000 completed questionnaires from citizens all over Afghanistan. Its members attended about 555 "public

[7] Information on the Commission, the constitution-making process, etc., is available at www.constitution-afg.com.

But is it enough to have a constitution? Certainly not! As Mr. Brahimi said, a constitution can be no more than a stack of papers. There has to exist a national will (irrada-i-millee) to put principles into practice. And there has to exist a national administration (iddara-i-millee) to ensure the implementation of the law.

Address to the Closing Ceremony of the Constitutional Loya Jirgah, Kabul, January 2004, by Hamid Karzai, President of the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan.

consultation meetings" in all provinces of Afghanistan, as well as in Iran and Pakistan to consult with the large refugee community. The views expressed by people were recorded and compiled in the Public Consultation Report, which was to form the basis for the preparation of the draft Constitution. Despite the efforts of the commission's secretariat, the public consultation process was somewhat hindered by a general lack of both understanding and a "culture of constitutionalism", in addition to the absence of comprehensive civic education campaigns.

The President finally released the draft Constitution, which was to form the basis for the deliberations by the Constitutional Loya Jirgah, to the public on 3 November 2003. While the draft certainly reflected the ATA's preferences concerning the future governmental structure for Afghanistan, it was left to the Constitutional Loya Jirgah to adopt the final Constitution. Provincial registration meetings were conducted in all provinces to register the Emergency Loya Jirgah district representatives who would elect 344 delegates to the Constitutional Loya Jirgah in early December. The elections for the 106 representatives of the so-called "Special Category Groups" women, refugees in Pakistan and Iran, IDPs, Kuchis, Hindus and Sikhs took place throughout the month of November. In addition, the President appointed 52 delegates directly. The convention gathered on 14 December 2003, and the 502 delegates adopted the Constitution by consensus on 4 January 2004.

While some national and international observers criticized the Constitution-making process as flawed, having little public participation or transparency, and "elite-driven",[8] it proved to be a remarkable step in a shift from military confrontation to political dialogue. Appearing on television throughout the nation, delegates to the Constitutional Loya Jirgah were generally able to express themselves freely, even though factional interests lurked underneath the debates.

Constitutionalism, however, has a poor record in Afghanistan's war torn history. At best, previous constitutional models were widely accepted but have commonly suffered from a lack of implementation and enforcement. Moreover, the Constitution itself stands witness to compromises that had to be brokered on all sides to find common denominators

Table 5.1: Rural Afghans' Opinions of the New Constitution

Province	Rural women: aware of new Constitution	Rural women: most important rights in new Constitution	Rural men: aware of new Constitution	Rural men: most important rights in new Constitution
Badghis	0%	Right to health and education	0%	Reinforcement of *Sharia* law
Herat	0%	Right to education	53%	Right to education
Kabul	0%	Right to health and education	30%	Ensure security
Kandahar	8%	Right to education	39%	Reinforcement of *Sharia* law
Nangarhar	26%	Equality between males and females	67%	Disarmament of armed groups

Source: Tufts University, "Human Security and Livelihoods of Rural Afghans: 2002–2003", 2004.

[8] See, for example, International Crisis Group 2003a and 2003b.

among the various political interests represented by the delegates. It is, therefore, crucial for the success of Afghanistan's new Constitution that its legitimacy is fortified by widespread information and awareness-raising campaigns to enhance understanding and acceptance among all Afghans. According to a recent Tufts University survey, the majority of rural Afghans in Badghis, Herat, Kabul, Kandahar and Nangarhar provinces had no knowledge of the constitutional process. Rural women were found to be four times less aware of the constitutional process than rural men. No rural women interviewed in three of these provinces (Herat, Kabul and Badghis) had ever heard of a constitution, while only eight per cent of women in Kandahar and 26 per cent in Nangarhar[9] were aware of it.

Ultimately, constitutional provisions need to be respected first and foremost by state organs that derive their legitimacy as well as mandate and authority to act on behalf of the state from the Constitution. In this regard, it is necessary that state officials are sufficiently familiar with the document and abide by its terms. Usually, this is safeguarded by entry exams for civil servants, who, depending on their professional level, will require varying degrees of constitutional knowledge. In a country like Afghanistan, which has had to cope without a legitimate constitutional framework to guide civil servants and citizens alike, state officials at all professional levels need training to become familiar with the Constitution.

In any post-conflict environment, civic education assumes a fundamental role in terms of participatory processes. This, in theory, not only requires educating all Afghan citizens about the meaning of democracy as enshrined in the recently adopted Constitution, but also focusing in particular on community leaders. While national as well as international institutions have always identified civic education and the participation of civil society as key to the long-term success of the democratic

Is this Constitution perfect? Most probably not. Will it be criticized? I fear it will, both inside and outside of Afghanistan. But nevertheless, I think that you have every reason to feel proud of what you have achieved and I am certain that the people of Afghanistan are very happy tonight and see in this constitution a new source of hope. Of course, we all know that all we have tonight is a number of pages on which words in Dari and Pashtu are written. It will be your responsibility Mr. President, with your Government, with these delegates and the rest of the people of Afghanistan to translate these words on a piece of paper into a living reality.

Impromptu remarks at the Closing Ceremony of the Constitutional Loya Jirgah, Kabul, 4 January 2004, by Lakhdar Brahimi, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General.



Source: *Zanbel-e-Gham*, Edition 9, December 2003

[9] Tufts University, "Human Security and Livelihoods of Rural Afghans 2002–2003", 2004.

Box 5.1

The State According to the 1382 (2004) Constitution

Overall, the Constitution seeks an equilibrium between building a strong central executive branch to further strengthen national unity and rebuild the national institutions that were destroyed, and respecting the rights of volition of the provinces to exercise more authority in managing local affairs by institutionalizing district and provincial level councils. It provides for checks and balances between a strong presidency and a two-chamber National Assembly with extensive powers of inquiry, which cannot be dissolved by the President. Furthermore, it represents a careful combination of respect for moderate and traditional Afghan values, and adherence to international human rights and democracy.

Under the President, who is also the Chief of Staff, the following political structures have been established (See Figure 5.1 for an outline of the entire system):

Judicial Branch: The judicial branch consists of a Supreme Court whose members are appointed by the President and approved by the House of the People, or the lower Parliament. The judges for the High Courts (appeal courts) and primary courts are recommended by the Supreme Court, but also appointed by the President.

Executive Branch: The Cabinet, whose members cannot be members of the National Assembly, oversees the executive branch of Government. The executive is regulated by the administrative rules and procedures determined by the Independent Administration Reform and Civil Service Commission (IARCSC), which apply to both national and sub-national levels of administration and civil service.

Legislative Branch: The legislative branch provides for a bicameral Parliament including a house of elders **(Meshrano Jirgah)** elected largely by provincial and district councils (66 per cent) and the balance being determined by the President (33 per cent). The members of the lower house, or House of the People (*Wolesi Jirgah*) will be elected in the forth coming parliamentary elections through free, general, secret and direct balloting. The 250 members of the lower house serve for five years and are elected in proportion to the population of each province. To insure that 25 per cent of the members are women, the Constitution requires that two female delegates be elected from each of the 32 provinces of the country. Such a high quota for women is rare, both in Islamic and non-Islamic countries. The President appoints one-third of the senators, 50 per cent of which must be women.

Figure 5.1: Structure of Administration



process, time constraints and deteriorating security conditions have largely rendered efforts towards these superficial at best. Moreover, the well-conceived initiative to create a secure environment for elections through a DDR programme to be conducted at the same time as the voter registration proved to be little more than an idealistic goal, with the numbers of combatants actually disarmed, demobilised and reintegrated having little impact on the overall –distribution of power.

The 1382 (2004) Constitution and Human Security

The ratified Constitution provides a framework for the protection of citizens' rights as well as the responsibilities and structure of state. Of particular significance, Article 21 provides for equal rights and full participation of women by stating that any kind of discrimination and privilege between the citizens of Afghanistan is prohibited: "The citizens of Afghanistan whether woman or man have equal rights and duties before the law". Further, Article 24 states: "Liberty is the natural right of human beings. This right has no limits unless affecting the rights of others and public interest, which are regulated by law. Liberty and dignity of human beings are inviolable. The state has the duty to respect and protect the liberty and dignity of human beings." Article 34 states: "Freedom of expression is inviolable. Every Afghan has the right to express thoughts through speech, writing, or illustration or other means by observing the provisions of this Constitution. Every Afghan has the right to print or publish topics without prior submission to the state authorities in accordance with the law. Directives related to printing house, radio, television, press, and other mass media, shall be regulated by law."

We, the People of Afghanistan... for the creation of a civil society free of oppression, atrocity, discrimination and violence and based upon the rule of law, social justice, protection of human rights, and dignity and ensuring the fundamental rights and freedoms of the people... have adopted this Constitution in compliance with the historical, cultural and social requirements of the era....

Preamble, 1382 Constitution

Box 5.2

The Afghan Constitution and Educational Rights

Article Forty-three: Education is the right of all citizens of Afghanistan, which shall be provided up to the level of the Bachelors (lis,ns) free of charge by the state.

The state is obliged to devise and implement effective programs for a balanced expansion of education all over Afghanistan, and to provide compulsory intermediate level education.

The state is also required to provide the opportunity to teach native languages in the areas where they are spoken.

Article Forty-four: The state shall devise and implement effective programs for balancing and promoting education for women, improving of education of the nomads and elimination of illiteracy in the country.

Article Forty-five: The state shall devise and implement a unified educational curriculum based on the provisions of the sacred religion of Islam, national culture, and in accordance with academic principles, and develops the curriculum of religious subjects on the basis of the Islamic sects existing in Afghanistan.

Article Forty-six: Establishing and operating of higher, general and vocational education are the duties of the state. The citizens of Afghanistan also can establish higher, general, and vocational private educational institutions and literacy courses with the permission of the state.

The state can also permit foreign persons to set up higher, general and vocational educational private institutes in accordance with the law. The conditions for admission to state higher education institutions and other related matters to be regulated by the law.

Article Forty-seven: The state shall devise effective programs for the promotion of science, culture, literature and the arts. The state guarantees the rights of authors, inventors, and discoverers and encourages and supports scientific researches in all areas and publicizes the effective use of their results in accordance with the law.

Article Forty-eight: Work is the right of every Afghan. Working hours, paid holidays, right of employment and employee and other related affairs are regulated by law. Choice of occupation and craft is free within the limits of law.

Source: TISA 2004.

To highlight a particular example of the significance of the Constitution for addressing threats to human security, Box 5.2 outlines key articles related to educational rights.

However, the example of education also illustrates that the extent to which the current administration has so far developed the core capabilities in good governance required to enact constitutional commitments remains in doubt. One of the main critiques of a rights-based approach to development is that realization of citizens' full rights would require resources and institutional capacities that are rarely feasible in practice. In Afghanistan, the co-existence of competing power structures, warlords and drug lords remains a major counter constraint to the realization of citizens' rights. It will take many years to resolve these tensions through a politically inclusive development process and with unwavering international support. In response to such issues, much of the work on rights and development focuses on extracting key principles and objectives that should inform analysis and interventions: social inclusion, participation, etc.. The implication is that there is a variety of means for contesting rights and determining outcomes, and that efforts need to focus not only on the definition of rights, but also on their interpretation and implementation through legal, policy and administrative processes.

Reform of the legal environment has been slow. Few reforms have been fully adopted under the law, and many are held up in the Ministry of Justice. Key legal texts have been approved and these relate primarily to administrative reform and to reform of the banking system.[10] The legal basis for administrative reform has far-reaching consequences for governance and the rule of law as it seeks to sequentially bring key departments into the reform agenda. However, laws related to the national budget, procurement and investment are still caught within the system. A significant component of new laws may not be passed until the Parliament is fully operational perhaps in late 2005–2006.

However, spearheading policy and institutional reform in the early post-conflict years remains a crucial pre-condition for overall investment in human security. Legal reforms in the area of family law are also very much needed, but are likely to take many years given the complicated nexus of social issues that need to be overcome all in the context of Islam and international law.

Afghanistan's Current Administrative Structure

Under the Taliban, there were 24 governmental ministries, as well as other legal budget entities related to security and the rule of law the Department of Vice and Virtue being among the most notable from a human rights point of view. In the aftermath of the Taliban regime and after the June 2002 Emergency Loya Jirgah, the size of the Cabinet expanded significantly to accommodate different political interests. Currently, 30 ministries, 11 independent bodies and several other central government agencies provide the administrative structure of state. At the sub-national level, around the office of the provincial governor, there are ministerial departments for finance, health, education, agriculture, rural development and so on, depending on the administrative division of the parent ministry in Kabul. In spite of the overly large ministerial structure, the basic organizational and administrative

[10] The Central Bank Act, ratified by the transitional Government cabinet on September 2003, gives Da Afghanistan Bank (DAB) the over-riding responsibility and full autonomy to maintain price stability and implement monetary and foreign exchange policies. Following ratification of this legislation, the DAB issued its first operating licences to foreign commercial banks, so that for the first time DAB will disengage from commercial banking and focus on its central banking role. This achievement is an important milestone in modernizing the financial sector.

Box 5.3

Main Administrative Constraints

- Party political structures remain fragmented, undermining the efficacy of central Government.
- Administrative structures too are fragmented with overlapping mandates and functions.
- The lack of professionally qualified staff within key ministerial or departmental positions significantly undermines the efficiency and effectiveness of state management capabilities.
- Fiscal problems constrain options for pay reform, reducing the recruitment of qualified staff.
- There is no merit-based recruiting patronage systems are visible at every level.
- Administrative systems are slow and cumbersome, with virtually no delegation of authority to lower ranks or to provincial departments.

Source: TISA 2004.

structures, functions and political accountabilities appear broadly to be intact.

However, the sub-national administration, at the provincial (*Walayat*) and district (*Wolaswali*) levels, is largely dysfunctional with poorly qualified staff, no autonomous budget, and few operations and sustainable support for maintaining state assets particularly in the areas of health and education (See Figure 5.2).

Under the new electoral laws, women are to comprise a minimum of 25 per cent of parliamentary membership and 30 per cent of provincial and district elected representatives.

In summary, there are 34 provinces and approximately 326 districts with each province comprising between five and 20 districts. There are provincial municipalities (*Sharwali Walayat*) within

Figure 5.2: Structure of the Government



each province (normally one) and at least one rural municipality (*Sharwali Woleswali*) within each district. Currently, the Government is deliberating over a reform framework that would downsize the Cabinet by at least 25 per cent to around 20 ministerial entities. This would enhance the effectiveness of budget formulation and execution procedures, and clarify institutional responsibilities for security, administrative, judicial and development functions.

Administrative and Civil Service Reforms

Remarkably, the rules and procedures of national administration in Afghanistan, however archaic, nevertheless appear to have remained intact throughout the years of conflict. At the same time, the quality of human resources within the administration is at an all-time low, necessitating urgent reforms. Moreover, while parts of the administration have survived, it should be stressed that these functioning branches have been working under various authorities, based on *de facto* control of military force and hence economic assets and flows. However, the state (as a political entity with a monopoly in legitimate force over the national territory) can be said to have collapsed.

The new economic policy of the Government also foresees that it will move from the role of (state) provider to (state) enabler; this too has legislative implications for both public and private sectors. For the state apparatus to ensure the attainment of national social and economic objectives, fundamental reform of the public

Box 5.4

The Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission

In June 2003, the Government formed the IARCSC to coordinate and manage the Public Administration Reform (PAR) Programme. It comprises: (a) a Civil Service Management Department responsible for developing a new legal framework (including a Code of Ethics) for the civil service, as well as modern human resources management policies and procedures; (b) the Independent Appointments Board, responsible for ensuring that appointments are based on merit; and (c) the Independent Appeals Board, responsible for hearing complaints against unfair, illegal or discriminatory behaviour in the workplace.

The IARCSC passed the Priority Reform and Restructuring (PRR) Programme decree in July 2003 to initiate the process of reforming the most critical functions of Government. The PRR allows administrative departments to place key staff on an elevated pay-scale while providing funds for organizational restructuring. The Government's PAR programme has been developed to provide a framework to build a sound legal, administrative and physical environment in which civil employees can function efficiently, and be held responsible for their performance. In the 2003–2004 National Development Budget (NDB), the Government presented a detailed short-term strategy for public administration and civil service reform, aiming at creating a lean, capable and motivated civil service, dedicated to supporting the country's national interests.

The PRR programme is now being expanded across all levels of administration, centrally and throughout provincial and district administration, as part of the Afghan Stabilization Programme. Moreover, it will take substantial effort to internalize significant numbers of public sector employees in the PRR process; and options for retrenching staff will have to be considered. According to the WB, there are currently some 360,000 individuals in public employment. Fewer than 10 per cent of these posts will be formally retained under the PRR by the end of 2007 (See Figure 5.3), in order to form a core civil service.

Programme Management Units have been created in selected ministries to enhance project ownership by ministries and strengthen implementation capacity. These units will improve the core financial management capacities of the administration. Further, so as to enhance the political reform process and strengthen executive decision-making, a Cabinet Office Secretariat is also to be established.

Source: WB 2003.

Figure 5.3: Public Employment in Afghanistan



Source: WB 2003.

administration is key. It should be stressed that reforming and training the civil service is a necessary but not a sufficient precondition for building a national political authority that monopolizes the legitimate use of force. Training administrators without measures to provide the national Government with necessary support to consolidate power and authority can potentially serve to reinforce the current position of *de facto* power-holders.

Fundamental reforms have, however, been a very slow and complicated process in Afghanistan. With no private sector to absorb redundant workers, shrinking the public sector or paying competitive salaries has been a challenge for the Government. As a result, many skilled and competent employees have sought jobs with the United Nations, embassies and the aid communities, creating a brain drain of dwindling human resources. The Government has now initiated a major reform programme in order to revamp the civil service by introducing incentives such as higher salaries and training for reforming ministries at the national and local levels. The Government has also committed to fighting corruption and reforming the civil service through the establishment of the Anti-Corruption and Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission (IARCSC).

State-periphery Relations: (De-facto) Decentralization and Participatory Planning

The difficulties entrenched in finding a proper balance between the need to build a strong central Government to immediately consolidate peace and stability, and the need for decentralisation to secure equal distribution and participation in the long term, are particularly strong in the context of post-conflict Afghanistan.[11] Based on the

[11] Ramazan Bashar Dost 2004b.

Box 5.5

State-Periphery Relations in Post-conflict Situations

Under peacetime conditions, decentralized governance, carefully planned, effectively implemented and appropriately managed, can lead to significant improvement in the welfare of people at the local level, the cumulative effect of which can lead to enhanced human development. The key to human development-friendly decentralized governance is to ensure that the voices and concerns of the poor, especially women, help guide its design, implementation and monitoring. For development and governance to be fully responsive and representational, people and institutions must be empowered at every level of society – national, provincial, district, city, town and village. Decentralized governance entails the empowering of sub-national levels of society to ensure that local people participate in, and benefit from, their own governance institutions and, by extension, urban/rural development, must bring policy formulation, service delivery and resource management within the purview of the people. These institutions should enable people, especially the poor and the marginalized, to exercise their choices for human development.

In post-conflict situations, societies are institutionally weak: they are socially fragmented, psychologically fractured and physically devastated, requiring efforts to simultaneously restore people's confidence and satisfy their basic need for water, waste disposal, food, jobs, health services, education, income and security. Post-conflict situations usually entail weak central government, if any at all. Service provision to the citizenry is minimal at best. A decentralized network of local institutions and individuals, often linked to humanitarian operations, can often be an opportunity to re-establish government services, mobilize communities, further democratic processes and demonstrate responsiveness of public institutions.

In post-conflict settings, as in others, decentralized governance initiatives are not a panacea. On the one hand, the implicit reallocation of power and resources that decentralization implies can generate, re-ignite or intensify power struggles, thus leading to further chaos or conflict. On the other hand, without appropriate accountability mechanisms, abuse of power, corruption, and capture by elites are a risk. Conflicts may also arise when reforms fail to address issues of social inclusion, particularly *vis-à-vis* ethnic and religious minorities, and respect for local customs and traditions. These challenges are added to those facing all decentralized initiatives: poor capacities, poor culture of participation, and lack of economic viability to secure mobilization of resources, among others. These and other risks can be minimized if decentralized initiatives and capacity development efforts fit within the overall national post-conflict peace-building and reconstruction strategies.

UNDP, *Governance in Post-conflict Situations*, 2004.

imperative that state-building in Afghanistan requires the central state to gradually assert its authority at the local level, the evolving relationship between Kabul and the provinces has been shaped by three factors: control of the central state, which determines the authority of the state at the local level; perceptions in the provinces of the transition process; and the political economy of central–regional relations.[12]

Strikingly, the formal administration inherited by the Afghan Interim Authority was largely centralized, but in late 2001, most civil servants were under the control of local leaders who had reasserted themselves after the Taliban. Attempts by the central Government to regain oversight over civil servants in the regions by fortifying control over the payroll (registry) have been difficult to implement. The Government's attempts to reassert control in provinces under the *de facto* authority of key provincial leaders, through the issuance of decrees and reshuffling of governors, similarly yielded only limited successes; the ability of the Government to bring about change was marginal at best, as long as the local power structures remained intact. This applied even more so to the district level, where local power structures remained largely unaffected by the Government in Kabul.

[12] Astri Suhrke 2004.

Aware of the need to reach communities at the village level in order to strengthen trust in the central structures, as well as to create a sense of popular empowerment to the detriment of the local power brokers, the central administration launched the National Solidarity Programme (NSP), which aims at "community-driven development." In essence, the NSP is based on elected village councils, which determine the spending priorities for small grants distributed directly to the villages. Another, more conventional approach adopted by the Transitional Administration has been to work with existing power structures at the provincial level to identify projects to be centrally funded. Following this scheme, the National Area-based Development Programme, supported by the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development and UNDP, started focusing in 2002 on helping provincial governors to establish district-level priorities over a two-year period.

The NSP: Community Empowerment for Democracy

On 22 January 2002, at the Tokyo International Conference for Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan, President Karzai, then Chairman of the Afghanistan Interim Authority, proposed a programme initiative to enhance democracy, generate employment and rebuild productive infrastructure.

Community development was presented as a centre-piece of the development strategy for Afghanistan, and it was stated that the transitional Government: "...intends to implement a local empowerment programme that would allow communities to manage their own resources. Such a programme would allow legitimate leaders to emerge and deal with issues facing their communities with forming a basis for consultative democracy in the future. Block grants would be distributed to villages and districts, and allocated to projects through inclusive and participatory processes and on the basis of simple criteria."

The objectives of the NSP are to: (a) Establish a framework for village-level consultative decision-making and representative local leadership as a basis for interaction within and between communities on the one hand, and with the administration and aid agencies on the other; and (b) Promote local-level reconstruction, development and capacity-building, which will lead to a decrease in poverty levels.[13] The Government's stated target is to have NSP cover the country's estimated 20,000 rural villages over a four-year period, so as to provide a single-window framework for village level reconstruction and development activities. The long-term vision is to build sustainable human capital and establish a national mechanism for the recurrent transfer of block grants to all village communities in the country.

Four key elements of the NSP approach highlight the nature of its expected contribution to national priorities:

1. **Facilitation:** Facilitation provided at the community level to assist communities in establishing inclusive community institutions through elections, reaching consensus on priorities and corresponding sub-project activities, developing eligible sub-proposals and implementing approved project-sub-proposals.
2. **A system of direct block grant transfers:** Block grants support rehabilitation or development activities planned and implemented by elected Community Development Councils (CDCs).
3. **Capacity-building:** Activities to enhance the competence of CDC members (both women and men) for

In order to organize activities and provide people the opportunity to actively participate in the local administration, a council shall be set up in districts and villages in accordance with the law. Members of these councils shall be elected by the local people through free, general, universal, secret and direct elections for a period of three years.

The Afghanistan Constitution 2004: Article 140

[13] The detailed operational modalities of the programme are described in the draft NSP Operational Manual.

financial management, procurement, technical skills and transparency.

4. **Institutional linkage:** Activities are undertaken to strengthen links between community-based institutions and public administration and aid agencies to enhance access to responsive services and resources.

Given the centrality of the unification of ethnic, political and socio-economic divisions to the NSP's vision, and taking into consideration the widespread devastation and the high prevalence of poverty across the country, the Government has, from the outset, decided that the NSP should not be geographically targeted.[14] However, in the first year of NSP, the initial three districts selected from each province were targeted on the basis of existing vulnerability and refugee return data. Facilitating partners (consisting of both Afghan and international NGOs and UN Habitat) assist in the delivery of NSP to communities. In each province, one or more facilitating partners deploy community facilitators and technical specialists to support target communities. Facilitating partners are expected to recruit and deploy female field staff to enable the inclusion of women in the decision-making and implementation processes. To be eligible for support through the NSP, communities are required to elect a CDC as a representative community-based decision-making body responsible for overseeing the preparation of the Community Development Plan (CDP) and the preparation and implementation of individual sub-projects. The breakdown for institutional responsibilities within the NSP is presented in Figure 5.4.

Afghanistan's first CDCs were elected from August 2003 onwards, and the first block grant disbursements began in December 2003. By March 2004, and as a result of improved access to many areas after the winter season, it is estimated that up to 2,000 village project proposals had been approved, and the first grant instalments disbursed to these. This is in line with the target for the first year of implementation to reach more than 4,100 village communities across the country. During the second year, operations will

Figure 5.4: NSP: Breakdown of Responsibilities

Responsibilities of Oversight Consultants	Responsibilities of Facilitating Partners	Responsibilities of Community Development Council
Appraisal of community project proposals.	Facilitate elections of inclusive CDCs	Overseeing preparation of the Community Development Plan
Management of NSP block grants for community projects (including effecting fund transfers, tranche payments, financial management, accounting and reporting).	Facilitate community project planning comprising CDPs and sub-project proposals	Convening community wide meetings
Supervision of Facilitating Partners performance.	Provision of technical assistance to develop sub-project proposals, either directly or through facilitation of access to market based assistance (preferred approach)	Overseeing planning and preparation of individual sub-projects
Planning and conducting training for staff of MRRD and FPs together with regular experience sharing workshops.	Provision of technical assistance to communities during implementation	Mobilising community contributions and ensuring community participation during all phases
Undertaking technical and financial monitoring and producing consolidated reports.	Provision of training to communities (e.g. book-keeping, procurement, contracting)	Presenting the sub-project plans at appraisal
Management of information and communication campaign.	Conducting monitoring and reporting	Managing and supervising sub-project implementation
		Overseeing or directly handling procurement and financial management at the community level
		Reporting to the community and to NSP on project progress and use of funds

[14] However, in the first year of NSP, the initial three districts selected from each province were targeted on the basis of existing vulnerability and refugee return data.

expand to cover all remaining villages in the initial districts and / or villages in new districts. Village communities that are able to successfully implement projects during the first year will receive a new but smaller block grant during their second year, with the same formula applied in successive years.

The NSP faces a number of competing demands. On the one hand, its long-term goal is to strengthen local governance, transparency, accountability and peoples' participation in development processes. On the other hand, in order to establish its credibility, it must quickly finance approved CDC plans that provide tangible benefits to communities. Without gaining credibility in the short-term, the NSP is unlikely to achieve its long-term vision. Therefore, the strategy for linking CDCs and sub-national administration is based on a phased approach that recognizes that NSP has some short-term goals. (The breakdown of responsibilities for the NSP is provided in Figure 5.4). In addition to the National Emergency Employment Programme (NEEP), other programmes, such as the National Area Based Development Program (NABDP) and Afghanistan's Stabilization Program (ASP), have been developed to strengthen sub-national administration and to improve service delivery in some key sectors such as health and education.[15]

Recognizing the significance of CDCs as the building blocks for local governance, the standardized and formal procedures for the election of CDC members have been introduced based on a secret ballot. Development councils elected through a process not complying with the established rules will not be eligible for funding under the NSP. This move has proved fundamental in demonstrating that Government commitment to the NSP rests on the recognition that block grants and small-scale infrastructure can only be effective in so far as local governance systems are strengthened and empower the marginalized rural poor.

During the programme design phase, various stakeholders initially expressed concerns about the general acceptability of a standardized procedure for the establishment of CDCs by communities throughout the country and, specifically, the extent to which gender issues would be effectively addressed in the process. However, to date this move appears to have been greeted with great enthusiasm in villages as an empowering and meaningful experience. Opportunities for cross-fertilization, analysis and learning are being harnessed. Elections to the CDCs will be the first experience of local community participation in voting and, for the majority of rural Afghan women, of participation in decision-making on a par with men with regard to matters that affect their lives.

To date, and in part as a result of the sensitivity of stakeholders to security issues and precautionary measures, all provinces are currently integrated into the NSP and receive the combined support of Government, oversight consultants and facilitating partners. However, the extent to which the NSP will continue to assist communities throughout the country remains critically dependent on the security situation.

In assessing outcomes,[16] the challenge will be to go beyond immediate satisfaction with financed sub-projects and the generation of labour days to an analysis

[15] The National Area Based Development Programme (NABDP) managed by MRRD with UNDP support is designed to complement NSP by addressing linkages between communities and government authorities. It aims to develope the capacity of sub-national authorities, and to help establish and maintain provincial and district consultation mechanisms that bring stakeholders' views into development planning and management. For the first time, a planning exercise has been conducted in all provinces identifying priority projects above the village level in each district.

[16] It is clear that the potential political outcomes arising from the NSP will extend beyond conventional definitions of poverty. A mid-term evaluation of the NSP is planned for June 2005.

of whether the programme has addressed the greatest constraints to poverty reduction and disempowerment and ensured optimum net benefits to communities. Social mobilization can have numerous effects on decision-making, democratization, political reform and development processes at large. With its focus on empowerment, NSP seeks to expand the assets and capabilities of poor people to participate in, negotiate with and hold accountable the institutions that affect their lives. This involves giving people access to information, opportunities to voice their concerns, greater social inclusion and participation, and organizational strength.

In introducing new modalities at various levels, the experience of the NSP to date highlights the potential significance of civil society and the private sector as essential and resource rich partners. However, in order to support the adaptation of these players to an increasingly favourable environment, it is clear that sustained assistance and complementary initiatives will be required. Ensuring commitment and resources to the long-term provision of services to facilitate community empowerment processes beyond an initial block grant transfer will be a challenge. The realization of national commitment is critically dependent upon guaranteed international support for political reform and reconstruction. Moreover, many of the activities financed by NSP and NEEP require sustained support from line ministries. Embarking upon a process for the empowerment of both communities and local governments thus necessitates an assured flow of funds from the central Government.

The perceptions from the provinces the second factor previously identified as shaping the relationship between the centre and the periphery vary from region to region, depending on the nature of the administrative rule and the level of security. Where administrative structures are partly or wholly under the control of local commanders and insecurity prevails, the central administration is increasingly being blamed for its inability to assert order and channel reconstruction aid to local communities. On the other hand, in regions where local strongmen are able to ensure public order, thus providing an environment of relative peace conducive to trade and economic growth, support for the central Government is similarly low. To many in the remote areas of Afghanistan, Kabul remains far away, particularly in view of the limited impact Kabul-driven politics exert on the day-to-day life of Afghans.

The political economy of centre-province relations remains an area of continuous political concern for the central Government. While international recognition and support, in particular the prospect of reconstruction funds, certainly have the potential to exert considerable appeal, they compete with revenues raised and kept by local leaders throughout Afghanistan. The central Government received only about US$80 million of an estimated US$500 million collected in customs duties in 2002, despite considerable efforts aiming at the collection of tax revenues from various provinces. Revenues generated in connection with illicit crop production and trade in narcotics further undermine the central Government's ability to compete with local warlords, who can easily attract local allegiances by offering the financial basis for community survival. *De facto* decentralization of this kind is most problematic in relation to equity issues on the national level, given the absence of national redistribution, which is prone to worsen existing inequalities among the provinces.[17] There are already substantial national differences in revenue generation:

[17] Astri Suhrke 2004.

Kabul and Kandahar generated together some Afs. 3 billion in revenue in 2002, while the combined total revenue collected in four other provinces surveyed (Badakhshan, Bamyan, Faryab and Wardak) was slightly less than Afs. 12 million.[18]

On paper, the newly adopted Constitution articulates a balance between building a strong central executive branch and respecting the rights of volition of the provinces to exercise more authority in managing their local affairs by institutionalising district and provincial level councils. The key challenge will now be to translate this balance into reality, bearing in mind the three factors that continue to shape the centre-periphery relations in practice.

The Next Step – Elections

Presidential and parliamentary elections in Afghanistan are the culmination of the post-conflict state-building process outlined in the Bonn Agreement. While such elections mean the end of the roadmap envisioned in the Bonn Agreement, they mark the beginning of a significantly new stage in the transition to a democratic political environment. It offers an opportunity to leave the "conditionalities" of Bonn behind particularly with regard to participation of groups based on military power and create truly legitimate as well as representative governance. The transition, however, has proven a challenge in itself, with the country still grappling with the root causes for previous conflict, underdevelopment and continuous threats to human security.

Initially, both parliamentary and presidential elections were to be convened simultaneously in order to remedy the democratic deficiencies of the interim structures. The Constitution thus exhorted (Article 160) that every effort was to be made to conduct the elections within six months after convening the Consitutional Loya Jirgah However, in view of growing security concerns fuelled by numerous terrorist incidences and logistical difficulties, a decision was finally made to conduct presidential elections on 9 October 2004, while postponing parliamentary elections to April 2005.

In anticipation of the elections, the Government took numerous legislative measures to improve the political environment in which they were to take place. A new political party law was enacted, allowing political parties to register provided that they satisfy minimum conditions, such as the absence of any affiliation to military movements. In addition to the registration of political parties, the Government passed a new mass media law and initiated the establishment of a Media Monitoring Commission. Most importantly, a new electoral law was enacted formally, paving the way for presidential and parliamentary elections based on a single, non-transferable and secret vote.

The vetting process undertaken to safeguard the barring of parties with military wings, however, somewhat complicated and delayed the registration process. And the significance of the newly emerging parties has been diminished by the electoral system chosen for the parliamentary elections, which will be conducted on the basis of votes for individual candidates per region rather than votes for political parties. Despite security concerns and civic education deficits, political activities are taking place throughout the country, with the north leading with 47 active political movements.[19]

Uneven conditions exist for the exercise of political rights in the regions, where the

Political freedom and participation are part of human development, both as development goals in their own right and as means for advancing human development.

UNDP, HDR 2002: Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World.

[18] AREU/WB – quoted in Astri Suhrke 2004.
[19] AIHRC – UNAMA, *Joint Verification of Political Rights, First Report (15 June – 7 July)*, 2004.

I am optimistic about our future. It is because the people are upbeat about a positive change. Not only do they demand change but they also want to be part of it. It is the best time in our history, I tell you.

Faraidoon Ahmad from Wardak

space that exists for political rights is largely determined by the factional elements in power and the extent to which they tolerate political activities by other actors. Political activities are also hampered by prevailing misconceptions with regard to political parties based on decades of conflict in which activism was subject to reprisals by competing factions.

Undoubtedly, the political environment in a post-conflict situation poses difficult challenges to the holding of elections living up to international standards. In such an environment, elections are often conducted too soon after conflict, before national political issues have progressed sufficiently and before the routines of normal peacetime politics have had time to develop. Ill-timed, hurried, badly designed or poorly run elections can actually undermine the process of democratization.[20] At the same time, elections can provide the basis for public support and legitimacy by enhancing participation.[21] Particularly in a context in which the exercise of political rights was previously impeded by years of conflict and unrepresentative governance, elections may serve as valuable "entry points" for public participation in the democratization process, provided that basic political freedoms are in place. While democracy is certainly not only about elections, public participation through electoral processes may gradually furnish a culture of democratic discourse by providing space for political dialogue and mutual tolerance.

Despite the challenges, the number of higher-than-expected registered voters has proved the Afghan people's willingness and readiness to support peace and democracy, and their hope for a strong, legitimate, accountable and representative Government.

Applying the human security paradigm and measuring the current electoral processes against a framework of participation, eradicating inequalities and responsibilities, the success of current efforts aiming at the establishment of fully representative state structures through national elections will depend on the following factors:

- **The extent to which participation of the people in the processes can be ensured despite growing security threats and the tight time-frame.** While security threats can certainly hamper participation, awareness of the processes and the political rights are fundamental prerequisites for every person to be able to participate fully. Compromises on civic education necessitated by the tight time-frame may in this regard impact public participation. The voter-registration figures, however, would indicate that the public is generally aware of the processes and keen on exercising its regained political rights.[22]
- **The extent to which the process is non-exclusive as opposed to exacerbating horizontal inequalities.** The legitimacy of elections will largely depend on its universality, or the extent to which all groups are able to participate in the process. The deliberate or unintentional exclusion of groups will naturally undermine the outcome of elections by inducing excluded groups to discredit and disassociate themselves from the process.
- **The extent to which the Government assumes responsibility for enabling the participation of all people.**

[20] UNDP 2004d, UNDP 2002.
[21] Nasrollah Stanikzai 2004.
[22] Overall, more than nine million of the estimated 9.5- to 9.8-million-strong electorate had registered in August 2004, with over 41 per cent of them women. UN/JEMB 2004.

Participation will lead to people assuming "political responsibility" while also enhancing the "responsibility" of the Government to promote accountability through public participation.

It should, in the meantime, be borne in mind that Afghanistan has only very recently embarked on its quest towards democracy. While the international community may be preoccupied with whether Afghanistan's recent presidential elections have met and whether the impending national parliamentary elections will meet all international standards, the fact that elections allowing for direct and secret voting are held may in itself fortify peoples' growing confidence in the democratic foundations that are gradually being built.

Despite all constraints, the majority of Afghans want to exercise their fundamental right to vote in national elections and have high expectations that the process will bring positive change to Afghanistan, in particular contribute to "good governance" by resulting in a Government that will be strong, legitimate, accountable and representative.[23] Building on the momentum generated by the recent presidential elections, parliamentary elections will provide an important window of opportunity not only to conclude the transitional period by establishing a truly democratic leadership accountable to the electorate, but also to generate public ownership of the state and its institutions. At the same time, political maturity, responsibility, ethics and sound motivation are critical factors in the complexity of creating a new Parliament, especially given the absence of the rule of law to prevent and stop corruption, nepotism and illegal acts. There is a need for considerable parliamentary support for over at least a decade in order to warrant that it can assume its constitutional functions and become part of daily political life in Afghanistan.

5.3. Rule of Law and Human Rights

While the previous pages have discussed the main building blocks of the current state-building efforts, the following section addresses two cross-cutting elements that determine and measure the extent to which these blocks remain stable elements of construction: the rule of law and human rights.

Security is a critical foundation for sustainable development. This includes protection from systematic human rights abuses, physical threats and violence, and territorial and sovereignty threats. Since poverty and insecurity reinforce each other and are particularly exacerbated when a nation's legal institutions perform poorly and the rule of law is weak, the requirement for security must include the well-being of persons and a strengthened justice system.

Without the protection of rights, and a comprehensive framework of laws, no equitable development is possible. Without development, justice and the rule of law remain but an academic and philosophical concept with little link to actual justice processes and practices. Building the legal framework and its implementation systems lays the foundation for the necessary confidence and credibility required for genuine and dynamic economic development. The link between legal institutions and poverty therefore is direct and fundamental.

Securing Afghanistan's Future: Considerations on Criteria and Actions for Strengthening the Justice System, 2004.

Three major concerns of our people include a return to civil war, lack of justice and corruption, and the usurpation of people's rights.

Shah Mohammad Jawad from Kabul

[23] Human Rights Research and Advocacy Consortium 2003.

The United Nations has learned that the rule of law is not a luxury and that justice is not a side issue. We have seen people lose faith in the peace process when they do not feel safe from crime. We have seen that without a credible machinery to enforce the law and resolve disputes people resorted to violence and illegal means. And we have seen that elections held when the rule of law is too fragile seldom lead to lasting democratic governance ... But a 'one size fits all' does not work. Local actors must be involved from the start. The aim is to leave behind strong local institutions when we depart.

Kofi Annan, UN Secretary-General, 25 September 2003.

Re-instituting the Rule of Law in Afghanistan

The law is the normative extension of the social compact on which any democratic state is built. It formally articulates the principles by which competing interests within a society are reconciled and thus offers the basis for peaceful co-existence. The law, furthermore, formulates the framework within which the state is to operate by authorizing organs of the state to act on behalf of society in creating an environment beneficial to all. This includes the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms by the state *vis-à-vis* its own organs and non-state entities. A particularly important aspect is the uniform application of the law, where the rich or powerful are dealt with in the same way as other citizens. The law "rules" when the legal framework is generally accepted and respected by its addressees both in terms of the contents of the norms and the institutionalised processes available to resolve conflicts of interest. The rule of law means that individuals as well as the state are held accountable against the set of applicable norms by organs entrusted to determine whether the law has been broken and impose sanctions accordingly. It also means that no other "law" rules than the one that is generated in compliance with the rule-making procedures.

Viewed from the human security angle, the provision of the rule and, by implication, enforcement of law becomes the responsibility of the state, in the absence of which threats such as crime, denial of property rights, and discrimination prevail. In positive terms, the rule of law guarantees the sustainability and irreversibility of development. While in post-conflict situations, reaffirming the centrality of the rule of law is a key prerequisite for the success of the reconstruction process, it also remains the key challenge given the inability of state structures to properly safeguard and enforce its implementation.

In general, a fair and effective legal framework requires the following: First, that a set of rules that are known in advance exist; second, that the rules are enforced; third, that means exist to ensure the application of the rules; fourth, that conflict resolution is a function of binding decisions made by an independent and credible judiciary; and fifth, that procedures are in place for changing the rules when they cease to serve the purpose for which they were intended.[24]

The pace of the reconstruction of the justice system in Afghanistan has been criticized as being unnecessarily slow compared to other sectors. The blame is usually attributed to uncoordinated donor efforts, lack of sufficient resources and lack of leadership by the international community and the UN.[25] Justice sector processes of reform will inevitably take a slower pace where the reform requires a deep cultural shift in both the justice providers and the justice seekers. Donors and international community interests in seeing immediate results against their diverse political agendas, and measuring success in terms of delivery and disbursement, have worked against ownership of the reform process by the justice institutions, and pose risks of fostering underlying factionalism.

The process of strengthening the justice system is based on two complementary efforts: strengthening political will, and provision of financial and technical assistance. While financial and technical support have been provided at a faster pace (in certain instances even too fast, given the country's slow absorption pace), the support of the necessary political will has been following more slowly. However, as in any post-conflict situation, the creation of the necessary political will and the ownership of justice sector reform entails

[24] UNDP 1995b.
[25] See, among others, United States Institute for Peace 2004.

Box 5.6

Access to Justice in Post-conflict Situations

Access to justice, security and human rights are central to sustainable peace and stability in any context, let alone post-conflict settings. Conflicts, whether internal or cross-border, invariably lead to the erosion of the civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights of the populations caught in the midst. Specific violations vary with each conflict, but they often include violations of civil rights, such as the right to life (unjustified killings), to physical integrity (physical injury, enforced disappearances, arbitrary arrest and detention and torture), and to freedom of movements; political rights such as freedom of speech, of association and of assembly and the right to political participation; economic, social and cultural rights such as the right to property (through loss by destruction or temporary deprivation as a result of internal displacement), to work, to an adequate standard of living, to a family, to freedom of information, etc. In such situations, where there is no justice or where there is only unequal access to justice, violent conflict is likely to re-emerge. Indeed, many conflicts are rooted in the real or perceived breakdown of justice where individuals and groups are not able to obtain a fair remedy for their grievances; where political, legal and institutional biases marginalize segments of the population such that they resort to violence. Even where the justice system *per se* may not be the cause of the conflict, with the continuation and the escalation of the conflict over time, the judicial and legal system generally becomes less able to cope with the injustices of war, thus compounding the perception that the judicial establishment is either unable or unwilling to fulfil the demands for justice. Finally, there needs to be a holistic approach to security sector reform (SSR) that ensures (i) sustainable disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, reintegration and resettlement (DDRRR) of former combatants, (ii) development of democratic, law-abiding police services and armed forces, including appropriate civilian oversight mechanisms, and (iii) necessary linkages between the judicial system, the police service and the prison service.

It is of "critical importance that public faith in the justice and human rights system is restored quickly without leaving room for the return to extra-judicial measures such as vigilantism and "mob-justice" or "victors – justice" or massive human rights violations. But at the same time, it must be a system that is credible, effective and efficient, observing prescribed legal procedures, dispensing justice and providing human rights protection equally and equitably."

UNDP, *Governance in Post-conflict Situations*, 2004.

by nature a strong cultural shift that cannot be pushed excessively, especially from outside. Moreover, sustainability requires that the national authorities are in charge of and own the process, not only technically but mostly politically.

The international community has struggled with investing in justice institutions that appear refractory to change, such as the Supreme Court, the Attorney General's Office, or a Ministry of Justice devoid of many of its usual coordinating functions (for example, budget control). The international community has preferred to deal with the much more palatable Judicial Reform Commission, set up in the Bonn Agreement with a vague mandate to "lead" the justice reform agenda and staffed with a number of English-speaking Afghans called back from Europe and the United States. The Judicial Reform Commission has in many instances provided an involuntary forum for the ideological battles of different donors, given the concentration of international attention, rather than serving as an avenue for reconciling the different interests of the justice institutions. Its failure to convene the justice institutions and to channel reform turned the commission into an easy scapegoat for the international community when it became apparent that no real reform or reconstruction could happen without the direct involvement of the Afghan permanent justice institutions and their political will.

However, the progressively increasing involvement of the justice institutions in the preparation of the national budget and the underlying policy direction framework indicates that the idea of consultative reform is beginning to move forward within the justice institutions as well. A strategy based on consultations with all the justice institutions has been formulated through the *Securing Afghanistan's Future* strategy, and is reflected in the 1382 (2003) Constitution and NDB for justice. However, the extent to which these consultative efforts reflect a real political will for reform among the justice institutions is still to be established and will be put on trial through the current ongoing process of choice and formulation of priority projects within the National Priority Programme for Rule of Law and Justice and the involvement of the justice institutions in any future policy-setting mechanism.

The main problems encountered in strengthening Afghanistan's justice system are of a political, structural and legal nature.

From the political point of view, the lack of control and security over the territory have made it hard for the formal justice system to have a presence outside the main provincial capitals. The lack of political dialogue among the main stakeholders has caused a lack of leadership and ownership in the coordination of the reform efforts. Dialogue, cooperation and engagement of the main justice institutions are all important in building the necessary political will to expand the control of the central Government at district level.

- It is necessary to strengthen the justice institutions in their administrative capacities, and support them for a meaningful participation in policy-setting and prioritization of resources. The justice system rehabilitation should be coordinated to the maximum extent with all other initiatives enhancing provincial and district governance and security (disarmament, public administration reform, police reform, and the deployment, formation and deployment of the national Army to fight against armed groups, trafficking, narcotics, organized crime and corruption, and to oversee areas of large return and displacement). Clear identification of criteria and mechanisms for prioritization of provincial interventions and their sequencing are key.
- The process of strengthening the justice system is still very fragile in the provinces and districts. Participation of the districts and provincial officials, both politically and in the identification of technical problems and shortcomings, and related future recommendations, needs to increase if the justice system is really to produce services for the population countrywide.

The justice institutions are experiencing gross structural problems and a lack of capacity of their staff. The internal administrative capacity of the justice institutions is so limited that they are not yet able to gather realistic data on their functioning and challenges.[26] Inadequate salaries (currently US$36 per month on average), lack of physical security, lack of infrastructure and lack of accommodation are the main factors that prevent even deployment and appointment of new justice personnel (judges, attorneys of the Attorney General's Office, and Ministry of Justice staff) in remote or difficult areas. In most cases, this means that local high-ranking members of the community are appointed as magistrates, independent of their skills or formal education, which might put at risk their

[26] Some data with regards to staffing at central and provincial levels are provided in *Securing Afghanistan's Future - Considerations on Criteria and Actions for Strengthening the Justice System*, 2004.

independence and impartiality and reinforce a general informal attitude towards justice.[27]

Due to the disruption of its education system and years of isolation, Afghanistan is also experiencing a lack of qualified justice personnel, which puts at risk the integrity of judicial administration, leaves room for corruption, and decreases people's trust in the formal justice system as well as the political and development process. A considerable number of positions within the office of the prosecutors or the courts are still vacant. Further, of the current staff, only a third of judges and prosecutors are educated to university standards.[28]

- Significant investments need to be made in the qualitative strengthening of the university system and post-graduate training programmes for justice personnel. At the same time, training for existing judges and administrative staff of the justice institutions needs to be supported, based on a thorough needs assessment and provided in conjunction with development and governance building programmes at the provincial and district levels. Again, a key factor will be the participatory process on which development of new curricula will be based and the factoring in of the complicated interlinkages of *Sharia* and secular law elements. This process needs to go hand-in-hand with the application of uniform criteria for entering the judicial professions.
- A critical element of the justice and security sector is the functioning of the correction system in accordance with human rights norms. In Afghanistan, governmental responsibility for the correction system has shifted from the Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of Justice. The shift has, for the most part, left the sector under-resourced and the staff institutionally unrepresented. The situation is aggravated by the fact that this is an area where it is extremely difficult to get donor support. However, the representatives of the prison department of the Ministry of Justice have been actively participating in the NDB, highlighting the needs for a nation-wide approach, enabling the rehabilitation of a correction system in line with international standards and pointing to the vast gap in resources.[29]
- Not to be forgotten is the systemic unbalance of the Afghan justice system due to the almost total lack of professional lawyers, especially female lawyers, participating in court proceedings. While the right to defence and legal assistance for the indigent has been recognized in the Constitution (Article 31), the Afghan judicial system does not have a tradition of professional lawyers assisting clients in court cases, nor does it have a bar association or systems of provision of legal aid. However, the work of NGOs (including the Norwegian Refugee Council, International Legal Foundation and Medica Mondiale), who are providing legal assistance and legal aid to clients in both formal and informal proceedings, shows that the positive effects of legal representation go beyond the immediate advantages for the justice seeker. Such support also helps to highlight shortcomings in the adjudication process and provide training for judges, prosecutors and correctional staff. Further efforts of the international community in

[27] *Ibid*.
[28] *Ibid*.
[29] The National Development Budget for Justice is available from the Afghan Government website: www.af.

developing the legal professions are badly needed, although a decision on the institutional framework in which it will operate (what form of bar association) will require consultations in and outside Kabul.

- In a broader way, the international community has, to date, mainly focused efforts on the lack of capacity to provide justice by the Afghan Government, leaving it to human rights bodies like the AIHRC and a few NGOs to build the capacity to seek justice within the Afghan population – through legal awareness and legal education programmes and legal aid schemes. This will need to be rectified if the Afghan justice system is to provide access to justice for all, regardless of ethnicity, gender, and financial, military and political power.

The legal framework operating in Afghanistan is also in a transitional phase. While the new Constitution presents the overall framework, the work of indexing and creating a digest of the existing laws to underpin future law reform efforts is yet to be done. The fact that there is no democratically elected legislative body also undermines the legitimacy of the existing legal framework. Current law reform efforts are uncoordinated and are aimed mostly at the swift creation of an enabling environment for private sector development to flourish, along with foreign investment, trade and exploitation of mineral resources.

However, while these might be needed in the short term to expedite economic development, a purely technical approach to law reform risks producing laws that are completely detached from the overall legal context and are thus hardly applied in practice, especially outside Kabul. Donor efforts would be better placed in supporting the strengthening of the capacity of technical bodies like the Ministry of Justice legislative department, which could either directly support the future Parliament in drafting laws or whose capacity could be transferred to the Parliament once it is in place. Matters are even more complicated by the lack of clarity on the relationship between formal and informal justice.

Surveys and studies carried out[30] show that the majority of judicial cases outside Kabul are dealt with by informal justice mechanisms. There is still insufficient knowledge of how prevalent their use is, how effectively they work, and what their impact is. While traditional justice systems provide access to established conflict resolution mechanisms,[31] they are also widely criticized for reinforcing traditional practices that infringe on human rights, especially those of women.[32]

- From a reform point of view, the challenge is to understand the relationship between the two systems and the fact that the main point of reference of many communities is not statutory or Islamic law, but local traditions governing that area. How the two systems could be used complementarily, including in terms of gender, should be further investigated. Due to the history of the Afghan legal tradition, formal legal mechanisms are much less consolidated than usually presumed. While a series of reforms to enact state laws was started at the beginning of the 20th Century, reforms were only achieved through the 1923 and 1964 Constitutions. However, the 1973 coup marked substantial changes to the administration of justice, so that the only time the formal legal system had to consolidate was the nine years

[30] International Legal Foundation 2003; Tufts University/Feinstein International Famine Center Study 2004.
[31] Hanef Atmar & Jonathan Goodhand 2002; Ali Wardak 2004.
[32] Ali Wardak, 2004.

between 1964 and 1973.[33] Expansion of formal legal and judicial mechanism throughout the country now needs to be preceded by a thorough study of the interface between formal and informal justice. It should involve the participation of the recipients of justice, in particular, those from disadvantaged groups.

Reinforcing Human Rights

As stated in the Bonn Agreement, the AIHRC is the main national institution to deal with monitoring and investigation of human rights violations, development of a national programme for human rights education, promotion of women's rights and transitional justice. The AIHRC has assumed a leadership role within the national development and security programmes. The Human Rights Advisory Group (HRAG) assists the AIHRC by serving as a forum for principled discussions on the current human rights situation. Eventually, it will be able to make policy recommendations intended for the national or provincial level. One mechanism will be to organize workshops focused on key sectors, where the lead ministries and other main partners will be invited to engage in a constructive dialogue. The HRAG will also assist the AIHRC in assessing the overall efforts undertaken by the Government to comply with its commitments in Bonn to protect and promote human rights.[34]

In view of the absence of reliable statistics or baseline studies in most areas, the HRAG recommends focusing initially on the national (development) budget process rather than on quantitative measures. The group has proposed that mainstreaming benchmarks should be based on a number of general criteria applicable to all Local Consultative Groups (LCGs):

- Non-discrimination with regard to ethnicity, gender, area of residence or any other criterion.
- Particular attention or focus in favour of the vulnerable groups of the population.
- Full transparency, so that all concerned Afghan citizens should in principle be able to access information regarding development activities.

Box 5.7

Treaties to which Afghanistan is a party

- International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)
- International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
- International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD)
- Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)
- Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT)
- Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the Optional Protocol on the involvement of children in armed conflict (CRCOPAC) as well as the Optional Protocol on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography (CRCOPSC)
- Convention on the Protection of Migrant Workers (CPMW).

OHCHR, *Country Profile of Afghanistan and the International Human Rights System*, 2004 (draft on file with the authors).

[33] *Securing Afghanistan's Future - Considerations on Criteria and Actions for Strengthening the Justice System* 2004.
[34] Advisory Group on Human Rights, *draft ADF statement*, 2004.

- Participatory approach in the design, approval and implementation of development projects to the extent possible, so that potential beneficiaries are consulted in all the above phases.

The legality of the projects should be evaluated against current domestic legislation and against international human rights instruments to which Afghanistan is a party. The HRAG recommends that Afghanistan should ratify the Vienna Convention on the Law of International Treaties to secure an adequate interpretation of its human rights obligations.

The government has already undertaken some positive initiatives to address the human rights situation. These include:

- The independent commission appointed by the President to investigate the violent incidents at Kabul University last November presented an impartial report, and measures were undertaken to prosecute those responsible for human rights abuses.
- A special human rights department has been created in the Ministry of Interior.
- The Government actively participated in important initiatives jointly undertaken with regional authorities and the international community to address serious human rights issues such as the return of IDPs to their areas of origin in the north of the country.
- The Cabinet ratified the Statutes of the International Criminal Court.
- The assessment of the human rights situation has been closely linked to the constitutional drafting process and the judicial reforms as well as the reforms within the security sector.

Significant challenges to be addressed will include the provision of measures to:

- Address serious human rights violations such as torture, extrajudicial killings, forced disappearances; arbitrary detentions and others.
- Encourage internal processes of accountability in Government institutions, particularly with respect to protecting and guaranteeing human rights (for example, requesting law enforcement agencies to establish appropriate disciplinary regulations and procedures, and investigate internally any possible allegation or complaint on human rights abuses).
- Ensure a commitment to respect human rights as a criterion in new appointments in the Government at the central and provincial levels.
- Support politically and otherwise the work of the AIRC; respond to its queries and recommendations; and acquire the technical capacity to report to appropriate treaty bodies on the implementation of the above-mentioned international legal instruments.
- Support and protect national and international human rights NGOs, in particular, those involved in shadow reporting on the implementation of international legal instruments signed and ratified by Afghanistan.
- Increase the awareness of the general public on basic human rights and fundamental freedoms, with particular attention to the inclusion of human rights aspects into the educational system.

In March 2004, the Government made several commitments on human rights at the UN co-sponsored international meeting "Afghanistan and the International Community – a Partnership for the Future". In what has come to be known as the Berlin Declaration, it agreed to extend full cooperation to the AIHRC and to strengthen Afghanistan's institutional

capacity to meet in an adequate and timely manner the reporting obligations of international human rights instruments. A unit within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) has now been established to support reporting. In February 2003, the Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights organized an initial training workshop, and plans are underway to provide technical assistance to the unit in order for Afghanistan to produce an initial report within the next year.

While this is a welcome development, however, it will likely overlook Afghanistan's obligations under other international instruments. Nonetheless, the establishment of the unit and of a database of human rights will support all further development efforts by the Government and the international community in providing much needed baseline data for setting human rights benchmarks and supporting human-rights-based monitoring.

Institutionalizing human rights monitoring within all branches of the Government will mean that a shift will be required also by the AIHRC, especially now that the Constitution (Article 58) recognizes the commission as a permanent statutory body. The AIHRC has been providing direct assistance in many cases of human rights abuses, sometimes channelling them through the institutional channels of the governmental justice system, where these exist, and sometimes assuming a direct mediation role. With the expansion of the Government's capacity and the realization of its responsibility *vis-à-vis* its citizens, the AIHRC will need to take a step back and ensure monitoring of these mechanisms, rather than offering an alternative to them. It has been said that the AIHRC represents a "bright light in strengthening the rule of law."[35] While it is true that the work of the AIHRC in human rights education and monitoring of human rights violations has contributed immensely to sensitizing Afghans about basic human rights, it cannot be forgotten that the ultimate responsibility for guaranteeing the rule of law and access to justice for all rests with the state, and that only through investing in the development of Government institutions mandated with providing security and peaceful conflict resolution will Afghanistan fulfil its obligations towards its citizens and the international community.

Past human rights violations

Another significant challenge that has yet to receive explicit attention in Afghanistan concerns past human rights violations. The need for national reconciliation is often emphasized while the specific means to address Afghanistan's past – entrenched in conflict and internal strife are ignored. Both national and international actors are hesitant to touch the issues arising from this past, despite initial efforts to incorporate transitional justice into the mandate of the AIHRC. The multi-ethnic layers of Afghan society combined with the fragility of state-building efforts, which remain dangerously exposed to polarization with the potential to perpetuate conflict, necessitates a cautious approach towards revisiting the past as a means to promote a process of national reconciliation.

While few would disagree that long-term political stability in Afghanistan is closely tied to the resolution of past grievances – including human rights violations, war crimes and crimes against humanity – what is yet to be determined is the sequencing of reconciliation as well as the mechanism by which a process of "national healing" can unfold. Essentially, the crucial issue will be whether the models of "transitional justice" that have been applied in other post-conflict contexts can be adapted to fit the complex history of war in Afghanistan.[36] On the one hand, the model of "truth and reconciliation" may be too

[35] Tufts University / Feinstein International Famine Center Study 2004.
[36] Rama Mani, AREU 2003; International Center for Transitional Justice 2004.

simplistic in a context in which perpetrators and victims are spread throughout society. On the other hand, the prosecutorial model, which emphasizes the need for justice through war crimes tribunals, may jeopardize the peace processes by threatening powerful strongmen who may be inclined to exploit ethnic divisions to escape from prosecution. Moreover, the prosecutorial model would be preconditioned on either a strong judicial system within Afghanistan or heavy international support, similar to the international war crimes tribunals established in the past. Neither system seems to be a given at present.

Less confrontational mechanisms – involving historical accounting through documentation and oral reports as well as restorative justice that facilitates community reconciliation using customary methods – may provide an intermediate measure of transitional justice. In order to obtain the views of the Afghan population concerning past human rights violations in relation to the building of a new state, the AIHRC has conducted consultations with 4,000 individuals and 200 focus groups. On the basis of these, recommendations on mechanisms for transitional justice in Afghanistan will be made to the President. Moreover, the UNHCR is conducting a mapping exercise with regard to past human rights violations (1978–2001).

It is becoming increasingly apparent from these exercises that a majority of Afghans demands that perpetrators of human rights violations must not be allowed to hold (key) governmental positions. Although a majority would seem to insist on judicial accountability in the long term, there currently is a lack of public trust in national judicial institutions to perform such an important task for national reconciliation. It is hoped that judicial reforms and strong international support will ultimately yield an environment conducive to addressing the past through judicial means.

Rights-based programming

It is clear that the human rights situation will be one of the main parameters by which international donors and the Afghan people will assess developments in Afghanistan. Sustained investments in encouraging demand from below and a constituency for claiming rights from above will be crucial for the progressive realization of human rights for all. Many challenges remain to be overcome in terms of shaping appropriate processes and outcomes within the context of an emerging rights-based agenda.

The establishment of the AIHRC provides a key forum for the ongoing assessment of Government efforts to comply with the commitments subscribed to in Bonn, and to protect and promote the rights of all Afghans. Similarly, the creation of a human rights database and the efforts on reporting to UN human rights treaty bodies will provide the international community with the visible benchmarks of rights-based development and assist the Government in programming development assistance through a human rights lens. The next challenge facing Afghanistan's policy-makers and the international community is to support civil society in its demand for sustained development and basic rights.

5.4. Security Sector Reform

As described in Chapter 1 of this report, the notion of security in its traditional sense does not sufficiently grasp the needs of the individual in terms of human development. Rather, the focus has to be on a broader understanding of human security as *freedom from fear* and *freedom from want*. However, throughout the preceding sections, the need for a strong central authority – and its peripheral requirements – has been repeatedly emphasized. Such an authority should be able to effectively address threats to security (in the traditional sense, that is, threats to survival) as a precondition to addressing issues of human development,

involving the creation of an environment conducive to reconstruction and equal distribution. It is well known that the security situation in Afghanistan is not only poor, but is constraining reconstruction and development activities, especially outside of Kabul, and particularly in the regions most affected by drought, past and current. The central authority, in its state-building efforts, has faced the difficult challenge of establishing a security apparatus adequately equipped to tackle the threat to survival posed by insurgent groups, criminals and warlords. This section briefly evaluates the security sector reforms undertaken so far and highlights the lessons that could be learned.

Security sector reform is the key to ensuring political stabilization and lasting security in post-conflict settings. The concept, first elaborated in the late 1990s, refers to the transformation of a country's security apparatus with the aim of ensuring that it is managed and operated in a manner consistent with democratic norms and principles. Responsible and accountable security forces should reduce the risk of conflict, provide effective security for the citizenry and foster an environment conducive to development activities. However, the record of security sector reform in post-conflict states has been mixed. In the Afghan experience, for example, progress on DDR has been slow.[37]

While security is a fundamental precondition for effective national programme execution, security sector reforms in Afghanistan have in general been slow, with insufficient coverage. The continued co-existence of opposing forces threatens reconstruction altogether. In recognition of the centrality of security sector reform for other development plans, five national programmes have been initiated to improve security (See Figure 5.5).

With respect to the central government's policy on security we have to say that it is a failure. There are currently many states within a state in different parts of Afghanistan. For example, the Islamic State of Herat; the Islamic Republic of Mazar-e Sharif and, of course, the powerful Republic Panjshir. These states have effectively undermined the central government and will continue to do so. But these mini states are not doing their job with respect to security either. In Herat the police, instead of ensuring peace and security, create conflicts, as we saw one day in Baghi Azadi when a security police started beating students. There are thousands of other examples.

Bashir Ahmad Ibrahimi, Herat

Figure 5.5: National Initiatives in the Security Sector



[37] Mark Sedra and Peter Middlebrook 2004.

Box 5.8

Security Sector Reform and the Berlin Declaration

The plans presented were very ambitious and included:

- The demobilization of 40 per cent of the Afghan Army (using stated troop strength as the base) by June 2004, including the decommissioning of military units.
- Agreement that NATO and the international military forces would continue to support the ANP and ANA.
- Extend full cooperation to the AIHRC Strengthen Afghanistan's institutional capacity to meet in an adequate and timely manner its reporting obligations under international instruments.
- The Afghan Government will develop human rights monitoring, documenting and reporting mechanisms in partnership with the international community.
- Establish a Supreme Court according to the Constitution with the necessary capacity to fulfil its mandate.
- Strengthen the administrative and financial management capacity of justice institutions.
- Accelerate the legislative reform process through adoption of key laws that would be compatible with the Constitution, including laws and procedures on the organization of judicial offices, criminal and civil codes, and a penitentiary law.
- Establish a national legal training centre.

Source: Berlin Declaration, 2004.

Over the past two years, there has been remarkably little progress in security sector reform. Forward movement has been stalled by the lack of national ownership, poor donor coordination, the absence of an integrated political process, the lack of stable governance provided in coordination by the centre and peripheral bodies, the slow pace of administrative reforms in the security sector, and the high level of off-budget defence spending. As a result, two key strategies have not been met: The establishment of an adequate national army[38] and police force[39] loyal to the central Government, and the effective demobilization of ex-combatants. The absence of a peace agreement and an agreed process for political representation, combined with the dominance of regional powerbrokers, has undermined these two critical reform paths.

Given that the success of Afghanistan's state-building enterprise depends to a significant degree on the establishment of a well-functioning and well-structured security sector, according to the *Securing Afghanistan's Future* report, 'security sector reforms, where progress has been too slow during the past two years, are now afforded the highest priority. The overall objective of security sector reform is to strengthen the capability of the security sector to provide an accountable, equitable, effective, and rights respecting service. The institutions that fall under its umbrella are needed to provide a basic level of safety and security for the public and facilitate a return to normalcy in the political, economic, and social spheres. To this end, the following steps must be taken:

- The establishment of democratic oversight over all security forces.
- Ensuring that resources are rationally and efficiently distributed within the security sector and through the budget.
- The preparation of security forces to meet existing threats and provide the

[38] As of May 2004, there were a total of 8,000 newly trained soldiers, some who are already in service in Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif.
[39] There are currently 5,800 fully trained police, and police academies have been established in Kabul, Gardez, Kandahar, Kunduz, and Mazar-e-Sharif.



Source: Zanbel-e-Gham, Edition 9, December 2003

civilian population with an adequate level of security.

- The clear delineation of the tasks and responsibilities of the various security forces and institutions to avoid overlap and redundancies.[40]

Future reform efforts will need to focus on:

- Expansion of military capability and the prevention of armed conflict.
- Disarming, demobilizing and re-integrating combatants in line with the expansion of the new national army.[41]
- Law enforcement (police).
- Judicial system reforms.
- Crime prevention and reduction of administrative corruption.
- Reduction in ethnic tensions through an inclusive political process.
- Reduction in drug production and trafficking.
- Clearing landmines.

5.5. Role of Civil Society Institutions

If the state is to effectively provide human security, mechanisms are required through which the public can meaningfully participate in institutionalized dialogue with the state. Empowered civil society institutions are also necessary. In Afghanistan, there are various traditional mechanisms through which the public engages with the –affairs of the state, such as *shuras*, *Jirgas* and religious networks. Moreover, civil society organizations are increasingly active in the state-building efforts, engaging in civic education, awareness raising, peace-building, and advocacy for human rights and gender equality. The implementation of an

[40] TISA, *Securing Afghanistan's Future*, 2004d.

[41] By 15 July 2004, a total of 10,770 officers and soldiers had turned in their weapons, while 10,460 had been demobilized. Some 9,000 of the personnel had started or are about to start their reintegration exercise. Taken from a press briefing by David Singh, Senior Media Relations Officer at UNAMA and by UN agencies in Afghanistan, 15 Jul 2004, available at www.reliefweb.int.

Box 5.9

Defining Civil Society and its Significance in the Afghan Context

The concept of civil society refers to a broad range of non-governmental and not-for-profit organisations that have a presence in public life, expressing the interests and values of their members or others, based on ethical, cultural, political, scientific, religious or philanthropic considerations. They include community groups, NGOs, labour unions, indigenous groups, charitable organizations, faith-based organizations, professional associations and foundations. Civil society organizations are increasingly recognized as influential actors in public policy and development efforts. An effective strategy for engagement with civil society in Afghanistan will be an integral part of the strategy for poverty reduction and achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

The benefits civil society can bring to development efforts include:

- Giving a voice to stakeholders particularly poor and marginalized populations and helping ensure that their views are factored into policy and programme decisions
- Promoting public sector transparency and accountability as well as contributing to an environment favourable to good governance
- Promoting public consensus and local ownership for reforms, national poverty reduction and development strategies by building common ground for understanding and encouraging public–private cooperation
- Bringing innovative ideas and solutions as well as participatory approaches to solve local problems
- Strengthening and leveraging development programmes by providing local knowledge, targeting assistance and generating social capital at the community level
- Providing professional expertise and increasing the capacity for effective service delivery, especially in environments with weak public sector capacity or in post-conflict contexts

Civil society organizations can be engaged through the provision of resources, training, technical support, etc. as envisaged for the process of formulating Afghanistan's poverty reduction strategy. Dialogue and consultation with civil society on key issues, policies and programmes (such as by listening to their perspectives and inviting suggestions), can strengthen the responsiveness and effectiveness of national policy reform processes.

effective strategy for the strengthening of and engagement with civil society, as exemplified by the Government's flagship NSP, will be a critical component in meeting the expectations of local communities.

As highlighted in Box 5.9, civil society can play a key role in the promotion of human security, pressing for basic and strategic entitlements to be established in law and ensuring that they are effectively enforced. Without group solidarity and collective representation (community groups, social movements, unions or national NGOs, etc.) the poor are unlikely to be granted rights, or, to the extent that they are granted them, to be able to hold state and non-state actors accountable for their realization. A national commitment to ensure human security does not, for example, imply that the state has to provide free public services in all cases, but rather that it is required to respect, protect and fulfil rights, whether by direct provision or by the state acting as a regulator and facilitator for other actors (such as the market and civil society), who provide services where this is the most effective and sustainable approach possible with the resources available.[42] International experience confirms that networks and alliances at both national and international levels can have a powerful impact in terms of scaling up local voices and priorities into organized claims. Moreover, experience highlights that the state is not monolithic and that there are organic links between actors within the state and actors

[42] Tim Conway, Caroline Moser, Andy Norton and John Farrington 2002.

within civil society. At the same time, it should be stressed that civil society is heterogeneous and that its interests are diverse. Afghan communities, like those in other countries, contain powerful social networks among the elites, which can often work against the interests of the poor, while the poor themselves are often divided along ethnic, cultural or gender lines.

The opinion of many international actors, lamenting the absence of civil society in Afghanistan, builds on the assumption that civil society in Afghanistan is, if not non-existent, at least very weak. Often this perception results from a narrow, culturally biased definition. However, Western notions of "civil society" do not transfer easily to the Afghan context. The idea of building a broad civil-society constituency for peace may only be possible in contexts where civil society is composed of vertically and horizontally integrated formal, rule-based organizations. Moreover, research from elsewhere suggests that where the state is weak and fractured, civil society will be similarly divided and lacking in voice; a strong, healthy state is usually the precondition for a strong and healthy civil society. In Afghanistan, by contrast, the state has collapsed and civil society predominantly consists of a complex web of informal, norm-based networks based on blood, kinship, and tribal, religious, cultural and ethnicities.[43] A comprehensive understanding of civil society in Afghanistan thus necessitates taking into account the particular historical, cultural and political context of the country.

Identifying Afghan Civil Society

Civil society as a concept originating within modern Western democracies often only includes associational forms such as NGOs and voluntary associations. In a non-Western setting, and particularly in an Islamic and traditional country like Afghanistan, a broader definition, encompassing s*huras*, *Jirgas* and religious networks in addition to voluntary associations and NGOs, is necessary.[44]

Community Councils

Afghanistan is very rich in its tribal and traditional structures. Throughout the country, a variety of local councils referred to as s*huras* or *Jirgas* exist. These are used as tools for negotiation and dialogue. Stakeholders belonging to different tribes and networks approach one another in order to solve disputes, gain resources, influence political processes or reach overall consensus upon major issues. Aid agencies increasingly work with s*huras* as partners for community development. Yet these councils do not function exactly along the same goals and principles of civil society, as the basic perspective of a *shura* is reactive rather than proactive. Through capacity-building measures, however, the mandate of s*huras* can be reoriented, in order to strengthen its civil society functions.

Religious networks

Religious leaders and networks have always played a prominent role in Afghanistan, especially in times of crisis, when they undertake crucial functions either in the form of legitimizing resistance or even forming its backbone. Due to their influence in society, religious councils, religious scholars (*Ulama*), and traditional Islamic leaders, including *Mullahs* and *Maulawis*, can serve as important elements of civil society in Afghanistan.

Voluntary associations

In urban areas especially, recent years have seen the formation of various voluntary associations and interest groups. These include women's, professional, youth, student, social and cultural groups. A

Security in general is the responsibility of the people themselves. In Afghanistan the Government is making us dependent on foreign security forces. This is not good for the country. The Government has to rely on its own people.

Said Rahim Rahimi from Kabul

[43] Hanef Atmar and Jonathan Goodhand 2002.
[44] Nasrollah Stanikzai 2004; Assadullah Walwalji 2004.

prominent example is the Professional *shura* of Herat that was founded in early 2002. It mainly consists of the local intelligentsia (doctors, lawyers, engineers, professors, etc.).

NGOs

Even though NGOs are a relatively recent phenomenon in Afghanistan and have mainly been established from the late 1980s onwards, there has been an explosion in their number in recent years. Today, more than 2,000 NGOs are registered with the Ministry of Planning. The majority of these, however, cannot be considered as genuine civil society organizations. Most are involved in emergency and reconstruction aid, and their primary role is implementing projects rather than fostering popular participation and social organization, or advocating the interests of the local population. Nevertheless, there are NGOs in Afghanistan that focus on civil-society-related issues such as human rights, peace-building and civic education. Some play a significant role in facilitating and encouraging constructive dialogue within civil society, as well as between civil society and the state.

Afghan Civil Society and the State

In order to act as a counterweight to the state, and influence the formulation of Government policies, civil society needs to have access to the state. Given the weakness of Afghanistan's current administrative structure, it is difficult for civil society organizations at present to assume this role in an institutionalized manner. First of all, in the past there has been a lack of a governmental "culture" to involve and strengthen civil society.[45] Presently, contacts and interactions between the Government and civil society are often strained due to intolerance and mistrust. These stem from ethnic, political and personal conflicts, or may simply be due to a gap in understanding about the role and function played by NGOs. At the provincial level, local power holders often create obstacles for civil society organizations to interact with communities, as this is perceived as a threat to their hold on the people. Moreover, since civil society appears to have only a limited influence on the current dynamics of the conflict, it is difficult to see it becoming a leading edge in a peace-building process. The potential for exerting pressure "from below" to influence the incentive systems of leaders and promote humanitarian principles appears to be limited.[46]

However, at this critical juncture of Afghanistan's state-building efforts, civil society has began to raise its voice. Since 2001, the numbers of Afghan civil society groups have not only increased sharply, they have also become much more visible and are demanding room to influence the peace process. Civil society representatives were invited to attend the Bonn Conference in 2001, and civil society groups have increasingly been drawn into the peace-building process as a balance to military and political organizations. They have also been involved in activities such as civic education, awareness-raising, peace-building, and advocacy for human rights and gender equality.[47]

The Role of Civil Society in Development

In general, civil society can play an important role in reconstruction, state-building, deepening democracy, peace, reconciliation and stability, provided it is recognized by the authorities, utilized and encouraged.[48] Projects planned and

[45] Assadullah Walwalji 2004.
[46] Hanef Atmar and Jonathan Goodhand 2002.
[47] Stephan Massing, UNDP Kabul, contributed to the section on civil society.
[48] Assadullah Walwalji 2004.

Box 5.10

Examples of Civil Society Involvement in Afghanistan

Even though the sphere of civil society activities in Afghanistan may still be a far cry from an ideal – where civil society has a major influence on peace processes, political stability, economic productivity and human well-being – there are a number of civil society organizations or representatives from civil society that are engaged in a variety of activities and have successfully implemented several interesting projects in the past years. The following examples intend to illustrate that promising initiatives and organizations do exist and constitute entry points for sustained cooperation and partnership.

Afghan Civil Society Conferences

Civil society conferences, with representatives of diverse civil society groups took place prior or parallel to the political conferences in Bonn (2001), Tokyo (2002) and Berlin (2004). The goal of these meetings was to involve Afghan civil society in the peace and reconstruction processes in order to achieve a more sustainable post-conflict reconstruction. At the most recent conference in Berlin, 40 representatives from civil society presented concise recommendations to the inter-governmental meeting and the Government of Afghanistan. The active participation of civil society in such meetings underlines that civil society groups have become much more visible, increasingly demand influence, and are eager to be part of the peace and development processes in Afghanistan.

The Afghan Civil Society Forum

The Afghan Civil Society Forum came into being at the first Afghan Civil Society Conference in Germany and began its activities in February 2002. Its mission is to support and strengthen civil society in Afghanistan. The main objectives of ACSF are to:

- Provide a platform for dialogue within Afghan civil society;
- Facilitate and ensure the involvement of civil society in the country's peace and reconstruction processes;
- Foster an engagement with political and international actors; and
- Use modern civil society agents (such as NGOs) in order to reach out to traditional members of Afghan civil society.

ACSF's primary activities comprise raising awareness; and conducting civic education campaigns, workshops and dialogue sessions (as for example, the Afghan Youth Civil Society Conference); producing newsletters; and facilitating civil society networking (including by establishing databases of civil society actors).

managed by the communities themselves typically show rates of return higher than those planned and managed by Government agencies, as well as enhanced ownership, a key factor to ensure sustainability.

Poor people are often viewed as the targets of poverty reduction efforts, rather than as assets and partners in the development process. Experience has shown that given clear plans, access to information and appropriate support, poor men and women can effectively organize to provide goods and services that meet their immediate priorities. Not only do poor communities have greater capacity than is generally recognized, they also have the most to gain from making good use of resources targeted at poverty reduction. As one of the Government's core priority national programmes, the NSP has taken a pioneering approach in the Afghan context to building grassroots confidence in the new central administration. With communities empowered to make decisions and control resources during all stages of the project cycle, the programme is laying a national foundation for good democratic governance.

The Afghan people have suffered tremendously as a result of decades of conflict, political instability and the effective collapse of the nation state. The high level of community expectations that have accompanied the launch of the state-building and reform processes have not been matched as quickly as many would have liked, particularly in the form of

tangible improvements in lives and livelihoods.[49]

The implementation of an effective strategy for the strengthening of and engagement with civil society, as exemplified by the Government's flagship NSP, will be a critical component in this regard. However, block grants and small-scale infrastructure can only be effective in the furtherance of human security in so far as local governance systems are simultaneously strengthened and the marginalized poor are empowered. In short, the challenge for the Government of Afghanistan will be to address the major strategic needs of its people, namely participation, dignity and empowerment within the policy and institutional reform processes.

If people can be of any help in enhancing human security they need to be taken into confidence with respect to the relevant policies. They should be provided with information about the current policies and asked about their advice with respect to improving them.

Gul Ahmad Yama from Ghazni

5.6. Conclusions: Building a State for Good Governance The "Great Democratic Game"

From this NHDR's perspective, the ultimate objective of the current reconstruction and state-building processes is the establishment of a governmental structure that, by providing for "good governance", enables and promotes human development. According to the Commission for Human Security, the following key governance issues need to be addressed in the post-conflict environment: Democratization, participation in decision-making, accountability of decision-makers, respect for the rule of law and human rights, and inclusive, equitable and fair rules and institutions. These institutions will allow for the effective empowerment of people and communities, which in turn is essential for effective governance.

- One central aspect in this process is the rule of law, which is key to institutional functioning and the protection of people. Establishing the rule of law, however, goes beyond the drafting of a constitution and laws, the creation of courts, etc. It requires the inclusion of norms, principles and practices that establish relations among people and between people and the

Box 5.11

Good Governance – For What?

From the human development perspective, good governance is democratic governance. Democratic governance means that:

- People's human rights and fundamental freedoms are respected, allowing them to live with dignity.
- People have a say in decisions that affect their lives.
- People can hold decision-makers accountable.
- Inclusive and fair rules, institutions and practices govern social interactions.
- Women are equal partners with men in private and public spheres of life and decision-making.
- People are free from discrimination based on race, ethnicity, class, gender or any other attribute.
- The needs of future generations are reflected in current policies.
- Economic and social policies are responsive to people's needs and aspirations.
- Economic and social policies aim at eradicating poverty and expanding the choices that all people have in their lives.

UNDP, *Human Development Report 2002: Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World*.

[49] This 'credibility gap' has been clearly highlighted in recent constitutional consultations. See Sedra and Middlebrook 2004.

state. Moreover, it is important to strengthen civil society in post-conflict environments, ensuring a mechanism for people to participate, express their views and hold decision-makers accountable.[50]

- There are certainly many factors that influence the outcome of post-conflict state-building exercises, but for Afghanistan, one aspect of the human security approach to human development seems to be particularly prevalent: the need for participation, whether active or passive. Participation is contingent upon two preconditions: that the state provides opportunities to participate (political security as a public good being the responsibility of the state), and that the people assume the responsibility to participate (civilian responsibility). Currently, neither of the two conditions has been met in Afghanistan. Rather, people often perceived the country as a nation, but not a state in which they can participate.

- Afghanistan needs people to translate the idea of a social compact into a reality. This requires, on the one hand, that the state structures or organs operate for the people in a responsible and non-exclusive manner. On the other hand, people should not perceive the state as an exogenous organism set up for the implementation of alien policies serving the elite, but should feel part of the larger community as contributors and controllers. With regard to the former, it is crucial that the state structures address the needs of the people and perform their functions in a manner that adheres to the axiom of "good governance". This will gradually build the necessary trust of the people, which forms the basis of the social compact that legitimizes the state. Concerning the latter, participation helps make the people responsible and bring the state closer to its constituency, which remains ingrained in communal structures given the absence of functioning public service providers. Only once governmental institutions feel "responsible" towards the people, and the people feel "responsible" towards the state, will the state-building exercise achieve its purpose. "It is all about what the state can do for the people and what the people can do for the state."[51]

- The crucial question will be for the future Government to promote the social compact through participation. Providing an environment within which political security can thrive will certainly generate trust and public participation. But to a large measure this will depend on the Government's ability to assert its central authority without disenfranchising the periphery. It will also depend on the manner in which the state can satisfy the public demand for holding prominent past and present violators of human rights accountable, and address growing concerns about corruption and mismanagement.

Having successfully passed the historic challenge of conducting Presidential elections without any major security incidents, the next test for the Government will be the extent to which it can sustain and reinvigorate the democratisation process aiming at the establishment of legitimate and accountable structures to govern Afghanistan on the basis of the Constitution. Apart from the requirement to ensure an enabling environment for the conducting of free and secure Parliamentary elections scheduled for spring 2005, it is called upon to build the

Corruption is eroding people's confidence in the government. It is so widespread, open and common that it is now accepted as some sorts of legitimate government fee.... I don't know why the government is not paying any attention to this social ill.

Khan Zaman, from Kabul

[50] Commission on Human Security 2003.
[51] Michael Schoiswhol, UNDP Programme Officer, Kabul.

structures necessary for a functioning Parliament, which can meaningfully represent the people and exercise control over the executive. Moreover, the Government is confronted with a plethora of challenges in implementing its transitional duties concerning necessary structural reforms in the executive and judicial branches, as provided for by the Constitution regarding the period until the establishment of the National Assembly (Article 159). Ultimately, it will need to inspire trust among the people by ensuring that the rule of law, as observed by the judiciary and executive organs, finally replaces the rule of the gun. In passing these "tests", the government will certainly face the difficult dilemma inherent in post-conflict state-building efforts: that the establishment of "good governance" after years of military confrontation takes time, even as the memories of the people are by far more short-lived than their expectations.

Chapter 6

What Kind of Development Vision is Needed for the New Sovereign State?

Photo: Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh

Chapter 6

What Kind of Development Vision is Needed for the New Sovereign State?

6.1. Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to analyse, from a human security perspective, the reconstruction and peace-building visions elaborated by the TISA in its first two years, and to make recommendations to be included in updated development policies of the new Government. The chapter briefly reviews the history of economic planning in Afghanistan in the past few decades before examining the current development visions and strategies from a human development and a human security point of view. Finally, it makes recommendations on types of development policies that Afghanistan should consider for a "humanly secure" future, given that, ultimately, post-conflict situations also provide opportunities to promote change, and to fundamentally recast social, political and economic bases of power in order to include the excluded, heal fragmentation and erase inequalities.

6.2. History

Development Planning in Afghanistan: A Clash of Tradition and Modernity

A political history of development planning in Afghanistan points to a number of trends that could be used as lessons in today's post-conflict period.[1] First, the economic history is one of great dependency on foreign aid and, with it, shifting economic policy orientation from a state-planned to a liberal market-based economy. Second, strategies were often designed and implemented from the top through ruling elites without the benefit of consultation with people. Third, economic development consistently has been concentrated in urban areas at the expense of the countryside. While significant gains were made at various stages of history, these were also rapidly reversed through wars and neglect.

The modernization of Afghanistan began with the reforms introduced in 1926 by King Amanullah (1919–1929), following a nine-month tour of Europe. The reforms were especially impressive for foreign visitors, one of who described Afghanistan in 1928 thus: "It is becoming a modern state. Its roads and communications have been transformed. There is a well-trained army. There are excellent schools.... In the centre of Asia what is almost a new country is in process of birth – or, at least, the old country is being metamorphosed."[2]

However, King Amanullah's aspirations to strengthen the state through imposing heavy taxes on peasants and traders proved less popular with the religious rural elite and clerics who ended his rule in 1929. This was the first time – but not the last –in the modern history of Afghanistan that rural conservatives reacted in opposition to the modernization process of urban elites.

In contrast to the fast reforms of Amanullah, the reign of Nadir Shah (1929–1933) and his son Zahir Shah (1933–1973) saw a slower pace of modernization, while innovations implemented by individual entrepreneurs boosted exports to Europe, often through the Soviet Union. Modern academic

The Afghan economy could barely walk even before this all started, but the Soviet invasion crippled it. The Mujahideen then sent it to a coma and the Taliban suffocated it to its ultimate demise.

Afghan Professor, CESR Report, 2002

[1] The discussions below have been taken from three authors: Omar Zakhilwal, Barnett Rubin in his response to the draft of the NHDR, and Umer Daudzai 2003.

[2] S. Huddleston 1928.

education started in Kabul in 1932, although a university was not formally established until 1947. In the 1930s, Abdul Majid Zabuli founded the Bank-i Milli as a private development bank and began accumulating capital through investment in the cultivation and processing of cotton in northern plains, especially around Kunduz. The state supported this effort by draining the malarial swamps and creating an irrigation system of dams on the Kunduz River. It settled Pashtuns (*naqilin*) from other areas, as well as former nomads, in this region, where they grew rice and cotton, the latter purchased by the Spinzar Cotton Company, a private company owned by Bank-i Milli.

By the end of the Second World War, Afghanistan had a reserve of about US$300 million from external trade. A number of industrial units were established and at least two major agricultural development projects, one in the north and another in the south, were launched. Starting in 1953, a decade with Sardar Daud as Prime Minister witnessed the nationalization of private sector institutions and a number of state-guided initiatives for rapid economic growth. New settlement schemes and state industries as well as improved infrastructure were pursued, financed by external borrowing. Between 1956 and 1979, the country's economic growth was guided by several five-year and seven-year plans aided by extensive foreign assistance, primarily from the Soviet Union and the United States. Roads, dams, power plants, factories and irrigation projects were constructed, and the education system expanded. The first five-year plan was launched in 1956, followed by the second five-year plan in 1962. Sardar Daud was successful in attracting foreign economic interest, so much so that Afghanistan was then receiving the highest levels of foreign technical assistance on a per capita basis of any country in the world.

Daud's five-year plans were plagued by the weaknesses of centralized economic policy and its disincentives for the private sector and for farmers, although they also led to some very important changes: the rapid expansion of the system of education in the provinces; the creation of a national army, which gave the state more effective control over the territory than ever before; and the construction of the first national road system, which enabled the army to reach the major regional centres and also facilitated the growth of a trucking industry. When the road system was completed with the opening of the Salang tunnel, it marked the first time that an all-weather road linked the country's north and south, a development that resulted in equalizing the price of wheat. The electrical grid was considerably expanded during this time, and natural gas was extracted from 1967, with 95 per cent of the total produced being exported to the Soviet Union.

The gradual modernization of the economy was mirrored in the political arena, which saw a Constitution finalized in 1964, guaranteeing free elections, a free press, and similar rights. By the end of the 1970s, Afghanistan was considered a modern state.

Educational opportunities and, to a lesser degree, health services were expanded, although limited to the relatively small urban sector, and leaving female enrolment in schools and the growth of services in rural area lagging behind. Sardar Daud's investments in infrastructure created a national market for the first time; however, his reliance on foreign aid led to dependence on external support rather than locally generated private capital. This was not the last time in Afghanistan's history that the economy came to be heavily dependent on external assistance.

The next decade saw Afghanistan's subsequent decision-makers vacillating between orientations towards Western liberal economic policies (as in the Republic proclaimed by Sardar Daud after deposing Zahir Shah in 1973), and then

towards pro-Soviet socialist planning systems (prompted by a coup in 1978 and the Soviet invasion of 1979). The long drawn-out war of Soviet occupation and subsequent internecine conflict severely damaged Afghanistan's economy. By the mid-1990s, most of the country's limited modern infrastructure was destroyed, and traditional irrigation systems were impaired by damage and lack of maintenance. Even more important was the progressive breakdown of the state over time and the erosion of institutions – both modern and traditional. Government-provided social services, which had never had much outreach into the rural areas, atrophied and, to a large extent, stopped functioning.

The Afghan economy – already reduced to a miserable state by years of conflict – continued its downslide during the Taliban regime, which saw not only the imposition of economic sanctions by the international community but also the longest and most severe drought recorded in the history of Afghanistan. As the national market disintegrated, each region became more integrated with the economy of its foreign neighbour, through migration, trade and military alliances, while household incomes came to depend on remittances from family members working abroad. The war economy, with opium cultivation, foreign military subsidies and printing of money to finance militias came into full bloom.

There was a modest economic recovery in the mid-1990s in regions that were largely free of conflict. Agricultural production increased. The number of livestock herds rose sharply, taking advantage of widely available unutilized grazing lands; horticultural production also grew, based on restoration and expansion of orchards and vineyards. Substantial numbers of refugees returned to their home with international assistance. The recovery, however, was concentrated in areas of the country taken over relatively early by the Taliban, where trade barriers had been removed and a certain degree of order restored. Subsequently, the deterioration in social services (particularly education) was aggravated by the Taliban's social policies, which excluded women from work and girls from school.

On the eve of the Taliban collapse, most of the essential infrastructure had been virtually destroyed, with none of the operational attributes of a modern state such as roads, electricity, telecommunication, schools or transport. War, drought, and the resulting depletion of social and human capital had made Afghanistan one of the poorest countries in the world.[3]

Lessons

Three trends stand out in the political economy of Afghanistan in the past 25 years, all of which could serve as lessons for the present:

- The first lesson relates to the heavy reliance on foreign aid, and with it, the shifting in the orientation of the economic policy from state planning to a liberal market-based economy. Afghanistan's strategic position during the Cold War period made it a large recipient of foreign aid, which funded the running of a centralized but relatively weak state without substantial domestic taxation. The limited "modernization" of the Afghan economy achieved by the end of 1970s was heavily dependent on foreign assistance, while the limited domestic revenue was used mainly for the Administration and the Army.
- The second lesson is that the various economic strategies did not create sufficient employment opportunities for all members of the new class

[3] Abdul Baqil Banwal 2004.

created by the educational system. While the education sector was used for the public sector, different rulers and their clients used ideologies, foreign aid and violence to eliminate their competitors for these niches. At the same time, strategies were systematically designed and implemented from the top through ruling elites, without consultations with the people.

- The third lesson involves the systematic disinterest in rural development in the country. Economic development consistently concentrated on the urban areas at the expense of the countryside. Largely as a result of foreign aid, the country had relatively good infrastructure, including a major road network as well as major irrigation and hydroelectric facilities. But these did not extend beyond the main arteries and urban centres.

6.3. The Present: Setting National Development Priorities

The National Development Framework, National Priority Programmes and *Securing Afghanistan's Future*

As Afghanistan turned a new page following the removal of the Taliban, the interim Government, with remarkable speed and with the help of the United Nations and international financial institutions, was able to outline its main "visions" for social and economic development in the NDF. This was put together in April 2002, shortly after the UN co-sponsored inter-ministerial International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan, held in January 2002 in Tokyo. The NDBs then translated the priorities of the NDF into concrete programmes and specific projects. In March 2004, the Transitional Administration, in partnership with agencies of the United Nations, the WB and ADB, also presented an investment document, *Securing Afghanistan's Future* at the international meeting in Berlin on "Afghanistan and the International Community – a Partnership for the Future". The investment plan proposed actions across the major thematic areas of social and human capital, physical infrastructure and natural resources, public administration reform and economic management, and trade, investment and the private sector and security. The bill for these programmes was a sum of US$27.5 billion, required over the next seven years in the form of investments by the international community in stability and peace-building in Afghanistan. The programme attracted an initial US$8 billion in assistance at the Berlin Conference, almost twice the support provided at the Tokyo Conference.

These agreements organized the priorities of the interim Government around three pillars of development:

- **Pillar 1:** Human capital and social protection. This was to assure conditions that allowed people to live secure lives and to ensure the formation of sustainable human capital.
- **Pillar 2:** Physical infrastructure. This pillar would generate employment opportunities through public works programs such as rebuilding roads, and water sanitation projects.
- **Pillar 3:** An enabling environment for development. This last pillar was modified twice. Within the NDF, the third pillar supported private-sector-led development as a distinct orientation of the economy. By March 2004, a more realistic "enabling environment" had come to mean the rule of law and security, without relinquishing commitments to the private sector. Within the budget, however, this did not include major items such as support to the new Afghan Army and counter-narcotics

and anti-mine action. It has shrunk from about 10 per cent in the first budget projection to only a couple of percentage points of the total in the last projection.

The three pillars were first elaborated through six National Priority Programmes, which were more than doubled by April 2004.

In addition to the National Priority Programmes, the TISA also set up 16 Public Investment Programmes co-ordinated by a consultative group mechanism created for each sector, with the participation of key national institutions, donors and aid agencies working within that sector. Through the consultative group and budget processes, the Government has moved to set the rules by which donors, UN agencies and NGOs will support its efforts. The new National Priority Programmes are to be implemented through a system of steering committees consisting of a number of ministers, and programme implementation units to be led by national professional programme managers and joint planning teams.

Afghanistan has now embarked on a phase of reforms prompted by the adoption of a staff monitored programme with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). These reforms include the forthcoming preparation of a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) in cooperation with the WB and other partners in the international community, and a number of structural changes to the Administration and to the macro-economic framework. The Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development have entered into major purchaser-provider relationships for service delivery, and the Ministry of Telecommunications is being transformed into a regulator rather than continuing as a competitor with the private sector.[4] Minister of Finance Ashraf Ghani also explained at the Berlin Conference that Afghanistan has completed the first

Box 6.1

National Priority Programmes

The new programmes being considered in the summer of 2004 were:

- National Skills Development Priority Programme
- National Rural and Urban Water (Drinking Water) Priority Programme
- National Vulnerability Priority Programme
- National Urban Priority Programme
- National Agriculture Priority Programme
- National Private Sector Priority Programme
- National Justice and the Rule of Law Priority Programme

These complemented the Government's existing priority programmes listed below:

- National Emergency Employment Programme (NEEP)
- Irrigation and Power Programme
- National Solidarity Programme (NSP)
- Afghanistan Stabilization Programme
- Transportation Programme
- Feasibility Studies Programme
- Education and Vocational Training
- Health and Nutrition

[4] Speech of Ashraf Ghani, Minister of Finance, TISA at Berlin Conference, March 2004.

phase of building a modern Ministry of Finance, with reforms in the treasury, budgeting, and customs policy and administration. An autonomous Central Bank was established, and a new currency launched in 2002–2003. The Finance Ministry also reversed a long policy of overdraft financing through printing money, and has taken major steps to centralize revenue from the provinces.[5]

The minister added also that carrying such reforms forward requires addressing "head-on the cancer of corruption and the weak capacity of the Government." The weakness is compounded by the problem of what he called "two internationally funded bureaucracies uneasily cohabitating" one, a bilaterally and multilaterally funded national bureaucracy, where Government civil servants are paid an average of US$60 a month, and the other centred on the UN agencies, other donors and NGOs, in which Afghans earn an average salary of over US$1,000 per month. To overcome the human capital crisis in Afghanistan, the Government is now proposing a lateral entry programme of recruiting over 1,000 senior managers from outside Government on contracts at market competitive salaries, but other short-

Figure 6.1: Consultative Group Mechanism



[5] *Ibid.*

and medium-term solutions are urgently needed to address this discrepancy.

A Consistent Bureaucracy

The rationale behind the identification of broad priorities, programmes, budgets and implementation mechanisms in the state-building exercise of Afghanistan has been the urgent need to set up a structure that responds adequately to the large amount of resources that the new Government was promised by the international community. The response has been the creation of a bureaucracy familiar to international agencies and tested in other post-conflict countries, which could accelerate delivery through coordination mechanisms between national and international structures. In this rush, however, although all "adequate" structures of a strong centralized Government were set up on paper, an important step had to be sacrificed, given problems of security, timing, capacity and infrastructure: consultation with the ultimate beneficiaries – the people and communities – especially those living outside of Kabul.

Consultation was systematically hampered by imminent threats to disintegration of the state, the urgency of vast amounts of aid, insecurity and the Government's lack of legitimacy outside of the capital. Establishing the rules of the new state was the priority, given the dangerous political vacuum. Nevertheless, concerns remain about the sustainability of top-down and outside-led structures, which fail to embrace broad participation.

The structures and mechanisms set up by the Government were meant to answer the reconstruction needs of a devastated country:

- Structures and strategies were designed to mobilize national capacity so that the Government could manage its own policies and programmes in partnership with the donor community. Leadership, both of the overall process through the Transitional Administration, and through increasingly strengthened ministry portfolios, provided confidence. The design of the programme implementation units promised the recruitment of competent national professionals.
- The broadening of the National Priority Programmes, both in scope and quantity, was a sign of confidence in the ability to deliver, as well as a strategic intent to move away from relief and rehabilitation projects to sustainable development, especially in rural areas. As such, the transformation and expansion were consistent with the evolution of the state-building process in the past two years.
- Moving from a short-term relief project modality to longer term programming expanded the necessary timeframe. *Securing Afghanistan's Future* proposed a strategy of growth and development consistent with the Government's commitments to reaching the MDGs by 2015, and the new National Priority Programmes were designed with five- to –15-year plans and objectives, with a rolling programme comprising annual sets of realistic objectives and budgets. Although avoiding the word "planning", which was reminiscent of the failed five-year plans of pre-war Governments, long-term "programming" cast a more realistic framework for reconstruction needs.
- Transparency and accountability were also boosted. Requirements for reporting on procurement, progress, financial management and so on were designed through a number of oversight committees at different levels, including the Cabinet. Furthermore, the Transitional Administration set up a central Web

site, an expression of its commitment to share information openly with its international and national partners, and with the Afghan people. This Web site, which has complemented the sites of the Office of the President and other line ministries, contains the major documents prepared by the Government (such as the NDB), and from the major international conferences on reconstruction. Most of the documents, however, are in English, a reflection of the intended audience. The site also contains a Donor Assistance Database (DAD), supported by UNDP, which provides a tool for tracking reconstruction and humanitarian projects in Afghanistan. It contains information on where projects are operating, who finances them, and which organization are implementing them.

- Consistent with the arguments presented in this NHDR that threats to human security cannot be prioritized, the various National Priority Programs were not designed to favour some over the other. In fact, they constituted a list of development needs identified by different ministries rather than an identification of priorities. Budget allocations, donor interest, and the capacity of responsible institutions may, on the other hand, lead to a sequential delivery and prioritization of programmes.
- Coordination was further boosted. By mid-2003, the Ministry of Finance oversaw the coordination of donor aid, organized now through a budget process, while insisting on complete information from aid organizations on the total inflow of aid. This coordination led to a coherent set of long-term priorities projected for three fiscal years (2003–2005) in the development budget. The Ministry of Finance took an increasingly important lead in coordinating both the aid flows in the country as well as the revenue collection from the regions.
- Partnership was among the targets of the new National Priority Programmes, which seek to provide points of collaboration around national policies between the Government, donors, the private sector, NGOs and communities.

Afghanistan has been unique in comparison with other post-conflict situations, where donors have been reluctant to finance core budget and recurrent costs of a newly established Transitional Administration because of the lack of control over funding or inability to show visible results. The Ministry of Finance in Afghanistan managed to mobilize support and trust through creating the database on donors, and by instituting a broad consultative process for the preparation of the NDB.

However, the two main shortcomings of development strategies designed by the transitional Government were the lack of broad-based participation and the scant attention paid to the root causes of inequalities in Afghanistan.

Analysis of the Priorities from the Human Development and Human Security Point of View

Using as the framework of analysis the four principles of human development outlined in Chapter 1 of this report (efficiency, equity, sustainability and empowerment), the following sections analyse the transitional Government's overall development vision as outlined in the NDF and further elaborated in *Securing Afghanistan's Future*, as well as the National Priority Programmes, in order to draw lessons for future visions of the new Government.

Efficiency

Strong commitments to efficiency can be recognized in both the priority given to economic growth and a core emphasis on

institutional and financial accountability. *Securing Afghanistan's Future* argued that although a number of key structural and systemic reforms had been carried out, much still needed to be done. If Afghanistan is to grow out of poverty, a drug-dependent economy and an environment of insecurity, an annual growth rate of at least nine per cent will be required. This level of growth is planned through a macro-economic framework that allow for broad-based development, financial and trade reforms, and the simplification of banking and investment laws, trade and customs rates among others. All reforms are premised on commitments to an economic policy of market integration, liberal trade, the promotion of the private sector as an engine for growth, and a key "enabling" role for the state.

Efficiency is also ensured through plans for core state capacity in managing fiscal and public administration: transparency in the management of resources; the creation of high-level decision-making capacity by putting in place a core group of public servants, supported by international advisors, while recognizing long delays in the planned broad-based civil service reform; the establishment of a budgetary process and identifiable payroll registers for the public service; and economies of scale through large programmes rather than fragmented projects.

Despite these efforts, however, the efficiency of the system is in question, given constraints on revenues as the peripheral provinces continue to collect revenues without adequate submission to the treasury single account. The efficiency of the planned programmes is also questioned in view of the costly strategies adopted in the short term. A market approach to building absorptive capacity in the public and private sector has led to the extensive use of foreign experts to enhance the ministries' capacity to channel large amounts of foreign aid to implementing reconstruction programmes. The solution to the problem of absorption capacity has been sought in the sub-contracting of private international firms for various functions, ranging from construction to accounting. This, however, could prove costly and unsustainable. Building national capacity – and not "importing" it, is a long-term and difficult task that requires adequate solutions from the incoming Government.

Equity

Commitments to equity are sought through a distribution of resources and opportunities regionally and across vulnerable populations. As the outline of the National Priority Programmes states: "Each NPP will be designed with the Cabinet approved principle of social equity in mind, and should also be capable of reporting its expenditures and impact in terms of provincial equity." Furthermore, various Government strategies emphasize support for the social protection of the poorest sections of society – those below the poverty line, the disabled, female-headed households and the elderly, in particular.

Yet, adhering to principles of regional or social equity is problematic when the real needs of different communities have not been properly assessed. Strategies may not have benefited from adequate participation in the design and implementation processes, given problems of lack of capacity and insecurity, which have hampered consultation, and the urgent need to draw up plans for attracting international investment. Furthermore, the existing development strategies do not have as an explicit goal or primary objective the eradication of horizontal inequalities. Specific attention must be paid to the equitable distribution of existing resources within the upcoming PRSP, which the Government will begin preparing in 2005.

The Government seeks to integrate best practices from free market economies by

focusing on economic growth, while also ensuring social inclusion of all groups and providing social protection for those not able to participate in that growth. Crucial importance is being accorded to the forces of a market economy in all of Afghanistan's development strategies. Yet as experience shows in a number of developing or post-conflict countries around the world, a market approach to reconstruction and development policies may inevitably have a number of negative externalities, which policy makers in Afghanistan must be aware of – widening inequalities, large pockets of poverty, limited provision of social and public goods, and high levels of crime. For Afghanistan, a market approach to reconstruction may fail to incorporate the root causes of the conflict: unequal distribution and competition over resources, lack of inclusion, poor political accountability and legitimacy, among others.

Sustainability

Commitments to principles of sustainability are expressed through a number of explicit objectives. Among these, the NHDR recognises four areas:

- Priority investments in human capital: The Government's vision for investments in human and social capital is "to create the conditions necessary for the people of Afghanistan to secure sustainable livelihoods in the legal economy and to lay the foundations for the formation of long-term human development."[6]
- Dealing with security and the rule of law as fundamental pre-requisites for political normalization, national reconciliation, social development and reconstruction.
- Emphasis on national capacity-building.
- Emphasis on infrastructure-building, including transportation and communication systems.

Although there are formidable challenges to raising national revenues in an environment of insecurity, lack of central authority, and the presence of regional power-holders with private armies and vested interests, nevertheless, the main concerns in terms of sustainability are the heavy dependence on external funding of both the development and the operational budgets of the Government. At the moment, there is a plan to get internal revenues up to over US$1 billion annually in the next five years thorough customs and international transit, tolls, communications, airspace licensing and fuels.

Another fundamental challenge is to ensure the adequate provision of public goods and services through national and sub-national departments. Afghanistan's reconstruction plans are based on a model where the state is a regulator that manages services and does not provide them. In many cases, services are provided via NGOs and UN agencies. For example, key national programmes for improving livelihoods and social protection, while managed by Government ministries, have involved the competitive contracting of implementation services by non-governmental agencies. These include the NSP, NEEP, Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation and Micro-finance Support Facility. Inevitably, during the first two years of reconstruction, there was a tendency for international assistance to seek opportunities for small manageable projects to stave off a potential humanitarian crisis and ensure the delivery of immediate and visible benefits to the people of Afghanistan. It was increasingly recognized, however, that projects are rarely effective or their impact sustainable,

[6] TISA, *Securing Afghanistan's Future*, 2004d.

unless they are embedded in emerging national policy and programme frameworks. In this way, it is hoped that National Priority Programmes will promote better outreach, transparency and a more accountable use of resources.

Participation and Empowerment

With strong commitments to social and human capital, protection of the poor and emphasis on private sector development through provision of infrastructure and micro-credit support to the rural poor and women, the development visions seek to ensure the empowerment of the people of Afghanistan. The NDF and *Securing Afghanistan's Future* lay a strong emphasis on community participation. As the latter notes, community action, involvement, and therefore ownership will be key to the security and sustainability of reconstruction efforts. Enhancing community participation can promote the effectiveness and efficiency of implementation. The Government can best convince communities of its legitimate leadership through the provision of support to communities in ways that empower them, such as the NSP.

Three variables can be used for analysing the national development priorities in Afghanistan from the viewpoint of participation and empowerment: the participation in the design of the strategies; empowerment through participation in the implementation process; and mechanisms for checks and balances by communities and civil society.

- **Participation in the elaboration of strategies:** This report notes that one of the most significant shortcomings of the development prioritization exercises has been the lack of adequate consultation with communities, especially outside of the capital. Imperfect consultation has been a problem of security; the credibility of state institutions outside of Kabul; the rush with which strategies and programmes were designed to meet large funding conferences; and the emphasis on preparing documentation in English by foreign advisors, which alienated by default the majority of the population. The Loya Jirgah, although a traditional consultative mechanism, was consulted only for the overall structure of the transitional Government and the Constitution, while development strategies such as the NDB, NDF and *Securing Afghanistan's Future* were presented to representatives as a *fait accompli*. As the state-building process matures in the next few years, top-down development strategies need to be complemented with bottom-up consultation in order to be designed to ensure implementation among a partisan population.
- **Participation in the implementation:** Initiatives such as the NSP (involving block grants to communities) and NEEP (comprising labour-intensive emergency-oriented projects) have been designed precisely in order to engage communities and distribute opportunities throughout the country. These programmes are key for demonstrating the peace dividend to people in a tangible and visible way. Accelerating them is imperative for engagement of communities in the reconstruction process.
- **Checks and balances:** Modalities to ensure transparency, visibility and accountability of the National Priority Programmes to the general public are provided through a system to "enable community, society and press investigations".[7] The implementation of these modalities, however, requires

[7] Outline of the NPP, Development Forum.

the empowerment of civil society, and a free and responsible press. In the absence of adequate consultation and information sharing, it is difficult to assess how civil society can act as an effective watchdog.

A Human Security Analysis of Strategic Visions

Concern for human security in Afghanistan takes an important place in the general goals and priority areas of the NDF, even though the notion is not mentioned explicitly. As the framework underlines: "Our vision of security, however, is broader than the services provided by the security sector to the citizens. Security of livelihood is critical to our endeavour, to eliminate poverty, to provide social justice, remove barriers to inclusion and to create a society where all citizens are provided with access to equality of opportunity."[8]

The NDF emphasizes that ensuring public safety is key to the success of the reconstruction process: "The Afghan state must have a legitimate monopoly of violence, a corollary of which is that its citizens will not need to pay the cost of protection as individuals."[9] *Securing Afghanistan's Future* outlines a much more detailed and integrated proposal, the so-called National Security Framework, which calls for improvement in the management and implementation of the following elements: police forces; counter-narcotic actions; the national Army; justice; human rights; DDR and de-mining.[10] In order to ensure this, future development visions must stress the question of personal security by designing an effective DDR strategy for ex-combatants, which would include the simultaneous collection of arms, education and vocational training, and economic opportunities for former soldiers. This is significant because, for many combatants, soldiering is no more than a lucrative job opportunity, a way to escape debilitating poverty. Demobilization plans must ensure the full involvement of local communities and recognize and reinforce local reconciliation processes. Voluntary demobilization should be encouraged, particularly focusing on how to best reduce and/or eliminate warring incentives. Given the levels of impoverishment of the population, plans must largely be based on economic support to communities, rather than on targeting ex-combatants as a special group. The launching of national reconciliation initiatives and peace education campaigns contributes to enhancing confidence-building.

As far as food and health security are concerned, the NDF recognizes the immediate need to address the questions of malnutrition and health of the Afghan population. According to the strategy "there is a major nutritional challenge ahead that requires urgent actions to halt deaths due to malnutrition".[11] To meet this urgent challenge, the framework underscores the importance of "improving the basic package provided under humanitarian assistance... and distributing these to populations where the information on chronic malnutrition is up-to-date".[12] Future development agendas may also want to consider the provision of trauma and mental health care to the population as part of health security. Psychological care and counselling are crucial to overcome the traumatic experiences of the long period of conflict.

The Afghan Government is well aware of the importance of launching rehabilitation and reconstruction at the earliest possible time in order to ensure social and economic

8 TISA, National Development Framework, 2002b.
9 *Ibid.*
10 TISA, *Securing Afghanistan's Future*, 2004d.
11 *Ibid.*
12 *Ibid.*

security. The NDF identifies detailed investment and development strategies to rehabilitate basic infrastructure in Afghanistan, such as roads, housing, power and transportation. One of the main goals of the reconstruction of the infrastructure is to create an efficient, affordable transport system that enables "people, commodities, and ideas to move and connect".[13] The framework includes the construction of a network of roads connecting the different parts of Afghanistan, and air transportation, all of which could greatly improve job security.

The NDF also addresses the need for a social protection policy to cater to people with disabilities and vulnerable populations, particularly women and orphans, as well as Government employees and pensioners.[14] The document identifies provision of employment and livelihood, as well as protection from abuse and neglect, as essential elements of the social protection policy.[15] *Securing Afghanistan's Future* stresses the importance of the quality of economic growth, which should be aimed at improving social indicators without a significant deterioration in income distribution.

Securing Afghanistan's Future aims at abolishing the drug economy, and therefore sees a crucial need to provide those involved in opium poppy cultivation with viable alternatives. It has identified the agricultural sector as a primary option, for which alternative livelihoods policies should be shaped as part of a successful counter-narcotics strategy. Agriculture has been recognized as the traditional economic activity of most Afghans, who consequently have the needed skills at their disposal to be included in a country-wide poverty reduction process focused on this sector.

Securing Afghanistan's Future also recognizes the importance of comprehensive social protection policies, especially for the most vulnerable and poor. As such, it highlights that the Government's Livelihoods and Social Protection Public Investment Programme is "to enhance human security and promote the reduction of poverty. It aims at empowering and supporting the poorest and most vulnerable people in Afghanistan, thereby helping individuals, households, and communities to better manage risk through both supporting sustainable livelihood strategies and direct provision of assistance to people who are unable to help themselves."[16] However, people with disabilities suffer from consistent under-funding and lack of attention by the Government. A specific disability and vulnerability programme could be developed as part of the future PRSP.

The NDF looks at the need for providing the population with shelter and housing,[17] but no concrete programmes have been designed so far. As to the provision of power, the framework emphasizes that its goal is "to provide power to households, enterprises and government – especially for health and education – by harnessing various sources of energy", including natural gas, coal, petroleum and other alternative sources such as solar and wind energy. However, there is a crucial need to improve the production, transmission and delivery of power to the people.[18]

Finally, two very important development issues stressed by the framework are to ensure water supply for domestic use and agriculture, and to create sewage systems

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13 *Ibid.*
14 Government employees and pensioners fall within this category of vulnerable as their current incomes are below one dollar a day. See National Development Framework.
15 TISA, National Development Framework, 2002b.
16 *Ibid.*
17 *Ibid.*
18 *Ibid.*

Source: Zanbel-e-Gham, Edition 11, February 2004

and improve rural sanitation. Yet the proposal outlined by the NDB for these services takes little account of the needs in rural areas, focusing instead on Kabul and other main cities. While, for instance, the budget envisaged US$8 million for supplying drinking water in Kabul for the 1382 (2004) budget, a total of only US$9 million was envisioned for six other major cities in Afghanistan. The rural areas were not even mentioned.[19]

Securing Afghanistan's Future underlines the importance of environmental preservation and regeneration. Future development visions should tackle environmental security in more detail, given the dangers in Afghanistan of drought and other natural disasters.

The question of reconciliation and community security is crucial in order to build a minimal level of trust among the people and make peaceful coexistence possible. Measures suggested globally by the Commission on Human Security include:

- Ending impunity through the setting up of tribunals and the involvement of traditional justice processes.
- Establishing truth through the creation of truth commissions, as was done in many Latin American countries and South Africa, for instance, along with the restoration of the dignity of victims, especially women in the Afghan case.
- Promoting coexistence by encouraging long-term community-based initiatives.
- Announcing amnesties for lesser crimes and assuring reparation for victims.

[19] TISA, National Development Budget 1381-1382, 2002a.

Yet, the NDF does not address the issue of community security at all. Future development visions may need to be considered based on analyses of the roots of the conflict, in order to confront this concern.

Financing Human Development

An analysis of the NDB from the human development point of view would require analysing the percentage of the budget devoted to social and human priorities against other sectors, as well as against indented outcomes and impacts. A budget analysis would enable policy-makers in Afghanistan to determine what they should allocate as a percentage of GDP for social priorities to promote human development and progress towards the MDGs. It is hoped that such a budget analysis will be carried out in future NHDRs for Afghanistan, as more information is made available on human development indicators.

An analysis of the budget in Afghanistan must point to two different but related areas of activity: the supply of money pledged by the international community, and the demands of the Government, as outlined in NDB processes.

The Supply

At the first pledging conference in Tokyo in 2002, the international community committed some US$4.5 billion for three years. Although the amount pledged in Tokyo was the biggest sum of foreign assistance ever promised to Afghanistan, it came under criticism for its flaws and inadequacies. The main criticism was that the US$75 per person per year pledged to Afghanistan was considerably lower than the average US$250 per person pledged to other post-war settings, such as Rwanda, Cambodia, East Timor and Kosovo.[20] Furthermore, the Afghan Assistance Coordination Authority (AACA) estimated that in 2002 and 2003, over 50 per cent of aid had gone for humanitarian purposes and aid co-ordination.[21]

In March 2004, *Securing Afghanistan's Future* attempted to remedy the flaws of international funding: first, by presenting the international donor community with a figure closer to the actual needs of Afghanistan; and second, by making international assistance more focused on reconstruction and development. The stated purpose of the report was to outline the public investment and associated fiscal costs required for economic growth and a financially viable state. It emphasizes that the figure requested "... is an investment by the international community in stability and peace-building at the local, regional and global levels. This funding should not be viewed as charity, but as an investment designed to lower the defense and security spending of major nations, and reduce the risks of major terrorist incidents globally. It should also be seen in the context of the cost of existing investments in Afghanistan, including over US$13 billion per year that is spent on Coalition and ISAF. It must also be seen in the context that more than US$2 billion has been spent over the last 24 months to avoid the humanitarian emergencies that a failed state has no capacity to address."[22]

The total external financing requirement allocated over the next seven years and spent over 12 was estimated at US$27.5 billion with an additional US$2.9 billion needed to support the recurrent budget, as Afghanistan moves to self-sufficiency. The Transitional Administration estimated investments in physical infrastructure and natural resources to be US$13.4 billion, or 54 per cent of the total; human and social protection at just under US$7 billion, or 28 per cent of the total; and in security

[20] CARE / Center on International Cooperation, 2003.
[21] *Ibid*.
[22] TISA, *Securing Afghanistan's Future*, 2004d.

and private sector development, including public administration, at just over US$4 billion, or 18 per cent of the total.

Against these calculations, the Afghan Government managed to get a pledge of US$8.2 billion for the next three years. For the 2005 fiscal year, donors pledged US$4.5 billion compared to the US$4.4 billion the country was seeking, but that also meant that for the subsequent two years, only US$3.7 billion was promised. Although short of the budget requested, this pledge was hailed both by the Afghan Government and the international community as a great success. Many lessons had been learned since Tokyo, not the least of which was the organization of the demand side of costs by the Afghans.

The Demand: The National Development Budget (NDB)

Afghanistan's new Government came a long way in installing the budget as a central instrument of policy and resource allocation decisions. The first NDB 1381-1382 (2002-2003) suffered from limited experience and pressure for rapid implementation and quick decision-making, as a trade-off for limited consultation processes and national ownership. The Government then foresaw the need to establish appropriate procurement and financial systems as a top priority, and hired internationally recognized firms such as KPMG to help ensure openness and accountability. The establishment of the budget also meant that donor governments could now either directly support the general budget or their specific projects, or make contributions to trust funds in line with their priorities.

The rationale behind creating a NDB was that the experience of the first year of reconstruction showed that the international community, not the Afghans, owned the reconstruction process. The Administration argued that the sum total of the various donor- and UN-driven strategies for recovery did not amount to the most appropriate and responsive answer to Afghanistan's needs, and that ad hoc project design did not deliver effective results, which is what mattered the most to ordinary Afghans. This led the Administration to take increasingly greater control over the allocation of scarce resources, and the series of national investment programmes with benchmarks and clear indicators with which to judge success was presented to the international community in March 2003. The level of sophistication in preparing the budget improved rapidly, with the budget being used increasingly to allocate both cash and in-kind contributions to the Government's highest-priority tasks. Perhaps one of the most important achievements was to focus on a medium-term expenditure framework, as opposed to the one-year time horizon that donors had imposed during the first two years of reconstruction.

In 2002–2003, a total of US$83 million in domestic revenue was generated against an ordinary budget of US$350 million. During that time, months passed when the Ministry of Finance had insufficient resources to pay the very meagre wages – around US$40 per month – of its civil servants. In the fiscal year ending March 20, 2004, and against an ordinary budget of US$550 million, the Administration pledged to achieve revenue earnings of US$200 million – a target it was able to meet.

While foreign assistance is vital, it is no substitute for domestic financing of sustainable human development. In 2004, external financing amounted to about US$5 billion, with more than 90 per cent of the Government budget externally financed. The key for the future will be domestic revenue mobilization, so that Afghanistan does not continue to rely on the international community to pay for operating expenses. In 2003, Afghanistan was able to meet its revenue target of

US$200 million, a 50 per cent increase in collections over the previous year. For 2004, the revenue target set by the Government was US$309 million, while the IMF-Government sponsored Staff Monitored Programme (which monitors external borrowings) had set a revenue target of US$256 million. The challenge for Afghanistan is to expand the economy and strengthen the revenue collection so that domestic revenues could eventually fund operating expenditures. Self-sustainability is the goal that Afghanistan has set for itself and its international partners.

For the ordinary budget, improvements already underway during the 1383 (2004) budget include building core capacities within the line ministries and establishing greater control over staffing, particularly for security sector institutions. The ordinary budget will continue to reflect an input orientation, while ministries will be asked this year for information on ministry goals and objectives as a first step towards programme budgeting. In the coming years, a fiscal framework will be established around a macro-economic model, and expenditures levels will be allocated to ministries for national programmes.

Government Resources (US$ million)	1380 (2001) – 1382 (2003)
Domestic Revenue	348.6
International Assistance	1,186.9
Total Government Resources	1,535.5
N.B. Domestic Revenue figures based on exchange rate of US$1= 48 Afs.	

Source: Ministry of Finance, *Financial Report*, 24 May 2004.

In my opinion, the best possible source of financing our reconstruction and development goals is number 5. However, number 12, and 14 are a matter of discussion, while the rest of the resources may not be desirable for Afghanistan and therefore not feasible.

Said Mubin Shah, NHDR background paper on economy, 2004

Box 6.2

Financing Development

Possible scenarios for financing the development needs in Afghanistan:

1 - Only aid

2 - Domestic resources together with aid

3 - Only foreign investment

4 - Domestic resources with foreign investment

5 - Domestic resources together with foreign investment and aid

6 - Only debt

7 - Domestic resources with debt

8 - Domestic resources with debt and foreign investment

9 - Debt with foreign investment and aid

10 - Debt with foreign investment

11 - Debt with aid

12 - Domestic resources with debt, aid and foreign investment

13 - Domestic resources with the creation of new money (monetization)

14 - Cutting Government expenditure

Investments in Human Development

A preliminary analysis of the first NDB 1381 (2002) - 1382 (2003) concludes that public spending on social priorities – including basic education, health care, nutrition, as well as water supply and sanitation is inadequate.

Currently, investments in the security sector, infrastructure and natural resources outweigh those in the social sectors. This imbalance will need to be addressed as Government capacities increase. While the proposed proportion of direct public spending on human and social security is only 28 per cent of total spending, the seven-year programme recognizes the primacy of security sector reforms and the provision of infrastructure for growth of the private sector as a precondition for human and social security. Investments in health and education, as well as the provisions of basic services such as water and sanitation, focus initially on policy and institutional reforms, cognizant of the limited ability of the Administration in the initial years to have a significant impact.

The NDF gives high priority to human resource development (education), health care and social development as important means by which Afghans could effectively participate in the rebuilding process. These sectors also support employment. The relatively high priority given to education programmes in the reconstruction agenda is evident from the high budgetary allocation to this sector. The total budget for 1381 (2002)–1382 (2003) amounted to approximately US$509 million. However, 82 per cent of this projection was not met.[24]

6.4. A Future of Human Security

Consensus on the Future: Targets of the MDGs?

In order to move forward at this stage of state-building in Afghanistan, the question, now that presidential elections are over, is: What should be a responsible agenda for the new Government?

Chart 6.1: Sectoral Components of the Development Budget 1383 (2004) – 1389 (2010)[23]



Pillar 1: Human and Social Protection		6,896
1.1	Refugee return	155
1.2	Education	2,703
1.3	Health and nutrition	1,368
1.4	Rural livelihoods and social protection	2,272
1.5	Culture / media / sports	400

Pillar 3: Security and the Private Sector		4,353
3.1	Trade and investment	690
3.2	Public admin and eco management	1,082
3.3	Justice	93
3.4	Police, law enforcement	645
3.5	National Army	1,043
3.6	DDR	216
3.7	Counter Narcotics	164
3.8	Mine action	420

Pillar 2: Physical Infrastr. and Natural Resources		13,429
2.1	Transport	6,136
2.2	Energy, mining, telecommunications	3,606
2.3	Natural resources	1,849
2.4	Urban management	1,839

Source: TISA, *Securing Afghanistan's Future*, 2004

[23] *Ibid*.
[24] TISA, National Development Budget 1381-1382, 2002a.

Table 6.1.1: Operating Budget Expenditures 1381 (2002)

Ministry	Personal Emoluments	Services	Tools and Materials	Maintenance and Repairs	Land, Structures and Equipment	Subsidies, Grants and Pensions	Total
President's Office	41.8	29.1	111.6	41.9	31.1	65.5	321.0
Supreme Court	61.8	5.0	5.4	1.1	7.8	1.1	82.2
Ministry of Finance	119.1	8.7	20.1	18.1	14.2	45.1	226.3
Ministry of Defence	1,806.4	62.1	1,866.5	85.5	275.3	54.5	4,150.2
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	98.7	101.2	11.8	3.4	5.3	1.1	221.6
Ministry of Religious Affairs and Haj	83.8	4.9	2.9	1.6	5.3	4.6	103.1
Ministry of Commerce	107.8	2.8	1.1	0.2	1.0	300.3	413.1
Ministry of Interior	1,067.9	121.1	1,512.0	37.2	346.9	21.2	3,106.3
Ministry of Education	1,332.0	4.8	12.2	2.9	3.6	18.9	1,374.3
Ministry of Higher Education	125.4	5.3	58.3	1.7	10.1	6.7	207.5
Ministry of Return of Refugees	9.5	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.0	0.2	10.4
Ministry of Repatriates	0.5	1.0	0.1	0.0	1.8	0.0	3.4
Ministry of Planning	11.2	1.4	0.8	0.3	1.8	0.2	15.7
Ministry of Mines and Industries	20.1	5.7	1.2	0.8	1.7	6.2	35.7
Ministry of Light Industries and Foodstuffs	5.7	0.4	0.9	1.6	2.2	78.6	89.4
Ministry of Communication	81.0	43.2	7.2	1.3	1.6	6.7	141.0
Ministry of Reconstruction	5.8	1.9	0.4	0.2	0.1	0.8	9.1
Ministry of Information and Culture	99.8	32.1	16.0	4.0	18.9	0.5	171.3
Ministry of Health	321.3	34.0	318.9	10.4	53.3	0.8	738.6
Ministry of Women's Affairs	12.2	0.8	1.9	0.3	0.6	1.0	16.8
Ministry of Agriculture	92.7	4.9	60.1	10.2	25.2	7.4	200.5
Ministry of Irrigation and Water	43.1	3.0	4.6	2.4	8.5	2.1	63.6
Ministry of Water and Power	62.1	1.8	1.3	0.8	116.9	0.3	183.2
Ministry of Public Works	70.5	4.2	4.0	0.3	34.3	3.4	116.7
Ministry of Rural Development	33.2	1.1	2.9	0.7	0.0	1.7	39.7
Ministry of Martyrs and Disabled	27.2	4.1	11.1	0.2	6.7	47.9	97.3
Ministry of Transport	57.6	1.5	1.0	0.1	1.7	1.3	63.2
Ministry of Frontiers	16.7	1.8	5.0	0.8	6.9	2.2	33.5
Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs	76.5	6.8	30.7	0.6	21.1	24.6	160.3
Ministry of Civil Aviation and Tourism	49.4	1.3	1.3	1.6	0.5	1.7	55.8
Minisry of Urban Development	43.1	1.6	0.6	0.5	1.2	0.6	47.6
Ministry of Justice	18.4	2.0	4.2	4.8	3.8	2.3	35.5
Counter Narcotics	3.0	1.9	0.5	0.3	1.6	0.1	7.4
Science Academy	12.5	1.1	0.6	0.9	1.0	1.1	17.2
National Olympics Committee	2.8	3.5	0.4	0.0	105.7	2.5	115.0
Geodesy and Cartography	11.6	0.7	1.3	0.5	0.8	0.9	15.9
Central Statistics Office (CSO)	10.8	0.5	0.5	0.0	0.5	0.7	13.0
National Security	286.0	53.4	230.4	50.0	74.2	16.3	710.3
Attorney General	73.3	3.6	23.6	1.7	12.9	1.5	116.6
Enterprise Assessment Commission (1)	0.3	0.1	0.1	1.2	3.8	0.1	5.6
Prime Minister's Office (1)	16.7	2.3	3.1	1.2	1.7	0.4	25.4
Civil Service Commission (2)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Total	6,419.1	567.0	4,336.6	291.6	1,211.8	733.9	13,560.2
Total in US$m	133.7	11.8	90.3	6.1	25.2	15.3	282.5

1. In 1382 the Enterprise Assessment Commission and the Prime Minister's office was included in the Administrative Affairs budget.
2. The Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission was created in 1382.
3. Figures based on exchange rate of US$ 1 equals 48 Afs. Note that this is an approximation, as the exchange rate fluctuated during both 1381 and 1382.

Table 6.1.2: Operating Budget Expenditures 1382 (2003)

Ministry	Personal Emoluments	Services	Tools and Materials	Maintenance and Repairs	Land, Structures & Equipment	Subsidies, Grants & Pensions	Total
President's Office	236.2	59.0	197.8	117.0	26.8	53.4	690.2
Supreme Court	103.2	3.7	14.7	3.8	9.2	1.5	136.2
Ministry of Finance	172.8	20.3	29.2	14.7	30.1	32.1	299.2
Ministry of Defence	3,105.4	74.5	1,546.3	124.4	561.5	9.3	5,421.5
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	376.5	260.1	28.4	66.3	173.0	21.9	926.2
Ministry of Religious Affairs and Haj	178.8	7.1	4.7	5.8	7.6	1.7	205.9
Ministry of Commerce	33.7	6.4	4.1	0.6	82.7	0.2	127.8
Ministry of Interior	1,816.3	50.1	1,391.5	282.6	1,038.7	256.8	4,836.0
Ministry of Education	3,275.0	25.7	73.0	28.5	40.1	3.4	3,445.8
Ministry of Higher Education	176.6	8.5	137.9	7.9	7.4	2.1	340.3
Ministry of Return of Refugees	41.3	11.9	11.2	3.0	6.6	2.1	76.2
Ministry of Repatriates	0.9	1.7	0.2	0.2	1.5	0.0	4.6
Ministry of Planning	16.3	2.5	1.2	0.5	0.9	0.5	21.8
Ministry of Mines and Industries	97.9	3.4	2.6	1.2	116.2	1.4	222.6
Ministry of Light Industries and Foodstuffs	16.1	4.4	1.8	3.6	2.4	118.2	146.5
Ministry of Communication	106.4	64.6	15.6	5.6	44.7	2.4	239.4
Ministry of Reconstruction	16.5	47.9	6.3	18.3	8.9	0.4	98.4
Ministry of Information and Culture	137.3	25.0	16.0	11.2	24.5	10.3	224.3
Ministry of Health	476.1	37.4	478.5	19.9	53.0	0.3	1,065.2
Ministry of Women's Affairs	24.7	2.3	2.0	0.6	0.9	0.4	30.9
Ministry of Agriculture	256.1	13.7	19.1	16.6	53.9	51.6	411.0
Ministry of Irrigation and Water	57.7	8.3	9.8	2.7	9.0	0.6	88.0
Ministry of Water and Power	21.3	4.3	4.5	2.6	125.3	1.1	159.1
Ministry of Public Works	77.3	4.1	21.6	10.4	157.3	0.6	270.3
Ministry of Rural Development	42.4	5.8	7.8	5.0	317.7	2.3	381.0
Ministry of Martyrs and Disabled	37.7	7.0	4.5	0.8	3.7	281.5	335.2
Ministry of Transport	35.6	2.4	2.4	0.5	2.9	0.2	44.0
Ministry of Frontiers	128.5	5.2	31.1	2.9	8.6	2.7	178.9
Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs	148.4	12.2	83.2	0.8	3.2	8.6	256.5
Ministry of Civil Aviation and Tourism	36.7	2.6	2.1	5.2	6.1	0.2	52.8
Minisry of Urban Development	14.5	2.1	2.5	1.9	1.1	0.6	22.8
Ministry of Justice	110.1	14.0	101.7	20.1	27.8	6.6	280.3
Counter Narcotics	3.4	0.6	0.7	0.3	4.0	0.0	9.1
Science Academy	17.1	5.2	1.0	1.8	0.9	0.0	26.0
National Olympics Committee	21.3	4.4	22.0	3.6	8.7	0.7	60.8
Geodesy and Cartography	21.3	3.5	3.0	1.5	4.0	0.1	33.4
Central Statistics Office (CSO)	21.8	2.1	1.3	0.2	1.0	0.4	26.7
National Security	314.4	8.3	238.0	10.4	11.2	0.5	582.8
Attorney General	144.1	4.9	16.9	2.9	14.5	0.1	183.4
Enterprise Assessment Commission (1)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Prime Minister's Office (1)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Civil Service Commission (2)	17.2	1.5	4.2	2.6	17.2	2.3	44.9
Total	11,934.9	828.7	4,539.6	808.4	3,015.1	879.2	22,006.0
Total in US$m	248.6	17.3	94.6	16.8	62.8	18.3	458.5

1. In 1382 the Enterprise Assessment Commission and the Prime Minister's office was included in the Administrative Affairs budget.
2. The Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission was created in 1382.
3. Figures based on exchange rate of US$ 1 equals 48 Afs. Note that this is an approximation, as the exchange rate fluctuated during both 1381 and 1382.

In 2004, the Transitional Administration declared its intentions to achieve the MDGs, eight specific goals and a series of related targets that emerged from a global agreement signed by 189 countries in 2000. The MDGs could become a normative framework for the formulation of national policies, and an opportunity for Afghanistan to engage in alternative long-term models that incorporate the most fundamental issues of development. Subsequent development frameworks should be clearly aligned with the MDGs.

The Millennium Declaration specifies: "Men and women have the right to live their lives and raise their children in dignity, free from hunger and from fear of violence, oppression or injustice."[25] The inherent relationship between the MDGs and human security is like that of the chicken and egg conundrum.[26] Deprivations in the basic dimensions of development also represent a deprivation of human rights and human security, and vice versa. Without security, the MDGs cannot be achieved.

Investigation at the regional and sub-regional levels in Afghanistan, which probe beyond the steady progress in improving the human development index (HDI) and reducing poverty at the national level, reveal grave disparities. Regions of high poverty and low HDI, (and thereby low levels of attainments of MDG targets) are precisely those where conflict is being fuelled. Regions with high levels of human

Table 6.2: MDG Targets for Afghanistan

MDG	CURRENT LEVEL	TARGET 2015
1. Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger	Poverty: 53% Hunger: 48%	Poverty: 26% Hunger: 24%
2. Achieve universal primary education	Primary (total): 36% Girls: 21% Boys: 51%	Primary (total): 100 Girls: 100% Boys: 100%
3. Promote gender equality and empower women	Female primary enrolment: 21% Girls enrolment share: 30%	Female primary enrolment: 100% Girls enrolment share: 50%
4. Reduce child mortality	Under-five mortality rate: 260 per 1,000 Infant mortality rate: 165 per 1,000	Under-five mortality rate: 90 per 1000 Infant mortality rate: 55 per 1000
5. Improve maternal mortality	Maternal mortality ratio: 1,600 per 100,000	Maternal mortality ratio: 400 per 100,000
6. Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases	Measles: 718 cases annually, Polio: 10 Malaria: 16% of population at high risk, 3 million annually, Tuberculosis: 321 cases per 100,000; 91 deaths per 100,000	Measles: 0 cases Polio: 0 Malaria: 8% of population at high risk, Tuberculosis: 48 cases per 100,000; Surveys and actions to curb rise in AIDS.
7. Ensure environmental sustainability and access to safe drinking water and sanitation	Population without access to safe drinking water: 87%	Population without access to safe drinking water: 43%
8. Develop a global partnership for development	ODA (% of GDP): 48% GDP per capita (US$): 170	ODA (% of GDP): 20% GDP per capita (US$): 500

Source: UNDP, *MDG Report Afghanistan*, 2004.

[25] UN, The Millennium Declaration, 2000, www.un.org/millennium/summit.htm.
[26] From discussions held on the UNDP MDG Network, summer 2004.

poverty, child malnutrition and human underdevelopment coincide with regions of internal insecurity.

Instead of attaining the MDGs at the aggregate national level, it is vital to devise targeted plans and monitor attainment of the goals by disadvantaged groups, such as women, different ethnic groups, or in the case of underperforming regions and districts. The consistent failure of some groups to attain the MDGs, while others in the same country move towards achieving them, reflects the failure of the state to serve as an impartial agency. Restoring representative and participative governance, particularly at the local level, where the majority of the excluded groups reside, may have to precede any international assistance towards reaching the MDGs. The first requirement for achieving overall growth and human security, therefore, is to ensure that there is uniform development, without significant inequalities and deprivations across gender, ethnic, linguistic or regional groups.

The MDGs are goals that need to be used in a manner that is flexible and addresses local realities.[27] For Afghanistan, broader programmes focusing on governance, inequality, land reform, human rights promotion, reducing domestic violence and justice reform should accompany a nationally tailored MDG strategy.

As Chapter 4 of this report points out, lack of progress on development and poverty may sustain conflict. Progress towards the MDGs could therefore contribute to the resolution of the conflict and recovery in Afghanistan, by addressing such vital issues as land distribution, inter-ethnic tensions, empowering the vulnerable (the poor, women and children), and strengthening governance institutions It may also help support people's coping mechanisms.

What Kind of Growth Strategy Does Afghanistan Need?

Subsequent development frameworks should also recognize the structural causes of conflict in Afghanistan, and take into account distributional justice that will allow for even and balanced development throughout the country. Following the Bonn Conference, the standard neo-liberal paradigm for internationally supported reconstruction in post-war situations that had developed during the 1990s was adopted in Afghanistan. This package, based on market-driven growth, an open economy and a minimalist regulatory state, recognizes economic growth as the principal strategy for development and combating poverty, and the private sector as the main engine of such growth.

The Government's NDF presents, for example, a vision of social and economic reforms based around macroeconomic stability, private-sector-led growth, liberal trade and a key 'enabling' role for the state.

But neo-liberalism, although hegemonic today, has had a poor performance in the last quarter century in both developing and post-crisis countries. Compared to the performance of post-colonial policy-making in developing countries, roughly from the 1950s through the mid 1970s, neo-liberal conditionality-based policies have performed poorly, in terms of slowing economic growth, greater economic instability, rising inequality, increasing under-employment and persistently pervasive poverty.[28] As was well documented in the late 1980s and early 1990s (cf. UNICEF's *Structural Adjustment with a Human Face* and UNDP's Human Development Reports), structural adjustment programmes have often imposed heavy social costs.

[27] *Ibid.*
[28] Terry McKinley, UNDP 2004.

While priority is given to economic liberalisation and building institutions of representative democracy, problems such as poverty, inequality, poor health and education, environmental degradation and social exclusion could intensify. Too often, Bretton Woods institutions and transitional states are concerned with establishing democracy, not inclusive government, while economic and social conditionality is directed towards promoting growth and efficiency and poverty reduction, but not reducing horizontal inequality. Yet, prevailing conditionalities will not succeed in realizing the objectives of economic growth and democracy if disparities persist. They need to be better targeted to place the reduction of horizontal inequality at the centre of development agendas, if conflict is to be avoided.[29]

To begin with, the root causes of conflict need to be factored into policies.

Any new framework for recovery in Afghanistan should be conscious of conflict issues, for instance, factors such as urban bias, capital flight, inflation, concentration of power in the hands of different factions, corruption, security and narcotics. Adopting a strategy that ignores the differences in participation in the political and economic agendas could lead to inequalities. Even if the GNP can increase within a few years, chances are that poverty will rise along with inequality. The higher the level of inequality, the less impact economic growth has in reducing poverty, regardless of the rate of economic growth. Inequality not only represses growth, but also has underlying political and social impacts on crime and political stability.[30] Exacerbated inequality is not inevitable, and should be mitigated through specific policies addressing not only traditional causes, such as disparities in education, land reform and regional policies, but also new causes, such as the uneven impact of new technologies and trade, the threat of sharp recessions that can arise from stabilisation and adjustment policies, a lack of coordination between national and international financial liberalisation and regulation, and the absence of progressive tax policies and equitable labour market policies.

In other words, distribution issues need to be integrated in policy advice given by the international financial institutions. Social equity and distributive justice, both as instruments and ends in themselves, should be seen as an integral part of the debate on development, not as add-ons when existing economic policies are inadequate. Inequality is associated with social exclusion, and declining confidence in the Government and the functioning of democracy. It can impede growth, undermine poverty alleviation and fuel social tension, and therefore should be of concern to policy makers.[31] If large segments of the population are not adequately considered in new laws and institutions, and are not given the opportunity to participate in public life, the legitimacy of the new political systems would be questioned. At the same time, however, equality has positive externalities. The empowerment of women, for examples, not only benefits them, but also children, families and the society at large. Investment in female education increases women's productivity, while decreasing infant mortality and helping to ensure the education and health of future generations.

Social stress, as a result of exacerbated horizontal inequalities, can ultimately manifest through conflicted behaviour at all levels, from increasing numbers of divorces and a rise in domestic violence, to crime, migration and warfare between different groups.

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29 See the work of Frances Stewart 2000 and 2002.
30 Cornia and Court 2001.
31 WB 2000.

What Kind of Growth is Necessary for Afghanistan?

A Broad and Fast One

Even an ambitious level of growth and assistance would only deliver a per capita income of US$500 by 2015, which may not enable Afghanistan to attain the MDG targets.

Strong, broad-based growth will be critical to Afghanistan's success. *Securing Afghanistan's Future* outlines the range of growth required for national and human security. According to its analysis, growth has been strong since 2001, with grain production doubling, and estimated GDP up by about 50 per cent in the last two years. Inflation has been contained by responsible fiscal and monetary policies and has remained stable. Afghanistan is putting in place the most liberal trade and tariff regime in the region. There has been rapid development of telecommunications, based on private investment in mobile phone technology, and a major road rehabilitation programme is underway.

Figure 6.2 presents various growth scenarios for Afghanistan based on non-drug GDP growth rates. Clearly, low levels of growth (three to five per cent) put Afghanistan's future at risk, undermining the visibility of growth for individuals and narrowing the revenue base within which the Government can drive the reform process. Growth rates in the order of eight to nine per cent over the medium term will be required to keep the reform programme on track, and to generate jobs and income for all – including poor and vulnerable groups.

The US$8 billion provided by the international community in Berlin in March 2004 is a vital input to the reconstruction process, providing for enhanced security, better access to basic services in health and education, and much needed infrastructure such as roads and irrigation systems. While the private sector will remain the engine for growth, public sector support will be required to create the enabling environment needed to reach the growth rates outlined above.

Figure 6.2: Growth Scenarios for Afghanistan



Source: TISA, *Securing Afghanistan's Future*, 2004

A Sustainable Growth Scenario: Mobilizing Domestic Resources and Debt Relief

To avoid long-term aid dependence, the Government needs to mobilize more domestic resources – boosting revenue or borrowing domestically for public investment while encouraging domestic steps towards direct lending to long-term private investment. Instead of cutting expenditures, the Government should be finding ways to mobilize resources.

Ideally, revenue collection should boost growth, but the precarious security situation, the lack of a harmonious relationship between the state and periphery, the general poverty of the population, and the lack of taxation on the largest sectors, namely cross-border illegal trade and poppy cultivation, have made Afghanistan heavily dependent on external aid for both its operational and development budgets.

Ultimately, foreign borrowing should lead to a substantial increase in income per capita, as well as an increase in net exports, otherwise the country may not have additional resources and the exchange needed to service its debt. Yet in the long term, aid should not be a substitute for taxation and domestic revenues.

Before the Tokyo Conference, Oxfam had called for donors to cancel Afghanistan's US$45 million debt to multilateral institutions, including US$33 million owed to the WB and the ADB, and US$8.8 million to the IMF. Oxfam noted, "The debt burden is both a major reason why poverty is so deep and widespread in many countries, and why these countries find it so difficult to find a pathway out of poverty. Unsustainable debt acts as a major barrier to poverty eradication. Debt repayments limit the resources available for investment in basic services which are essential to the poor. Debt also creates uncertainty for domestic and foreign investors, thereby restricting growth in Afghanistan."[32] As the transitional Government began paying off pre-1979 loans owed to multi-lateral banks, new debts were being accumulated (See Box 6.3). Although there is no doubt that the country needs all the support it can get from bi- and multi-lateral organizations, and that the loans and grants provided target the actual needs of the reconstruction, the experience of too many countries points to a cycle of debt and poverty from which it is hard to break free.

Sustainability depends on a domestic revenue base and on raising additional public revenue. An investment-led pro-poor growth strategy requires three financial conditions: mobilizing sufficient revenue for public investment; mobilizing sufficient private savings to finance private investment; and complementing domestic resources with stable inflows of public and private capital. Domestic borrowing can contribute to financing public investment, but only as a complement to revenue mobilization.[33]

The Transitional Government counts on domestic revenue and on a dynamic private sector, both domestic and international, to sustain growth in Afghanistan. As the Minister of Finance stated, "Aid is a development catalyst, but never a substitute for a dynamic private sector, both domestic and international, that provides the engine of growth. Sustained growth transforms the people, particularly the poor, into stakeholders in the economy and polity."[34]

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[32] Oxfam 2002.
[33] McKinley 2004.
[34] Speech of Ashraf Ghani, Minister of Finance, at Berlin Conference, March 2004.

Box 6.3

Debt in Afghanistan

In the financial year 2003, the total debt outstanding and disbursed was US$2,429 million, according to data collected by the ADB and the IMF. An annual foreign debt service is equal to about one-tenth of Afghanistan's annual GDP, non-viably high for a society without an economic surplus.

By 2004, Afghanistan had US$8 billion in bilateral debt, mostly to Russia, and US$500 million in debt to multilateral development banks.[35]

Between 1964 and 1979, the WB had provided 21 loans amounting to US$230 million, of which US$147 million was cancelled. The ADB had given loans for US$95.1 million between 1966 and 1979, when it withdrew from Afghanistan.[36] Between 1979 and 1992, Afghanistan continued to repay the WB and ADB loans until it gained a non-accrual status with both organizations in 1992. A number of governments cleared Afghanistan's arrears (pre-1979 loans) in 2002–2003: US$26 million of the pre-1979 WB loans were paid off by Japan, Italy, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom, and US$18 million in arrears to the ADB were cleared by the United Kingdom.

With the re-engagement of the WB in Afghanistan since 2002, Afghanistan has continued to repay its pre-1979 loan (US$56 million had been repaid by 2004) with the help of bilateral agreements and through the Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF); simultaneously, new debt activities began. In 2003, the WB gave US$171.8 million in International Development Association (IDA) grants (no-interest loans called "credits) and US$7.7 million in Japan Social Development Fund (JSDF) grants, while for 2003–2004, the WB had planned loans of US$326.4 million in IDA credits and US$7.75 million in International Finance Cooperation (IFC) loans(private sector loans). Since April 2002, the WB has committed US$281.8 million in grants and an additional US$221.4 million in no-interest loans.[37]

In 2002, the ADB approved a US$150-million "post-conflict multi-sector" loan. By December 2003, the bank had approved 11 loans for Afghanistan amounting to US$412.3 million[38], and at the Berlin Conference it announced that it would consider assistance up to US$800 million in the form of Asia Development Facility (ADF) loans and grants at highly concessional interest rates, during 2005-2008.[39]

Table 6.3: Debts incurred by Previous Administrations 1380 (2001) and Before.

Lender	Debt (local curr.)	Debt US$m
Confirmed Debts:		
United States Agency for Inter. Dev. (USAID)		57.4
United States Dep. of Agriculture (USDA)		25.0
(Former) German Dem. Rep.		40.0
OPEC Fund		1.8
World Bank		49.5
Asian Development Bank		9.2
Total Confirmed		182.9
Unconfirmed Debts:		
Bulgaria		36.0
Iraq		5.7
Kuwait Fund	3.74m Dinar	12.7
(Former) Czechoslovakia		75.0
Saudi Arabia		30.0
Total Unconfirmed		159.4

Source: Ministry of Finance, Financial Report, 24 May 2004.

35 *The World Factbook*, U.S. Department of State.
36 Otherwise noted, the information here is from the Bank Information Center, 2003, http://www.bicusa.org/bicusa/issues/WB_ADB_in_Afghanistan_outline.pdf.
37 WB. *Afghanistan Country Update*, 2004c.
38 ADB, "A Fact Sheet on Afghanistan", data as of 31 December 2003.
39 ADB press release, March 2004, http://www.adb.org/Documents/News/2004/nr2004025.asp.

A Secure Growth Scenario: Transforming the War Economy

The precarious security situation in Afghanistan is ultimately linked to the perseverance of the war economy.[40] Spoilers of peace persist because, as described in Chapter 4, the conditions that allow them to remain have not fundamentally changed, and because they have strong incentives to retain power for as long as possible. Following the expulsion of the Taliban, regional commanders realized that a key source of power for the central Government would be international aid, something to which they had no access. The lack of adequate distribution of funds to the regions led power-holders, among others, to question the Government's capacity to provide basic public goods, and gave them the signal to develop their own alternative resources through illegal transit fees, smuggling and drug dealing.

Given the insecurity-related dependency of most Afghans on private militias and power-holders, it would appear that human insecurity and economic stagnation will continue fuelling each other until either an effective security system is put in place, or more profitable, licit economic opportunities come into existence.[41] For the time being, however, it will not be easy to persuade the legions of labourers skilled in opium harvesting – not to mention those who reap much of the profit – to find other sources of income. For the drug economy to be eradicated, estimates are that the legal economy would need to grow at a steady nine per cent for many years to come.[42]

In general, there is little money for alternatives that would allow farmers to grow viable and legal money-earning crops. A recent attempt to buy out opium farmers only encouraged more to plant poppies. Essentially, opium prices, though falling, are still high, and the profits more than compensate for the risks of the crop's nominal illegality. Changing the calculation of risk and reward would involve punishing poppy growers and opium distillers more consistently, and making trafficking harder and riskier, both of which require security institutions that do not yet exist. Most importantly, Afghans need other ways to make ends meet.

One possibility for the diversification of livelihoods among Afghans is dried fruit. Afghanistan used to be the world's biggest exporter of raisins and a net exporter of food. Various other fruits and herbs are grown in the south and east, and business people talk of exporting flowers and cotton. The most promising licit economic opportunities are perhaps found in the carpet trade. Many "Afghan" rugs on sale in the West are actually made in Pakistan, where much of the industry migrated during the decades of war. The remaining carpet-makers in Afghanistan struggle to compete with their technically advantaged rivals in other countries. Providing the necessary technical assistance to Afghans would not represent a major obstacle; however, getting the carpets to market might.

The abysmal lack of infrastructure in Afghanistan clearly represents a hindrance to economic security. A transport system is integral to economic regeneration in Afghanistan, both in terms of trading and in providing transit routes. Some believe that the customs revenues being siphoned off at the various border points by regional power-holders are roughly equivalent to the entire national budget.[43] If there was an adequate national road system, tolls could be charged by the central Government, recapturing lost revenue.

Lots of new high-rise buildings have been erected in Kabul lately. Some see them as a sign of improvement in the economy. But whose economy? Not mine for sure! My biggest concern is that both our political and economic systems have yielded permanent presence and roots to warlords – the very ones responsible for many of the recent human catastrophes.

Jawad, from Kabul

[40] Section adapted from Jeanette Kroes 2004.
[41] Abdul Baqi Banwal 2004b.
[42] *The Economist*, "It's Hard Going Straight", 1 April 2004.
[43] United States Institute of Peace 2003.



Source: Zanbel-e-Gham, Edition 5, May 2002

No society can be flourishing and happy where the greater part of the numbers are poor and miserable.

Adam Smith, 1776.

Foreign aid and engagement are both essential for rebuilding Afghanistan, but the country will remain one of the world's poorest states, and its human security will continue to be threatened, unless it finds a way out of the multiple vicious circles in which it seems to be trapped. Economic progress depends on security and a stable Government; however, security also depends on economic opportunities. With neither security nor alternative economic opportunities, many Afghans will continue to cultivate poppies, thus enriching peace-spoilers who thrive on and sustain lawlessness.

An Equitable and Balanced Growth

It is obvious that poor countries should focus on the question of growth versus income distribution, and that development requires a higher GNP and a faster growth rate. The basic question, however, is not only how to make GNP grow, but also who would make it grow, the few or the many. If GNP growth is based on the rich, then it will likely be appropriated for them, and poverty and income inequality will continue to grow worse. But, if it is generated by the many, then the poor will be its principle beneficiaries, and the fruits of economic growth will be shared more evenly.[44]

If Afghanistan is to reach the target of halving extreme income poverty by 2015, rapid growth is certainly essential. However, if growth is more equitable – so that the incomes of the poor grow faster than average – the country may have a much better chance of reaching this target. Growth has to be rapid to improve the absolute poverty of the poor, but also equitable to raise the relative position of the poor. If growth is to reduce poverty, it should have a pattern that directs resources disproportionately to the sectors in which the poor work (such as small-scale agriculture), the areas in which they live (such as underdeveloped regions) or the factors of production that they possess (such as unskilled labour or land).

The trend in GDP growth in the past two years in Afghanistan will not be sustainable if longer term policies do not address urban–rural disparities as much as poverty and inequality in general, as well as the

[44] Mubin Shah 2004.

inequalities between men and women. Balanced human development may not occur automatically with economic growth, while economic growth cannot be sustainable if it fails to address the causes of spatial and social inequality. High levels of inequality are, therefore, inefficient in addition to being unjust. Furthermore, even if there is considerable social and economic progress, rifts may start to appear if the country does not address fundamental problems and deep inequalities (such as land distribution, gender discrimination, urban–rural gaps, etc.) Growth models should therefore be based on inclusive economic processes. As part of an investment-led strategy of growth and development, the Government must also adopt policies that promote an equitable distribution of the fruits of this development. These must involve measures to contain and reduce the rising inequalities in incomes that characterizes the situation in Afghanistan.

Without taking these steps, there is a danger of growth that alienates the population and leads to grievances, as discussed in Chapter 3. Other dangers of a skewed distribution pattern could be urban bias, which neglects rural development, as has been the case of almost all development models in Afghanistan's history, as well as the potential difficulties faced by urban areas struggling to absorb surplus labour from the countryside. Failed or non-existent rural development policies push households out of the rural areas, while investment in urban areas creates the "city lights" fantasy that pulls in rural households. Once in the city, without adequate housing or employment, migrants end up joining the informal sector in squatter settlements without guarantees of satisfying basic human securities, such as income, education, health, personal security and so on.

To avoid prolonging the "Kabul and the rest" perception, the new Government must design a comprehensive regional development strategy. The reconstruction efforts of the past two years as well as economic revival boosted by drug trafficking have contributed to the booming economy in Kabul and major urban centres. The continuation of this trend could give rise to mass migration and marginalize people, thereby perpetuating inequalities.

A balanced growth pattern also needs to tackle the unequal redistribution of national revenues, especially taxes and local revenues received by some of the provinces (Herat, Kandahar, Mazar, Jalalabad), a large portion of which does not reach the central Government. The rationale behind creating a strong central state in Afghanistan in the first place was the sharp geographical differences in wealth in different provinces. For instance, Herat province in 2002 generated revenues 5,000 times greater than the poor province of Bamiyan, and about 2,000 times the amount generated in the province of Wardak, just south of Kabul.[45] Today, central ministries are encouraged to use market mechanisms for distributing reconstruction projects and social services.[46] As one researcher puts it, however, "the competitive bidding process will exacerbate rather than diminish present inequalities if NGOs, firms and aid agencies bid last on projects in backward, insecure or inaccessible areas, as they might be expected to do."[47] Balanced development requires addressing the formidable challenge of adequate collection and fair distribution of revenues throughout the country.

Growth Based on Employment

In countries of the Asia Pacific region, a UNDP study found that agricultural and rural development were crucial

[45] Astri 2004.
[46] *Ibid*.
[47] *Ibid*.

underpinnings of a pro-poor growth strategy, yet such development was often ignored in the allocation of public resources and in PRSPs.[48] In Afghanistan, agriculture remains a large and important economic sector, particularly for employment and the livelihoods of the poor. Thus, agricultural development, and rural development more generally, remain crucial for poverty reduction.

In linking growth to poverty reduction, strategies have to address the importance of generating widespread employment. But such employment has to be at decent wages to actually reduce poverty. This implies that self-employment and micro-enterprises (and the micro-finance services supporting them) cannot serve as the foundation for a pro-poor employment strategy. Although such micro-programmes can help raise incomes, secure and remunerative employment cannot be sustained by these interventions alone. The emphasis has to shift to small and medium enterprises, and large enterprises that are employment-intensive and enhance skills.[49] Poverty alleviation strategies, therefore, have to identify a critical set of public policies that can help achieve widespread employment at decent wages.

We want democracy in the country but not at the expense of our culture and religion. I believe they all could be reconciled and that is what should happen.

Adam Khan from Jalalabad

Growth Based on Adequate Participation

Public participation is also required to develop national and local policies deemed both effective and just. This should be assured through information dissemination to socially vulnerable groups in remote areas as well as to more visible NGOs. Participation in development strategy design itself can be done through the engagement of civil society organisations and communities in order to take their needs into consideration. At the same time, they can hold Government partners, especially the UN agencies and international financial institutions, accountable in meeting a number of requirements: environmental protection policies, social protection and equalizing policies, and public consultation and information disclosure requirements. Consultation with the public is important because citizens of Afghanistan have an active role in the development process, both as beneficiaries and as agents. Their participation can lead to better project design and the prevention of costly mistakes. These mistakes, as the history of Afghanistan has showed, can be both economically costly as well as, more importantly, leading to serious human costs.

Including people in the development strategy design and implementation in Afghanistan is also a way to ease the gap between perceptions of a "modern" state with its modern elite and a "backward" tribal people. Rural tribes often understand fast-paced urban modernization as an influence of the West. Perceiving this as anti-Islamic, they are quick to reject it.

Finally, involving people in recovery and reconstruction helps build a bridge between projects with a quick impact and longer-term interventions leading to the achievement of the MDGs. This promotes new vested interests in sustaining peace.

A Private-Sector Led Growth?

At the core of the NDF is the vision of a light regulative framework to promote broad-based private sector growth. Inclusive economic growth is a precondition for easing livelihood strategies based on the militias. The framework accords a central role to the private sector as the engine of national growth, employment generation and poverty reduction in Afghanistan, hence its centrality to overall Government policies. Sustained economic growth is a

48 McKinley, UNDP 2004.
49 *Ibid.*

precondition for poverty reduction, national reconstruction and sustainable self-financed service provision through the generation of domestic resources.

The framework asserts that overcoming the constraints to trade, investment and more general private sector development can best be achieved through:

- Institutional capacity-building for both public and private sectors.
- Improved public sector management.
- Formulation of a sound, enabling regulatory framework for businesses.
- Development of banking and insurance services.
- Introducing standards, methodology testing and quality certification services.
- Labour market training and skill enhancement.
- Land titling.
- Infrastructure development for trade and investment.
- Trade, transit and transport facilitation.
- Support to private sector capacity building.

The Afghan private sector also needs to benefit more directly from the current reconstruction process, and efforts to create partnerships and consortia must be prioritized, as should improved information flows in both directions.[50]

The Government has already taken important initiatives to support private sector development, including: (1) the enactment of the Law on Domestic and Foreign Investment (September 2002); (2) the establishment of the Afghanistan Investment Support Agency (AISA), a single-window clearance and advice centre for domestic and foreign investors (August 2003); (3) opening the telecommunication sector to private investment, and (4) the initiation of institutional restructuring process in the Ministry of Commerce. To foster trade, the Government has implemented a number of reforms, including the streamlining of customs tariffs and the renewal of existing trade agreements. As a landlocked country, Afghanistan may be disadvantaged in terms of trade competitiveness. However, the significance of trade for human security can be seen in the context of the recent drought, when commercial cereal imports played a crucial role in price stabilization and ensuring that effective demand was met, thereby averting national catastrophe.

Future reforms for the promotion of broad-based private sector investment will need to include accelerated rehabilitation and construction of infrastructure, and an increased emphasis on investment in human capital, the establishment of sound regulatory frameworks for investment, the promotion of foreign direct investment and the gradual formalization of the economy.

There is, however, despite the high commitments to the principles of a free market, a critical dilemma. There are clear risks inherent to strengthening markets as they stand, firmly rooted in existing power relations and widespread horizontal inequalities. By reinforcing the existing and mutually beneficial interests of big business and military power holders, unregulated, informal and illicit markets could be undermining the agendas of reconstruction and development.[51] Current patterns of economic growth may also imply a destabilizing impact on the country politically. The directions of economic growth are informed by power relations – in the current context, there is a serious risk that growth is therefore likely to be neither fast nor equitable. The economy, while booming, is mainly informal and highly illicit. Participation in markets is not open to all, nor are the benefits equitably spread. Furthermore, the markets are currently having a negative effect on political governance and state-building.

[50] TISA, *Securing Afghanistan's Future*, 2004.
[51] AREU, "Trading in Power: The Politics of Free Markets in Afghanistan", 2004d.

Our proposed programme of investment and reforms will not move us to a middle-income country, but it would allow us to move from abject poverty to poverty with dignity.

Ashraf Ghani, Minister of Finance, Afghanistan

Thus, while the appearance may be one of economic growth and dynamic market forces, in practice, informal regulatory institutions interacting with the market are effectively restricting competition and participation.[52] In this context, the benefits from growth tend to be skewed towards the powerful. State intervention will be required to ensure accountability of market operators to a formal regulatory framework in the interest of the public and to effectively manage the existing threats to social, political and environmental security. Without additional state intervention to address market imperfections and facilitate the wider distribution of growth benefits, social equity resulting from broad based and inclusive growth will be delayed and the environmental implications of growth will be disastrous. Likewise, a deliberate strategy to limit the power of those currently in control of the informal economy will be required to accelerate political security and to prevent the continued destabilization of the economy and political environment by existing market structures.

Informal free trade is not new to Afghanistan, and existed even during the years of the communist Government. However, experience in post-war situations shows that an enforcement of the private sector may not necessarily serve the long-term interests of the country. Multi-national corporations may exploit national resources for maximizing profits without investing in a sustainable socio-economic base for the country. As noted by a researcher, "The increase in disposable income for a tiny minority, combined with the abolition of many import controls, may lead to a corresponding increase in the range of consumer goods available, with energies focused on the marketing sector. Similarly, the introduction of cost-recovery schemes in health care and education, combined with the curtailment or abolition of even very limited welfare provision, may serve to entrench poverty and increase indebtedness, as people borrow in order to pay for healthcare and education."[53] In line with the market approach, contracts are awarded through competitive bidding. However, privatized delivery of health care services may not be suitable in view of Afghanistan's geographic diversity and difficulty in assessing some areas. Reforms may mean that poor and remote villages may be even worse off.

Preparing for Afghanistan's National Poverty Reduction Strategy

Pro-Poor, Pro-Human Security Strategies

The Government of Afghanistan has made a commitment to sharpen the poverty focus of the NDF by outlining an interim PRSP by mid-2005. This will comprise an agreement with the international community on the adoption of specific poverty reduction measures, from a national perspective. The preparatory work already provided under the NDF – along with *Securing Afghanistan's Future*, this NHDR and the preliminary analysis based on NRVA findings – will provide valuable inputs. The aim will be to adopt a strategy of broad-based growth, macro-economic stability, and targeted poverty reduction measures. The role of civil society in enhancing public policy dialogue around the key themes will undoubtedly be essential to defining a sustainable, community-led approach.

As the country begins the preparation of the PRSP, it should bear in mind that even when growth occurs in some developing countries, it often does not reach the poor. This has raised the importance in the international development community of

[52] *Ibid*.
[53] Sultan Barakat, 2002.

identifying policies that can foster "pro-poor growth". This is growth that not only can improve the "absolute" conditions of poor households (by raising their level of real incomes along with the average level), but also can enhance their "relative" conditions *vis-à-vis* non-poor households (by reducing inequality between the poor and non-poor).

Bearing in mind that institutional reforms and behavioural changes need long-term transformation, the PRSP in Afghanistan should make an effort to link development strategies with peace and security, as conflict is one of the principal, if not exclusive, causes of poverty in the country. Poverty reduction should also be seen as a critical dimension of a strategy for conflict resolution, peace-building and national reconciliation.

The PRSP needs to incorporate regional and global political and economic influences as much as national ones. It may not be enough for Afghanistan to adopt democratic governance policies or fiscal reforms when external forces, especially regional geo-political interests in war and stability, could destroy or disrupt human development goals in the country.

The scale, type and status of the conflict in Afghanistan as well as the degree of violence must be appropriately factored into the strategies pursued. In this sense, a two-track policy is recommended. It should attempt short-term stabilization and poverty reduction, while setting a medium-term framework for properly sequencing development and reconciliation goals.[54] An integrated approach is also imperative to minimize the disconnects between policy prescriptions provided in poverty eradication frameworks, such as the PRSP, which are conditioned to receive concessional lending from the IMF, and the on-the-ground realities in post-conflict situations. PRSPs should not ignore the structural roots of the problems that cause conflict in the first place, as discussed in Chapter 4.

Because of potential links between poverty and insecurity, the way poverty is tackled influences analyses about its causes, evolution and post-conflict solutions. Peace in Afghanistan therefore needs to be understood as a dynamic process in which it is possible to think about liberties without obstacles such as fear, vulnerability and the absence of human dignity.

Among the different proposals about the kind of economic growth that would lead to human development and security, as outlined above, the NHDR recommends that the PRSP incorporate four elements:

1. A consultative process during the design and monitoring of the strategy that would ultimately provide better inputs for shaping a realistic strategy. It would also improve the impact on poverty of expenditures financed by external partners and the effectiveness of technical advice by increasing country ownership and shifting policy to a more results-oriented approach.
2. A complete analysis, during its preparatory phase, of the root causes of conflicts in Afghanistan, as well as the root structural causes of poverty, in order to draw potential linkages.
3. Emphasis on employment generation, especially through large-scale public works that offer decent wages while providing services needed in different regions.
4. A comprehensive monitoring and reporting framework, correlated with the UN and national initiatives, to collect, analyse and monitor data. Closely related to this goal is the need

...every step taken toward reducing poverty and achieving broad-based economic growth – is a step towards conflict prevention. All who are engaged in conflict prevention and development, therefore – the United Nations, the Bretton Woods institutions, governments and civil society organizations – must address these challenges in a more integrated fashion.

United Nations, Millennium Report of the Secretary General, New York, 2000, p. 45.

The system is not just. Many people are very poor. Many of the poor have developed mental and psychological illnesses. How can you expect them to raise quality children?

Neda Mohammad from Wardak

[54] From UNDP Network discussion on PRSPs in conflict situations, Poverty Reduction Network, Summer 2004.

to address the paucity of data, which requires that a database disaggregated by gender, rural–urban habitat, sub-national disparities, ethnicity and language groups, among other categories.

6.5. Conclusions

The revival of Afghanistan's economy is fundamental to future sustainability as well as for providing the needed jobs of today. Economic growth is required to reduce poverty, improve disparities and provide employment, and this calls for a strengthening of sources of growth through key domestic industries, not just reliance on an infusion of capital through international aid.

As the country now moves towards the preparation of a PRSP, a new opportunity is opening to review the kind of economic growth needed to provide human security as a public good. The role of civil society in enhancing public policy dialogues around key themes will also undoubtedly be crucial to defining a sustainable, community-led approach.

Economic growth should be based on principles of poverty eradication and job creation, long-term sustainability, and an adequate redistribution of wealth and assets. Growth models should be based on inclusive economic processes and equitable distribution of development. This will involve measures to contain and reduce the rising inequalities in incomes in different regions, and the gaps between urban and rural areas. In linking growth to poverty reduction, strategies have to address the importance of generating widespread employment.

Economic growth can be on the basis of private initiatives, but in order to better translate this growth process into the well-being of the people of Afghanistan, a proper role for the state is crucial. This requires state institutions to have the capacity to raise revenues, deliver services, properly distribute the accumulated wealth and regulate the market to prevent discrimination. The role of the Afghan state in the economy should be to ensure economic efficiency, social justice and individual liberty, through an appropriate combination of market intervention and planning.

While bilateral and multi-lateral aid is the surest immediate engine of growth in the country, Afghanistan strives for self-sufficiency in the future. International aid is estimated at five per cent of GDP per year, while opium production provides almost 40 per cent of GDP today. Afghanistan needs to explore other sources of growth. The Government should seek to improve labour and technology in key industries through training and investment, expanding markets and refurbishing the infrastructure. This requires the development of the material base for other export potentials, such as animal husbandry, mining, tourism, knowledge-based industries, and traditional crafts and fruits. The refurbishing of the industrial base will provide jobs, and eco-tourism could be envisioned once security is ensured.

The economy can also be supported by emigrants' remittances or by the absorption of expatriate skills into new opportunities inside the country. With the development of roads to Central Asia, and with the prospects of an oil pipeline from Turkmenistan to Pakistan, there may be significant economic gains for the country, although these may not be anticipated in the immediate future.

Chapter 7

The Role of the International Community: Aid and Peace-building

Photo: Golam Monowar Kamal

Chapter 7:

The Role of the International Community: Aid and Peace-building

Afghanistan faces no easy task in its efforts to ensure a speedy and smooth transition from a large-scale, short-term, externally driven military intervention, to more grass-roots, longer term, locally driven interventions for development. While the former tends to perpetuate dependency, the latter must be focused on building self-sufficiency in order to safeguard the gains achieved through the intervention. This chapter looks at how aid in post-conflict situations, as in Afghanistan, can provide incentives or disincentives for peace-building. It examines the lessons that should be learned from aid patterns in Afghanistan, not only over the past two-and-a-half years, but from decades of engagement with the country in various ways. It also presents recommendations to the international community on how to ensure that aid does more good than harm in Afghanistan.

7.1. Introduction: Accountability and Legitimacy

In *Securing Afghanistan's Future*, the Afghanistan Transitional Administration presented a case for extensive support from the international community in order to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a "narco-mafia state". Yet, increased money for reconstruction by itself may not be sufficient to sustain peace-building. More attention must be directed to aid spending patterns, local institutional capacity, and the Government's successes in raising internal revenue and curbing corruption. The danger of Afghanistan becoming a *rentier* state funded through large inflows of foreign aid must be avoided. Dependency on this kind of funding would make the Afghan Government more accountable to foreign patrons than to its own people, despite the latter being one of the objectives of the Bonn Agreement.

Despite the dangers, aid is nonetheless essential for Afghanistan's successful reconstruction, and the manner in which it is administered will ultimately determine whether or not the country and its people will find long-term stability and prosperity. The implementation of such an agenda in Afghanistan's war-torn and devastated society will ultimately require that donors, agencies and NGOs ensure that Afghan institutions are owned by and accountable to the people of Afghanistan.

After Afghanistan was identified as a base for terrorist activities in 1998, the international community announced sanctions against the Taliban. Although specific studies do not exist on the subject, it is believed that the impact of the sanctions on the Taliban as non-state actors may not have been as punitive as their impact on the everyday lives of ordinary people. Dealing with terrorist threats to "international security" was prioritized over dealing with the threats to the human security of the people of Afghanistan. Indeed, the history of support from the international community for different regimes or different opposition groups often serves to illustrate the risks associated with external assistance, which has been perceived as unaccountable to legitimate domestic concerns.

Yet a government that is legitimate and accountable to its people needs to follow a national process, one that the international community could support, but not lead. Legitimacy should be sought through accountability to the people of Afghanistan in a smuch as to the international community. The provision of aid can help

this process only if it is transparent and consultative, and it can hamper it if it is not. Aid-supported development and democracy should ultimately render the Government of Afghanistan responsible towards its people. As Afghan civil society matures, it can assume the role of holding both the Afghan state and the international community accountable.

It is now an accepted fact that the Government cannot make good on many of its promises it makes to the people. However, we also know the reasons for the inability of the Government and we have lowered our expectations. Our concern, nevertheless, is the inability of the international community to bring improvement in people's lives. Many people now question the seriousness of the international community with respect to Afghanistan.

Ahmad Fawad from Kapisa

7.2. Analytical Framework: The Conspicuous Role of Aid in Conflicts

Debates on the role of aid in Afghanistan are staged within the context of growing global interests in the relationships between aid and conflict, and how development assistance can be re-conceptualized as conflict prevention, what has been described as the "securitization of aid".[1] During the late 1990s, donors, through the Strategic Framework (SF) process, increasingly saw aid as an instrument for building peace and acting as a catalyst for political agreements. Such an instrumental approach to aid as a tool of peace-building, however, was contested by those who argued that this approach inevitably leads to the distortion of humanitarian mandates and principles, particularly those of neutrality and impartiality. Instead of being used for political objectives, humanitarian aid should be distinct, both for ethical and pragmatic reasons, as aid may not have sufficient leverage to tackle the political dynamics of conflicts.[2]

In Afghanistan, because aid is introduced in a political environment, it may have in the past, and may continue in the future, to create incentive systems, both positive and negative. "Aid affects not only the size of the economic pie and how it is sliced but also the balance of power among the competing actors and the rules of the game by which they compete.... The political impacts of aid can help to decide whether the peace endures or war resumes."[3] The potential negative and positive externalities that assistance could introduce in a conflict or post-conflict situation, based on lessons learned around the world, is summarized below.

Negative Incentives: Aid Could Harm

- Massive and sudden aid may exacerbate conflict. It may be appropriated by military groups, as it was during the years of resistance, first to the Soviet invasion and then to the Taliban, when aid in Afghanistan became an integral part of the war economy by nurturing, directly or indirectly, armed groups.
- Aid can also increase competition if the institutional mechanisms for equitable distribution have not been established, anti-corruption measures are not in place and the ethics of public sector management and procedures are not followed. High-profile relief programmes in urban areas, such as food distribution, can be prone to corruption, with aid feeding client networks.
- Aid that is heavily based on relief assistance could prolong dependence on external sources. Instead of finding large-scale alternatives – as, for example, to a war economy based on poppy cultivation – small-scale and transient project interventions funded through aid may not only be unsustainable, but even harmful. Relief aid may potentially fuel corruption and dependency, and supersede local responsibility for welfare.

1 Mark Duffield as quoted in Jonathan Goodhand 2002.
2 Goodhand 2002.
3 J. Boyce, 2000 'Beyond good intentions: external assistance and peace building,' in S. Forman and S. Patrick (eds), *Good Intentions. Pledges of Aid for Post Conflict Recovery*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner, 2000 as quoted in Goodhand 2002.

- The distribution of massive amounts of relief aid such as food can create market distortions and substitution as it generates a strong competition with local supply. The introduction of large amounts of wheat in Afghanistan in 2002 and 2003 by the World Food Programme (WFP) led to a fall in wheat prices to an all-time low, undermining efforts to revive local production.
- Assistance strategies that bypass the central Government and work directly with regional administrations controlled by warlords risk heightening tensions between the centre and the provinces, and could potentially skew distribution of assistance in favour of certain regions. Aid that solely focuses on a centralised state also risks not reaching target beneficiaries if fair distribution is not planned or implemented by the Government.
- Artificial "islands of development" could result from an intense influx of relief aid that is likely to be abruptly halted as the crisis scales down.
- Donor funds are usually bound to tight disbursement schedules for budgetary reasons, which can create conflict with long-term planning. Furthermore, pressure on delivery can lead to wasted funds.

Positive Incentives: Aid Can Help

The examples above are potential hazards of large-scale, uncoordinated, ineffective aid. Aid that is well managed, evaluated and monitored can effectively avoid negative or unintended outcomes. The involvement of NGOs and community-based organizations could increase both the efficiency of delivery and accountability, helping to ensure that aid, in fact, does no harm in Afghanistan. Although no systematic and reliable analysis has been conducted to assess the real impacts of aid in Afghanistan today,[4] it may be concluded that the positive incentives have been many and have outnumbered the negative ones. In addition to directly improving livelihoods, aid can result in other welcome outcomes and externalities, such as:

- Practical interventions at the local level that integrate people from across factional lines for the management of common resources – such as irrigation or grazing, trading networks, rehabilitation of infrastructure and so on – achieve positive outcomes of peaceful and cooperative co-existence.
- Education programmes raise not only the levels of literacy but also have a host of positive externalities ranging from improved household health management, to expanded decision-making capabilities, more informed resource management and so on. These can significantly improve human security.
- De-mining leads to vast improvements in the agriculture sector.
- As one researcher noted, "It is also important not to undervalue the impact of aid on more intangible factors like ideas, relationships, social energy and individual leadership. Aid agency interventions, in addition to their economic effects, may promote cross-cutting ties (or bridging social capital) between social groups, counteracting the social compacting (or bonding social capital), which warlords create and use to mobilize groups."[5]
- Aid can also cultivate the ground for private sector development. It can

[4] For an evaluation of aid during the Taliban years, see Dabelstein Niels, OECD 2002, and Van Brabant and Killock, OECD/DAC 1999. For another evaluation of UNDP's PEACE programme during the Taliban and the Habitat Community programmes that highlighted positive impacts on local governance, see Astri , and Kristian Berg Harpviken 2001.

[5] Mary Anderson 1999 refers to this as building "connectors" or "constituencies for peace" quoted in Goodhand 2002.

create an environment for a flourishing private sector by taking measures to improve security, the legal framework and investment guarantees.

Although such activities may not always "bring peace", they could play a role in supporting the coping strategies of communities, and providing alternatives to the war economy. At best, aid agencies should be simultaneously providing a mixture of humanitarian, rehabilitation and development-oriented assistance, in partnership with a range of actors, including the central Government, regional authorities, local authorities and community-based *shuras*. At the very least, there will be a need to ensure that aid (both humanitarian and development assistance) does not undercut peace-building efforts and other policy instruments attempting to build structural stability.

While aid cannot be the main factor tipping the scale in a peace process, it may play an important role in consolidating a fragile peace. But it can only do so by adopting new approaches. For aid not to increase tensions or contribute to existing or new conflicts, it must apply a conscious human security approach that takes into consideration root causes, and a transformatory approach that helps translate "peace-making" into "peace-building."[6] Encompassing rehabilitation, reconstruction and conflict prevention, these approaches assist in legitimizing outside interventions in order to achieve the ultimate goal of sustainable security and peace. They can be built on the following three pillars:

1. **Conflict sensitivity and the search for root causes:** Helping to prevent violent conflict and sustaining peace after it occurs requires an intensive focus on finding and combating their "root causes". The question to be asked is: "How does development impact on the risk factors for conflict, and how does conflict impact on development?" Such an approach would require first and foremost being aware of the negative externalities that misguided or misused aid could incite. It requires: sensitivity to equitable benefits; flexibility in terms of planning and implementation; monitoring and evaluation (including some form of impact assessment of peace and conflict); and strong linkages with society in order to ensure adequate "buy-in". Peace-building and reconstruction need to be based upon an understanding not only of the issues around which the conflict became politicized – particularly, ethnicity and religion – but also on the prior failures of governance. This requires aid actors both to think historically and to plan ahead over the long-term, based on knowledge and the willingness to learn lessons. Yet, it is often the case that expatriates and international aid workers, as the distributors of aid, often neither have a clear understanding of the prevailing political contexts (background of members of the Government) nor of the historical context. This lack of local knowledge makes them prone to follow institutional approaches that could impede peace-building in the long run.

2. **Recognizing transformation:** Conflict sensitivity requires not only the restoration of infrastructure, institution-building and structural reforms, but also changing incentives that trigger or fuel conflict. Although many of the problems facing post-conflict societies existed before the outbreak of conflict, it can also radically alter the political, demographic and economic structure of a country, requiring an understanding of an often complex and rapidly changing reality. For example, the gender balance changes when women

[6] The origin of the concept is found in the 1992 *An Agenda for Peace* issued by the UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. His described peace-building as "an action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict". It encompasses rehabilitation, reconstruction and conflict prevention, and legitimizes outside intervention in order to establish the ultimate goal of sustainable security and peace.

become household heads in the absence of men. Migration of educated classes negatively impacts the remaining human capital. Displacement creates new ethnically polarized zones. Hence, changes brought about by the conflict need to be identified and incorporated in rehabilitation and assistance strategies.

3. **Mainstreaming conflict prevention:** Building peace requires sound foundations based on a commitment to righting wrongs and achieving an acceptable level of social justice and accountability. From this perspective, reconstruction, too, should have a corrective dimension that promotes socio-economic change and not just the restoration of the status quo, if it is to secure not only the successful implementation of initial reconstruction activities but, more importantly, sustain that investment into the future.

From the beginning of an intervention, external actors should clearly understand their role, the effectiveness of which will depend on the degree to which they manage to support internal actors. This is especially important for Afghanistan, where transparency in peace-building efforts will be one of the most important aspects of regained sovereignty.

7.3. Lessons from a History of Politicized Aid

The legacy of the way that donors and aid organizations operated in the past when dealing both with the Mujahideen and Taliban administrations points to the dangers of politicizing aid: Aid conditionalities seem to have had contradictions at times, undermined the impartiality of the international community, and hampered the human security of the people of Afghanistan.

In order to understand the contemporary role of aid in Afghanistan, it is important to appreciate the history of aid before and during the conflict. As one researcher noted: "Afghan responses to the political transition and the reconstruction programme will be conditioned by their understanding of what has happened in the past. Many of the current dilemmas are echoed from the history of Afghanistan. Having survived years away from the spotlight of international attention, Afghans might be forgiven for being confused at the haste with which decisions are now being made about the future shape of their country. They might not have much left, but Afghans have their memories."[7] The legacy of Afghan history must be examined through the role that foreign aid played in creating a *rentier* elite and a state that failed to develop a social contract with its citizens.

Pre-war aid

By the middle of the 20th Century, Afghanistan had become a *rentier* state, with external finance, mostly from the Soviet Union and the United States, playing an increasingly important role in funding domestic expenditure. By the 1960s, foreign aid accounted for more than 40 per cent of the state budget.[8] State-led modernization programmes, funded through foreign aid, contributed to a bifurcation of the Afghan economy and society – which one researcher characterized as a society split between a rural, largely subsistence economy and an urban economy dependent on a state that in turn drew most of its income from links to the international state system and market.[9]

Aid in the Cold War years

Following its occupation at the end of 1979, the Soviet Union replaced Western development programmes in subsidising the Afghan state and its mostly urban

7 Chris Johnson and Leslie Jolyon 2002.
8 Jonathan Goodhand 2002.
9 Barnett Rubin 1995.

project of modernization. Humanitarian aid often became tangled in the militarization of refugee camps, used as bases for the Mujahideen. Until 1988, the UN and the ICRC could not provide aid to Soviet-held land areas because of sovereignty issues. NGOs, therefore, played an increasingly important role as providers of cross-border relief operations, often planned from Peshawar and Islamabad in Pakistan.

At the same time, politically motivated opposing flows of aid accentuated the split of Afghan society and strengthened unaccountable elites.[10] As a researcher noted, the "Pattern of distribution reflected political ties and proximity rather than absolute humanitarian need. Consequently, urban populations controlled by the government and populations in the central highlands were largely bypassed in favour of populations in the east."[11]

The period also marked the development of systematic patterns of aid manipulation, especially of food aid, by resistance commanders, border controllers and others, while humanitarian aid also led to dependence as food production fell by half to two-thirds. During this period, humanitarian assistance in some cases complemented military aid, while NGOs and UN agencies were able to avoid working with Afghan official structures. In the 1980s and 1990s, Western emergency aid, often in the form of cash, was channelled through the Mujahideen, for whom there was often unconditional sympathy. As one researcher pointed out, "this pattern of interaction was above all a *partisan and negotiable relationship*. Linking diverse humanitarian actors to their preferred Afghan counterparts, the relationship was prone to corruption and political favoritism."[12] Thus, aid in the 1990s, coupled with trade with neighbouring countries and arms provision, further weakened the central state apparatus and strengthened regional groupings. Regional power-holders invited humanitarian agencies and NGOs to provide basic health care, education and relief services for their populations.

Aid in the post-Cold War years

The end of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in 1989 was the beginning of a period of confusion about how the international community should respond to the needs of the Afghans. This period was characterized by the fragmentation of the Mujahideen factions and continued shifts in allegiances mirrored by fragmented support from the international community. Humanitarian aid efforts depended on commanders for cross-border activities, resulting in diversification of support and resources.

The post-Cold War years also saw increased aid from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Assistance (UNOCA) to the fragmented state, both to Mujahideen- and Government-held areas from a variety of entry points in neighbouring countries. NGOs also began working with district or village-based *shuras* in an increasingly professional way. The early 1990s witnessed the development of several NGO coordination mechanisms along with new programmes in the west and north, and by 1994, there were over 200 registered Afghan NGOs.

While the UN had a challenge in dealing with the Government of the Islamic State of Afghanistan, which possessed limited domestic legitimacy and limited control over the country, in 1997 it decided to extend support to Afghanistan for the development of the SF. Its aim was to provide "a more coherent, effective and integrated political strategy and assistance

[10] Barnett Rubin 2000.
[11] Jonathan Goodhand 2002.
[12] Astri Suhrke 2004.

program" through a "common conceptual tool that identifies key activities... on the basis of shared principles and objectives." The framework was in fact the introduction of aid conditionalities alongside humanitarian concerns, and of the diplomatic process as a tool for peace. It forced a confrontation with the Taliban on issues such as peace, human rights, gender and drugs. The framework called for inter-agency coordination to introduce incentives and disincentives related to aid – that is, a carrot–and-stick policy – and to make the linkages between aid, peace and human rights, based on the assumption that aid can lead to significant behaviour changes by actors in a conflict situation.

Yet the SF cannot be considered a very successful initiative. As evaluated by an OECD/DAC study,[13] its policy of negative incentives, which included military diplomacy, sanctions and aid conditionalities, only isolated and hardened the position of the Taliban, pushing them closer to radical Islamist groups. Aid acted more as the only possible form of international engagement than as a significant lever for change. And it was unable to compete with other resource flows driving the war economy. The value of aid to Afghanistan (roughly US$300 million per annum) couldn't stand up to the US$2.5 billion generated in 1999 through cross-border trade between Afghanistan and Pakistan.[14] At the same time, however, aid conditionality prevented long-term capacity-building activities by donors under the name of "principled programming", weighing down donor efforts to provide vital institutional support in health and education.

Coordination and a top-down managerial framework also proved a challenge for diverse organizations operating in a complex and changing environment. The framework alienated NGOs such as Mèdecins Sans Frontiëres, which objected to the curb on their independence of action. Most importantly, the SF pushed the aid community into a position of *de facto* political opposition to the Taliban, politicizing aid even further. In contrast to the partisan and negotiable relationship formed with individual Mujahideen leaders, the SF encouraged a strategic distancing from *de facto* national authorities. This was accentuated by the UN General Assembly denying Afghanistan's seat in the UN to the Taliban regime, and the introduction of UN sanctions against the regime in 1999.

Learning from History

The history of aid in Afghanistan provides a number of lessons that remain pertinent today. Aid may have widened gaps between warring factions and created dependencies on external agencies for basic needs, thus undermining national and traditional institutions. Such a dependency was exacerbated by the fact that aid was short-term, rather than sustaining long-term economic activity. In the absence of possibilities to work with a central and legitimate authority, aid was also concentrated in the periphery. Yet the periphery had increasingly become integrated into the economies of neighbouring countries through licit and illicit trade. It is also safe to say that capacity-building generally received low priority, and the rush of fulfilling urgent needs prevented long-term planning and the engagement of Afghan counterparts in policy design, implementation and monitoring. Most Afghan NGOs ended up as contractors for short-term emergency projects, often cutting corners in project implementation to sustain the organization until the next contract came through.[15]

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13 Van Brabant and Killock, OECD/DAC 1999.

14 Zareen Naqvi 1999. By 2000 it was estimated that the value of Afghanistan's exports and re-exports to Pakistan had dropped to US$1,227 million (WB 2004a).

15 Suhrke 2002.

On the whole, humanitarian assistance during the past two decades may have contributed to the reinforcement of power structures, at both the regional and the local levels. Aid certainly registered some local development, but did not modify a regionalized political economy of war that made leaders more dependent upon – and responsive to – outside forces rather than their own people.

7.4. A Promise to Keep and a Responsibility Towards Human Security

As the international community re-engages in Afghanistan, a window of opportunity opens to learn lessons from the past and make good on commitments to the Afghan people in an ethical and transparent manner.

Why Responsibility?

For too long, the interest of external actors has been what many would consider opportunistic self-interest: showing off Afghanistan as a test case for international intervention, and benefiting from the control of the drug trade while gaining access to Central Asian oil and gas supplies. There is a striking contrast between the way Western countries pursued their strategic interests in Afghanistan during the Cold War and after September 11, and their effective disengagement and the resulting political vacuum which was allowed to continue unchecked during the interim period, from 1992 to 2001[16] Too often, democratic principles have had to be bypassed in the interest of engaging with this or that regime, starting with the politicization of aid to overthrow the Soviet-backed regime during the Cold War, at the expense of working with less than acceptable human rights standards. Similarly, today, the United States and its allies are interested in winning the "war against terrorism" and in a successful outcome in Afghanistan as designed through the Bonn process, even if this requires the blurring of certain humanitarian principles and codes of practice.[17] The current pursuit of military objectives in Afghanistan, i.e. eradicating the remaining Al-Qaida and Taliban groups through arming militias in the south, runs the risk of endangering peace. The international agenda for action must therefore go beyond a minimalist position of attempting to ensure that the country no longer harbours terrorists.

Changing the lens of security to that of the people of Afghanistan requires compromises, but these have to be based on a renewed ethical responsibility towards their well-being. There are plenty of reasons why the international community of nations should support the reconstruction of Afghanistan. For one, the "war against terrorism" is costing the United States more than US$1 billion each month, while much less than that is being spent on curbing the poverty that could breed extremism. Globally, overall aid is still rising, but is more conditional on traditional security. As one study by Christian Aid claimed, the year 2004 saw the diversion of US$1 billion in aid to the war on terrorism at the expense of the war on poverty and the attainment of the MDGs. The US Congress reduced its aid package from US$1.6 billion to just US$650 million globally, and the United Kingdom diverted about £150 million of British development aid to the re-building of Iraq. Furthermore, "rich countries" development budgets, including those of Japan and Australia, have been re-defined to include items like counter-terrorism training, which limits the money for poverty reduction programmes.[18]

16 Sultan Barakat 2002.
17 *Ibid*.
18 Christian Aid 2004.



Source:Zanbel-e-Gham, Edition 3, March 2003

Further, aid can foster economic stability and trade with other countries, while diluting the appeal of political extremism. But beyond these instrumentalist arguments lies the most important rationale for responsibility and accountability. Given that Afghanistan's human insecurities have been the result of conflicts compounded by foreign interference, the world now has a particular obligation to help resolve them. This responsibility also stems from having successfully driven the Taliban out of Afghanistan on the promise of nation-building. In his "State of the Union" speech in 2003, President Bush pledged to help Afghans secure their country, rebuild their society and educate all their children.[19]

Support to the renewed sovereignty of Afghanistan cannot therefore coincide with donor fatigue. There is no doubt that the international community must engage itself decisively in order to prevent the country from sliding back into civil war and becoming a sanctuary for drug production and terrorists – but a fundamental rationale must also be to restore long-denied human security for the people of Afghanistan. The human security argument for more investment in Afghanistan should be focused on meeting the needs of the Afghan population, and not only the potential cost to the international scene should Afghanistan become a "narco-mafia state".

UN Member States should support the peace-keeping agenda in Afghanistan as an objective in itself, and as a way to reward peace and not war. In this context, donors and other agencies have a responsibility to ensure that their work reinforces the political transition, rather than undermining it. At its best, assistance could help to promote the credibility of the Government that emerged from the elections by improving the lives of ordinary Afghans and giving them a stake in the future.

What Kind of Responsibility?

A quantitative responsibility: engagement with Afghanistan should not dwindle

A substantial aid package is first and foremost necessary for Afghanistan to transform the war economy into a peaceful one. At the beginning of the reconstruction period there was talk of a Marshall Plan, but this did not materialize. Yet at the Berlin Conference in March 2004, commitments were guaranteed for the next seven years. The international community pledged US$4.5 billion in the first year, and met a substantial part of the Afghan requests for US$27.5 billion for the second and third years. In late 2003, the United States, Afghanistan's most generous donor, also sharply increased aid, expanded technical assistance and actively involved itself in the Afghan constitutional process and democratic elections. The substantial

[19] President George Bush, "State of the Union Address", January 2003, www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-19.html.

Box 7.1

What is the Rationale for Aid?

The ways in which needs are defined and prioritized have real implications for the outcomes for which aid was intended. The various ways in which the need for aid could be computed include:

Aid based on needs: Aid could be based on defined basic humanitarian needs of the population, which could form, for example, four related "core elements" – the protection of life, health, subsistence and physical security. Basic human welfare needs in a conflict situation include freedom from violence, and fear from coercion and from deprivation of the means for survival.[20]

Aid based on rights: While aid based on humanitarian needs is value-neutral, it could also be based on the more normative rights-based approach. The identification of these rights involves a moral (and perhaps a legal) claim about entitlements, with the corresponding responsibilities and duties.

Aid based on threats (human security): Aid based on perceived threats converges the basic-needs-based approaches (risks to survival) with the rights-based approach (to entitlements, and to a life of "dignity"). It also introduces an element of urgency: Insecurities should be dealt with not only because they are immediate threats to survival and dignity, but also because they could lead to renewed conflicts or inefficiencies in systems of democracy and reconstruction.

Aid based on costs: Arguments for aid based on costs, which have been used by *Securing Afghanistan's Future* and the NDB, are based on the assessed costs of the public investment needed for a politically and economically sustainable process. They are based on what the ministries in charge of different sectors need in order to function, both operationally and for the implementation of development programmes. The shift to aid based on costs, prompted by the Minister of Finance after the first two years of reconstruction, was a way for Afghan institutions to take the lead role in determining the amount and allocation of resources pledged to Afghanistan.

Aid based on meeting long-term targets: For countries that have undertaken a costing exercise of the MDGs, aid can be based on the assessment of what it takes to reach the agreed upon targets of development by the year 2015. Focus on the MDGs, which began in Afghanistan in 2004, when President Hamid Karzai, expressed his willingness to sign the Millennium Declaration, transformed the discussion of aid to Afghanistan from the short-term context of post-war reconstruction to the longer term concern of development.

aid promised at the Berlin Conference represents a significant departure from the policies of the previous decade, in which the international response was one of disengagement and containment.

First and foremost, political will is needed to continue sustained peace-building efforts in Afghanistan and in the region at large. There are fears that the current levels of international political support and commitment to the rebuilding of Afghanistan may not continue indefinitely. Evidence from other crisis-countries is that the international community may move on to other crises in the spotlight, or that as agendas and administrations change, so do political commitments to incomplete projects, such as that of Afghanistan.

Source:Zanbel-e-Gham, Edition 3, March 2003

[20] James Darcy and Antoine Charles-Hofmann 2005.

7.5. Challenges to Needs Identification and Aid Distribution in Afghanistan

Needs Based on Supply: The Challenge of a "Light Footprint"

Needs assessment typically is subsumed within a process of resource mobilization, conducted by agencies in order to substantiate funding proposals to donors. One can argue that the reconstruction project in Afghanistan did not begin on the basis of established real needs assessment or a carefully planned process based on agreements among all parties to the conflict. On the contrary, it was initiated by external actors as part of a rushed reaction to the sequence of events that followed September 11th, 2001.[21] The pledges to reconstruction in Afghanistan have been carried out in haste and based on the urgency of international pledging conferences, rather than on needs analysis.

Such an assessment, which is conducted in the context of an appeal for funds, in fact "encourage(s) supply-driven responses, and risk(s) distorting the scale of the threat and the importance of the proposed intervention. The lack of independent 'reality checks' makes it difficult for the system to ensure that responses are appropriate, proportionate and impartial."[22] In such circumstances, the political interests of the international community, or the capacity of specific agencies, national or international, to "market" their interests may introduce biases in the situation analysis. Hence, the rushed tendency of donors to "construct" and "solve" crises with little reference to evidence could erode trust in the system.[23]

At the Bonn Conference, the United Nations promised a "light footprint".[24] However, worldwide attention to Afghanistan brought a myriad of international aid workers to the country, making the relief scene similar to other post-war situations. Problems associated with heavy foreign aid, especially in Kabul, amounted to pressure on real estate prices, which skyrocketed, and to the "white vehicle syndrome", which could foster popular resentment. They also include a serious distortion of salaries, prompting the flight of qualified local personnel to the aid sector. In a country decimated by "brain drain", aid agencies "have in a sense held in 'cold storage' a potential source of leadership for the future."[25]

Although large amounts of money have been given to Afghanistan, the danger of introducing these sums is in raising Afghan expectations of rapid growth and recovery to an unrealistic level. Large amounts of aid do not guarantee improved well-being, just as the human development approach argues that growth in itself does not necessarily trickle down to all members of society. Talking about the quantity of aid does not address issues of efficiency, distribution impact and overall well-being. Equally important is that aid be properly targeted, designed, implemented and monitored to address the needs of the Afghan people.

The Puzzle of Definitions and Obstacles to Assessment

An important challenge in a post-conflict situation like Afghanistan is the lack of systematic definition of what the "needs" are, and who is ultimately "at risk", and on what basis is this decided. While this report tries to present a case for a threat-based human security needs analysis, other documents in the reconstruction landscape in Afghanistan have assessed "needs"

[21] Suhrke 2004.
[22] Darcy and Charles-Hofmann 2005.
[23] *Ibid*.
[24] ITAP 2002.
[25] Goodhand 2002.

based on other definitions (*Securing Afghanistan's Future* on costs, the *MDG Report* on goals, a Center for Economic and Social Rights (CESR) study on human rights needs, a Tufts University study on human security and livelihoods needs, the NRVA on vulnerability and so on). Improving needs assessment demands greater consistency in the ways that problems are framed, symptoms are observed, and causes and acute risk factors are approximated. A proper assessment requires defining not only needs (based on answering the question of "why aid"), but also thresholds, and the minimum requirements for survival and dignity. What constitutes "enough" may depend on the context and the level of risk that people face.

Logistical, security as well as capacity problems have hampered both the collection of data and the assessment of real needs. In Afghanistan, there is a lack of crucial information available to decision-makers, and the kinds of needs assessment required to generate this are conducted only sporadically. The result is that few situations are assessed as a whole, making prioritization within and across contexts difficult. When data is collected by various agencies and by the CSO, it is not always relevant data, or in a form that would allow comparisons and cross-examination. For example, baseline and population figures were necessary for voter registration and were carried out by the CSO in the summer of 2003. Yet, data collection in an insecure environment proved very difficult, as exemplified by the murder of numerous CSO officials. The NRVA and UNICEF/CSO MICS surveys have been able to shed more light on the situation of poverty and vulnerability in Afghanistan, but these also have been conducted in less than perfect circumstances and the data may not be complete.

Needs assessment, at least in the formal sense, often plays only a marginal role in the decision-making of agencies and donors. However, rapid assessments in an insecure environment such as Afghanistan depend on assumptions, estimates and predictions rather than on observed facts, which require checking. Monitoring of outcomes of interventions should also be based on an assessment of the external environment and the changing nature of risks, rather than the typical focus on the output–input equation of project management.[26] As the country becomes more stable and united in the months and years after the parliamentary elections, coherent data collection and assessment will become an imperative.

Coordination and Consultation

As much of the information in Afghanistan comes from international NGOs, a system of coordinated assessment should be established that includes the CSO, UN agencies, NGOs and relevant Government bodies. Needs assessments were initially undertaken by individual aid agencies in accordance with their mandate and funding needs, and were gradually coordinated and correlated by international groups such as AIMS and by the Government within the framework of the AACA and most recently by the Ministry of Finance. Coordination of the various analyses and data generated by the multiplicity of agencies that have become involved in what is a well-funded post-crisis situation will be one of the major challenges of the new Government and its international partners.

Adequate consultation has been perhaps the most thorny question in a situation where funding proposals have had to be submitted to international conferences within a short time, while insecurity and lack of capacity prevented consultation with various regions and stakeholders. But

[26] Goodhand 2002.

Table 7.1 Donor Disbursement table

Donor	4Q80 + 81 (Jan02-Mar03) ALL SUPPORT			1382 (Mar03-Mar04) TOTAL			of which: TRUST FUNDS		of which: PROJECTS	
	PLEDGE	Com	Disb	PLEDGE	Com	Disb	Com	Disb	Com	Disb
Aga Khan	25.0	20.3	8.2	25.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
ADB	15.0	15.0	10.0	10.0	58.1	2.5	0.0	0.0	58.1	2.5
Australia	33.7	20.3	20.3	13.7	3.6	3.5	2.6	2.6	1.0	0.9
Belgium	11.7	11.7	11.7	6.0	2.3	1.6	0.7	0.0	1.6	1.6
Canada	83.0	83.0	83.0	95.0	90.9	91.0	55.8	56.3	35.1	34.7
China	27.0	31.0	30.0	20.0	20.0	10.0	0.0	0.0	20.0	10.0
Denmark	28.0	28.0	16.5	28.2	44.9	19.2	5.0	5.0	39.9	14.2
EC	218.4	176.4	112.4	292.1	304.6	144.1	170.4	111.4	134.2	32.7
ECHO	73.5	73.5	64.0	63.3	42.6	42.6	0.0	0.0	4.3	4.4
Finland	13.2	13.0	13.0	11.2	5.9	4.8	2.5	2.5	3.4	2.3
France	32.0	34.2	27.8	30.2	23.0	2.1	0.0	0.0	23.0	2.1
Germany	142.0	104.6	104.6	107.5	102.1	51.8	11.4	11.4	90.7	40.4
India	40.0	101.7	101.7	60.0	213.6	42.4	0.2	0.2	213.4	42.2
Iran	50.0	68.0	68.0	50.0	19.6	48.0	1.0	1.0	18.6	47.0
Ireland	4.0	4.3	4.0	5.0	4.1	2.2	3.9	2.0	0.2	0.2
Islamic Devt Bank	10.0	8.8	0.0	0.0	24.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	24.3	0.0
Italy	43.0	49.5	49.5	52.8	51.9	23.7	0.0	0.0	51.9	23.7
Japan	357.8	357.8	357.8	142.2	252.3	137.3	0.0	0.0	252.3	137.3
Korea (Rep of)	10.0	22.7	8.1	15.0	25.8	13.7	2.0	2.0	23.8	11.7
Kuwait	15.0	15.0	5.0	30.0	20.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	15.0	0.0
Luxembourg	5.0	0.0	0.9	1.0	6.3	4.9	0.0	0.0	6.3	4.9
Netherlands	100.5	100.5	93.3	65.3	50.6	49.0	47.1	45.9	3.5	3.1
Norway	40.0	40.0	40.0	53.0	41.5	40.5	30.2	30.2	11.3	10.3
Oman	3.0	0.0	0.0	3.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Pakistan	50.0	50.0	17.7	20.0	30.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	30.0	0.0
Portugal	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.0	0.0
Qatar	20.0	20.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Russian Fed.	30.0	0.0	0.0	30.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Saudi Arabia	35.0	35.8	35.8	35.0	36.0	6.0	5.0	5.0	31.0	1.0
Spain	25.7	6.4	6.4	62.0	12.0	0.0	0.0	0.01	2.0	0.0
Sweden	30.0	30.0	30.0	35.6	27.0	10.1	6.0	6.0	21.0	4.1
Switzerland	12.0	14.4	14.4	13.0	8.6	5.4	0.4	0.4	8.2	5.0
Turkey	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.0	0.7	0.7	0.0	0.0	0.7	0.7
UAE	36.0	0.0	0.0	22.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
United Kingdom	137.8	91.6	149.0	144.0	194.1	128.1	59.1	55.1	135.0	73.0
USA	836.3	836.3	836.3	1,300.0	2,190.3	836.3	96.5	20.0	2,093.8	816.3
World Bank	103.3	101.5	23.2	160.0	125.8	97.2	20.8	20.8	105.0	76.4
Total	2,712.6	2,645.4	2,417.5	3,003.1	4,075.4	1,844.8	528.4	385.7	3,508.6	1,420.9

Includes preliminary data on commitments and disbursements against pledges.
Based on data provided to Ministry of Finance as 1 May 2004.

NB. This table represents the best information at this point in time that donors have provided to Government. We expect that donors will revise this information over time and that figures will change. Zero represents either no disbursements or no information provided.

Table 7.2: Total Assistance to Afghanistan 1380 (2001) – 1382 (2003)

Channel	US$m	% of Total
Assistance Not Provided to Government		
To United Nations		
Emergency Loya Jirgah	22.9	
Constitutional Loya Jirgah	13.0	
Elections	75.5	
UN Agencies	1,845.8	
United Nations Subtotal	1,957.2	45.9%
To national and international NGOs	413.1	
NGO Subtotal	413.1	9.7%
To Private Companies		
examples:		
Louis Berger	275.1	
Bearing Point	71.4	
KFW	45.9	
Private Companies Subtotal	705.1	16.5%
Subtotal of Assistance not Provided to Government	3,075.4	72.2%
Assistance Provided Directly to Government	1,186.9	27.8%
Total Assistance	4,262.3	100%

N.B. A significant amount of UN Agency funding is subcontracted to NGOs and private companies.
Source: Ministry of Finance, Financial Report, May 24, 2004

consultation requires effective consensus-building on the elaboration of anything from development strategies to negotiations over small projects. In Afghanistan, in the meantime, there has not been much consultation on many of the agendas, beginning with the NDF and *Securing Afghanistan's Future*. While pressure, from the international community on the Transitional Administration and on the aid agencies, to deliver is understandable, the danger is that this pressure may be at the expense of proper consultation, both with the majority of Afghans, and within the different branches of the administration itself. It risks perpetuating the perception that aid is to sustain the presence of a large international community. Consultation, formal and informal, with civil society, and with the *shuras* and even with the diaspora is essential for planning the path towards genuine and lasting democracy and development while ensuring "Afghan ownership".

Afghan ownership does not only mean keeping people informed or consulting with them. It means allowing them to be in the driver's seat in designing strategies. At the same time, while it is vital that Afghans take centre-stage in the decision-making processes concerning their reconstruction, it should not be assumed that there exists a national consensus concerning a vision for the nation's future reconstruction and development priorities. There is also a danger that the country's weak transitional structures will be overwhelmed and marginalized in decision-making processes, especially if the international community takes too strong a lead and undermines the inputs from the people of Afghanistan. It should instead be seen as supporting national institutions at the central, provincial and district levels, as well as local authorities such as the *shuras*.

The Dilemma of Top-down Versus Bottom-up Approaches

Prior to the Bonn Agreement when the international community was unable to collaborate with a legitimate central authority, multiple aid agencies had taken

on the challenge of experimenting with alternative, community-based initiatives. Many of these continue today, built on the conviction that aid, at the individual and community level, may effectively support alternatives to war by cultivating ideas, values, livelihoods, forms of governance and leadership.[27] The underlying belief is that aid, administered at the individual and community level in a "conflict sensitive" manner, can subdue violence, and thereby make communities less vulnerable to the interests and agendas of "conflict entrepreneurs". The effects of these micro-level initiatives are likewise assumed to spill over and influence macro-level politics. Though the results of such efforts have yet to be measured, the importance of the work being done by these "social entrepreneurs", who attempt to bridge the gap between civil society and top leadership, should not be underestimated.

However, lessons from the past show that one should not assume that bottom-up peace-building approaches will automatically have a cumulative effect. Bottom-up approaches of the past have led agencies to avoid working with the authorities at the national level, while their efforts remained highly localized, not to say fragmented. Moreover, such community-based approaches tend to overestimate the capacity of civil society to influence unaccountable leadership, which often comes to power with the gun, rather than through consent.

Related to a balance between top–down (aid to the central state) versus bottom-up (aid to communities) approaches, addressing human insecurities in Afghanistan requires an even distribution of aid and of peace dividends across regions and groupings. At the moment, data is hard to come by on the geographic distribution of aid and rehabilitation projects, although the DAD is now making such information available. However, while data is available on a number of projects per province, an attempt to use it for a comparison is impossible due to double reporting by donors and implementing agencies, difficulty in differentiating between finished, ongoing and planned projects, and an uncertainty as to whether all projects were reported and whether those reported had actually been implemented.[28]

The Government's NSP, as a regional and well-distributed community development initiative, is designed to bridge the gaps between the supply from above and the demand from below. In the coming years, it will be necessary for all aid agencies to work together to devise an appropriate Afghan model for aid, which would ideally involve an optimal blend of top-down and bottom-up strategies.

Quick-fixes Versus Long-term Interventions

"Civil wars that end in a stalemate may require rapid, re-integrative measures lest the belligerents resume fighting. The situation in Afghanistan is different; the major potential for conflict lies rather in how to divide the spoils of peace."[29]

As short-term humanitarian relief to save lives continues in many parts of Afghanistan, aid agencies have also begun concentrating on longer term livelihoods support and capacity-building. This has involved building on the foundations of community coping skills to create alternatives to the war economy, rebuilding social capital and physical infrastructure, and, most importantly, helping to 'de-militarise' the mind".[30]

The large amount of aid that has poured into Afghanistan has made it difficult to

If people can be of any help in enhancing human security they need to be taken into confidence with respect to the relevant polices. They should be provided with information about the current policies and asked about their advice with respect to improving them.

Gul Ahmad Yama from Ghazni

[27] Goodhand 2002.
[28] Suhrke 2004.
[29] Suhrke 2004.
[30] Goodhand 2002.

resist the temptation of quick-fix projects that demonstrate immediate results. The problem is not a shortage of funds, but a lack of absorption capacities and policy priorities. It is also very important to avoid expectations of a quick recovery. Slow progress may spark disillusionment with reconstruction, especially among the high percentage of unemployed youth. Expectations for rapid growth and recovery are particularly acute during post-conflict situations, where negative changes can add up to popular resentment.

The Danger of Dependency

The inevitable dependence on external assistance, in the short term at least, must not be allowed to render the Transitional Administration more accountable to donors than to its citizens. In the past, the ruling elite was never forced to develop domestic accountability through internally derived revenue because of the strong role of external finance. In 2004, the situation may not be much different. Two-thirds of the operating budget for the year 2003–2004 and the entire first NDB were financed by foreign aid. International technical advisors were assigned to most of the ministries in Kabul, and some in the provinces as well. Absorptive capacities for the large amounts of funding requested at Berlin were guaranteed through hiring large international companies to assume responsibility for tasks such as reconstructing infrastructure and performing Government accounting functions.

The country has now become totally reliant on foreign aid to finance development. Yet, too much aid can be a curse rather than a blessing. It can lead to lower domestic savings, and higher exchange rates, which lower the competitiveness of national enterprises in domestic and foreign markets. While the contribution of aid to long-term and sustained economic growth is questionable, it can lead to serious indebtedness.

Large amounts of aid may mean that both donors and a recipient state, like the Afghan Transitional Administration, become tied to a culture of financial accountability required for the management of short, fixed-term budgets measured by indicators of expenditures. Funding is geared to financial probity and timely disbursement, rather than to the more difficult task of measuring its effectiveness through social impact evaluations of long lasting improvements. For a state heavily dependent on international money, this practice encourages accountability to international and national financial intuitions and tax-payers in other countries. In addition, the timeframe creates a situation wherein, even if the international organizations and the state are both morally accountable to the beneficiaries, in practice the accountability will be more to those controlling the resources and budgetary calendars.

Holistic Versus Sectoral Approaches

Sectoral approaches may not be the best way to deal with human security in Afghanistan, not only because they may lead to fragmentation and contradictions, but also because they may fail to take into account the inter-connections between the various threats to well-being. Instead, an integrated and holistic approach is needed.

For example, if food aid (relief assistance) is not correlated with food security (agriculture and rural economic recovery), it could slow post-war agricultural recovery. Similarly, agricultural recovery needs to be correlated with mine clearance and the employment sector. The reintegration of refugees and IDPs should not be dealt with separately from the reintegration of demobilized combatants, given that they are likely to be returning to the same rural and urban communities. Similarly, although many agencies work on mainstreaming gender issues into their

programmes, women are singled out as a "category" in isolation from their wider social, cultural and family contexts. A macro-economic framework based on market incentives may lead to inequalities and the proliferation of needy individuals. This fragmentation extends to the way that the United Nations, and the various consultative groups and government ministries (as discussed in Chapters 5 and 6) adopt sectoral approaches, with separate programmes and budgets. Yet the list of inter-connections can go on, each time pointing to the need for a more integrated approach to planning, budgeting and monitoring interventions across various sectors and in collaboration with various agencies in order to avoid negative externalities.

Building Capacity

One of the most important problems of aid in Afghanistan is the pace with which it needs to proceed on the one hand, and the reality of slow processes and low capacity on the other. It is especially important to recognize the importance of letting the Afghan political process mature, while promoting reforms and policy priorities that have long-term implications.

Capacity-building cannot be rushed. It is a process that develops and transforms itself with time, making it even more imperative not to substitute externally imposed blueprints and template solutions that tell Afghans what they "should do" instead of looking at what they "can do".[31] Afghan people and institutions must be given the timeframe that suits them best, in accordance with necessary respect, and not be pressured to adhere to the constraints of budget deadlines determined by Western capitals. A perceived lack of capacity, the haste of implementing relief while providing security, and the desire to promote Afghanistan as a showcase for the international community may have meant that the early stages of reconstruction have run ahead of Afghan preparedness, pre-empting the process of national negotiation and decision-making.

Since 2002, however, there has been a process of building Government capacity and finding personnel that have the competence and authority to act as genuine counterparts. This recognizes that the limited capacity within line ministries continues to represent a major constraint to planning, implementing and monitoring development programmes. Central institutions have been weakened by the conflict, and their relationships with the periphery constrained by insecurity and the lack of communications infrastructure. Capacity needs to be built at the centre and in the provinces simultaneously, in order to ensure that the reconstruction process is indeed piloted by the Afghans themselves.

In the meantime, given the absence or weakness of administrative structures, the UN agencies, international financial institutions and bilateral donors increasingly pursue a policy of direct intervention, including becoming involved in the day-to-day administrative running of the Government through advisors, or through "technical assistance" strategically placed in key institutions. The same trend is seen when NGOs substitute for the state at the local level in providing services, with the assumption that there are no capable state structures. Replacing the state at the local or national levels, either directly or indirectly, however, does not lead to long-term capacity-building or ownership.

The lack of educational provisions for the overwhelming majority of the younger generation (men as well as women) has left a huge gap in the general capacity of the nation to resume control of its affairs. This situation is already leading international agencies to take the

[31] Nancy Hatch Dupree as quoted in Barakat 2002.

convenient option (from a communications and time-saving point of view) of relying on returning, Western-educated expatriates as the sole interpreters of the culture and aspirations of the whole nation. While these returning nationals constitute a precious resource, they too must undergo a learning process. In the meantime, the largely illiterate Afghan population, still struggling for physical survival and coming to terms with its losses, is in danger of being overridden by the usual hasty solutions, before they have time to consider their role in the process.[32]

The Problem of Conditionalities

Aid conditionalities can range from explicit contractual arrangements on budgetary accountability to more implicit notions of what type of political, economic and increasingly military conditions are necessary.[33] It can include positive approaches that reward compliant countries, as was seen at the Berlin Conference, and punitive measures, such as suspending aid to require specific types of economic and political reforms or the adoption of human rights principles. The latter can be imposed through sanctions, as was witnessed during the Taliban years. Although conditionalities are necessary in order to assure that assistance is given to the "right policies" of "good governance", or that loans are returned and investments safeguarded, the problem of conditionalities lies in the asymmetry of power and voice between the donor and the recipient country. Conditionality in war-torn societies can seem even more problematic when viewed in terms of the extreme vulnerability of populations and the lack of bargaining powers of weakened administrative structures.

In fact, recipient stakeholder agendas are not disregarded or overruled, but they often become part of donor conditionalities. Imposing organizational changes does not necessarily challenge well-established institutions, but promotes an elite engaged in a patron–client relationship with donors. In such circumstances, the elites become less accountable to the people they are supposed to serve. Another case involves the legitimacy sought by new governments, especially those under threat from powerful neighbours or internal conflict. In these situations, association with the international community provides a defence or protection. A number of other factors can also lead impoverished people and their new governments down a similar path of accepting conditions that may be less than desirable.[34]

While Chapter 6 discusses the pitfalls of conditionalities based on standard economic policies, this chapter examines the need to be cautious about tying humanitarian or development assistance to military conditionalities. The distinction between humanitarian assistance and military objectives is increasingly blurred in Afghanistan. This is manifested not only through the implementation of infrastructure-building carried out by the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) of the Coalition Forces, but also through misplaced and dangerous conditionalities, such as during May 2004, when the US Army was distributing leaflets calling on people to provide information on Al-Qaida and the Taliban or face losing humanitarian aid.[35]

Listening and Learning from Local Resilience

The first step towards reconstruction and development is to recognize and value people's existing resilience in conflict situations and to nurture their survival and coping skills. In Afghanistan, despite

[32] Mohammad Haneef Atmar and Jonathan Goodhand 2001.
[33] Barakat 2002.
[34] *Ibid*.
[35] *The Guardian*, 6May 2004.

decades of violent conflict, there are community level structures and a civil society that have not only survived but also continued to grow. Too often the international community may not recognize or value such local initiatives, and insist on creating new structures instead of building on these. It is therefore important that even in such politicised environments, space is given for civil society to mature and to contribute positively to any ongoing peace negotiations or processes. It is of critical importance as well that civilians should take centre-stage in the decision-making process in Afghanistan's reconstruction. The dilemma facing the country is that there has not been a neutral space for debate to enable a common vision of the future to emerge, or for intellectuals and development professionals to gather, to think, to discuss and to plan. "Afghanistan today is a huge, shifting kaleidoscope of differing expectations and regional aspirations, which has been shaped by the collective experience of 23 years of war."[36]

In the meantime, while the capacity of internal institutions to manage recovery has been severely weakened, institutional capacity survives in Afghan society, although much of it is customary ("rule-based") rather than formal ("role-based").[37] As two researchers noted, "successful programmes to develop institutional and individual capacity should not be designed and implemented from outside, but they should evolve and grow, because sustainable and legitimate institutions can be created in direct relations to the social experiences of a people and created by those they are to serve."[38]

Aid agencies have often failed to recognize existing social institutions. The implication has been bypassing the social formations that have emerged through history, and relying on a small set of organizations with characteristics conforming to the Western NGO model. This cultural bias may mean overlooking traditional social formations that are central to people's lives, including associations based on ethnic and religious allegiances, ad hoc and informal groupings, the extended family and so on. When civil society is viewed in terms of a confrontational relationship with the state, these institutions are denied the chance of working both constructively with the state and holding it accountable.[39]

Assessing past practices, and conducting a political and economic analysis of aid, may enable different development agencies to learn from past mistakes. This need to listen and learn is, however, hampered by physical distances, high staff turnover, poor coordination and information-sharing, and the aid agencies' concern with outputs rather than outcomes and impacts. But the knowledge does exist, both in the international and local communities. Now it must be tapped into so that aid agencies can truly make significant contributions to development and democracy in Afghanistan.

7.6. Conclusions

International aid has a long and controversial record in Afghanistan. The wrong kinds of aid have at times created perverse incentives leading to renewed conflict. In the future, donors and aid agencies must be more self-critical and aware of these potentially negative effects. A continued priority should be placed on conflict prevention.

It is mostly through the state that people relate to the international system. The international community can forgo the state and cooperate directly with sub-national societal units, but it does so at the

36 Suhrke, Strand and Harpviken 2001.
37 Goodhand and Atmar 2001.
38 *Ibid*.
39 *Ibid*.

risk of replacing or weakening the state. This does not necessarily enhance human security in the long run. If aid agencies in Afghanistan, for example, bypass the central Government and work directly with regional administrations controlled by regional power-holders, they risk heightening tensions between the centre and the periphery.

Human security efforts need to be locally sustainable. They require an effective, legitimate, accountable and participatory political structure capable of securing its own resources. International interference is unlikely to enhance local capacities in these directions if it does not build upon the pre-existing efforts and capabilities of those directly affected.[40]

Integrating a human security approach in development programmes and plans calls for reorienting them to respond to new challenges and realities. Conflict prevention measures need to be included at all stages, even in post-conflict and so-called "normal" development situations. These peace-building and conflict-prevention measures could be:

- Correlating programmes that span functional areas such as economic growth and distribution, food security, agricultural and urban livelihoods, governance and institution building, education, health, environment and resource management.
- Recognizing potential vulnerability and threats through regular human security assessments or early warnings and risk analysis.
- Building capacity for dialogue among communities.
- Reducing poverty with a specific view to helping narrow and close inter-group disparities.
- Enhancing participatory development, the rule of law, and good governance through institutional reform aimed at improving representation of national groups or creating legal avenues of redress for grievances.
- Integrating a gender perspective in national and local planning.

Direct assistance for peace-building as part of development is only one of the responsibilities of the international community, and in many circumstances may not be the most important. Others include:

- Stemming the proliferation of weapons and taking serious steps to limit the flow and diffusion of arms.
- Combating corruption.
- Encouraging macro-economic stability, and open regional and international flows of legitimate trade, investment, and know-how.
- Enhancing regional cooperation.
- Allowing for equitable global trade regimes.
- Targeting aid in such a way as to act as a multiplier by facilitating an environment for private and public investments.

To meet the ultimate challenges of tomorrow requires thinking beyond aid, since sustainable peace and development will, in the final analysis, not be the result of development assistance, but of home-grown governance and Afghan entrepreneurship.

[40] Commission on Human Security 2003.

Chapter 8

Recommendations:
Laying the Foundations for Democracy, Development and Human Security in Afghanistan

Photo: Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh

Chapter 8:

Recommendations: Laying the Foundations for Democracy, Development and Human Security in Afghanistan

Chapter 8 presents the main recommendations stemming from the holistic approach to human security problems that has been taken in this first NHDR for Afghanistan. Since the report has primarily analysed past and current issues within a particular framework of human development and human security, the recommendations are presented as general directions that the new Government and international community could pursue. These are meant as attempts to initiate dialogue in Afghanistan on broad and inter-connected issues. Easing some of the barriers to progress could be sought through discussions and further in-depth studies, including in future NHDRs. This first report took a more general approach to set the scene for an integrated pursuit of the goals of human development and human security.

8.1. Introduction: The Dilemma of Afghanistan

In many countries emerging from war, overt armed conflict may come to an end while low-level violence continues for many years, involving former factions, demobilized combatants, bandits or militias. Military and diplomatic measures, though important, are unlikely by themselves to secure a transition towards a stable peace. For development and democracy to take root, the manner in which the reconstruction is structured (needs assessed, resources allocated, partners chosen, projects implemented, results monitored, etc.) can either provide positive incentives that foster nation-building, or destroy its very foundations. Carefully planned reconstruction should be seen as part of the overall peace-building agenda, one that builds trust in institutions, promotes participation, heals wounds and restores dignity.

It is first important to note that there are no perfect solutions, no pre-determined blueprints for post-conflict reconstruction. "The best that the actors ...can hope to do is to steer a course that does the least harm, by learning from past efforts."[1] Sultan Barakat 2002. Reconstruction must necessarily be a continuous and prolonged process of negotiation between diverse interest groups as well as between them and political actors.

Sustained peace in Afghanistan is not guaranteed despite the early successes in state- building that have now led to elections. Human security is still needed in Afghanistan. The breakdown of institutions has left the population vulnerable to the whims of peace-spoilers and their private militias, which can easily raise and sustain an army from among impoverished populations. Rebuilding institutions constitutes the core task for protecting Afghans' human security. This should be done according to an "Afghan model" that reflects the country's history and strives not only to satisfy the immediate needs of individuals, but also to develop the capacities for self-sufficiency and empowerment.

The triple challenge in Afghanistan is that an ambitious national reconstruction programme has been launched at the same

[1] Sultan Barakat 2002.

time as a fragile political transition and an ongoing military campaign.

- While a strong state is needed to provide human security as a public good, an overly centralized state may also exacerbate horizontal inequalities, which could lead to conflicts. There is a need for order at the national level, but at the same time, the geography does not facilitate central control, and freedom should be bestowed on the independent tribes to allow for local economic development. Devolution of power, therefore, is needed at the same time as this power is consolidated at the centre.
- Institutional capacity-building is needed, but this is a long-term project. In the short term, the immediate needs of the people include human rights, security and jobs, imperatives that cannot wait for the building and strengthening of new institutions.
- The ongoing military campaign against the remaining Taliban fighters and peace-spoilers could present trade-offs that the new Government and its international partners must deal with, including diversion of funds to the military, concentration on rogue provinces, and so on. Although, for the moment, this has been the responsibility of the Coalition Forces in Afghanistan, the sovereignty gained after the elections also means increased responsibilities to protect the citizens of Afghanistan, as well as those of other countries affected by the insecurities there.

The goal in Afghanistan is not simply to create a development or democracy agenda, but to use these tools to prevent conflict, on the one hand, and to provide the ultimate goal of human security as a public good, on the other.

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A human security agenda is, first and foremost, a conflict prevention mechanism for Afghanistan and the region. Beyond conflicts and military diplomacy between states, it addresses causes of conflict from with in the state: hunger, disease, crime and repression, and personal crisis caused by decades of war. These threats are easier – and less costly – to address through early prevention and detection, than after another full-fledged war has erupted. Resorting once again to military missions and international humanitarian interventions under pressure can be avoided, if a timely, stratified and gradual approach is adopted.

Human Security Externalities

Focusing on people as the subjects of security is an imperative, built on the following premises:

Box 8.1



- **Conditionality for development:** People must have a minimal sense of security in order to engage in development activities, while development, in turn, contributes to the increased freedom and security of both the people and the state.
- **Legitimacy of the state-building process:** Legitimacy, so crucial for the new Afghan Government, should be based on accountability towards Afghans primarily, and not towards regional or international interests.
- **Stability for the state:** Without the fear of continued conflicts, and anticipating a pact with citizens, the state should allocate its resources to productive sectors, instead of to military hardware or a continued struggle with alienated groups.
- **Ownership:** The peace-building and state-building agendas should be "owned" by the Afghan people, the ultimate beneficiaries.
- **Increased participation:** Afghans should play a greater role in the design and implementation of new policies and projects.
- **Building trust and respect:** The alienation of the state from its people should diminish, leading to positive externalities.
- **Efficiency and sustainability:** Projects, policies and budgets should be designed through a demand-driven process and vetted for sustainability against the engagement of beneficiaries.
- **Eradication of horizontal inequalities:** Equity between groups of people should diminish competition and conflict.
- **Morality and ethics:** The shift in focus to the security (well-being) of people constitutes, ultimately, a moral imperative for institutions and actors whose *raison d'être* is to serve those who put them there in the first place.

Development and Democracy and Conflict Prevention

Development and Conflict

Recovery in war-torn societies is an integral part of the development challenge, with poverty reduction, development strategies and interventions all capable of having positive as well as negative effects. In a negative scenario, development interventions may (inadvertently) strengthen underlying causes of conflict, and the actors who are pursuing opportunities for violence. In a positive scenario, development interventions may contribute to weakening these factors, and help de-escalate conflict.

In fragile transitional situations such as Afghanistan, many of the causes of conflict must be addressed if the country is to avoid sliding back into conflict. Greater development – economic, social and political – can help build peace and reduce the dangers of violent conflict. Yet development itself causes change and transformation, which can be de-stabilizing. Even when it is successful, development raises expectations and highlights disparities, sometimes adding to the factors that may trigger violence. It is also important to be aware of the limitations of development interventions in defusing conflict and building peace. Development can only complement, never replace, direct peace-building measures such as political transformation or preventive diplomacy, and other measures to stop hostilities and "get back on track".

At the same time, while development itself is not the only response, and developed societies also fall prey to major internal or external crisis, research does show that certain levels of achievement and improvement in conditions of life – such as economic well-being; freedom and

War is not a single catastrophic event but a devastating way of life closely associated with chronic poverty and social injustice. Peace is not a quick-fix but a development process that begins and can be nurtured long before ceasefires are brokered, and which needs to be sustained through years of 'post-war recovery'.

Sultan Barakat, 2002

choice; social stability and social justice; trusted mechanisms of open, responsive governance; and the respect of individual and minority rights – do ultimately tend to support peace. These public goods, in addition to being desirable in themselves, work together to form a solid foundation for sustainable peace.

The Role of Democracy for Conflict Resolution and Prevention

Democratic governance may be the most appropriate system for conflict prevention and resolution, assuming that democracy is a system that allows, via institutional outlets such as political parties and representative parliaments, the sustainable management of conflicts, , rather than suppressing or ignoring them. It is a system where accumulated resentments that arise from perceived misallocations of resources can be aired – whether they relate to access to land, discrimination on the basis of gender or religion, or any of the other myriad sources of deeply felt grievances. In the context of deep-rooted conflict, democratic institutions are more relevant for their potential ability to initiate a process for conflict prevention or resolution than for actually resolving conflicts, per se.

Liberal democracy and a market-oriented economy, because they open up national systems to a multiplicity of interests, are not always the answers to all types of development operations, nor the surest foundations for peace. Democracy and capitalism, both encouraging social competition, could in some cases worsen social conflicts in war-shattered states that lack the institutional structures required for conciliation. Fledgling democracies, therefore, have to face political hurdles that can hamper economic and social development. Democracies may also be too dependent upon special interest groups that all too often win at the expense of favourable conditions for economic growth. The dilemma for post-conflict countries such as Afghanistan is to reconcile competing interests and to create a democracy that does not further widen inequalities. Instead, it should lay the foundations for a democracy that is just and responsible, and that is based on the principles of participation and governance.

Box 8.2

What Kind of Democracy Does Afghanistan Need?

- Where the rule of law is respected to keep risk factors, such as greed and grievances, from being converted into conflict.
- Where security is established and maintained not only as a reinforcement of punitive action, but as a pro-active empowerment strategy that encourages citizens to respect the rule of law.
- Where there is national reconciliation and a consolidation of peace through power sharing and democratic representation of constructive elements of society.
- Where there is genuine participation in all processes from design to implementation to monitoring.
- Where all human rights are respected, especially those related to freedom of expression.
- Which is built on local traditions and consultation mechanisms.
- Which respects diversity, and can bridge ethnic, geographic and gender differences.
- Which is based on respect for institutions, and not on the personalization of politics.
- Which addresses asymmetries and power inequalities as a matter of injustice, whether they are related to gender, geography, ethnicity religion and so on.

The Need for Information and Conflict Analysis

A human security analysis should focus on the threat of inequalities within the context of historical changes, the dynamics of future trends, the degree of politicization, public perceptions and linkages to poverty. In a highly fragmented society such as Afghanistan's, where conflicts have been waged based on perceptions of exclusion, a disaggregated analysis across social, ethnic, gender and regional groups is needed in order to:

- Examine the sources and consequences of conflict.
- Determine the factors that can be addressed through policies, programmes and international assistance.
- Examine the country's resilience to outbreak or escalation of violent conflict.
- Assess the ability to de-escalate violent conflict.
- Determine how resilience can be strengthened through development assistance and policies.

The WB uses nine indicators for a conflict analysis framework that captures deterioration in a country.[2]

1 **Violent conflict in the past ten years:** If a country has experienced violent conflict in the past ten years, there is a high possibility of recurrence.

2 **Low per capita GNI:** Countries with low per capita GNIs face a higher risk of experiencing violent conflict.

3 **High dependence on primary commodities exports:** Countries with a high dependence on primary commodities exports are more likely to experience violent conflict.

4 **Political instability:** This includes two components:

- *Transformation of the state structure:* Restructuring of the state at frequent intervals signals serious instability and the likelihood that violence is being employed to bring about systemic changes.
- *Breakdown in law and order:* When the government is not able to maintain control or effective rule (in certain parts or throughout the country), law and order breaks down, and violence is likely.

For violent conflict, these two factors can occur independently or in tandem.

5 **Restricted civil and political rights:** The deliberate and systematic denial of civil liberties and political rights increases the likelihood that groups will express dissenting views through violence, thus upping the probability of violent conflict.

6 **Militarization:** Countries may have a high defence spending as a ratio of their GNI and large armies as a proportion of their population. However, a militarized society also highlights the availability of arms among non-state actors. These factors suggest the likelihood of emerging or escalating violent conflict.

7 **Ethnic dominance:** When one ethnic group controls state institutions and/or the economy, there is an increasing risk of an outbreak of violent conflict.

8 **Active regional conflicts:** Regional conflicts are likely to have a cascading effect, such that the internal stability of a country (flow of refugees, arms) is threatened, increasing the probability of violent conflict.

[2] Conflict Analysis Framework, WB 2003, http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/ESSD/sdvext.nsf/67ByDocName/TheConflictAnalysisFramework/$FILE/CAFAugust03.pdf.

9 **High youth unemployment:** Youth unemployment can have a critical bearing on the probability of violent conflict. Lack of jobs and opportunities tend to create frustration, making unemployed youth (especially young men) prime candidates for recruitment by militant organizations with funds and arms at their disposal.

While it is likely that each of these factors exacerbate situations that can portend the outbreak, escalation, or resurgence of violent conflict, none of them is individually "necessary" or "sufficient" for violent conflict. Still, as the number of indicators checking positive increases, the importance of conflict analysis also rises.

8.2. Recommendations and Elements of a Human Security Vision for Afghanistan

This NHDR considers the following **seven elements** as necessary for long-term human security in Afghanistan:

1. Security and safety

The political scientist Max Weber once defined a state as an entity that has a monopoly over the legitimate use of force in a country. To ensure human security, and to function as a capable state, the new Afghan Government should take back its monopoly, and put an end to the privatisation of security that is generating negative competition.

By the end of 2004, debates continued on how peace and security should be pursued, and in whose interests Afghanistan should be made secure. The argument is that while 20,000 Coalition Forces largely pursue their own agenda, hunting down the Taliban, Al-Qaida and anyone actively and violently opposing them, there remain only 5,000 Kabul-based ISAF troops and 15,000 Afghanistan National Army troops to address the broader national agenda for stability and peace-building. With an inadequate and small police force, it is little wonder that the influence of the transitional Government does not extend far beyond the capital.

Hence, there is a need to strengthen the ANA and the ANP so that they will be accountable, and have the will and capacity to enforce the law throughout the country. At the same time, ISAF's current role in security may be both inadequate in terms of its small numbers, and inappropriate because its current modus operandi creates a sense of dependency amongst Kabul residents. Instead, international security forces should help improve the delivery of security by extending the influence of the ANA and ANP, and not by creating dependence on a foreign military presence. Today there are 15,000 National Army soldiers and nearly 30,000 National Police officers, and support to these institutions needs to be increased.

An immediate focus should be on the remodeling and implementation of a strengthened and accelerated DDR strategy. Disarmament, however, needs to be carried out within a context of employment creation and alternative livelihoods. An ill-planned DDR approach, involving no long-term plan for the employment of disarmed persons and no training for security personnel to replace them, may be more dangerous than no strategy at all. Even though the current private militia are largely responsible for the insecurity threats throughout the country, they would become more lethal if the self-assigned security responsibility in the areas under their control is taken away from them through DDR and then left to ad-hoc strategies.

At the same time, it needs to be recognized that while security is undoubtedly a priority, if won through an expansion of military operations, it cannot provide a permanent solution to the security dilemma in Afghanistan. Nor does such a narrowly defined security goal amount to what will be required to meet the human security

needs of Afghans, the vast majority of who remain poor, highly vulnerable and without fundamental human rights. There is no fast track to lasting human security and political stability through military action alone.

PRTs exemplify the shortcomings of a narrow interpretation of human security objectives. They simultaneously seek to address military, political and humanitarian dimensions through an expanded role for Coalition Forces in Afghanistan. The coalition-commanded PRTs are proving to be an inadequate and dangerous vehicle for provision of security, however, and their new "humanitarian" role is increasingly hard to distinguish from that of genuine humanitarian and development aid workers.

Without peace and stability, there can be no sustainable human development in Afghanistan. Beyond the call for more international forces to be deployed throughout the country, the NHDR notes that true security rests on a genuine national reconciliation process that adequately addresses the greed and grievances existing in Afghanistan today.

Justice must be dealt with at the same time as stability. While the need for national reconciliation is often emphasized in Afghanistan, both national and international actors have been reluctant to touch specific means to address the country's past. The multi-ethnic layers of Afghan society, combined with the fragility of state-building efforts that remain dangerously exposed to polarization, necessitate a cautious approach towards the revisiting of the past as a means to promoting reconciliation. Few would disagree that long-term political stability in Afghanistan is closely tied to the resolution of past grievances – including human rights violations, war crimes and crimes against humanity – but the sequencing of reconciliation as well as the mechanism to facilitate "national healing" are yet to be determined.

2. A Responsible State and an Accountable State-building Process

Any debate on Afghanistan's state-building process must focus on the state's prospective role and size.

A public good is characterized by non-excludability and by non-competition in consumption; thus, social security, physical security and the rule of law, as well equal distribution and the upholding of human rights are considered as vital responsibilities of a "strong" state.

A number of factors contribute to the "weak state" in Afghanistan. Geography and topography are not conducive to facilitating communication, and they assist regional power bases competing with the centre. The interference of strong regional and international powers in the internal political process has also prevented a strong state from evolving, while the legitimacy and power of the centre is further challenged by local tribal structures led by powerful personalities. However, while the state may be challenged, the nation is not. Afghanistan's rich ethnic and religious diversity has not led to separatist aspirations by ethnic groups, despite the presence of warring parties and factions. Instead, what is sought is a redistribution of the "power" of the state equally among the different groups to ensure that all are implicated in the political discourse on state-building throughout the country and not only in Kabul.

The capacity to "provide" human security depends upon a strong state that can generate and distribute public goods. Human security as public good requires the state to have a regulatory as well as a provisionary role; it must regulate in order to ensure conditions for reconstruction, and provide sufficient security for the market to function. It must also play an active part in offering social services, quality (even if basic) health care, education and job security to all the population, not only as a matter of right, but also to diminish threats.

The viability of a peace-building process depends ultimately on the establishment of a legitimate Afghan state, responsive to the demands of the population, responsible for providing the public goods that comprise human security, and able to resist threats from regional military groups within the country as well as pressures from external parties. The Government can delegate some activities to commercial and non-governmental organizations, but it still bears the ultimate responsibility.

Given the complex nature of post-war society in Afghanistan, state responsibilities should increase rather than decrease. This does not mean that the state should dictate the directions of the economy, but that it should intervene in areas where the market cannot ensure an efficient allocation of resources or equal access to assets and opportunities for all people. The role of the state should be threefold: 1) to guarantee that the reconstruction process is equitable, efficient and empowering; 2) to promote investment in human capabilities; and 3) to equally distribute resources. First and foremost, the role of the state should be to equalize opportunities.

A weak state cannot deliver human security priorities and can breed grievances, so "efficient" and "fair" state building is the first priority of a human security agenda. The inability to satisfy basic needs in provinces can cut into the credibility of the central Government. State-building in Afghanistan therefore requires cooperation between the central Government and its local representatives, as well as with community and tribal leaders that have been instrumental in creating law and order in provinces. These relationships, based on mutual interest, and adequately spelled out in the Constitution, need to be reinforced. What needs to be avoided is the segregation of the country into semi-autonomous regions.

At the same time that the state should provide for its people, they should also be willing and capable of contributing to the state. Checks and balances against the powers of the state should be set up through traditional negotiation structures such as the Loya Jirgah to ensure that the relationship between Afghan civil society and the central state grows into one of mutual engagement rather than distrust.

One of the crucial issues will be whether the models of "transitional justice" that have been applied in other post-conflict contexts can be adapted to fit the complexities of the history of war in Afghanistan. On the one hand, the model of "truth and reconciliation" may be too simplistic in a context in which perpetrators and victims are spread throughout society. The prosecutorial model, on the other hand, which pursues justice through war crimes tribunals, may jeopardize the peace process by threatening power mongers inclined to exploit ethnic divisions to escape sanction. Moreover, the prosecutorial model would be preconditioned on either a strong judicial system within Afghanistan or heavy international support similar to the international war crimes tribunals established in the past, neither of which seems to be available at present. In view of the current challenges to transitional justice, answers to the questions of the past may be "postponed" until the critical threshold for long-term stability has been achieved. The risk remains, however, that without measures to demonstrate commitment to dealing with previous injustices and grievances, public trust and confidence in the newly established state structures, particularly its judiciary, may further corrode, to the detriment of the state-building process itself. This may particularly apply in cases where political interests seek to exploit past grievances to garner popular support.

Making reconciliation part of state-building is important for three reasons: 1) It would

serve justice; 2) It would send a message to both the victims and the culprits to relegate past violations to the past and move forward; and 3) It would help marginalize perpetrators of human rights violations.

3. Inclusive and Empowering Institutions and Policies

In Afghanistan, all development strategies have to be based on addressing inequalities between groups (gender, regions, religions and ethnicities). Otherwise they may fail in reaching their targets, while exacerbating causes for renewed conflict. Afghanistan is not a normal underdeveloped country that needs fast recovery growth based on market forces. It is one with deeply imbedded inequalities that must be eased.

The implementation of a human security vision requires policies that allow all groups an adequate voice and representation in decision-making processes. This would mean addressing disparities and inequalities in opportunities based on gender (men and women), geography (urban/rural or regions), generation and age, ethnicity, and whether or not people are settled, be they IDPs, returnees or nomads. Policies based on principles of equitable access to opportunities create social cohesion and an integrated, peaceful society, which is what Afghanistan needs first and foremost today.

If the differences and disparities are a result of objective factors, then efforts should be made, through specific policies, to diminish these. If, however, these are a result of policy decisions, then they must be eradicated. The very real constraints of the new Government, in terms of resources, geography and history need to be dealt with first and foremost through political will.

The immediate test for the Government will be the extent to which the political environment of upcoming parliamentary elections will be perceived as fair and secure. The intermediate test will be the Government's ability to build the necessary structures to allow for a functioning Parliament, which can meaningfully represent the people and exercise control over the executive. Whether the rule of law, observed by the judiciary and executive organs, will finally replace the rule of the gun will be the ultimate test for the Government to inspire people's trust. In passing these "tests", it will certainly face the difficult dilemma inherent in post-conflict state-building efforts: that the establishment of "good governance" after years of military confrontation takes time, keeping in mind that people's memories are more short-lived than their expectations.

4. Genuine Participation

A shift to a human security vision requires the involvement of people as agents of change and opportunities. It moves beyond viewing people as vulnerable groups for whom projects are designed, and views participation and consultation as key to the shift to long-term development.

There is no denying that democracy and respect for human rights build security in society. A representative democracy, where all social groups have access to political decision-making process and benefit from equal representation, satisfies the goals of equity and justice. In a post-conflict situation like Afghanistan, the principles of democracy can shape the best environment for securing political and social freedoms. Empowering and inclusive governance systems can provide security better than military defence measures. Civil society can be involved in the promotion of human security by helping in early detection, providing feedback into policy-making, partnering with the state to offer protection and assistance, and informing public opinion.

All policies, development policies and plans in particular, need to involve public

participation and voices in order for them to be meaningful, supported and sustainable. People-based institutions such as the district and provincial level *shuras* and the National Assembly need to be about more than vetting political regimes; they should be primarily involved in consulting the Government with respect to economic and development programmes. This will enable the Government to engage local resources for help with the development work, while at the same time drawing the s*huras* and the Assembly's attention away from negative politics to positive participation in development.

Participation is to a large extent the responsibility of individuals. It means people taking responsibility for their own future, which in turn creates accountability. The new Government must take steps to empower people to take on this responsibility. The first prerequisite is an informed and mature civil society capable of making choices. For this, the elements are information and forms of consultation that allow people to voice grievances and discontent. Participatory planning raises the level of people's commitment, enables a human development focus, and encourages people to contribute their own human and financial resources. Sharing power and responsibility, since they distribute the work required for development, can end up accelerating it.

Community action, involvement and ownership will be key to future security and the sustainability of reconstruction. The role of communities as monitors and champions of infrastructure development, and in the management of health and education services, will need to be vigorously promoted. Given the extent to which community participation is pivotal to successful reconstruction, investments such as the NSP (establishing community-based development committees across all 20,000 villages) and NEEP will necessitate appropriate and sustained levels of donor support.

Box 8.3

Why is Culture Important to Human Development?

The present critical state of Afghanistan's cultural traditions and properties is nothing new. Similar upheavals have occurred during the course of its long history. One need only recall the horrid decimation of the luxurious Ghaznavid capital in the 12th Century, followed by the onslaughts of Genghis Khan in the 13th Century. Nonetheless, although conflict often inflicts irredeemable physical damage, the massive displacements accompanying such destruction can also strengthen a people's determination to preserve cultural traditions that affirm their national identity in the midst of disruption. This is the case with Afghanistan.

The challenges that Afghanistan faces today are daunting, but now is the time for new beginnings. It is time to recognize that the full potential of culture, stimulated by innovative thinking and un-submerged by economic and political interests, can make major contributions to the human development process.

Culture establishes a nation's integrity and fortifies a sense of national identity among its citizens

A nation's integrity is assured when its members hold fast to cultural values that fortify their sense of national identity. Afghanistan sits at the hub of an intercommunicating zone between four great civilizations. The mingling of a wide diversity of peoples who came at various times for various reasons forms a rich cultural mosaic. The vigour of Afghan society resides in this vibrant medley of peoples, and the nation derives its strength from the interchanges of one with the other.

Although a number of ethnic groups straddle the nation's boundaries and similarities with adjacent populations can be noted, Afghans are noticeably distinct from their neighbours and take pride in their uniqueness. It was their determination to remain true to the essence of their cultural ethos that enabled the Afghans to endure years of economic and social hardships with forbearance and courage. The nation was utterly traumatized, but the culture survived.

Culture reinforces national cohesiveness and development

The principle that there is strength in diversity aptly characterizes this nation comprised of peoples with so many different backgrounds. Variations in cultural expression exist not only between its disparate groups, but within

groups of common origin as well, depending on the geography of their settlement areas. Differences also distinguish rural and urban populations, within which members of various social classes cherish their own customs and value systems. Yet there is also an overriding belief in a wide range of common cultural values that function as cohesive bonds to keep the nation united around its own recognizable identity.

Afghan history abounds with episodes of clashes between its separate groups, but it also reveals periods of tranquility. It was during these periods of tolerance and unity that the peoples living in the Afghan area utilized their ingenuity to introduce cultural innovations that enabled them to achieve economic, political and artistic heights from which they exerted influence far beyond the territory they controlled. The brilliance of these periods grew out of the coming together and fusion of the many creative ideas flourishing with the Afghan borders.

Culture is intertwined with all forms of human development.

What is meant by culture? Culture embraces those shared ideas, beliefs, emotions and customs that mould behaviour and place value on creative artistic expressions, such as art, music, literature, architecture and relationships with the environment. It defines the way people live, and the way they utilize material and non-material resources. It encompasses all members of society – men, women and children, old and young. It embodies individual and community aspirations. It influences decision-making. Having a strong sense of one's own culture permits individuals to develop an inner strength that inspires them to reach out for more fulfilling lives for themselves, their families and their communities.

Culture, community and human development are thus inextricably intertwined because each focuses on people as agents of change in their search to improve themselves and the environment around them. Yet, the pervasive role culture plays in the lives of people and their development is rarely acknowledged. Development rhetoric at times may allude to culture as something vaguely desirable, but specifics are seldom provided.

Instead, the encouragement, promotion and development of "culture" is too often treated as an appendage to development strategies that focus on economic or social factors, and in which economic growth, reducing poverty, and minimizing education and health disparities become ends in themselves, dominating policy planning and choices. These key goals are valuable, but they cannot be realized without considering the society's beliefs, emotions and behaviour patterns.

Culture's role in human development is poorly recorded.

Not only is the examination of the relationship of culture to human development a subject that is largely overlooked, there are serious deficiencies and large gaps in the cultural information that is available. Because available data are insufficient, it is difficult to conduct adequate quantitative assessments that can be used to establish meaningful benchmarks and evaluate progress. The complexities that will accompany the process of establishing viable, comprehensive cultural indicators that can be measured and monitored should not obscure the fact that the issue cannot be reduced to a single dimension.

It would be unwise to leave the identification of indicators solely to outsiders. For example, a recent archaeological inventory conceived and completed abroad was so bloated with inconsequential factors as to be virtually unusable. Relevant indicators can best be selected in concert with those involved, for locally generated data provide insights into people's perceptions of what is important to them for the attainment of richer, more meaningful lives. It is their concerns and priorities that matter. When cultural data that reflect society's basic values are factored into policy analyses, the totality of human development is enhanced.

Nancy Hatch Dupree, 2004.

5. Balanced Development

Building on its successes with initiatives such as the NSP and NEEP, the new Government must design a comprehensive regional development strategy. The initial stages of the reconstruction programme concentrated most development efforts in Kabul and major urban centres. As the drug economy contributes now to the rapid development of cities, the international community and the Government must temper this imbalanced growth with an increased focus on rural areas, including remote villages.

Assistance to Afghanistan should not give the impression of uneven re-development, even if for security reasons some provinces are easier to access than others. Special attention should be given to unstable areas; otherwise these "rogue provinces" could

threaten the stability of the entire country. What should be avoided is the evolution of a country increasingly divided between a turbulent south and east, on the one hand, and a more stable crescent stretching from the west to the north, where rehabilitation and development can move forward.

An adequate regional and rural development strategy would enable Afghanistan to make the best use of its human capital. While the central Government requires the resources of the provinces, it needs to also enter into appropriate relationships that empower the local communities and their representatives. By being involved in the design and implementation of projects and policies, people as well as political and community leaders in different regions will share the responsibility of maintaining peace and stability in the area.

As an equalizing and empowering measure, the state should address the wide gaps in opportunities between different regions, as well as between urban and rural areas. A long-term human security vision should avoid islands of privileges (the cities) within seas of poverty (the rural areas). Wide gaps exist today in income opportunities, as well as in the provision of jobs, and basic services and infrastructure. A high concentration of jobs in Kabul is the result of the presence of public sector institutions, the international community and an informal sector boosted by revenues from drugs.

The rapid urbanization of Kabul, which has attracted people from rural areas for its better services and employment prospects, is a worrying phenomenon. The population has soared from 800,000 to 2.9 million people, and the ratio of rural to urban people risen from 20:80 to 30:70.

Balanced development also means curbing corruption and correcting a situation where those in power have access to funds and money. It means a more balanced redistribution of national revenue, especially of taxes received by some of the provinces, given that a large portion of local revenues still does not reach the central Government.

Finally, balanced development involves women playing an active role in the reconstruction process. The mainstreaming of gender concerns in all policies, budgets and plans is a first step. Supporting grass-root organizations and leadership among Afghan women will help ensure that their interests are adequately defended. In the final analysis, real democracy in Afghanistan will largely depend on the genuine, and not just nominal, representation of women in decision-making.

6. A Supportive International Community

Local Ownership, International Support

The international system should help promote peace in Afghanistan by accepting and sustaining its responsibility to support the country's peace and conflict prevention efforts. Cooperation and assistance should be scrutinized for issues related to ownership, impact, efficiency, coordination, political agendas, etc.. Afghan ownership, leadership and capacity development should be seen as the most important objectives of the aid community.

A supportive international community also implies a responsibility for the global economic powers to promote growth through principles of fair trade. Since the transnationality of human security threats provides opportunities for nation-states, other countries should be prepared to subsidize certain services that Afghanistan lacks the resources to provide, but which are of interest to countries outside of the region. These include supporting fair trade regimes, establishing environmental controls and protection, halting drug trafficking and production, preventing communicable diseases, stopping the spread of terrorism and so on. Global and

regional commitments to stem the spread of arms are another aspect of the responsibility of the international community towards human security in Afghanistan.

Human security is an interdisciplinary problem and, as such, requires an interdisciplinary and integrated solution that can be best reached through integrated programming and efficient coordination among the various international organizations working in Afghanistan. Improved coordination mechanisms are needed between the various UN agencies, between the international financial institutions and other agencies, and between the international community and the Government.

Long-term commitment from donor countries is needed to make Afghanistan a viable state. The international community must know what Afghanistan has the potential to become if they ignore it. The must also understand that investment here is not just in the Afghan people, but in their security as well. While developments over the past two and a half years have been encouraging, much remains to be done, and progress could be lost if attention turns away from Afghanistan at this crucial turning point. The price the international community would pay to protect itself from Afghanistan would be far greater than what it will pay to help develop the country.

7. Peaceful and Cooperative Regional Agendas

The international community's general interest in promoting peace and stability in Afghanistan covers two, quite different positions a minimalist concern to support just sufficient change in the country to ensure that it will not harbour militant movements that pose a threat to other states, and a more ambitious commitment to help the country modernize, develop and democratize. For the countries of the region, both positions are crucial and mutually dependent, because investments in Afghanistan are an investment in the region. The development of physical infrastructure and internal stability in Afghanistan will help the country to re-assume its historic role of a land bridge linking Central Asia to South Asia, a step that will strongly boost regional economic development and trade. Neighbouring countries should see the reconstruction of Afghanistan as an opportunity to change past conflict relationships into renewed opportunities for regional development and mutual benefit.

Afghanistan has been isolated from the world and regional markets for many years. Closer integration with neighbours as well as increased access to regional and international markets is essential to its future. The emergence of a stable Government and the reconstruction efforts being undertaken are already opening new possibilities for regional trade and economic cooperation, as well as enterprises in neighbouring countries. Ongoing humanitarian and reconstruction activities represent an opportunity for the private sector in the region to expand its business with international partners, increasing the exposure to international markets and procurement. In addition, better regional cooperation will eventually improve the overall climate for business, build greater intra- and inter-regional relations, and attract larger scale foreign direct investment.

Afghanistan's regional economic cooperation with Central Asia, Iran and Pakistan could be intensified through the active engagement of the private sector in the reconstruction efforts.[3] Many businesses in the region have the proven capacity to provide cheaper goods and

Today Afghanistan represents a unique example of international relations: a multilateral partnership that is working well, with very promising prospects. The goal of this partnership is to create an Afghanistan that is politically stable and democratic, and economically prosperous – an Afghanistan that contributes to Regional and Global Security.

President Hamid Karzai, Berlin Conference, March 2004

[3] See proceedings from a 2004 UNDP organized conference in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, on "Afghanistan's Regional Economic Cooperation: Central Asia, Iran and Pakistan".

services, while meeting the required international quality standards. Cooperation will reinforce the overall regional interdependence and contribute to peace in the region.

Sustainable growth in Afghanistan will have a major impact on all its neighbours. Once the road network is ready, the travel time to a warm-water port will be dramatically reduced – every Central Asian capital will be a maximum of 32 hours from the Gulf. Central Asia's natural resources, such as cotton, can be sent to Pakistan and India for processing and manufacturing. Oil and gas pipelines and energy power grids crossing Afghanistan can also help integrate the region. In sum, economic interdependence is a win-win proposition, and it will turn all the stakeholders into advocates of stability. A UNDP Conference held in Bishkek in May 2004 on the economic cooperation between Central Asia and Afghanistan drew a roadmap both for the critical role of neighbours in Afghanistan's reconstruction, and the role of Afghanistan as the land bridge and missing link in regional development. The implementation of such a plan should attract the full support of donors.

Human security in Afghanistan cannot be achieved in isolation. The region's involvement in reconstruction will contribute both to getting Afghanistan back on its feet, and to ensuring sustainable human security solution in a number of neighbouring states, despite all the complications created by the decades of conflict. A multilateral forum to be built on the Bishkek Action Plan will ease mutual suspicion and create a structure for sustained positive involvement.

The failure to build on a strategy of cooperation involves great risks for the region. The instability in Afghanistan has had both an "outside–inside" influence as well as an "inside–outside" ones. Interference from far and near countries fuelled hostilities with arms, ammunitions and support, while the conflict had spill over impacts on the region. These especially affected the countries of Central Asia, which were the first to call for a political resolution to the problems in Afghanistan. Its instability and unpredictability had direct implications for Tajikistan, for example, which shares more than 500 kilometres of border and fell into its own civil war in 1992-1995. Afghanistan's conflict has also led to the:

- Spread of fears about extremism through transparent and uncontrolled borders.
- Proliferation of arms.
- Spread of drugs both in transit and for consumption.
- Large-scale refugee flows with additional stress on host communities and countries.
- The militarization of the region.
- Creation of networks of mafia structures and organized trafficking in arms and drugs.
- Destabilization of trade and economic security for markets in the region.

8.3. Human Securty as Public Good for Afghanistan

Beyond these seven general and directional recommendations, a summary of the analysis presented in the NHDR leads to a number of recommendations for the state and the international community. These address six components of human security in Afghanistan, based on the definitions outlined in the UNDP 1994 global *Human Development Report.*

Economic Security

Investments in physical infrastructure (especially roads, water and electricity), agricultural markets, skills development, financial services, good governance and

education are all expected to play a key role in laying the foundation for sustained and broad-based economic growth. However, freedom from economic insecurity and hunger requires the translation of growth into an assured basic income, either from waged employment, self-employment or social transfers (formal or informal). The challenge remains to ensure that inclusion in a dynamic economy results in the needs of economically vulnerable people being addressed through self-reliance or effective public action.

Can Growth Lead to Human Security?

Afghanistan's economy, while booming, is mainly informally regulated and highly illicit. To the degree that economic growth is informed by power relations (the business elite have strong connections with the sub-national political power base, and the operation of informal markets is closely linked to broader insecurity), growth is likely to be neither free nor equitable. The way markets are currently functioning may also negatively affect political governance and state-building. Benefits from economic growth strengthen existing power bases. Reinforcement of the mutually beneficial interests of big business, and political and military power holders, is spawning unregulated, informal and illicit markets that are undermining the agendas of reconstruction and development.[4] If these patterns continue, they could further depress the already bleakhuman security indices.

Economic growth in Afghanistan is widely recognized as a necessary precondition for state-building and poverty reduction. However, state intervention will be required to ensure improved accountability of market operators, and to promote opportunities to participate in markets (thereby enhancing economic, political and environmental security). Socially equitable growth implies some redistribution of social and economic benefits – and a public concern with the quality as well as quantity of growth.[5]

Addressing non-competitive behaviour caused by powerful institutions outside a legal framework presents an enormous challenge. It is important to underscore that reform of the private sector in support of enhanced economic security rests heavily on the effectiveness of broader political reforms. Nevertheless, the Government can potentially play a key role in strengthening the effectiveness of market mechanisms in support of democratic state-building and poverty reduction.

Existing tax and tariff regimes (red tape) should be greatly simplified to minimize opportunities for corruption. The promotion of effective and efficient financial service markets can play a key role in enabling smaller enterprises to compete. Other constraints to economic security at the macro level include poor infrastructure, insecurity and lawlessness (a significant disincentive to would-be investors), and the lack of a regulatory framework for upholding standards for exports. The shortage of human resources (expertise and professional skills) and the break-down of education systems also present significant stumbling blocks.

Can Poverty and Hunger be Eradicated in Afghanistan?

In *Securing Afghanistan's Future*, the Government makes the case that sustained international assistance and growth could result in meeting a number of the MDGs by 2015. Indeed, economic growth can have a profound impact at the household level in terms of employment opportunities

[4] AREU 2004d.

[5] An example of economic insecurity arises in relation to the production of carpets, mainly by women, who remain almost without exception excluded from the market place and for whom the wage levels remain alarmingly low.

and asset accumulation. However, without public investment in human capital (health, education and social protection), the access of poor households to the potential benefits arising from a growing economy will be severely restricted.

The prospect of a large proportion of poor Afghans remaining trapped in poverty, regardless of macro-economic growth, appears likely without an intensification of efforts to support self-reliance through public interventions. Since 2002, the Government has emphasized the need for international assistance to be channelled through coherent national programmes rather than as stand alone projects. Nowhere has this been more significant than in the area of social protection, where there is a strong case that resources can be used more efficiently and productively through employment-based safety nets and community-driven social fund mechanisms.

Despite widespread economic insecurity among the majority of Afghans, they remain remarkably resilient, having developed strong community support networks during decades of conflict and in the almost total absence of service delivery. While some coping strategies have adverse implications (reduced consumption, pulling children out of school, under-age child marriage, etc.), it is crucial that policies and programmes support positive existing strategies wherever possible (including livelihood diversification and migration).[6] However, the challenges associated with implementing the National Drug Control Strategy highlight the need to ensure that alternative income-generating opportunities are promoted prior to eradication of poppy production. While the opium economy is antagonistic to national prosperity and stability, an increasing proportion of Afghans depend on daily wage labour as agricultural workers in poppy fields or as processors of opium.[7]

The challenge to design and deliver a coherent national strategic framework for social protection lies in effectively reaching the poorest and most at-risk segments of the population, while supporting the ability of communities in general to secure basic entitlements and develop the capacities required for reducing insecurity over time. In the short term, existing programmes should be strengthened to ensure effective implementation and meaningful monitoring and evaluation, which can then inform the design and innovation of new initiatives.

- In relation to land resources and agriculture, the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development and Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Husbandry must target the well-being of the rural poor by improving the quality, quantity, productivity and value of the natural resources essential to their livelihoods. The Ministry of Irrigation, Water Resources and Environmental Protection must target improving the environmental externalities associated with resource use and management. All policies and implementations must be participatory.
- The Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs should adopt medium- and long-term policies to increase capacities and opportunities for the poor.

The new Government must be supported in its efforts to produce a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper as a development strategy based on policies aimed at creating a favourable climate for stimulating

[6] At least in principle, this appears to have been recognized in the recently launched National Vulnerability Programme, which has been accorded priority status by the Government.

[7] Evidence suggests that opium poppy cultivation involves as many as 2 million people and provides an economic safety net. In many cases, it has played a key role in helping poor rural households recover from asset losses.

investment and productivity, and designed with the inclusive participation of beneficiaries.

Health Security

Lack of an adequate health care system and the presence of widespread health problems are threatening the human security of Afghans, as exemplified by the life expectancy at birth – 45 for males and 44 for females. The country's poor healthcare system is characterized by high infant and child mortality rates,[8] while the maternal mortality rate is one of the highest in the world.[9] There is a huge disparity in the distribution of health care facilities and staff.[10] According to WHO (2003), in 2001, the total expenditure on health care in Afghanistan as a proportion of GDP was 5.2 per cent, of which 52.6 per cent was contributed by the Government and 47.4 per cent was private expenditure.[11] The CSO figures for 2002 present a more dismal picture, reporting that just 0.5 per cent of public expenditure goes towards health care. The number of doctors (MDs) per 1,000 people is a mere 0.167 against 1.1 on average for all developing countries.

With this background, many competing priorities in the health sector are challenging the human security agenda. The poor infrastructure, lack of capacity and insufficient financial resources make the situation complicated. To address these problems, important policy documents and strategies have been designed by the Ministry of Health, but have not been implemented. The following issues urgently need to be addressed:

- The Government must increase the development budget in the health care sector to enable the Ministry of Health and other actors to contend with the shortfalls of the system in a sustainable way.
- For sustainability, the ministry should accelerate the process of the Partnership Performance-Based Agreement, and work towards an exit strategy for the agreement in the provinces. Certain criteria should be developed to avoid bias re-assignment of staff to rural and remote areas. Rationalization of hospital staff is critical, and it is essential to bring gender balance among medical students. Attention is required to train allied health professionals.
- To safeguard the public from ill treatment and abuse, the quality of services in private clinics and dispensaries have to be regulated by the ministry, and abusers penalized.
- Mental health units need to be established by the ministry at the national level, which should design community intervention programmes on mental health and coordinate all efforts nationwide.

Environmental Security

As far as health and environmental security are concerned, the Government should both improve access to basic public infrastructures such as sanitation and clean water, and aim for some basic universal health care protection for all, especially the poor, since they cannot afford private health care. A variety of community-based health insurance schemes exist to assure individuals of continued income in case of illness. Financed out of a common pool, they are an option the new Government should look into. It could help by subsidizing these initiatives and promoting the link between them and formal health care institutions.

Environmental insecurity is already a major concern, given the critically poor quality

8 Naqibullah Safi 2004.
9 *Ibid*.
10 *Ibid*.
11 WHO 2003a.

of water and air. Many rivers have gone dry, as groundwater stocks sink to new depths each year. Likewise, forms of natural capital, such as land, forests and biodiversity, are undergoing long-term decline. They increasingly constrain economic prospects and growth, and so pose a serious threat to Afghanistan's mid and long-term stability, and sustainable human development.

The health of the public depends to a great extent on the quantity and quality of drinking water. The UNICEF/CSO MICS estimates that 39 per cent of households in urban areas and 69 per cent of households in rural areas do not have access to safe water. The problem of inadequate sanitation also deserves immediate attention and ingenuity. In Afghanistan's circumstances, it is necessary to think of sanitation without water, and not to consider water improvements without sanitation.[12]

Another issue involves integrating environmental protection and energy policies. The Government's capacity to drive sustainable energy development is crucial, given its central role in society and that it needs to be centrally coordinated. Priority should be given to the development of the hydropower sector, and the Ministry of Water Resources and Environmental Protection should implement projects that have already been designed to develop small and medium multi-purpose hydroelectric dams.

To achieve these goals and the MDGs, the establishment of frameworks for development is not sufficient. Action is needed, and this requires a major effort and commitment by many actors. National priorities for spending should be redirected to the most basic environmental needs and capabilities of the citizens. Successful sustainable development programmes will ensure the participation of local communities in the design and implementation of policies, and draw on local wisdom, experience and traditions for the sustainable management of natural resources. To achieve this goal:

- The state must establish a national environmental protection, management and information agency to design and implement environmental policy.
- Relevant ministries, such as the Ministry of Irrigation, Water Resources and Environmental Protection, must adopt a clean and green technology policy and conduct environmental impact assessments on all reconstruction and modernization projects.
- Groundwater resources and watersheds must be managed by empowering self-regulated community associations.

Personal Security

Personal security rests upon safety from physical violence and various threats. In Afghanistan, people are increasingly threatened by sudden and unpredictable forms of violence, such torture inflicted by the security forces and police, international or cross-border terrorism advocated by the Taliban, violent attacks on civilians, threats from individuals or gangs against other individuals, street violence, hostage-taking, domestic violence, child abuse or rape, child abduction, neglected child labour, child prostitution, and rising drug use.

While the policies adopted in the NDF, the NDB and *Securing Afghanistan's Future* show serious concern for the restoration of human security in post-conflict Afghanistan, nevertheless, they do not provide an integrated and coherent human security approach that would guarantee the personal safety of Afghans. It is not clear who will address personal

[12] *Ibid.*

insecurities and how. The objective should focus clearly on people as individuals and their personal security needs and aspirations. Relative personal security could be achieved once the Government fulfils its obligations to the Bonn Agreement with regard to disarmament and establishment of the rule of law.

It is suggested that the Government seriously reconsider the DDR measures and adopt a feasible strategy to tackle the lack of viable livelihoods as an incentive to disarm. Labour-intensive and long-term public and private projects such as hydroelectric and road constructions should be created in order to prevent the poor, and demobilized soldiers, from engaging in illicit economic activities or crime.

Community Security

One of the greatest impacts of the Afghan conflict has been the breakdown of community social structures and the propagation of mistrust between different Afghan sub-communities at clan, tribe and ethnic levels. Societal grievances have not been the root causes of the Afghan conflict, but they certainly are one of the unfortunate outcomes of it, which in turn can serve as hindrance to societal security. There are many issues pertaining to communal security, but the ones that demand greater policy attention include the following:

Pastoral and land disputes: Land and pasture disagreements have always been one of the main reasons for societal disputes, and explain the ability of warring factions to raise ethnic-based backing, particularly in the central and northern regions. This is largely due to past or present unresolved land and pasture disputes between communities. Two societal groups that are largely affected by this are the Kuchis and IDPs from the north and northwest. The IDPs, mostly ethnic Pashtuns, have been driven from their homes by powerful military commanders out to grab their lands. Intervention to resolve this problem is of the utmost importance in putting an end to the spiral of ethnic violence in the north. This might include seeking a legal framework for solving present cases, and monitoring human rights related to IDP movements in areas where violations continue to generate displacement. Meanwhile, confidence-building measures between communities can be designed and promoted, including discussions between the local authorities and the IDP representatives to seek guarantees upon return.

Although disputes over land use and competition over resources between sedentary peoples and the Kuchis have reached violent levels in the past, there is presently no overall policy regarding land tenure and pasture rights. The local formal and informal authorities and the specific attitudes of the people involved determine access. The traditional system of pasture rights seems to have been eroded and replaced by the power of the gun, however. Development programmes for pastoralists, and in particular those aimed at setting up infrastructure on land used by the nomads, can impact the existing relations and understanding between the communities. If development programmes for Kuchis are designed such that they also benefit the sedentary population, the relationship between the two communities may turn to that of friendship and cooperation. Otherwise, development on land which has been used seasonally by nomads can create a perception among the sedentary people that they will in the future claim this land, or the Kuchis will encroach upon the lands traditionally used by the villagers – hence conflict will result.

Community participation in political and development processes: The success of any development and political process lies in the buy-in by Afghan communities. This can be ensured through the community's full participation not only in the implementation of such processes, but also in their design and monitoring.

Therefore, the development of local capacities is imperative for human development and state-building to succeed. As the Government seeks to build accountability and legitimacy in the fragile post-conflict period, transparency in policy-making and programming, open debate and critical review are essential.

Restoration of traditional social order and/or social capital: Afghanistan has always had a weak Government and a strong traditional society, with understandable rules and conduct for societal order and security. The two, however, complemented each other. No size of military force and no degree of central control will be able to restore the sense of communal security that is possible under traditional social structures. This suggests that successful political and security policies and measures are ones that revere the strength of the traditional community, and embed this in its principles.

Political Security

Political exclusion is visible in many forms: labelling and stereotyping entire ethnic, linguistic or religious groups; monopolies over power; inadequate ethnic representation in higher ranking Government positions; the denial of the right to employment and access to higher education to certain groups; an unequal distribution of resources; and the dominance over the media of a section within the Government. These practices must be reversed, because they have disenfranchised many Afghans, who have responded with non-cooperation in all matters of state-building, including the provision of security.

Afghanistan is fast-tracking its transition to democratic governance. However, democracy in a situation where political security is not ensured could fall into the danger of imposing a Government and Parliament that legitimize proponents of force, who so far have denied the population the option to actively participate in policy formulation and decision-making.

The political power of the warlords *vis-à-vis* that of reformist politicians is reinforced by the financial resources (both internal and external) at their command. Many warlords still receive financial support from countries whose interest they served in the past or still serve. In addition, many of the benefits of robust economic growth are skewed towards the powerful. Institutions of the market and informal regulation controlled by the people in power ensure that competition and participation are restricted to their advantage. State intervention will, therefore, be critical to unleash markets and allow wider distribution of the benefits of growth. The extent to which existing market structures reinforce instability is a major concern, and it necessitates a strategy to limit the power of those who control markets. Another factor is the involvement of the warlords in the narcotics trade, and their control over Afghanistan's precious underground resources, namely lapis lazuli and emeralds.

To a large extent, political security is centred around the issue of the warlords' sphere of influence. This continues to be imposed on the people of Afghanistan, backed by weapons, market control, the narcotics trade and control over precious stones. The response to the first issue lies in an unwavering commitment to the DDR process; to the second in market and public service reforms, to the third in law enforcement with respect to the demand side of narcotics; and to the fourth in the strengthening of the central Government's capacity and extension of its authority.

8.4. Summary: *Dimensions of Human Security in Afghanistan*

Dimensions of security	Key findings	What needs to be done	How should it be done
1. Economic security	High level of indebtedness. Opium economy equals 38.2% of the country's official GDP.	Reliable multi-year commitments from donors crucial for long-term development investments. Strengthen legal and regulatory framework for private sector. Social policy to meet the needs of vulnerable groups. Prepare a PRSP.	Simplification of existing regulations and implementation of appropriate laws. Asset creation for the poor. Targeted interventions to promote outreach for different categories of the vulnerable. Objective of effective and representative poverty reduction strategy can provide opportunity for extensive consultations and focus on gender challenge.
2. Health security	The collapse of the state resulted in an inadequate health care system, further restricting access to health care services, particularly for the poor.	Increase the development budget in health care sector. Regulate the quality of services in private clinics and dispensaries, as well as pharmaceutical services. Establish national-level mental health units.	Ministry of Health and other actors address the shortfalls of the system in a sustainable way. For sustainability, the Ministry of Health should accelerate the process of the Partnership Performance-based Agreement (PPA), and work towards an exit strategy for PPA in provinces. It is essential to bring gender balance among medical students.
3. Environmental security	Environmental insecurity is a major concern. Water and air quality is equally poor. Access to safe drinking water is dismal. Natural capital, i.e., water, land, forest and biodiversity is under a long-term decline.	Need to install sound environmental management practices.	Design and implementation of policy through a participatory process.
4. Personal security	Physical violence by armed militia; torture by the security forces; violent attacks by Taliban, street gangs; hostage-taking; domestic violence against women, abuse or rape; violence against children such as child abuse, child abduction, child labour, child prostitution; and drug abuse are the main personal insecurities.	Strengthen Afghanistan's institutional capacity to meet in an adequate and timely manner its national and international obligations. Separate civilian and military functions.	Strengthen human rights monitoring, reporting mechanisms, Government accountability and the rule of law.

Dimensions of security	Key findings	What needs to be done	How should it be done
5. Community security	Land insecurity pervasive.	Establish systems for management and reform of land tenure.	Policy and law enforcement.
6. Political security	Failure to implement security related provisions of the Bonn Agreement. Little progress with DDR efforts. Illicit economies play a key role in maintaining political insecurity and in fact create significant returns to the maintenance of insecurity. Need for externally supplied security during the transition – upon which state-building is dependent. Collapsed state – functioning parts of sub-national administration are controlled by local militia commanders.	Enhance security and the rule of law – top priority must be given to security sector reforms. State-building depends on political entity with monopoly of legitimate force and hence economic assets and flows – reforming and training civil service without consolidation of power and authority is insufficient. Issuing instructions to civil servants and military personnel concerning their duty of political impartiality and protection of political freedoms – appropriate sanctions must be taken against those who fail to fulfill obligations. Ensuring freedom of expression and freedom of the press. Political normalization – full support to emerging political institutions (Cabinet, legislative bodies, judiciary, etc.) to enhance effectiveness.	Complete the formation of National Police and National Army (only armed forces). Implement National Drug Control Strategy (alternative livelihoods, strengthening security, anti-trafficking and demand reduction) – avoid short term and poorly conceived interventions against drugs. Accelerate legal reform process to strengthen Constitution. Imperative to ensure that addressing political, military and humanitarian objectives simultaneously does not result in the blurring of institutional mandates and functions in the process. Military operations should not be presented as developmental and the impartiality of humanitarian actors must be supported. Channel resources from central Government to sub-national level to accelerate reform of public administration beyond Kabul and reduce corruption.

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Photo: Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh

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Annexure 1

Photo: Golam Monowar Kamal

ANNEXURE 1

Building Statistical Capacity and Infrastructure : An Urgent Need

> "I gather, young man, that you wish to be a Member of Parliament. The first lesson that you must learn is, when I call for statistics about the rate of infant mortality, what I want is proof that fewer babies died when I was Prime Minister than when anyone else was Prime Minister. That is political statistics."
>
> **Winston Churchill (1874-1965)**
>
> "To call the statistician after the experiment is done may be no more than asking him to perform a postmortem examination: he may be able to say what the experiment died of."
>
> **Prof. R. A. Fisher, Indian Statistical Congress, 1938**

Relevant, reliable and timely statistics are well recognized as essential for setting policies, holding decision makers accountable, monitoring progress and evaluating results. Yet despite considerable recent improvements in gathering and analysing statistics in some countries, meeting the demand for basic data on human development remains a major global challenge. The problem is even more acute in Afghanistan, which has not featured in the annual compilations of statistics in UNDP's global HDRs since 1996. Hence, there were formidable challenges in securing statistical inputs for the NHDR.

A Demand for Statistics and a Statistical System

As in most post-conflict situations, a high demand for updated information in Afghanistan coincides with a low capacity to properly collect and analyse data. More than two decades of war have devastated the statistical infrastructure of the country, and a large number of statistical personnel have migrated to other places. The lack of systematic knowledge of statistical procedures is compounded by the fact that salaries paid to statisticians working for the CSO are too low to retain specialists.

Most of the current data in Afghanistan has been collected either by international organizations or in cooperation with them. Though such information has been able to meet many of the data requirements of the country, collection exercises have often been driven by short-term external needs that do not always contribute adequately to a stronger statistical infrastructure. Exceptions include the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) support to the CSO to prepare the national Population Census, and a new project by the WB that targets capacity building. The last census was held in Afghanistan in 1979, and even then not all the results were analysed thoroughly.

The CSO is currently involved in a pre-census, which provided preliminary population figures for the election, although the activities were hampered by the grave security situation in some provinces. The main Population Census is scheduled for 2005, and will be conducted with UNFPA's assistance. It will face complexities in collecting and verifying data. Given the mobility of the population, it will have to be completed quickly and assessed adequately.

Ultimately, a fair amount of statistical information is available, but it is fragmented, and often recycled from second-hand sources. Much secondary data can be extracted from the various existing surveys – such as the WFP VAM, the UNICEF/CSO MICS, the NRVA, etc. – although for capacity building to take place, the wealth of information derived from these surveys needs to be properly analysed and evaluated with the help of Afghan trained specialists.

With policy making focused on emergency and rapid responses rather than being based on adequate situation analyses, the national demand for statistics in Afghanistan is not very strong. Consequently, the resources available for various statistical activities are meager. The CSO suffers from serious underfunding and low capacity, lacking even a conference room equipped with computers and presentation equipment.

The statistical system in Afghanistan is centralized, with the CSO charged as the main agency for coordinating statistical activities across the country. Data is currently provided to the central office through regional offices, which are in dire need of capacity building as they are now mostly run by one person with no computers; ministries and their local branches; and international organizations. Contributions from the last category are first vetted against the CSO's own methodology, and the office plays an important role in verifying, "owning" and promoting these statistics. However, it confronts difficulties in coordinating reporting on human development indicators because of a heavy workload. This stems from its concentration on conducting the national census and surveys, and producing national economic figures, along with its low level of resources. Other obstacles include the lack of human resources and legal authority. Provincial statistical offices need to be strengthened, and the possibility of district or regional offices considered.

Most ministries in the meantime have access to their own sets of sectoral data gathered from their representatives in the districts. Some ministries, particularly those receiving foreign assistance, such as the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development and the Ministry of Women's Affairs, have small statistical cells under the supervision of international advisors. Their information is fed into the CSO, and also used for their own monitoring and evaluation. Here again, however, data collection suffers from poor connectivity to the regions.

The ministries and the CSO both recognize the logistical difficulties in gathering data from provinces and villages. Communication and reporting is constrained by the absence of roads, networks, knowledge, know-how on surveying, etc. Representatives of these national institutions in the provinces have very limited human resources and access to technology, and cannot properly communicate and align data collection with the centre.

Some Key Data Problems for the NHDR

In order to properly measure progress in human development in Afghanistan, including trends in the rise or fall of poverty and inequality, data need to be sufficiently disaggregated by gender, province, rural and urban areas, ethnicity, etc. With respect to these criteria, the statistical system of Afghanistan does not fare well. Some of the problems encountered during data collection and analysis for this report were as follows:

1. Most data was for only one year, making a trend analysis impossible.
2. Data was not disaggregated by provinces, making regional analysis difficult.
3. The country lacks proper recording of births and deaths after 1979, making demographic parameters inadequate.
4. The reliability of available data was another problem. A large number of surveys have been conducted without a proper sampling frame, with no efforts made to update the 1979 census frame. There were disagreements between the national CSO and some international organizations about the number of villages and even districts in the country, which highlighted the problem of the reliability of data collected in the absence of an up-to-date sampling frame. Afghanistan has also lacked a regular survey agency, and many surveys have been carried out by NGOs without properly trained statistical personnel.
5. Different figures were quoted for the total population of the country, even by international agencies. These included estimates ranging from 21.4 million (ADB) to 27.2 million (WB). The CSO estimates the total population by assuming an annual natural growth rate of 1.92 per cent during the period 1979 to 2003, although this number was unlikely with high infant mortality rates and migration. The MICS conducted by UNICEF and the CSO, which was the most reliable assessment, estimated population growth rates of 2.50 per cent and a total population of 23.85 million.
6. The GDP rate had to be calculated separately to include poppy cultivation, which, according to the document *Securing Afghanistan's Future*, was estimated at US $2.5 billion in 2003. Proper estimates of employment and unemployment as well as wage rates are not available.

7. The NRVA survey, used for poverty estimates, was conducted only in rural areas. With approximately 22 per cent of the population living in urban areas, its results may not be representative for the country.

8. Though collecting information on the maternal mortality ratio is much more difficult than for infant or child mortality rates, maternal mortality estimates ranging from 300 in Kabul to 2,200 in Badakshan are often quoted in international documents. Yet the reliable UNICEF/CSO MICS was not able to provide estimates of infant and child mortality for the provinces because of small samples. It is therefore questionable as to how the estimates of maternal mortality at province level were obtained.

9. Some sources quote the number of people with HIV/AIDS in the country to be 200 to 300. However, the 2003 WB Indicators note a 0.01 per cent prevalence rate of HIV among 15-24 year olds. This indicates a large discrepancy.

10. Though the main theme of this NHDR is human security, detailed data were not available on various indicators pertaining to personal security, such as the total number of crimes, sexual crimes, ethnic differences, economic security such as employment opportunities in the private sector, skill availability, environmental security, etc.

Some Suggestions for Meeting the Data Requirements of Future NHDRs

The monitoring of the MDGs and the production of subsequent NHDRs in Afghanistan will require time series data. This will be possible only when systemic plans are prepared in consultation with national and international agencies for the collection of requisite statistics at regular intervals.

Some of the specific suggestions for meeting the data requirements of the NHDR are as follows:

1. The Population Census is likely to be conducted in June 2005. This will be the most important source of data for the NHDR. At the time of the preparation of the questionnaire for the census, questions to calculate various human development indicators must be included in both the questionnaire and the tabulation plan. Raw data can be analysed by subsequent NHDR teams while the census data is being processed.

2. A sampling frame created on the basis of the Population Census and updated at regular intervals is required for conducting any large-scale survey in the country for any purpose. This frame may be maintained in the CSO and should be supplied to any agency wanting to conduct a large-scale survey.

   As the Population Census is conducted only every ten years, some alternative sources of demographic and economic data have to be identified. As in many other countries, a plan may be prepared to conduct a large demographic and health survey during the mid-census period, bearing in mind the difficulties of establishing and improving the registration of births and deaths in the near future.

3. There is an urgent need to conduct a labor force survey in order to find out the employment, unemployment and wage rates, with specific reference to the informal sector.

4. Once data is made available from the 2005 census, a life table for Afghanistan should be prepared to calculate proper values for life expectancy. At present, various agencies provide different estimates. Some sources maintain that female life expectancy at birth is lower than that of males, whereas other sources claim the reverse. In view of the prevailing health and nutritional situation in the country, female life expectancy is likely to be lower than that of males. Figures contradicting this could create confusion.

5. The possibility of using administrative data is very limited, given the poor state of statistical set-ups in ministries and provinces. In the meantime, different ministries have to collect numerous administrative data for monitoring and planning various programmes under their jurisdiction, and sometimes these are the only data that provide annual figures. For example, enrolment in primary, secondary and tertiary levels of education can be provided every year by the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Higher Education, based on data received from schools, colleges and universities. Similarly, data on financial assistance, and expenditures on education and health, etc. can be provided by the relevant ministries based on their administrative records. Therefore, there is an urgent need to develop a system for analysis of administrative data in different ministries, with regular publication of the analysis, preferably annually.

Box A.1

The Government and UNDP Set the Standards

It is widely recognized that transparent and shared information has a significant impact on efficiency, accountability and the alignment of resources with priorities. This in turn improves the effectiveness of reconstruction and development. Yet information management in Afghanistan is limited, often relying on complex or inappropriate processes, and rarely geared towards promoting transparency or sharing data.

The Government is now leading efforts to address these issues, in part through the AIMS project, which is one of a number of UNDP initiatives focused on rebuilding information management capacity. Involving the joint cooperation and commitment of major donors and key Government ministries, AIMS is creating a unique window of opportunity.

In order for the new Government to plan, coordinate and manage development, it needs to make completed, ongoing, and planned reconstruction and development activities visible and accessible. Working closely with the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, USAID and the European COmmission, AIMS is facilitating the development and implementation of standards for sharing information between ministries and other organizations.

These include the adoption of MDG indicators, international classifications for both functions of government and project and sector typology, and standard activity tracking metrics. Common metrics of achievement will facilitate the identification of successful activities, while higher level indicators will help Afghanistan track progress on the MDGs.

UNDP Afghanistan is promoting information transparency in government and other organizations, with profound implications for improved tracking, planning and coordination of development and in the process providing one more foundation stone for sustainable government.

Some general suggestions for the improvement of the statistical system in the country are as follows:

1 Since statistical capacity is very low, a programme has to be developed for training existing statistical personnel on a regular basis in various statistical fields.

2 At present, statistics are not taught as a separate discipline in universities. Though students trained in mathematics, economics, commerce, etc. can meet the requirements to some extent, those educated exclusively in statistics may be required in order to continuously understand and implement developments in the field of official statistics. One consideration could be support for the new Government in introducing the teaching of statistics in universities.

3 There is an urgent need for strong statistical coordination. Presently, a number of international agencies are collecting data either on their own or through NGOs, with little cross-agency information sharing. Since this may result in duplicated efforts absorbing scarce resources, a coordination role should be assigned to the CSO. A detailed data collection plan for the next five to ten years can be prepared on the basis of information received from various agencies about their own plans. The CSO could also examine the sampling design, data collection method, etc. to be adopted by the different agencies to ensure minimum statistical standards.

4 The ADB is in the process of implementing a Statistical Master Plan. All the agencies in Afghanistan, national and international, may contribute to and participate in its successful implementation. It will go a long way towards improving the data situation.

Annexure 2



Photo: Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh

ANNEXURE 2

Technical Appendix on Statistics

Gross Enrolment Ratio for Primary, Secondary and Tertiary

From the *Statistical Yearbook* 2003 brought out by the CSO of the TISA, the total number of students in primary, secondary and tertiary for the year 2002 was taken. The proportion of females in primary, secondary and tertiary education was 33 per cent, 25 per cent and 22 per cent respectively. By taking the simple average, the proportion of female in the total primary, secondary and tertiary students would be 27 per cent. Total number of students was bifurcated in male and females by using this ratio.

The relevant age group for the primary, secondary and tertiary education is 7 to 21 years in Afghanistan. The population in this age group was derived by using the age distribution for the year 2002 given in the CSO *Statistical Yearbook* 2003.

Per Capita GDP (PPP US$)

In the CSO *Statistical Yearbook* 2003, the per capita income for Afghanistan in US$ for the year 2002 is given. However, for the computation of the indices per capita GDP in purchasing power parity (PPP US$) is required, which was not available from any source. In the UNDP's HDR per capita income in both US$ and PPP US$ are given for most of the countries. The ratio between the per capita GDP (PPP US$) and per capita GDP (US$) was worked out and applied to the per capita GDP (US$) to find out the per capita GDP (PPP US$) for Afghanistan. The ration of 4.327 used for 11 land-locked and neighbouring countries used in the *Securing Afghanistan's Future* was used for the computation of indices.

Deriving the Male and Female Share of Income

For computation of the GDI for Afghanistan, the methodology prescribed by the HDR was used. However, as information on the male and female share of income was not available, approximations were made as follows:

- ***Female and Male Share of Economically Active Population***

  In the CSO *Statistical Yearbook* 2003, the proportion of workers in agriculture, industry and services were estimated at 80 per cent, 2 per cent and 18 per cent respectively. It was also stated that 30 per cent of the workers in the agriculture sector were women. Using this information it was assumed that the proportion of women and men in the economically active population is 30 per cent and 70 per cent respectively.

- ***Ratio of Female Non-agricultural Wage to Male Non-agricultural Wage***

  Similar to information on economically active population, no data is available on the wage rate for men and women. The NHDR used the suggestion from the UNDP's HDR which stated that for countries lacking data on non-agricultural wage rate, the ratio of female non-agricultural wage to male non-agricultural wage could be assumed to be 0.75.

Probability at Birth of not surviving to age 40 (per cent of Cohort)

Though the life expectancy at birth for Afghanistan for the year 2002 was mentioned in the CSO *Statistical Yearbook* 2003, information about the probability at birth of not surviving to age 40 was not available. In the HDR, the values of life expectancy at birth and the probability at birth of not surviving to age 40 are given for large number of countries, indicating a strong correlation. Coefficient of -0.92. The value of correlation coefficient was -0.96 when countries with low human development index were considered. In view of the strong correlation between these two indicators, the value for the probability of not surviving to age 40 was obtained for the given value of life expectancy at birth using the regression analysis with least square method.

Methodology for Construction of Composite Indices

The methodology used for the computation of composite indices was the one used in the UNDP's HDR 2003. The methodology is reproduced below.

HDI and GDI

For constructing these two indices, human well-being was accessed for the following three dimensions.

- **Longevity:** The ability to live long and healthy life-Measured by indicator life expectancy at birth
- **Education:** The ability to read, write and acquire knowledge-Measured by adult literacy rate and combined gross enrolment ratio at primary, secondary and tertiary level
- **Command over resources:** The ability to enjoy a decent standard of living measured by per capita GDP (PPP US$).

Indicator	Maximum			Minimum		
	Male	Female	Combined	Male	Female	Combined
Life expectancy at birth (Years)	82.5	87.5	85	22.5	27.5	25
Adult literacy rate (%)	100	100	100	0	0	0
Gross enrolment ratio at primary, secondary and tertiary level (%)	100	100	100	0	0	0
GDP per capita (PPP US$)	40,000	40,000	40,000	100	100	100

The actual values used for these indicators for year 2002 were as follows:

Indicator	Value		
	Male	Female	Combined
Life expectancy at birth (Years)	45	44	44.5
Adult literacy rate (%)*	43.2	14.1	28.7
Gross enrolment ratio at primary, secondary and tertiary level (%)	59.34	29.57	44.93
GDP per capita (PPP US$)	1182	402	822

* Pertains to year 2003

For computing these indices minimum and maximum values for different indicators were as follows:

Calculating the HDI for Afghanistan

$$HDI = \frac{1}{3}\sum_{i=1}^{3} I_i$$

$$I_i = \frac{X_i - Min(X_i)}{Max(X_i)-Min(X_i)}$$

X_1: Life expectancy at birth
X_2: 2/3 X_{21} + 1/3 X_{22}
X_{21}: Adult literacy rate
X_{22}: Combined gross enrolment ratio at primary, secondary and tertiary level
X_3: Per capita GDP (PPP US$)

Calculating the GDI for Afghanistan

While the HDI measures average achievement, the GDI adjusts the average achievement to reflect the inequalities between men and women in all the three dimensions of HDI. The methodology adopted for the adjustment is same as used in the HDR and is reproduced below.

First, Female and Male indices were calculated according to the general formula

$$I_i = \frac{X_i - Min(X_i)}{Max(X_i)-Min(X_i)}$$

Second, the Female and Male indices in each dimension were combined by taking the harmonic mean of the Female and Male indices as given below to find out the equally distributed index in each dimension.

$$\text{Equally distributed index} = \left\{ \frac{\text{Female Population share}}{\text{Female index}} + \frac{\text{Male Population share}}{\text{Male index}} \right\}^{-1}$$

Third, the GDI was calculated by combining the three equally distributed indices in an unweighted average. For getting Male and Female share of income was estimated as:

$$\text{Estimated Female earned income (PPP US\$)} (Y_f) = \frac{(S_f * Y)}{N_f}$$

$$\text{Estimated Male earned income (PPP US\$)} (Y_m) = \frac{(Y-(S_f * Y))}{Nm}$$

$$\text{Female share of wage bill} (S_f) = \frac{(W_f/W_m) * EA_f}{\{(W_f/W_m) * EA_f\} + EA_m}$$

W_f/W_m: Ratio of Female to Male non-agricultural wage
EA_f: Female % share of economically active population.
EA_m: Male % share of economically active population.
Y: Total GDP (PPP US$)
N_f: Female Population
N_m: Male Population

Calculating the HPI for Afghanistan

The methodology adopted for the HPI was also the same as that for developing countries in the HDR. Indicators chosen for computing HPI were as follows:

P1: Probability at birth of not surviving to age 40 (times 100) equals 45.99 per cent
P2: Adult illiteracy rate equals 71 per cent
P3: Combined per cent of people not using improved water source (i.e. X_1= 60%) and children under five who are underweight (i.e. X_2=49%). Combined value for P3 was obtained as unweighted average of X_1 and X_2 (i.e. P3 = $^1/_2$ (X_1 + X_2)

Calculating the GEM for Afghanistan

As neither the requisite data was available nor it could be generated through statistical exercise, this index could not be calculated for Afghanistan.

Annexure 3

Photo: Golam Monowar Kamal

ANNEXURE 3

Statistical Indicators Template (August 2004)

HDI

Indicators	Value	Year	Source
Life expectancy at birth (years)	44.5[a]	2002	CSO *Statistical Yearbook* 2003.
Adult literacy rate (% of age 15 and above)	28.7	2003	MICS/UNICEF 2003.
Combined primary, secondary, tertiary gross enrolment ratio (%)	44.93	2002	Estimated using students and population data from the CSO *Statistical Yearbook* 2003.
GDP per capita (US$)	190	2002	CSO *Statistical Yearbook* 2003.
GDP per capita (PPP US$)	822	2002	Estimated using ratio of 4.327 based on the average of GDP per capita (PPP US$) to GDP per capita (US$) for 11 countries (land-locked and neighbouring) - Quoted in *Securing Afghanistan's Future*
Life expectancy index	0.342	2002	
Education index	0.343	2002	
GDP index	0.352	2002	
HDI index	0.346	2002	
HDI rank	173	2002	Only five countries below Afghanistan.

GDI

Indicators	Value	Year	Source
Life expectancy at birth (years)			
Male	45	2002	CSO *Statistical Yearbook* 2003.
Female	44	2002	
Adult literacy rate (% of age15 and above)			
Male	43.2	2003	MICS/UNICEF 2003.
Female	14.1	2003	
Combined primary, secondary, tertiary gross enrolment ratio (%)			
Male	59.34	2002	Estimated using students and population
Female	29.57	2002	data from CSO *Statistical Yearbook* 2003.
Total	44.93	2002	
Share in economic active population			
Male	70	2002	Using the ratio in agriculture given in
Female	30	2002	CSO *Statistical Yearbook* 2003.
Ratio of female non-agricultural wage to male non-agricultural wage	0.75	..	As per HDR 2003.
Estimated earned income (PPP US$)		2002	..
Male	1182	2002	
Female	402	2002	
GDI index	0.300	2002	..
GDI rank	143	..	Just above Burkina Faso with rank 143 and value 0.291. Only two countries below Afghanistan.

[a] Average of male and female

HPI and Income Poverty

Indicators	Value	Year	Source
Probability at birth of not surviving to age 40 (% of Cohort)	45.99	2002	Estimated using regression of probability at birth of not surviving to age 40 and life expectancy at birth for low HDI countries
Adult illiteracy Rate (% age 15 and above)	71	2003	MICS/UNICEF 2003.
Population without sustainable access to an improved water sources (%)	60	2003	MICS/UNICEF 2003.
Per cent of children under five who are underweight	49	2001	CSO *Statistical Yearbook* 2003.
Calorie deficient rate (%)	20.4[b]	2003	NRVA 2003.
Population below US$2 a day (%)	70	2001	WB's estimates quoted in *Securing Afghanistan's Future*.
HPI index (%)	59.30	2002	..
HPI rank	94	..	Just above Niger with value 61.4 and rank 94 as per HDR 2004. Only two countries below Afghanistan.

DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS

Indicators	Value	Year	Source
Total population (millions)	23.85	2003	MICS/UNICEF 2003.
Annual population growth rate (%)	2.50	2003	MICS/UNICEF 2003.
Urban population (as % of total)	28.80	2003	MICS/UNICEF 2003.
Population under age 15 (as % of total)	50.16	2003	MICS/UNICEF 2003.
Population aged 65 and above (as % of total)	2.61	2003	MICS/UNICEF 2003.
Total fertility rate (per woman)	6.30	2003	MICS/UNICEF 2003.

COMMITMENT TO HEALTH: ACCESS SERVICES AND RESOURCES

Indicators	Value	Year	Source
Households using adequate sanitation facilities - flush or pit toilet (%)	67	2003	MICS/UNICEF 2003.
Population with sustainable access to an improved water sources (%)	40	2003	MICS/UNICEF 2003.
Population with sustainable access to affordable essential drugs (%)	50-79	1999	UNESCO Institute for Statistics. 2001. Quoted in HDR 2004.
One-year-olds fully immunized against tuberculosis (%)	60	2003	MICS/UNICEF 2003.
One-year-olds fully immunized against measles (%)	76	2003	MICS/UNICEF 2003.
Oral rehydration therapy use rate (%)	40	1994-2002	UNESCO Institute for Statistics. 2001. Quoted in HDR 2004.
Contraceptive prevalence rate (%)	28	2003	MICS/UNICEF 2003.
Births attended by skilled health staff (%)	11,5	2003	MICS/UNICEF 2003.
Physicians (per 100,000 people)	10	2002	CSO *Statistical Yearbook* 2003.
Public health expenditure (as % of GDP)	0.50	2002	CSO *Statistical Yearbook* 2003.
Private health expenditure (as % of GDP)	2.50	2001	UNESCO Institute for Statistics. 2001. Quoted in HDR 2004.
Public health expenditure per capita (US$)	1	2002	CSO *Statistical Yearbook* 2003.

[b] Using the NRVA 2003 data, the WB estimated that 52.8 per cent of Afghans live below poverty line (Afs. 8,450/person/year). This figure quoted in *Securing Afghanistan's Future*. It was later observed that the calculation had some methodological problems and it has been now estimated by NRVA that calorie deficient rate for Afghanistan is only 20.4 per cent, meaning that 20.4 per cent of rural population do not have 2,070 kilocalories/person/ day. The monetary value corresponding to this min. calorie requirement is Afs. 3,775/capita/year.

LEADING GLOBAL HEALTH CRISIS AND CHALLENGES

Indicators	Value	Year	Source
Under nourished people (as % of total population)	70	2001	CSO *Statistical Yearbook* 2003.
Children under weight for age (% under age five)	49	2001	CSO *Statistical Yearbook* 2003.
Children under height for age (% under age five)	48	2001	CSO *Statistical Yearbook* 2003.
Infants with low birth-weight (%)	20	2001	CSO *Statistical Yearbook* 2003.
Adult living with HIV/AIDS (% of 15-24 population)	0.01	2001	CSO *Statistical Yearbook* 2003.
Women living with HIV/AIDS (% of 15-24 population)	..	..	..
Children living with HIV/AIDS (% of 15-24 population)	..	..	..
Malaria cases (per 100,000 people)	937	2001	CSO *Statistical Yearbook* 2003.
Tuberculosis cases (per 100,000 people)	321	2001	CSO *Statistical Yearbook* 2003.
Cigarette consumption per adult (annual average)	..	..	..

SURVIVAL: PROGRESS AND SETBACKS

Indicators	Value	Year	Source
Life expectancy at birth (years)	45	2002	CSO *Statistical Yearbook* 2003.
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births)	115	2003	MICS/UNICEF 2003.
Under five mortality rate (per 1,000 live births)	172	2003	MICS/UNICEF 2003.
Maternal mortality ratio (per 100,000 live births)	1,600	2003	*Securing Afghanistan's Future.*
Probability at birth of female surviving to age 65 (% of Cohort)	38.20	2000-2005	UNESCO Institute for Statistics. 2001. Quoted in HDR 2004.
Probability at birth of male surviving to age 65(% of Cohort)	35.40	2000-2005	UNESCO Institute for Statistics. 2001. Quoted in HDR 2004.

COMMITMENT TO EDUCATION: PUBLIC SPENDING

Indicators	Value	Year	Source
Public expenditure on education (as % of GDP)	1.60	2002	CSO *Statistical Yearbook* 2003.
Public expenditure on education (as % of total Government expenditure)	6	2002	CSO *Statistical Yearbook* 2003.
Public expenditure on pre-primary and primary education (as % of all levels)	87.60	1990	UNESCO Institute for Statistics. 2001. Quoted in HDR 2004.
Public expenditure on secondary education (as % of all levels)	..	..	..
Public expenditure on tertiary education (as % of all levels)	12.40	1990	UNESCO Institute for Statistics. 2001. Quoted in HDR 2004.
Government expenditure per student (US$)	12.10	2002	CSO *Statistical Yearbook* 2003.

LITERACY AND ENROLMENT

Indicators	Value	Year	Source
Adult literacy rate (% age 15 and above)	28.7	2003	MICS/UNICEF 2003.
Youth literacy rate (%age 15-24)	..	..	..
Net primary enrolment ratio (%)	27	1990-1991	UNESCO Institute for Statistics. 2001. Quoted in HDR 2004.
Gross primary enrolment ratio (%)	54.4	2003	MICS/UNICEF 2003.
Net secondary enrolment ratio (%)	..	..	..
Children reaching grade 5 (%)	..	..	..
Tertiary students in science, math and engineering (as % of all tertiary students)	19.37[c]	2002	CSO *Statistical Yearbook* 2003.

TECHNOLOGY DIFFUSION AND CREATION

Indicators	Value	Year	Source
Telephone mainlines			
Total Number	29000	2001	Ministry of Communications (unpublished).
	33050	2002	
	36700	2003	
Mainline (per 1,000 people)	1.36	2001	Population - 21.4 million - 2001.
	1.52	2002	Population - 21.8million - 2002.
	1.54	2003	Population - 23.85million - 2003.
Cellular mobile subscribers (per 1,000 people)	5.67	2003	*Securing Afghanistan's Future*.
Internet users	..	..	Ministry of Communications (unpublished).
Total Number	700	2003	
Internet users (per 1,000 people)	0.029	2003	Calculated as population 23.85 million.
Patents granted to residents (per million people)	0.00	2003	DAB estimates (unpublished).
Research and development expenditures (as % of GDP)	..	..	..
Scientists and engineers in R&D (per million people)	..	..	..

ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE

Indicators	Value	Year	Source
GDP (US$ billion)	4.05	2002	CSO *Statistical Yearbook* 2003.
GDP (US$ billion)	6.55	2002	*Securing Afghanistan's Future* (including the value of US$2.5 billion of poppy cultivation in the country).
GDP (PPP US$ billion)	17.52	2002	*Securing Afghanistan's Future*.
			PPP ratio 4.327 See indicator GDP percapita. (PPP US$).
GDP per capita (US$)	190	2002	CSO *Statistical Yearbook* 2003.
GDP per capita (PPP US$)	822	2002	CSO *Statistical Yearbook* 2003 and *Securing Afghanistan's Future*.
GDP growth rate (%)	(-)9.4 28.6	2001 2002	CSO *Statistical Yearbook* 2003.
GDP per capita highest value (PPP US$)	..	1975-2001	..
GDP per capita year of highest value	..	..	..
Average annual change in consumer Price index (%)	(-)15.1 4.6	2001 2002	CSO *Statistical Yearbook* 2003.

[c] Number (4400) of students studying sciences, mathematics and engineering. Compiled from the faculty-wise details of the universities.

INEQUALITY IN INCOME OR CONSUMPTION

Indicators	Value	Year	Source
Share of income and consumption			
Poorest 10%	..	..	..
Poorest 20%	6	2003	NRVA 2003.
Richest 10%	..	..	..
Richest 20%	43	2003	NRVA 2003.
Inequality measures			
Richest 10% to poorest 10%	..	..	..
Richest 20 % to poorest 20%	7.17	2003	NRVA 2003.
Gini index	35.50	2002	DAB estimates (unpublished).

THE STRUCTURE OF TRADE

Indicators	Value	Year	Source
Value of import of goods and services (US$ million) estimated.	2,531.10	2001	CSO *Statistical Yearbook* 2003.
Imports of goods and services (as % of GDP).	86	2001	CSO *Statistical Yearbook* 2003.
Value of export of goods and services (US$ million) estimated.	1,657.40	2001	CSO *Statistical Yearbook* 2003.
Exports of goods and services (as % of GDP).	57	2001	CSO *Statistical Yearbook* 2003.
Primary (fresh and ripe fruits, medicine botani, spices and seeds) exports (as % of merchandiseexports).	72	2002	CSO *Statistical Yearbook* 2003.
Manufactured (skins, wool, sausages and carpets) exports (as % of merchandise exports).	18	2002	CSO *Statistical Yearbook* 2003.
High-technology exports (as % of manufactured exports)..	..	..	..
Terms of Trade (1980 equals100).	..	..	..

FLOWS OF AID, PRIVATE CAPITAL AND DEBT

Indicators	Value	Year	Source
Official development assistance (ODA) received (US$ million) estimated.	1,813.125 1834.7	2002 2003	DAB estimates (unpublished).
Official development assistance (ODA) received (as % of GNI).	..	..	..
ODA received per capita (US$).	83.17 83.40	2002 2003	DAB estimates (unpublished).
ODA received per capita (as % of GDP).	37.10 39.00	2002 2003	CSO *Statistical Yearbook* 2003. DAB estimates (unpublished).
Foreign direct investment inflows (as % of GDP).	1.06	2003	DAB estimates (unpublished).
Other private flows (as % of GDP).	0.00	2003	
Total debt service (as % of GDP).	..	..	..
Total debt service (as % of exports of goods and services).	..	..	..

PRIORITIES IN PUBLIC SPENDING

Indicators	Value	Year	Source
Public Expenditure on Education (as % of GDP)	1.60	2002	*CSO Statistical Year Book*
Public Expenditure on Health (as % of GDP)	0.50	2002	*CSO Statistical Year Book*
Military Expenditure (as % of GDP)	0.12	2003	DAB estimates (unpublished)
Total Debt Service (as % of GDP)	..	..	

ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT

Indicators	Value	Year	Source
Traditional fuel consumption (% of total energy use)	97	2002	*CSO Statistical Year Book*
Electricity consumption per capita (kwh.)	2	2002	*CSO Statistical Year Book*
GDP per unit of energy use (PPP US$ per kg. of oil equivalent)	..	..	..
Carbon dioxide emissions per capita (1000 tons)	1037	1998	World Development Report 2003, WB
Total electricity produced (million kwh.)	502.67 489.71 557.31	21/3/00-20/3/01 21/3/01-20/3/02 21/3/02-20/3/03	*CSO Statistical Year Book*
Ratification of environmental treaties:			
Cartagena protocol on biosafety	..	..	..
Framework convention on climate change	..	..	..
Kyoto Protocol on the Framework Convention on Climate Change	..	..	..
Convention on Biological Diversity	..	..	..

REFUGEES AND ARMAMENTS

Indicators	Value	Year	Source
Internally displaced people (thousands)[d]	1,000	2002	*Securing Afghanistan's Future.*
Refugees returned by country of asylum (thousands)[e]	2,500	2002	*Securing Afghanistan's Future.*
Refugees by country of origin (thousands)	..	..	..
Conventional arms transfers			DAB estimates (unpublished).
Imports (US$ million)	12	2003	
Exports (US$ million)	0.00	2003	
Exports Share (%)	0.00	2003	
Total armed forces	50	2002	UNESCO Institute for Statistics. 2001. Quoted in HDR 2004.

[d] Data are based on police records and its coverage may not be complete. In view of this data on this indicator may be interpreted cautiously.
[e] The Parliamentary elections are scheduled for April 2005. Data on this indicator may become available after that.

VICTIMS OF CRIME[f]

Indicators	Value	Year	Source
Total Crime	5,084	2002	Ministry of Interior Affairs (unpublished).
	6,586	2003	
Property Crime	53	2002	
	31	2003	
Robbery	1,521	2002	
	1,644	2003	
Sexual Assault	185	2002	
	257	2003	
Bribery (corruption)	11	2002	
	9	2003	
Assault	..	..	..
People victimized by crime (as % of total population)			Computed using the data on crime supplied by
Total crime	0.03	2003	Ministry of Interior Affairs and total population
Robbery	0.007	2003	for 2003 available from MICS/UNICEF 2003.
Property crime	Negligible	2003	
Bribery (corruption)	Negligible	2003	
Sexual assault	Negligible	2003	

GENDER INEQUALITY IN EDUCATION

Indicators	Value	Year	Source
Adult Female Literacy			
Female rate (% 15 and above)	14.1	2003	MICS/UNICEF 2003.
Female rate (as of % of male rate)	33	2003	MICS/UNICEF 2003.
Net primary enrolment	..	..	..
Gross primary enrolment	556,426	2001	CSO *Statistical Yearbook* 2003.
Female ratio	0	2001	
Ratio of female to male	0	2001	
Gross primary enrolment	3,083,434	2002	CSO *Statistical Yearbook* 2003.
Female ratio	0.331	2002	
Ratio of female to male	0.494	2002	
Net secondary enrolment	..	..	..
Gross secondary enrolment	247,535	2001	CSO *Statistical Yearbook* 2003.
Female ratio	0	2001	
Ratio of female to male	0	2001	
Gross secondary enrolment	621,801	2002	CSO *Statistical Yearbook* 2003.
Female ratio	0.245	2002	
Ratio of female to male	0.324	2002	
Gross tertiary enrolment	22,717	2002	CSO *Statistical Yearbook* 2003.
Female ratio	..	..	..
Ratio of female to male	..	..	..
Gross tertiary enrolment	29,342	2003	Ministry of Higher Educations.
Female ratio	0.22	2003	
Ratio of female to male	0.278	2003	

[f] Data are based on police records and its coverage may not be complete. In view of this data on this indicator may be interpreted cautiously.

GENDER INEQUALITY IN ECONOMIC ACTIVITY

Indicators	Value	Year	Source
Female economic activity rate (age 15 and above)			
Rate	48.1	2002	UNESCO Institute for Statistics. 2001. Quoted in HDR 2004.
Index	103	2002	
As per cent of male rate	57	2002	
Contributing family workers			
Female (as % of total)	..	..	..
Male (as % of total)	..	..	..
Employment by economic activity			
Agriculture (%)			CSO *Statistical Yeabook* 2003.
Male	70	2002	
Female	30	2002	
Total	80	2002	
Industry			
Male	..	..	
Female	..	..	
Total	2	2002	
Services			
Male	..	..	
Female	..	..	
Total	18	2002	

GENDER EMPOWERMENT MEASURE

Indicators	Value	Year	Source
Seats in Parliament held by women (as % of total)[g]	..	..	..
Female legislators, senior officials and managers (as % of total)	..	..	..
Female professional and technical workers (as % of total)	..	..	..
Ratio of estimated female to male earned income	0.34	2002	Calculation based on the data of the GDI table.

STATUS OF MAJOR INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS

Indicators	Status	Source/Remarks
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination	Ratified	HDR 2003
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966)	Ratified	HDR 2003
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966)	Ratified	HDR 2003
Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979)	Ratified	HDR 2003
Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984)	Ratified	HDR 2003
Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989)	Ratified	HDR 2003

g The Parliamentary elections are scheduled for April 2005. Data on this indicator may become available after that.

Annexure 4



Photo: Golam Monowar Kamal

ANNEXURE 4
Definitions of Statistical terms

Armed transfers, conventional: Refers to the voluntary transfer by the supplier (and thus excludes captured weapons and weapons obtained through defectors) of weapons with a military purpose destined for the armed forces, paramilitary forces or intelligence agencies of another country. These include major conventional weapons or systems in six categories: ships aircrafts, missiles, artillery, armoured vehicles and guidance and radar systems (excluded are trucks, services, ammunition, small arms, support items, components and component technology and towed or naval artillery under 100-millimeter calibre).

Births attended by skilled health personnel: The percentage of deliveries attended by personnel (included doctors, nurses and midwives) trained to give the necessary care, supervision and advice to women during pregnancy, labour and postpartum period, to conduct deliveries on their own and to care for newborns.

Carbon dioxide emissions: Anthropogenic (human-originated) carbon dioxide emissions stemming from the burning of fossil fuels, gas flaring and the production of cement, Emissions are calculated from data on the consumption of solid, liquid and gaseous fuels, gas flaring and the production of cement.

Cellular subscribers: (also referred to as cellular mobile subscribers) Subscribers to an automatic public mobile telephone service that provides access to the public switched telephone network using cellular technology. Systems can be analogue or digital.

Consumer price index: Reflects changes in the cost to the average consumer of acquiring a basket of goods and services that may be fixed or may change at specified intervals.

Crime, people victimized by: The percentage of Crime to the population of the country in the given year

Earned income (PPP US$), estimated (female and male): Roughly derived on the basis of the ratio of the female non-agricultural wage to the male non-agricultural wage, the female and male shares of the economically active population, total female and male population and GDP per capita (PPPUS$). For details on this estimation, see Technical Appendix.

Earned income, ratio of estimated female to male: The ratio of estimated female earned income to estimated male earned income. See earned income (PPP US$), estimated (female and male).

Education expenditure, public: Including both capital expenditures (spending on construction, renovation, major repairs and purchase of heavy equipment or vehicles) and current expenditures (spending on goods and services that are consumed within the current year and would need to be renewed the following year). It covers such expenditures as staff salaries and benefits, contracted or purchased services, books and teaching materials, welfare services, furniture and equipment, minor repairs, fuel, insurance, rents, telecommunications and travel.

Education Index: One of the three indices on which the human development index is built. It is based on the adult literacy rate and the combined primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrolment ratio. For details on how the index is calculated, see Technical Appendix.

Education levels: Categorized as primary, secondary and tertiary in accordance with the Educational System prevalent in Afghanistan. Generally the age group corresponding these levels of educations in Afghanistan is 7-21 years.

Electricity consumption per capita: Refers to gross production, in per capita terms, which includes consumption by station auxiliaries and any losses in the transformers that are considered integral parts of the station.

Employment by economic activity: Employment in industry, agriculture or services as defined according to the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) system (revision 2 and 3) and used in *CSO Statistical Year Book*. Industry refers to mining and quarrying, manufacturing, construction and public utilities (gas, water and electricity). Agriculture refers to activities in agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing. Services refer to wholesale and retail trade; restaurants and hotels; transport, storage and communications; finance, insurance, real estate and business services; and community, social and personal services.

Enrolment ratio, gross: The number of students enrolled in a level of education, regardless of age, as a percentage of the population of official school age for that level. The gross enrolment ratio can be greater than 100% as a result of grade repetition and entry at ages younger or older than typical age at that grade level.

Exports of goods and services: The value of all goods and other market services provided to the rest of the world. Included is the value of merchandise, freight, insurance, transport, travel, royalties, licence fees and other services. Excluded are labour and property income and transfer payments.

Export, primary: Include export of Fresh and Ripe fruits, Medicine Botani, Spices and Seeds, etc.

Fertility rate, total: The number of children that would be born to each woman if she were to live to the end of her child-bearing years and bear children at each age in accordance with prevailing age-specific fertility rates.

Foreign direct investment, inflows of: Inflows of investment to acquire a lasting management interest (10% or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor, It is the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long-term capital and short-term capital.

Food consumption, national, share of poorest 20% in: The share of food consumption accruing to the poorest 20% of the population. Data on household food consumption has been taken from National Risk & Vulnerability Assessment Survey

Fuel consumption, traditional: Estimated consumption of fuel wood, charcoal, bagasse (sugar cane waste) and animal and vegetable wastes. Total energy use comprises commercial energy use and traditional fuel use.

GDP (gross domestic product): The sum of value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the valuation of output. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated capital assts or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Value added is the net output of an industry after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs.

GDP (US$): GDP converted to US dollars using the average official exchange rate.

GDP index: One of the three indices on which the human development index is built. It is based on GDP per capita (PPPUS$). For details on how the index is calculated, see Technical Appendix.

GDP per capita (PPP US$): See GDP (gross domestic product) and PPP (Purchasing power parity).

GDP per capita (US$): GDP (US$) divided by midyear population.

GDP annual growth rate: annual growth rate, calculated from constant price GDP in local currency units.

Gender-related development index (GDI): A composite index measuring average achievement in the three basic dimensions captured in the human development index-a long and healthy life, knowledge and a decent standard of living-adjusted to account for inequalities between men and women. For details on how the index is calculated, see Technical Appendix.

Health expenditure per capita (US$): The sum of public and private expenditure (in US$), divided by the population. Health expenditures includes the provision of health services (preventive and curative), family planning activities, nutrition activities and emergency aid designated for health, but excludes the provision of water and sanitation.

Health expenditure, public: Current and capital spending from government (central and local) budgets, external borrowings and grants (including donations from international agencies and non-governmental organizations) and social (or compulsory) health insurance funds. Together with private health expenditure, it makes up total health expenditure.

HIV/AIDS, people living with: The estimated number of people living with HIV/AIDS at the end of the year specified.

Human development index (HDI): A composite index measuring average achievement in three basic dimensions of human development-a long and healthy life, knowledge and a decent standard of living. For details on how the index is calculated, see Technical Appendix.

Human poverty index (HPI) for developing countries: A composite index measuring deprivations in the three basic dimensions captured in the human development index-a long and health life, knowledge and a decent standard of living. For details on how the index is calculated, see Technical Appendix.

Illiteracy rate, adult: Calculated as 100 minus the adult literacy rate. See literacy rate, adult.

Immunization, one-year-olds fully immunized against measles or tuberculosis: One-year-olds injected with an antigen or a serum containing specific antibodies against measles or tuberculosis.

Imports of goods and services: The value of all goods and other market services received from the rest of the world. Included are the value of merchandise, freight, insurance, transport, travel, royalties, licence fees and other services, such as communication, construction, financial, information, business, personal and government services. Excluded are labour and property income and transfer payments.

Income poverty line, population below: The percentage of the population living below the specified poverty line i.e. US$2 a day-at 1985 international prices (equivalent to US$2.15 at 1993 international prices), adjusted for purchasing power parity.

Infant mortality rate: The probability of dying between birth and exactly one year of age, expressed per 1000 live births.

Internally displaced people: People who were displaced within Afghanistan and to whom the United Nation High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) have extended assistance.

Internet users: People with access to the worldwide network.

Life expectancy at birth: The number of years a newborn infant would live if prevailing patterns of age-specific mortality rates at the time of birth were to stay the same throughout the child's life.

Life expectancy index: One of the three indices on which the human development index is built. For details on how the index is calculated, see Technical Appendix.

Literacy rate, Adult: The percentage of people aged 15 and above who can, with understanding, both read and write.

Malaria cases: The total number of people suffering from malaria in a specified year.

Maternal mortality ratio: The annual number of deaths of women from pregnancy-related causes per 100,000 live births.

Official development assistance (ODA): Disbursements of loans made on concessional terms (repayments of principal) and grants by official agencies of the members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), by multilateral institutions and by non-DAC countries.

PPP (purchasing power parity): A rate of exchange that accounts for price differences across countries, allowing international comparisons of real output and incomes. At the PPP US$ rate, PPP US$1 has the same purchasing power in the domestic economy as $1 has in the United States.

Probability at birth of not surviving to age 40: Calculated as 1 minus the probability of surviving to age 40 for a given cohort. See probability at birth of surviving to age 40.

Probability at birth of surviving to age 40: The probability of a newborn infant surviving to age 40 if subject to prevailing patterns of age specific mortality rates.

Refugees Returnee: People who have fled their country because of a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of their race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social group and who cannot or do not want to return. The returnee refugee figure in this report is based on the assistance provided by UNHCR to the persons returning to Afghanistan.

Sanitation facilities, population with access to improved: The percentage of the population with access to adequate excreta disposal facilities, such as a connection to a sewer or septic tank system, a pour flush latrine, a simple pit latrine or a ventilated improved pit latrine.

Science, math and engineering, tertiary students in: The share of tertiary students enrolled in natural sciences; engineering; mathematics and computer science; architecture and agriculture, forestry and fisheries.

Telephone Mainlines: Telephone lines connecting a customer's equipment to the public switched telephone network.

Traditional fuels, population using: The share of the population using solid fuels, which include traditional fuels such as fuel wood, charcoal, bagasse (sugar cane waste) and animal and vegetable wastes.

Tuberculosis cases: The total number of tuberculosis cases reported. A tuberculosis case is defined as a patient in whom tuberculosis has been bacteriologically confirmed or diagnosed by a clinician.

Under-five mortality rate: The probability of dying between birth and exactly five years of age, expressed per 1,000 live births.

Under height for age, children under age five: Includes moderate and severe stunting, defined as more than two standard deviations below the median height for age of the reference population.

Undernourished people: People whose food intake is chronically insufficient to meet their energy requirements.

Under weight for age, children under age five: Includes moderate underweight, defined as more than two standard deviations below the median weight for age of the reference population, and severe underweight, defined as more than three standard deviations below the median weight.

Urban population: The midyear population of areas classified as urban. It includes population of national metro cities and 26 provincial towns.

Water source, improved, population without sustainable access to: Calculated as 100 minus the percentage of the population with sustainable access to an improved water source. Unimproved sources include unprotected wells/springs/ponds, river/canal/stream or other unprotected sources.

Water source, improved, population with sustainable access to: The share of the population with reasonable access to any of the following types of water supply for drinking: household connections, public standpipes, boreholes, protected dug well, protected springs and rainwater collection. Reasonable access is defined as the availability of at least 20 litres a person per day from source within one kilometer of the user's dwelling.



Photo: Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh

UNDP Afghanistan
Shah Mahmood Ghazi Watt, Kabul

Tel: (+93) 20 2101682-87
Fax: (+873) 763 4638 836
e-mail: registry@undp.org.af
www.undp.org.af